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PREFACE
In 1827 L. G. de Beaupoil, the comte de Sainte-Aulaire, produced
his Hlstoire de la Fronde, the first scholarly work on the Fronde,
that curious mid-century outburst of unrest touched off by the
leadership of the Parlement of Paris in 1648.

Sainte-Aulaire

recognized that the Fronde had been a long time coming, and he
sought its immediate origins in the regency of Anne and Mazarin
for the young Louis XIV.

In the Introduction to the second edition,

however, Sainte-Aulaire wrote that Richelieu, as well as the regency
government of Anne and Mazarin, had been responsible for abusive
treatment of the sovereign courts. The author went on to note
that as early as the 1630's the magistrates in the high courts had
been subjected to excesses at the hands of lntendants. commissaires
extraordinaires. and councilliar power, as well as affronted by
numerous llts de justice and even arrests of radical judges.

These

early manifestations of absolutistic governmental practices, had
continued to expand during the regency and had eventually culminated
in the Fronde -parlementalre of 1648.
Since Sainte-Aulaire's tfistolre de la Fronde more than a halfdozen major works and several times as many significant articles
have treated the events of the Fronde.

No history was dedicated to

Louis XIII1s Parlement, however, and not until recently did any
historian return to Sainte-Aulaire's thesis that some of the Fronde's
iii
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origins might lie in Richelieu’s ministry.

In 1972 A. Lloyd Moote

dedicated an introductory chapter to that possibility in his Revolt
of the Judges. The answers and the thesis of "governmental revo
lution" provided there were tantalizing— and led to more questions
concerning the mechanisms of absolutism under the first Cardinal.

In

particular, could Richelieu's parlementaire policy properly be con
sidered part of a general "governmental revolution," or was it more
in keeping with past centuries of Crown-Parlement relations? What
was the impact of Richelieu's reason of State philosophy on the Parle
ment? Was the Parlement's reaction chiefly motivated by the values
of a limited, harmonious, constitutional, and "traditional” monarchy,
or was it spurred on by defense of its own selfish interests in office
holding? Finally, how did the issues that arose during Richelieu’s
ministry compare with those which appeared in the Chambre de St.
Louis in the summer of 1648?
This study seeks to define an answer to these questions and
others surrounding the Parlement's role in the growth of French abso
lutism under Cardinal Richelieu.

Its chronological scope was dictated

by the limits of Richelieu's ministry, but it has been necessary to
violate these limits on occasion, particularly in tracing the devel
opment of the Parlement's political role through the fourteenth,
fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries.

The essay naturally organized

itself into two large parts, a three chapter narrative of the parle
mentaire politics of Richelieu’s ministry and several supportative
essays bearing on the events of the years 1624-1642.

The first

iv
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two chapters furnish an introduction to the history of the Parlement,
the practices of French office holding in the seventeenth century,
the nature of French law, and the role of the Parlement in making
and keeping that law. The third chapter is dedicated to the general
seventeenth century crisis which pervaded Louis XIII's reign and to
a brief outline of the Parlement's part in that crisis.

The fourth

chapter is devoted to Richelieu’s philosophy of government and justice;
the fifth seeks to how the application of that philosophy through the
practices of absolutism was related to the history of justice in the
monarchy.
If the resulting essay seems narrowly legalistic and insti
tutional, it is because I have believed that ultimately the nexus
of absolute monarchy could be defined only in these terms.

Though

the phenomena of absolutism had cultural, religious, and social
parallels, the final definition of the term must take on a consti
tutional expression, inasmuch as this could be applied to the broad
and diffuse content of French public law in the l600's.

Then, as

for a millenium past, the Crown's power was expressed largely in
judicial ways; contemporaries as different as LeBret and La RocheFlavin recognized that the right and proper uses of power depended
on legal checks as well as moral principle.
Conversely, this is not an exercise in social history which
finds so much favor today.

In the l600’s the Parlement counted more

than 200 judges, with an annual turnover of ten or more.

A thorough

study of these men such as that prepared by Frangois Bluche for the
v
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eighteenth century would undoubtedly be revealing, but it was
clearly beyond my resources.

In any case, with the possible ex

ception of the First President, it was the Parlement as an insti
tution, rather than individuals within the court, which shaped the
play of tensions characterizing the eighteen years of Richelieu's
ministry.
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ABSTRACT
In the early seventeenth century, the place of the Parlement of
Paris in the French kingdom was easy to define: it was the most
politically powerful and socially prestigious institution outside
the royal council.

Having split off from the curia reals in the early

part of the fourteenth century as a sovereign court of justice, the
Parlement had rapidly developed administrative and political qualities
in addition to its primary judicial functions.

The Parlement, for

example, played a major part in the municipal affairs of the city of
Paris.

Even more importantly, hy the fifteenth century the court had

assumed an important role in the political life of the monarchy.

Early

on French kings sent copies of ordinances to their judges to be veri
fied and registered; out of this practice had arisen the right to
remonstrate on the content, as well as the form, of legislation.

By

the seventeenth century the right to remonstrance was an accepted, if
undefined, part of French government, and it gave the Parlement a
significant ability to remind kings of their obligations before the
law, be it written or customary. The demise of the Estates General
after l6l*+ sharpened this responsibility, so that when Richelieu
entered Louis XUI's council in 162*+, the Parlement was the only
national body in France with the capacity to moderate the abuses of
absolute government.
A collision between the Parlement's values of legal, limited, and
viii
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traditional monarchy and the absolute royal power envisioned by
Richelieu became evident as the Cardinal’s ministry progressed during..
the 1620’s. The court had few objections to the Crown's suppression
of the Huguenots, the reduction of dueling, or development of a
unified ministry of marine, but issues such as the trial of the due
de Rohan, deemed necessary for reasons of State, began to produce
friction as the 1620's wore on.

In 1629 the court managed to delay

acceptance of the Code Michaud for eight months, even though it had
been personally presented by the king in a lit de justice.
The frictions of the 1630's flowered into an open contest after
Richelieu's full assumption of power after the Day of Dupes (November
10, 1630). Punishment of the defeated Marillac faction required the
death of marSschal Louis de Marillac for political reasons of State;
during the spring of 1631 the Parlement tried to block the employment
of fiommlssalres in the trial.

Just as tensions crested in this affair,

the court became enmeshed in Richelieu’s attempts to deal with the
treasonous followers of the King's brother, Gaston d 'Orleans. No
sooner were these issues resolved than the issue of commissalres.
this time in the Chambre de 1*Arsenal, reared its head.

On the last

day of January, 1632, the court was humiliated in a dramatic meeting
at Metz, and its objections to commissioned justice were permanently
ended.

This very important victory— meaningful because it indicated

the council's increased powers— did not mark the end of troubles with
the Parlement.

In 1635 the Parlement steadfastly resisted the creation

of offices for financial ends; resistance to financial measures in one

ix
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form or the other went on throughout the rest of the 1630’s.

In

February, 1641, with the shadow of a regency looming, Richelieu
acted in a lit de .justice to permanently restrict the court's rights
in matters of State.

Thus, by the end of the Cardinal's ministry,

the Parlement's political pretensions had been considerably reduced.
The regency of Anne of Austria and the Fronde of 1648-1652, however,
would show this reduction to be shortlived.
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CHAPTER I
THE MEDIEVAL AMD RENAISSANCE PARLEMENT
Until the thirteenth century, the kings of Prance, aided by
their advisers in the royal entourage, personally handled every
aspect of French government.

Moving about the realm from one royal

residence to the next, the king dealt out royal justice in ad hoc
fashion, guided by the precepts of feudal law and the counsel of a
few trusted officials in his court.

These officials— the chancellor,

constable, chamberlain, and butler— were often joined once or twice
a year by other great lords to form a plenary meeting of the curia
regis.

These meetings of the king's court were held wherever the

king happened to be, and assemblies of the curia regis considered
all sorts of infractions of feudal law brought before it by the king's
vassals, as well as administrative questions arising out of the royal
domain.
By the thirteenth century the growing complexity of central
government and the increasing need for specialization of functions
within the court had brought about substantial changes in the admin
istration of royal justice.

Justice was no longer merely the simple

process of determining guilt or innocence of persons; it was becoming
a technical field of knowledge with its own vocabulary and procedure.
This process was stimulated by the revival of Roman law which filtered
out of Italian universities during the course of the thirteenth

1
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2

century; at the same time the volume of royal judicial business in
Prance increased appreciably after the annexation of former Angevin
lands by Philip Augustus.'1' Not only did Philip increase the size of
the royal domain, but he also instituted the first baillis and
sgngchaux in the countryside.2

Baillis were powerful agents of

royal authority and administration, and appeal from their decisions
could be carried only to the curia regis itself.

The great lords of

the council, however, had neither time nor inclination to deal with
the increased volume of affairs presented to them.

Often, too, they

lacked the capacity and training to cope with the intricacies of
oral and written evidence which were replacing the crude and unsatis
factory trial by ordeal or combat.
By the time of Louis IX’s accession in 1226, the curia regis
began to take on a dual nature in its judicial aspect.

Great officers

1For developments in judicial procedure during the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, see A. Esmein, Cours Sl&nentaire d'hlstoire
du droit francals (15th ed.; Paris, 1925), pp. 723-35.
2Before Philip's time, the only royal agents in the countryside
were a few prgvots royaux charged with administration and adjudi
cation within the royal domain. The appearance of the baillis. or
sSnSchaux as the same officers were known in southern Prance, marks
the creation of the first intermediate level in medieval French
administration. The baillis were commissioned to supervise the
•prgvots and were often used to extend the royal presence into newly
acquired areas of the domain. At first, the powers of the baillis
were tiniversal, including competence over financial, judicial,
military, and administrative matters within their bailllage. a dis
trict comprising perhaps one-third of a province. In the seven
teenth century the baillis were more numerous and their duties con
siderably restricted by the appearance of superior royal officers.
For a discussion of the prSvots. baillis. and other facets of medieval
administration, see Robert Fawtier and Ferdinand Lot, Hlstolre des
institutions francals au Woven Age. Vol. II: Institutions royales
(Paris, 1958). Henceforth cited as Fawtier and Lot, Institutions
royales.
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3
of the Crown, magnates, and important prelates continued to pro
nounce judgments, but the real work of legal business was increasingly
assumed by lesser men, mostly clerks trained in law, who formed a
kind of permanent commission at court.

These legalists, the maglstrl

curiae, worked throughout the year and were always in attendance on
the king.

Even though the king himself continued to render justice

personally, and although the great barons continued to participate
in judicial affairs, the professional lawyers steadily enlarged their
sphere of influence.

By the middle of the thirteenth century, devel

opments within the curia regis coupled with increasing demand for
sovereign justice would bring a radical revision in the organization
of the judicial activities associated with the king's court.
As the most recent historian of the Parlement has noted, the
exact circumstances surrounding the separation of the Parlement of
Paris from the curia regis remain uncertain.

The word parlement.

^J. H. Shennan, The Parlement of Paris (Ithaca, New York, 1968),
p. 14. A good summary of what is known of the origins of the Pariement can be found in C. V. Langlois, "Les Origines du Parlement de
Paris,” Revue historicue. XLII (1890), 74-114, and in Fawtier and Lot,
Les Institutions royales, pp. 332-71. Of the literature covering the
entire history of the court, Shennan’s book is outstanding. The
author drew heavily from an earlier two volume work by the French
legal historian Ernest Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, son role
•politique depuis le rfegne de Charles VII jusqu'i. la RSvolutlon
(2 vols.; Paris, 19 0 1 ) . Despite its age and often superficial
approach, Glasson*s account remains useful for its reign-by-reign
analysis of the court's role in affairs of State. Glasson in turn
built upon E. Fayard, Apercu hlstorique sur le Parlement de Paris
(3 vols.; Paris, 1876-1878)7 a pioneering work which covered the
entire history of the court. Neither Shennan nor Glasson nor Fayard
utilized manuscript sources. The best survey of the Parlement's
early existence is Edouard Maugis’ magisterial Hlstolre du Parle
ment de Paris de l'avSnement des rois Valois & la mort d*Henri IV
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4
a derivative of the Latin pallamentum. was used in both England and
Prance at this time to describe a general conference or discussion
between sovereign and councillors.

In England the term came to denote

the familiar representative institution; in France, through a process
badly defined by surviving documents, the word -parlement came to be
associated with assemblies of judiciary specialists which from the end
of the thirteenth century were called mattres tenant le Parlement
(maglstrl tenentes parlementurn). It seems likely that these early
parlements were summoned more or less regularly, perhaps once or
twice a year.

Participation was by royal invitation and varied from

meeting to meeting, but most parlements included regular members of
the curia regis who were joined by learned clerics and a few maglstrl
having degrees in Roman and canon law.

4

The outlines of the emerging court become much clearer during
the reign of Philip the Bold (1270-1285).

Not only do the court's

first registers record the more important pleas and decisions of the
period, but from the reign of Philip comes the first surviving royal
(3 vols.; Paris, 1913-1916). Maugis’ account is based on solid
exploitation of the manuscript registers of the Parlement, but
apparently other manuscript or secondary sources were not consulted.
I have used Maugis in preference to FelixAubert, Hlstolre du Parle
ment de Paris, de I'orlgine & Franyols I : 1250-1515 (2 vols.;
Paris, 1894).
^Except for the absence of secular noblemen, a parlement called
in 1253 was probably fairly typical. It included the Archbishop of
Bourges; the Bishops of Paris and of Evreux; the Dean of Saint-Aignan
of Orleans; the chevecier of Angers; three clerks designated as
maitres: the baillis of Caen, Etampes, and Orleans; the two prgvots
of Paris; and Geoffroi de la Chapelle, chevalier, who pronounced the
decision. Langlois, "Les Origines du Parlement de Paris," p. 89.
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5
regulation governing the procedures of the Parlement.*’ From the
Ordinance of 1278 it becomes obvious that the court had now ceased to
accompany the king in his travels about the kingdom.

In fact, by this

time the court had acquired its permanent home in the royal palace on
the Ile-de-la-C it§.

It would not move from this location, later

called the Palais de Justice, until the dissolution of the Parle
ment in 1790.6
From the regulation of 1278 and subsequent ordinances issued in
1291 and 1296 by Philip the Fair, it is possible to see the shadowy
outline of the Parlement's future organization.

For example, with the

-These records, commonly referred to as the Olim. can be called
the first in what would become an entire series of registers. Unfor
tunately, only four of seven original 011m have survived the ravages
of time, and even these four books seem to have been selectively
edited from original rolls. An excellent commentary on the 011m
and later parlementalre records can be found in E. Boutaric, ed.,
Actes du Parlement de P&ris, with an Introduction by A. Grun
(2 vols.; Paris, 1853-1867), I, i-ccxcvi.
^In the thirteenth century, the Palais de la GitS contained the
royal apartments as well as all administrative offices of the Crown.
During the fourteenth century, the need for administrative office
space came to prevail over considerations of royal housing; in 1360
the Dauphin Charles moved his court and the council into the SaintPol Quarter on the right bank of the Seine. The royal household
would never again return to the island on a permanent basis, and by
the time of Francis I the Louvre had become the principal residence
of the king when he was In Paris. The space vacated in the Palais
de la CitS was taken over by expanding financial and judicial insti
tutions; by the seventeenth century the Palais housed the Parlement,
the Chambre des comutes, the Cour des aides, the Grand Consell, and
several lesser courts. By the seventeenth century, too, the home
of the Parlement had acquired the informal designation of "Palais
de Justice," or simply "the Palais." For a brief history of the
Palais and its role in the political life of Paris, see Roland
Mousnier, "Paris, capltale politique," in La Plume, la faucille
et le marteau (Paris, 1970), pp. 95-139.
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Ordinance of 1278 comes the first allusion to the Chambre pour pledier.
a special chamber dedicated to the hearing of pleas.

During the reign

of Philip the Pair, the Palais de la Cit€ was enlarged and a more
spacious meeting place was provided for the presentation of cases.
This room, the so-called Grand'Chambre, soon lent its name to the
organizational heart of the Parlement.

Despite many additions to

the court over the next three centuries, the judges assembled in the
Grand'Chambre remained the essential nuclear component of the Parle
ment o However, the ordinances of Philip make it clear that plenary
sessions of the Parlement in the Grand'Chambre were incapable of
dealing with cases of appeal presented to them unless all parties
could be present.

Judgments involving extensive enouetes (investi

gations) in the countryside and the lengthy evaluation of written
evidence began to be considered by special commissions detached from
the Grand'Chambre. The commissions for written inquests were formally
organized into a separate Chambre des enouetes with eight members
by a royal ordinance of 130?.

These eight members of the Enouetes

had grown to fifty-six by 1336; clearly the number of appeals accepted
was rapidly growing.

About the same time and for similar reasons the

Grand'Chambre spawned another special chamber to handle oral requests
for justice from the Parlement. It was the duty of judges assigned
to this Chambre des reouetes to sort through plaintiffs appearing
before the court, hear their cases, and decide if they merited a
hearing before the Grand'Chambre. By the beginning of the fourteenth
century, then, the basic form of the court can be seen, even though
considerable degree of plasticity would characterize the Parlement
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7
for the next fifty years.'
Personnel and procedure in the early Parlement show much flu
idity and irregularity of method.

All during the fourteenth century,

assemblies of the Parlement would represent heterogeneous gatherings
of nobles, prelates, clerics, and lawyers.

By the time of Charles

V (1364-1380), however, a certain defivAtion appeared among those
to be found sitting in the court.

Two ongoing tendencies can be

seen in the displacement of prelates and barons by the maglstrl.
most often men of non-noble origin, and in the displacement of clerics
by laymen.

Of these two trends, the ever-growing dominance of the

professional lawyers was of utmost consequence for both king and
Parlement.

After 1291 the maglstrl or maitres were named by the

king as .judges rapporteurs and .juges enoueteurs. giving them a func
tional status equal to that of their more distinguished colleagues
the prelates and barons.

Prom this position they made themselves

the masters of the Parlement.

Imbued with the principles of Homan

law, they worked tirelessly to establish it over customary law in
order to unite a divided feudal sovereignty and to have the ideas
of equality under royal law triumph.

To this end they distinguished

two different qualities in the person of the prince: that of the king
and that of suzerain seigneur. They slowly established that the
authority of the king as seigneur, and hence that of his law, extended
not only over vassals but over all inhabitants of the kingdom without
division or limit.

The mattres wanted to see in the monarch a

7
Langlois, "Les Origlnes du Parlement de Paris," 94-101;
Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 17-20; Fawtier and Lot, Institutions
royales. pp. 333-48, 410-13.
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successor to the ancient Roman emperors, and they translated the
imperial maxim Quid orincini -placult legis hahet vigorem into the
French catch-phrase Si veut le roi. si veut la loi. The eventual
result of their labors and decisions was a fortification of the royal
authority over all the realm, a strengthening which worked in the
interests of ruler and ruled alike.®
Not only was the composition of the court shifting during the
fourteenth century, but restrictions were being made on those entitled
to participate in its meetings.

By 1296, for example, the baillis

and sSnSchaux were banned from participation on the grounds that they
should not sit in judgment on their own earlier verdicts which had
been appealed to the Parlement.

In 1319 a royal ordinance ordered

"that there should be no prelates in the Parlement," although the
ruling remained limited in effect since the king was obliged to
respect the right of lords to attend what was still thought of as
9

the judicial section of the council.

Gradually, too, the king ceased

to appear personally, except to open the court’s sessions and to
preside over cases of unusual interest to the Crown. Even though
royal absences in no way affected the sovereign authority of the
court, they did create a need for a presiding officer.

The chan

cellor presided by right after the king, but increasingly the magis

^Fayard, Anercu historique. I, 90-91.
9

Fawtier and Lot, Institutions royales. p. 337.
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9
trates themselves directed the court's business.1^ By the 1300’s
a distinction was being made between those nominated to preside over
sessions— the -presidents— and other ordinary conseillers of the
court.

By 1333 there would be three such presidents in charge of

debates and the pronunciation of decisions.

Despite the above devel

opments, however, the Parlement was not yet fully institutionalized.
Each session of the court required an act of royal convocation, and
the number of judges convoked varied from year to year.11
Transformation of the Parlement of Paris into a permanent insti
tution of French government was completed by two important devel
opments of the mid-fourteenth century.

The structure, organization,

and procedures of the court were fixed in a great ordinance issued
by Philip VI in March, 13^5*12 This ordinance may be considered as
the birth certificate of the Parlement; looking back from the six
teenth and seventeenth centuries, the magistrates of the court often
saw the independence of their body in this legislation.

13

Among

chancellor continued to be considered the chief of justice
and could preside over the rarlement at any time. Was this also true
of the garde des sceaux? The court believed that the garde des sceaux
could preside but could not receive the same honors as the chancellor.
See Bernard de la Roche-Flavin, Treze fsic~j livres des parlemens de
France (Bordeaux, 1617), Bk. VII, Ch. I, No. 11.
11In June, 1316, the king called together twenty-nine judges
to constitute his Chambre des plaids: in December of the same year
thirty-five were summoned; three years later, in December, 1319» the
number fell to twenty-two. Shennan, Parlement of Paris, p. 25.
124he essential provisions are given in Fawtier and Lot, Insti
tutions royales. p. 3^3*
^See, for example, the speech of Chancellor and former president
Frarigois Ollivier before Henry II in the first royal session of his
reign in 15^7* Maugis, Hlstolre du Parlement. I, 518-19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
its many provisions, the ordinance confirmed the divisions of the
court into the Grand'Chambre. a Chambre des enquetes. and a Chajnbrp
des requetes. Each chamber was given a fixed number of juges, the
Grand'Chambre being constituted, with fifteen clerics, fifteen laymen,
and three presidents, while the number of Enquetes was fixed at forty
and of Requetes at eight.

Hours of daily sessions, salary arrange-

ments, and comportment of the judges were all regulated in detail.

14

Despite progressive development of the Parlement during the
fourteenth century, the court was still held to be an assembly
existing for one year only.

Each session of the court required a

royal act of convocation, and on the first day of each session, every
magistrate took an oath promising to obey the regulations of the
court as read out by the chief clerk.

During the fourteenth century,

however, the act of convocation became a formality, and by the
accession of Charles V in 1364, the practice of yearly royal con
vocation was abandoned altogether in favor of a simple act confirming
the previous year's membership rolls.

Members now had to swear

obedience only once, when they were first mantled with the dignity
of magistrate.

The practice of confirmation lasted throughout the

fifteenth century, with the ceremony becoming part of the inaugural
14
Members of the court were expected to assemble after Easter
and remain in Paris until the feast of St. Michel on September 29.
Daily sessions of the court were to begin with a mass at six
o'clock in the morning and continue until the ringing of the angelus
indicated the noon hour. In court magistrates were expected to ex
cuse themselves from cases which related to their family or to
friends; outside the Palais the judges were not to fraternize with
parties involved in litigation. Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp.
24-27.
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act of each reign.^

The disappearance of the necessity for con

vocation marks the final step in the establishment of the Parlement
as an institution; however unconsciously or hesitantly the path was
travelled, the Parlement had finally achieved autonomy from the royal
council.1^
/

The maturation of the Parlement from 1350 to 1600 is in one
respect the elaboration of an organization already well founded in
its basic structure.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries

the Parlement continued to perfect its internal workings, to spin
off additional chambers, to increase its complement of personnel.
The court came to possess a distinct hierarchy within its ranks, and
at the same time it strengthened its identity as a corporation made
up of the Crown’s most elevated officers.

By the reign of Louis XIII,

the Parlement had virtually achieved the form it would have in 1789*
with a large and diverse staff of 200 judges organized into twelve
chambers, the ensemble very much resembling a Baroque variation on a
At each change of monarch, the magistrates lost the power
delegated to them by the deceased king and had to receive a con
firmation of authority from the new sovereign. This act became pure
form, but it never disappeared. See the letters of confirmation
for the reign of Louis XVI in F.-A. Isambert et al., eds., Recueil
g€n6ral des anciennes lois frany'aises (29 vols.; Paris, 1822-1833),
XXIII, 2. Henceforth cited as Isambert, Anciennes lois franyalses.
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 2-3. The old rule of
annual convocation was never formally proscribed; Francis I recalled
it in a moment of rage and even had it revived in the text of an
ordinance. The oath of allegiance to the royal ordinances bound the
member for life. It was not renewed for judges as was done for
bailiffs and lawyers twice each year at the opening of the Parle
ment, even though these also took an oath at their reception.
For example, when on August 28, 1550, the king requested the court
to swear loyalty to a new edict of pacification, the First President
answered that the pgfeidents and conseillers swore to obey the
ordinances only at their reception. Ibid.. 271-72.
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medieval theme.

17

Nowhere was the medieval ancestry of the Parlement more evident
than in the Grand*Chambre. In the seventeenth century, as in the
fourteenth, the Grand*Chambre was the most prestigious and pre
eminent part of the court.

It had been the heart of the early

Parlement, the original chamber of pleas, and it continued to be the
hub around which the other chambers revolved, fulfilling their lesser
yet complementary roles.

Whenever the entire court assembled in

plenary session, be it for a lit de .justice, to consider extra
judicial matters, or simply in the normal course of business, the
meetings had to be convened by the Grand’Chambre and held in its
17
'It is extremely difficult to ascertain the exact complement
of the court or of any single chamber in the early l600's. Few
complete rolls have survived, and these often contradict each other.
The problem is complicated by the fact that the conseillers are
sometimes listed according to their clerical or lay status, then
in order of seniority, rather than by their respective chambers.
A compilation for 1621 in B.N. Ms. fr. 32140, "Recueil de listes
des presidents, conseillers, et officiers du Parlement de Paris
(XIII -XVH siecles),” fols. 561-65, lists 212 magistrates. This
manuscript represents an eighteenth century copy made from the salary
records of the Chambre des comptes. The lists in this manuscript end
with a fragment for 1622, and the last entries are for 1686. A role
of the Parlement drawn up after that of the chief clerk and dated
November 21, 1629, lists 199 judges. B.N. Ms. Cinq.-cents de Colbert
212, fols. 78-81. The most recent historian of the Fronde parlementalre of 1648, A. Lloyd Moote, exaggerates but little in main
taining that "the only way to understand the Parlement’s organi
zation is to read its records.” A. Lloyd Moote, Revolt of the
Judges (Princeton, New Jersey, 1971), p. 20, n. 32. Moote has a
good, if brief, description of the Parlemenk’s organization and
operations and its relationship with other royal officers in the
seventeenth century. The most detailed information on the devel
opment of the court and its procedures may be found in the first
two volumes of Maugis, Histolre du Parlement.
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presence.

18

The total complement of the Grand'Chamhre had changed little
since Philip VI had fixed it at thirty-three, hut the proportion of
presidents to conseillers had shifted markedly.

During the 1620's and

1630’s the chamber usually included seven prgsidents 2L mortier. the
senior judges in the court who were readily identifiable by
distinctive square headgear and ermine bordered robes, black for
workaday affairs and red for occasions of grandeur.

Below the

presidents i mortier but elevated in prestige above the other judges
A lit de .justice was a ceremonial visit of the king to the
Parlement. The term originated in the medieval period when the king
was literally carried into the coi’rt to hold a "bed of justice” with
his councillors. The lit de .justice represented in ceremonial form
a reunion of the full curia regis. since with the king came the chan
cellor, the garde des sceaux, the royal councillors, and any dukes
or peers who were able to attend. The powerful legal meaning of the
lit de .justice stemmed from this symbolic reunion of the source of all
justice with those who advised on its administration. Following the
principle adveniete prlnclpe. cessat magistratus (with the coming of
the prince, magisterial functions cease), the will of the king as
rendered in a lit de .justice could not be questioned either during
or after the ceremony. Early llts were formal judicial hearings in
which the king returned to his Parlement to personally hear a plea
or to be advised by his judges. These early assemblies had no over
tones other than solemnity and grandeur of occasion. As the Parlement
assumed an increasing political role during the sixteenth century,
kings found the finality of the lit de .justice a useful instrument
in impressing their will on the court when it refused to verify or
register royal letters and edicts. During the sixteenth century the
lit de .justice increasingly became a terminal disciplinary measure
associated with the imposition of royal authority on recalcitrant
magistrates, though for a long time other important matters of State,
such as the declaration of regencies, were celebrated in lits de
justice. Descriptions of llts de justice are numerous. See La RocheFlavin, Treze llvres des parlemens. Bk. IV, Ch. I, 283 et seq.. 38^;
official accounts of llts de justice may be found in Isambert,
Anciennes lois franqalses. For the llts of July Zk and December 16,
1527, see XII, 275 and 285; for that of September 7, 1651, declaring
the majority of Louis XIV, see XVII, 258.
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of the court were about twenty-five clerical and lay conseillers. ^
Access to the dignity of a Grand'Chamhrier was highly restricted,
promotions being reserved for the deans of the Chambres des enquetes
according to the lay or clerical quality of the vacant seat.2** Even
after obtaining a seat in the Grand'Chambre as conseiller, aspirants
to a presidency had to serve at least ten years and await the age of
forty before being considered qualified.

These restrictions ensured

that the chamber would remain an experienced and relatively couservative body of men.

21

The chief figure in the hierarchy of the Grand'Chambre. and thus
of the Parlement, was the First President.

As head of the entire court

and its official representative on ceremonial occasions, he was one of
the greatest figures in the kingdom.

Inside the court he ceded place

only to the chancellor and king; outside the court the First President
marched in precedence just behind the grand chambellan. During the
sixteenth century the First President became a member of the royal
^B.N. Ms. fr. 3214-0, fol. 561, lists seven presidents and
twenty-three conseillers in the Grand'Chambre in lo21. Thelist
does not discriminate between lay and clerical conseillers.
20
*
Curiously, members of the Reouetes could not be promoted into
the Grand'Chambre. To avoid this regulation, which was shrouded in
controversy, some Requetes passed first into the Enquetes and then
tinto the Grand'Chambre. Maugis, Hlstolre du Parlement. II, 230-31.
The entire question of accessability to the chambers of the court must
always be considered in the light of the practices of purchase and
heredity in office holding discussed below.
21Maugis, Hlstolre du Parlement. II, 230; Shennan, Parlement of
Paris, p. 135.
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council, along with his fellow -presidents a mortier.22 The First
President, or his authorized substitute, had to convene all plenary
sessions of the court, and during such sessions he directed discussions
and in large measure controlled debates and voting procedures.

In

light of these broad powers and responsibilities, it is not surprising
that the Crown had been careful to retain the prerogative of
appointing the First President, rather than permitting the office to
become venal.

The men commissioned with the office were usually out

standing magistrates and often chancellors in the making; such was the
case with Frangois Ollivier and Antoine Duprat under Francis I.2^
The Grand*Chambre remained unique throughout the history of the
Parlement, but the chambers of Enquetes and Requetes had been forced
to absorb a considerable expansion of the court during the sixteenth
century.

As late as the accession of Francis I, there were only two

chambers of Enquetes and one of Requetes: the total membership of the
court, including the Grand'Chambre. numbered only 100 in 1515.

This

number began to swell during Francis I's reign, and the multiplication
of chambers and places in them continued under the last Valois.

In

dignity of royal councillor was spread far and wide during
the sixteenth century, and in 1605 the Venetian ambassador remarked
that the number of members of the royal council was "infinite." Thus
the right to sit in council was little more than sin honorific dis
tinction for the judges. Roger Doucet, Les Institutions de la France
au m
slecle (2 vols.; Paris, 19W), I, 138-39.
2^Usualiy the First President was the most senior of all the
prSsldents a mortier. but this rule was sometimes violated. Nicolas
Le Jay, named First President in 1630, was at the top of the list of
-prSsldents a mortier when he was named First President, but Mathieu
MolS, Le Jay’s successor in 1641, had been procureur gSnSral and had
never held a presidency a mortier. For the duties of the First
President, see La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des -parlemens. Bk. II,
Ch. I, Section XIV, Nos. 9-19.
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1522 Francis created a third chamber of Enquetes with twenty-two
conseillers. despite the vigorous and prolonged resistance of the
court which lasted until 1531-

A fourth chamber of Enquetes was

added in 15^3 and a fifth in 1567. A second chamber of Requetes
further enlarged the court after 1580.

Oh

The functions of the Enquetes and Requetes had scarcely altered
since the appearance of the first chambers under Philip the Fair.

In

the seventeenth century the Enquetes judged written appeals for civil
and criminal justice arising out of lower courts; the Requetes still
considered the merits of requests for justice from the Parlement in
first instance.

At one time these requests had been delivered orally,

but by the sixteenth century most petitions took the form of lettres
de commlttlmus. royal letters committing an individual's case
directly to the court.
Proliferation of the Enquetes and Requetes had increased the
number of these chambers without erecting any sort of hierarchy among
them.

Regardless of its anciennetg. no one of the five Enquetes or

two Requetes stood above the others in prestige.

Within each chamber

2b

The Parlement firmly resisted each new creation of office made
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; this resistance usually
occurred in two stages. The court delayed its approval of the legis
lation of creation as long as possible, then it refused to receive the
new officers on a footing equal with that of older posts. A typical
example of refusal to accept new men came in 1597 when one August
Banin purchased one of ten new conselllershlps created by edict of
May 21, 1597* He presented his credentials to the court on August 31
and was refused; the same thing happened on September 1 and December
5; Banin was finally received on the 15th of December. Even after
formal reception, new men were by no means assured of receiving an
equitable share of cases and the fees accompanying them. Maugls,
Hlstolre du Parlement. II, 225-26.
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one or two judges enjoyed a commission to preside over their fellow
conseillers. "but these presidents des Enquetes or Requetes should not
be confused with the presidents ]fc mortier of the Grand'Chambre. the
original and only true presidents of the entire Parlement.
Besides the regular chambers of the Parlement, mention should
be made of four auxiliary chambers.

Until the fifteenth century, the

Grand*Chambre alone exercised high criminal jurisdiction.

A problem

arose, however, in cases involving bloodshed, for the canon law of the
Church prohibited conseillers clercs from hearing such cases.

It

became necessary to detach benches of non-Churchmen from the Grand'
Chambre to hear crimes of violence.

When Charles VII reunited the

Parlements of Paris and Poitiers in 1^36, royal instructions decreed
that a commission of lay conseillers should be sent periodically to
the tower of Saint-Louis just behind the Grand'Chambre to judge
criminal cases requiring la question and'capital punishment.

In 1515

Francis I transformed the commission into a permanent Chambre de la
tournelle crlminelle which was served in semestrial rotation by the
five lowest ranking presidents a mortier. ten conseillers laloues.
and, by trimester, two conseillers from each Chambre des enquetes.
In the seventeenth century, the competence and composition of the
Tournelle had changed little from Francis' time.

Ecclesiastics, nobles,

and numerous royal officers maintained their ancient rights to trial by
the entire Grand'Chambre. but capital crimes committed by those of low
2*5
estate went before the Tournelle.
Since the fourteenth century the

historians cannot agree whether the name Tournelle accrued to
the chamber because it met in the Tour Saint-Louis or because of the
system of semestrial rotation. On the Tournelle see Fawtier and Lot,
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Chambre de la mar€e possessed a rather peculiar cognizance over all
litigation arising out of the supply and sale of fish to Paris and its
banlleu. The constitution of this chamber was remodelled in 1601,
giving it a president J. mortier and two conseillers from the Grand*
26
Chambre.

While the Parlement was in recess from September 7 until

November 12, pressing business was conducted before the Chambre des
vacations. a panel composed of a president a mortier. who was rotated
27
every fifteen days, and twelve or thirteen conseillers.
The Chambre
de l 1Edit was a result of Articles 30 and 31 of the Edict of Nantes,
which lent its name to a special bench of judges having competence
over all cases invovlving Huguenots.

The Edict had provided for a

chamber of ten Catholics and six Protestants, but in the event, only
two Huguenots were allowed among the sixteen magistrates in the
chamber.2®
Institutions royales, p. 3^5* La Roche-Flavin, Treze llvres des parlemens. Bk. I, Ch. XV, No. 6; Ch. XVI, No. 2; Ch. XVII, Nos. 1-2;
J. Declarueil, Hlstolre gSnSrale du droit franyals des orlgines a 1789
(Paris, 1925)» pp. £>18-19; Marcel Marion, Dlctionnaire des institutions
de la France aux XVIIe et XVIII8 silcles (Paris, 1923), p. *4-26.
2®Declarueil, Histoire gSnSrale du droit, p. 619; Marion,
Dictionnaire des institutions, p. ^26.
27
Declarueil, Histoire generale du droit, p. 619; Marion,
Dlctionnaire des institutions, p. ^77; La Roche-Flavin, Treze llvres
des parlemens. Bk. I, Ch. XX.
2®0n the creation of the Chambre de l'Edit and ensuing diffi
culties with its establishment, see Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris.
I, 95-99• During the religious uneasiness of the 1620’s and 1630’s,
the staffing of the Chambre de l'Edit was a politically sensitive
issue, so sensitive, in fact, that selection of its members had to be
approved by the Crown every other year. The procedure began about the
middle of October when the procureur g6n€ral remitted a list of recom
mended candidates to the chancellor or garde des sceaux. The chan
cellor or garde des sceaux then made a selection of those thought
suitable and had the list reviewed by the king. After royal review, a
final list of judges was sent back to the procureur ggnSral for
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In addition to the regular judges of the court, there were three
magistrates who did not occupy a bench, yet whose participation was
vital to the life of the Parlement.

The royal attorneys, a -procureur

gSnSral and two avocats gSnSraux. were charged with maintaining royal
interests in the court.

In this capacity the gens du roi, or King's

Men, communicated royal documents to the court and presented their
conclusions concerning possible legal courses of action.

The attorneys

were excused from participation in ensuing deliberations and retreated
presentation to, and registration by, the Parlement. For letters
indicating the above procedure, see Mathieu MolS, MSmoires. ed. AimS
Champolllon-Figeac (4 vols.; Paris, 1855)» I. 217 . 250 , 281. MolS
was procureur ggnSral in the Parlement from 1614 until 1641, when he
became First President. His MSmoires are actually a collection of
official documents, such as lettres de cachet. extracts from court
registers, and correspondence with government figures, drawn from
B.N. Ms. Cinq-cents de Colbert 5. 8, and 212-215* Interesting
insights into the selection of the Chambre de l'Edit can be found
in a letter of 1633 in which procureur gSnSral Mole explained the
process of selection to the new garde des sceaux, Pierre SSguier:
"I have not pursued registration of the Chambre de l'Edit. foreseeing
opposition and knowing well the speeches that will be made. The Edict
of Nantes provided for the establishment of the Chambre, but since
that time, the practice of putting two conseillers of each chamber
there has been observed, and the remaining number of conseillers has
been taken as it pleased the chancellors and gardes des sceaux. to
serve there two years only. And when they have sent commissions
contrary to this order, it has given subject for debate, as you see
by a decision given in 162^. In this one, there are eight from the
fourth chamber [of Enauetes~| and none from the fifth; you could
provide there if you please, seeing that the king can do all out of his
absolute authority, but he should avail himself of it only in pressing
circumstances. I venture to promise myself the honor of your review
before executing this which the paper cannot bear." The garde des
sceaux apparently refused to modify the composition of the chamber
as MolS requested; there followed opposition from the court to the
king's lettres de provision. The Parlement agreed to register only
upon the declaration of MolS that he had made known to SSguier the
irregularities in the Chambre de l'Edit for 163^, and that SSguier
had promised to observe the accustomed forms in the future. This
promise was duly noted in the court’s registers for November 1^, 1633*
MolS, MSmoires. II, 178-79*
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to the floor, or -parquet, which lent its name to those standing there.
The gens du roi were charged with carrying the Parlement's decisions
hack to the royal council, the chancellor, or the king himself.

The

gens du roi thus acted as a human interface between court and Crown,
a role which often placed these magistrates in a delicate and con
flicting position somewhere between loyalty to the court and to the
king.29
PrSsidents, conseillers. and the royal attorneys made up the
working judicial section of the court, but their activities would soon
have ground to a halt without the services of many auxiliaries
attached to the court.

Official records were kept by three chief

greffiers (clerks of court), of whom the greffler civil was the most
important.

Although without a seat on the court's benches, the chief

clerks enjoyed all the honors and privileges of the Parlement,
including the right to red robes, transmissible nobility, and the
right to trial by the court itself.

Discipline within the court was

maintained by a corps of twenty-five hulssiers (bailiffs), the first
of whom enjoyed most of the privileges of the chief clerks.

The

hulssiers had important duties outside the confines of the Palais,
for they were charged with the collection of fines, enforcement of
parlementalre decrees, and the seizure of wanted men and confiscated
property.

In addition, since the basic function of the Parlement

always remained the hearing of litigation, there were several hundred
barristers and solicitors swarming in or near the halls and chambers
29
Franjois Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francais des
orlglnes a la RSvolution (Paris, 1951). PP. 535-36.
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of the Palais.

Both kinds of lawyers, like the huissiers and

greffiers, had purchased the right to practice before the Parlement,
but unlike the clerks and bailiffs, they were not royal officers.

30

In the course of the long history of the Parlement, a number of
groups and individuals came to possess the right to sit in the
sessions of the court on an honorific basis, and still others exer
cised ancient rights only on an irregular basis.

During the sixteenth

century, for example, all retired conseillers and nrSsidents received
honorific membership.

The dukes and peers of France could assume

their places at any time, though in the l600's this practice was
decidely anachronistic.

As the titular head of justice, the chan

cellor might assert his right to preside over the court at any time,
although most chose to avoid all but ceremonial occasions.

The

question of whether the garde des sceaux. who exercised the chamcellor's functions if he were disgraced, had this prerogative was
still a moot one in the seventeenth century.

31

There remains one important group associated with the court
which resists firm categorization.

The maitres des requetes were

part of the milieu of the high robe which included the sovereign
courts and the personnel of the royal council.

As their full and

proper title of mattres des requetes de 1*hotel du roi suggests, the
mattres had originally received petitions directed to the king’s
council, studied them, and reported the pertinent information during
■^Doucet, Les Institutions de la France. I, 173-7^» Shennan,
Parlement of Paris, pp. k5-k8; Marion, Dictionnaire des institutions.
pp. 268-69.
31Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 273-75*
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meetings.

Much councilliar business was expressed in legal terms,

hence the maitres were expected to show proficiency in the law as
well as a broad and flexible knowledge of administrative procedures.
As the Parlement and the royal council separated during the fourteenth
century, the maitres des requetes continued to freely attend both
bodies.

In the early seventeenth century, four maitres retained the

privilege of sitting in the Parlement, and all could claim judgment
before it, but their offices were still functionally tied to the royal
councils.

Therefore, in theory the maitres were considered as members

of the court but not as judges, being listed in precedence before all
the conseillers and enjoying the honors and privileges extended to
other magistrates.^ The maitres also had strong professional and
social links with the Parlement.

Many of them were former conseillers

of the court, and in 1598 Henry IV established that each maitre des
requetes had to serve at least six years as a conselller in a
sovereign court or twelve years as a lawyer pleading before such a
court.

The ruling reflected the historic function of the Parlement

as the training ground for future administrators, for of thirty-five
maitres studied by Roland Mousnler, twenty-four had been former
conseillers in the Parlement.

33

However close their ties with the

Parlement, the maitres were even more closely associated with the
^B.N. Ms. fr. 32140, fols. 56lv°-562. lists sixty-one maitres
des requetes in 1621. In precedence the maitres in this list are
given after conseillers of the Grand*Chambre but before other
conseillers of the court.
^^Roland Mousnler, Lettres et mSmolres adressis au chanceller
SSguier (2 vols.; Paris, 1964), I, $6.
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royal councils which they served, and by the reign of Louis XIII, at
least, the maitres should he considered as attached to the king's
council.

34

Particularly after the time of Henry II, French kings came to
appreciate the potential utility of the maitres des requetes as
instruments of royal policy and began to detach some of them from
the routine of councilliar business in favor of temporary tours of
inspection, or chevauchges. through the provinces.

For these tours

the maitres were armed with royal letters commissioning them with
immediate and final authority over an immense range of administrative,
financial, and judicial problems discovered in the course of their
circuits.

In many cases these commissalres extraordinalres received

royal sanction to hear individual complaints and to judge them over
all lesser authorities.

If the commissalre was sent to a particular

locality to superintend the functions of justice, he frequently
carried the title of intendant de justice. The distinction between
simple commissalres and intendants was never very clear, with the
latter term only gradually coming to prevail during the reign of Louis
In addition to their tasks with the councils, the maitres had
a host of diverse functions and jurisdictions assigned to them both by
the ordinances and by direction of the council or chancellor. To cite
but one example, the maitres could judge finally and sovereignly all
sorts of cases sent to them by decision of the council; to do so
required a panel of at least seven. The maitres also had important
jurisdictions over the right of commlttimus by which the king could
direct contentious issues into or out of certain jurisdictions. In
this regard they should not be confused with the Requetes of the
Parlement, who also possessed petitions for justice. Mousnler,
Lettres et mgmoires adressgs au chancelier SSguier. I, 43-44; Marion,
Dlctionnaire des institutions, pp. 358-59*
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XIII.

Whether called commlssalre or intendant. these extraordinary

agents represented one of the hallmarks of the processes of abso
lutism and centralization.

The relationship between these new

arrivals on the administrative scene and older regular officers
would represent one of the essential issues to be resolved in the
strengthening of royal authority that took place during Louis XIII’s
rule.35

The recruitment of members into the medieval Parlement was as
rudimentary as the structure of the court.

During the latter part of

the fourteenth century the rolls of the court were simply confirmed
at the beginning of each reign, and magistrates served renewable terms
of one year.

By the fifteenth century many judges were spending a

lifetime in the Parlement, and in 1467 Louis XI, ceding to the
insistence of his judges, decided that the magistrates in general
would be irremovable."^ Upon the death or resignation of a judge,
^Mousnler, Lettres et mSmoires adressgs au chancelier SSguier.
I, 44-45; Gaston Zeller, Les Institutions de la France au XVI siecle
(Paris, 1948), pp. 115-17; Georges Pages, Les Institutions
monarchlques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV (Paris, 1937). PP« 78-85.
•^Irremovability was proclaimed in the edict of October 21,
1467, which declared that "in the future judges can be removed or
deprived of their charges only for official misbehavior, previously
judged and judicially declared according to the terms of justice by
competent judges." Isambert, Anciennes lols francalses. X, 511;
B.N. Ms. fr. 7549i fol. 26. Irremovability was applied only to
magistrates in royal seats, those of seigneurial benches always
being subject to removal by seigneurs at their pleasure and will.
Louis XI did not always obey his own ordinance. In spite of the
ordinance of 1467, shortly after the trial of the due de Nemours
in 1476, three conseillers were removed from the Parlement because
their decisions had run contrary to Louis' will. Fayard, Aperyu
historique. I, 241. Despite this incident, however, the principle
of irremovability soon came to be regarded as inviolable.
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the king simply appointed a replacement of his choosing, often
selecting from among three candidates proposed by the court itself.
Gradually the court was allowed not only to present candidates but
also to elect them with royal approval.

This system of election

survived the troubled Anglo-Burgundian period and was confirmed by
ordinance in 1443*

Louis XI, however, exercised the most authori

tative control over the court since the Gapetian era and installed
his own appointees in direct fashion without regard to the
magistrates' wishes.

Under Charles VIII and Louis XII, the principle

of election made a partial recovery but never completely supplanted
royal nomination.

Of the conseillers appointed during the

reign of Louis XII, for example, thirty-two were selected through
the court’s election and twenty-seven appointed by royal command.^
By the accession of Francis I, a third method of recruitment
through resignation enjoyed considerable favor within the court;
during the sixteenth century this practice would come to triumph over
all others.

The consequences would be of considerable import to the

Parlement of the seventeenth century, for in the train of resignations
came acceptance of the principle of survivance. which in turn led to
hereditary succession in judicial offices.

By the seventeenth century

the Renaissance practices of confirmation, election, and bonafide
royal appointments had been scrapped in favor of systematized venality
of office.

Venality, in its turn, made its effects felt in the com

position of the court and created a special set of political and

■^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 113-14; Maugis, Histoire du
Parlement. I, 3-9.
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financial circumstances essential to the court of Louis X H I ’s era.
The practice of resignations in favor of a designated successor
(resignatio in favorem) probably began early in the history of the
Parlement.
operated.

It is not difficult to envision how the embryonic process
A magistrate seeking to resign his office would announce

his intention to colleagues and suggest a worthy successor.

After

investigating the candidate's qualifications, the court would usually
confirm the newcomer, who had to swear the succession was untained by
outside considerations.

The number of resignations increased steadily

during the fifteenth century, and by the reign of Charles VIII, the
practice was well established and rivaling election or appointment
in popularity.-^
Growth in the number of resignations brought with it abuses of
survivance. or the privilege of resignation in favor of a close
relative, son, brother, or nephew.

It was only natural that some

magistrates desired that their office remain within the family.
In order to ensure this continuous familial possession, judges began
to resign in favor of their kin but with royal dispensation to hold
the office jointly until the successor came into possession.

In

theory the king continued to maintain his royal rights of appointment,
the privilege of survivance always hinging upon royal acquiesence to
such transactions.

39

38
Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 115-16.
39lbid.; Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 1-133, passim.
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But royal acquiesence was easy to acquire when the royal
treasury was empty, and it was almost always empty during the six
teenth century.

The critical element in the transmutation of

survivances into a systematized exploitation of office holding was,
then, the exigency of Crown finances.

After raising old taxes,

imposing new ones, debasing the coinage, floating huge loans, and
alienating the royal domain, French kings still found themselves
wanting.

To ease the financial millstone of constant warfare in

Italy and the Low Countries, the Crown turned to commercial traffic
in royal offices.

Once established, expediency was soon transformed

into a permanent fixture of bureaucratic life, for both the treasury
and the officers benefitted from venality.

The traffic grew more

complex and attractive as it grew more profitable, and by the l600's
the Bourbons found themselves inextricably enmeshed in a net of
practices which seriously affected relations between the Crown and
its officers.^
The sale of survivances certainly antidated the reign of
Francis I, but it was Francis who, under the burden of the Italian
Wars, made venality a Crown monopoly.

He changed the practices of

The standard work on sale of office under the Old Regime is
Roland Mousnier's magisterial treatise La Vgnalltg des offices sous
Henri IV et Louis XIII. The first edition appeared at Rouen in 1945;
the second, revised and augmented, appeared at Paris in 1971. Inex
plicably, certain tabular material present in the first edition has
been omitted from the second; hence, it has been necessary to refer to
both editions. Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the
second edition. An old but provocative article on the same subject is
Georges Pages' "La VSnalit§ des offices dans l ’ancienne France," Revue
hlstorlque, CLXIX (1932), 477-95. Pages’ article remains of interest
for its thesis that the royal bureaucracy partially developed its
characteristic layered quality through the continued imposition of
new extraordinary agents on top of old regular officials.
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private venality, which had existed between private individuals
since the medieval period, into a public and bureaucratic operation.
As early as the fifteenth century, royal lettres de provision for
almost any sort of office or resignation could be had upon suitable
payment; Charles VII had admitted as much in an ordinance of 1453*

41

The outright sale of such rights appeared more and more often under
Charles VIII and Louis XU, extending to even the highest offices of
judicature.

Francis I simply expanded previous practices of

survivances to cover most offices in the bureaucracy and established
a special treasury bureau, the Parties casuelles. to receive the
^^The admission can be found in Article 84 of the Ordinance of
Montils-les-Tours, issued in April, 1453. The prohibitions in this
ordinance are worth examining in detail, as they were to be repeated
in virtually the same form during the sixteenth century. Article 84
began with the admission that "we [Charles VII] understand that
several have, in times past, during war and dissension, offered and
paid several sums to several of our officers and councillors, and by
this means have obtained the said offices, from which many evils and
improprieties have come to our laws, our subjects, and to the public
affairs of our kingdom. We, in following the ordinances of our prede
cessors the kings of France, prohibit and restrain all our officers
and councillors from receiving any promise or gift of anything to
have or to obtain any of the said offices from us, under penalty to
our officers and councillors of paying to us four times as much as has
been promised, given, or lent, and of incurring our indignation, and
of being punished severely for it. And to our subjects, under penalty
of losing the office that they have obtained, and of being forever
deprived of all royal offices, and of paying us similarly four times
that which they have promised, given, or lent to have the office."
Isambert, Anciennes lois franjaises, IX, 237-38. The same prohi
bitions were continued throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth cen
turies. The ordinances of 1493 and 1499 forbade any traffic in
elections. The great Ordinance of Origans in 1560 continued to main
tain the principle of free election in the sovereign courts, and
Article 100 of the Ordinance of Blois (1579) expressly prohibited the
practice of venality. See Isambert, Anciennes lois framgalses. XI,
238, 343, 350, 477; XIV, 74, 205.
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revenues and to administer the transactions. Requirements for
obtaining the right of survivance were liberalized, and the privilege
came to turn solely about the ability of the parties involved to
finance the transaction.

Usually the beneficiary was taxed for a

tenth or a twelfth of the office's estimated value; the payment took
the form of a forced loan to the Grown to avoid direct contravention
of the ordinances.

In addition, officers quitting a post were freely

permitted to accept money from their successors.

These measures

proved immensely popular with royal officers, but Francis soon came
to see that royal rights were slipping away too freely.

To further

squeeze the officers after 1534 the famous clause of "forty days"
was inserted into royal lettres de provision. It was stipulated that
if the resigning party died within forty days of the agreement, his
office would revert to the king who could then resell it at full cash
value instead of receiving merely the one-tenth or one-twelfth
survivance tax.
but at a price.
satisfied.

43

Exemptions from the "forty days" clause could be had,
h.9

The results were gratifying, but Francis was not

He proceeded to take the trends of the past to their

Mousnler, La VSnalitS des offices, pp. 35-92. In the time of
Henry IV, who was very miserly with exemptions, dispensations from the
clause of forty days could be had for some offices for 800 Scus. or
2000 livres. See Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. II, 215.
Parties casuelles early became an important, perhaps an
indispensable, source of royal revenues. During the first half of
1524, the Parties produced 88,594 llvres toumois for the treasury.
This had risen to 464,803 llvres toumois for the entire year of 1527.
Marino Cavalli, Venetian ambassador to Francis I, estimated that the
creation of offices alone brought the king about 400,000 Scus, or
900,000 llvres a year, at a time when Francis' budget totalled ten to
twelve million livres. By 1581 the total budget of the Crown (reve
nues clear at the treasury) amounted to 10,561,488 6cus; of this
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logical conclusion by openly creating new offices for public sale.
As has been seen above, the Parlement of Paris alone was forced to
hit

accept 101 of these creations of office during the sixteenth century.
The practices initiated by Francis proved far too profitable to
be abandoned by the later Valois, even though they were constantly
denounced by public bodies, the law, and by kings themselves.

45

In

fact, earlier practices were continuously refined and expanded as the
century passed.

Koyal offices of the domain were openly declared

hereditary in 1580, and positions in the administration of the Eaux
amount, the Parties casuelles furnished 3,545,885 Scus. or one-third.
Mousnier, La VgnalitS des offices, pp. 67-68, citing figures from
A.N. KK 351, KK 352, and B.N. Ms. Dupuy 958, fol. 85.
44
According to the opinion of Edouard Maugis, most of the growth
of the Parlement during the sixteenth century can be attributed to
the financial demands of the monarchy rather than to any greatly
increased volume of judicial affairs. In Maugis' words, "If one
excepts the great work of reconstitution [of the court] by Charles
VII, which filled the years 1439-1454, the various alternatives of
growth or reduction were always determined by considerations of
money, not of service, which the court saw, with reason, as a most
direct affront to its dignity and its prerogative of co-optation."
Histoire du Parlement. I, 4-5.
Mousnier, La VfinalitS des offices, pp. 35-36. The great
Ordinances of Orleans (1560)and Moulins (1566) plainly decreed the
abolition of all offices created since the fifteenth century, but the
abolitions remained a dead letter, as did Article 100 of the Ordi
nance of Blois (1579)* "We wish and intend that the said officers
[of judicature] should remain suppressed, until they have been reduced
to their former number . . . and that in the future only persons of
requisite quality will be provided without paying any tax: declaring
that our intention is of ending all venality of the said offices,
which to our very great regret has been suffered by the extreme
necessity of the affairs of our kingdom: wishing and ordering that
those who in the future should sell offices of judicature directly
or indirectly should lose the price and moreover should be fined
double." Isambert, Anciennes lois franqaises. XIV, 405-06.
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et forets followed in 1583.

Offices hitherto immune from venality

succumbed one after the other, including important posts in the army,
the household of the king, and even the governorship of provinces.
By the "beginning of the seventeenth century, venality and heredity
were established fact in the vast majority of royal posts.

LA

The only threat to the security of officers, the Damocles-like
clause of forty days, was removed when the hereditary principle was
given its final form in 1604.

All previous practices, provisions,

and payments were standardized in a general uniform arrangement called
the paulette after tax farmer Charles Paulet who suggested it to

Ln

Henry IV.

The provisions of the -paulette were landmark ones, for

the edict acknowledged the virtual independence of royal officers
from the king in exchange for financial considerations.

Any royal

office holder might freely transmit his office to heirs or to other
46
Zeller, Les Institutions de la France, p. 37; Mousnier, La
Vgnalltg des offices, pp. 37-38.
47
The establishment of the paulette was accompanied by peculiar
circumstances which are described in Mousnier, La VSnalltg des
offices. pp. 237» 240. The -paulette was drawn up in the form of an
arret du Consell which outlined the complete terms of the agreement
with Paulet on December 7. 1604. The first nine articles of the
contract were contained in a declaration dated December 12. The
complete edict was never sent to the sovereign courts for verification.
Mousnier asked if this might be because a verified edict could only be
abolished by another verified edict which would very likely be rejected.
To change the provisions of an arret or declaration not registered
would have required only the issuance of another arret or declaration
in the chancellery, and the king could be sure of his council and his
chancellor. The annuel could then be suppressed after the six years
of the contract had passed if the results were bad. The arrets
establishing the paulette were registered by the Chambre des comptes
in 1606 for reasons of fiscal control, although the farm had been
functioning for over a year.
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parties without the forty day reservation if he paid, an annual tax to
the Crown (the droit annuel) amounting to one-sixtieth of the value
of the office at purchase.

The arrangement was instituted for nine

years and had to he renewed after that period.

Thus the Crown might

always suppress the paulette; it might also suppress individual
offices or redeem its rights by buying the office back, but it seldom
found the means or the will to do either.

The alienation of royal

rights over Crown offices was now complete, and all future attempts
to alter the situation foundered on the unified resistance of the
48
bureaucracy and upon the financial impecunity of the Crown.
The Parlement felt itself directly affected by the development
of venality in a number of ways, though the practice did not alter
the nature of the public function of the offices.

The court began the

sixteenth century by firmly denouncing survivance and associated
Ilq

practices as detrimental to judicial standards. 7 At that time, too,
there had been some fear that venality would overcome the cherished
rights of hereditary succession, that offices might come to be sold
to the highest bidder rather than remaining within family groups.
As the sixteenth century wore on, these fears proved groundless.
Venality proved to be the natural ally of heredity rather than its
antagonist, and as the magistrates came to realize the massive
benefits accruing to the, they became staunch, if sub rosa. supporters
of venality in all its aspects.

Recognition of the inherent evils

^^ousnier, La VSnalltS des offices, passim.
49
See, for example, the denunciation presented in Articles 9,
10, and 11 of the remonstrances offered to Louise of Savoy in 1525.
Maugis, Hlstolre du Parlement. I, 562-63.
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never died out— reformers continuously demonstrated all the argu
ments against the system— hut magisterial, resistance assumed a low
key when confronted with the patent material security of office
holding.
The growth of venality and heredity was accompanied by a
gradual abandonment of the last trappings of free royal appointment,
disappearance of the oath of untainted interest upon assuming office,
and a decline in attention to the qualifications of membership.

The

decline of the act of confirmation of the court's rolls at each
accession shows well both the influence of heredity and the growing
independence it produced among the judges.

Until the reign of

Francis I inclusively, royal letters confirmed the magistrates in
their functions upon renewal of their oath of allegiance to the royal
ordinances and regulations of the court.

Henry II, Charles IX,

Henry III, and Henry IV simply rendered letters of confirmation
without requiring an oath.

At the accession of Louis XIV in 1&+3,

however, the letters of confirmation demanded a new oath from the
j u d g e s . T h e Parlement refused to comply, and when Chancellor
SSguier observed that the letters were the same as those delivered
at the death of Francis I in 15^7. the parlementalres retorted
5QThis demand may well have been provoked out of remembrance
of the continued troubles which characterized relations between the
Crown and the Parlement during the reign of Louis XIII. As events
turned out, the formality of the oath made little difference to the
course of parlementaire behavior either during the regency of Anne
of Austria or later during the reign. The lettres de cachet
renewing the magistrates's functions and demanding the oath are in
Isambert, Anciennes lois francaises. XVII, 1-2.
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with a vigorous statement of their independences
"Since this time [of Francis I's death], which has been almost
one hundred years, the face of public affairs had changed a
great deal; that kings had authorized the disposition of
offices, even those of judicature, and that the establishment
of the droit annuel was a variety of public heredity which
rendered the condition of the officers assured. This was not
[said] in order to dispense themselves from the respect,
obedience, and submission that they owed the king, contrary to
which they could not and would not prescribe, but in order to
dispense themselves from these ancient formalites which were
observed when offices were simple commissions."
In light of the attention paid to symbolic formalities and forms in
the Old Regime, the regent, Anne of Austria, created a dangerous
precedent by ceding to the wishes of the magistrates.

Letters

rendered in 1715 upon the accession of Louis XV did not mention the
obligation of an oath.

52

The same diminution of old forms could be observed in other
ways, too.

On May 29, 1586, the judges themselves asked the king to

cease requiring an oath of monetary disinterest from candidates to
office because the practice contributed to perjury.

Age requirements

and inquiries into educational qualifications were increasingly
disregarded as the 1500*s passed.

On January 1^, 1605, for example,

Nicolas de Bellievre, son of Chancellor Pomponne de Bellievre, was
received into the Parlement at less than twenty-two.

In 1602 Pierre

V SSguier, a son and grandson of presidents, was received at less
^Tsambert, Anciennes lois fTan9aises. XVII, 1-2, quoting
registers of the Parlement.
•■^Emest Glasson, "Le Roi, grand justicier," Pt. I, Nouvelle
revue hlstorlque du droit francals et Stranger. XXVI (1902), 725.
The second part of this article appeared in the same publication,
XXVII (1903), 76-9^. These parts are henceforth cited as Glasson,
"Le Roi, grand justicier," I-H.
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than twenty-five; in 1606 Mathieu MolS, future -procureur gSnSral and
First President, was received at less than legal age.

These dispen

sations tended to become commonplace during the seventeenth century,
spreading out from distinguished candidates to be applied to the most
mediocre of applicants.

53

The long term effects of venality on the Parlement worked them
selves out through two associated tendencies.

The prices, and thus

the property value, of offices in the Parlement rose continuously
during the sixteenth century, and they reached enormous figures in
the early seventeenth century.

Each of the twenty conseillerships

created by Francis in 1522 to constitute a third Chambre des enquetes
was assigned an official value of 6,000 livres. By 1597 the value
of these conseillerships had reached 11,000 livres; the figure
reached 120,000 llvres in 1 6 3 5 In 1627 a presidency a mortier
cost between 300,000 and 400,000 llvres if, indeed, a free market
value could be put on these offices which were accessible to so few.^
Higher offices in the Parlement were touched before others by a
second tendency which also became plain by the reign of Louis XIII,
-^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 3-4, 264; II, 213-15•
-^Doucet, Les Institutions de la France. I, 177; Mousnier, La
VSnalit§ des offices, pp. 361-62. Mousnier gives figures for the rise
in price of a conseiller's office in the Parlement of Paris ass
1597, 11.000 llvres; 1600. 21.000 livres: 1606, 36.000 livres; 1614,
55.000 livres; l6l6, 60,000 llvres; 1&L7. 67,500 livres: 1635,
120.000 llvres; 1637, 120,000 livres. From 1597 to 1635 the value
of offices of conselller increased by a factor of 12.23.
^At the death of prSsident a mortier JSrome de Hacqueville
in 1627 his office was sold to Nicolas de Bailleul for 420,000 llvres.
Robert Arnauld d'Andilly, Journal inSdit, ed. Eugene and Jules
Halphen (10 vols.; Paris, I888-I909), VIII, 12.
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A tendency to form lines of heredity succession within the court
was probably as old as the institution itself, but the developments
of the sixteenth century certainly accelerated the process, so that
by the 1620*s the formation of -parlementaire castes could be dis
cerned, especially among the higher offices of the court.^
The social origins and standing of men holding office in the
sixteenth century do not appear to be greatly different from those
named to the court by the early Valois.

From its inception, the

Parlement had been an aristocratic body, and though the great barons
and ecclesiastics ceased to attend after the fifteenth century, it
seems that the once relatively humble magistri managed to assimilate
the reputation, if not the strict title, of nobility.

Nominally, the

non-noble lawyers were considered members of the robe longue and thus
in the pecking order of Renaissance society fell into the Third
Estate.

97

The Parlement, however, was the court of the highest

nobility in France, and feudal law upheld the principle of trial by
peers.

Many early magistrates, too, were both of noble birth and

trained in the law.

By inference, then, the seats in the court con-

^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 117-18; Maugis, Histoire du
Parlement. Ill, "Role de la cour par regnes, 13^+5-1610: presidents,
conseillers, gens du roi," passim.
^ I n the early l600's the profession of the robe, or magistrature, was broadly divided into the robe courte. which included
clerks and ordinary lawyers, and those of the robe longue, which
took in members of the sovereign courts, the maitres des requetes.
the conseillers d’Etat, and the trSsorlers de France. In the early
seventeenth century there were probably about 1,500 men qualified as
of the high robe. As a general expression la robe, or its pejo
rative form les robins, took in all those pursuing a career in
judicial administration.
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ferred a certain elevated standing usually described as gradual or
customary nobility.

To acquire this status in the sixteenth century

it was sufficient for a son to follow in his father's office according
to the formulary a patre et avo consulibus. The requisite duration
of such conditions were not clearly specified but were assumed to be
about twenty years.

The social status so gained was perhaps undefined

but was widely considered to be on an equal basis with the prestige
and privileges accruing to members of the noblesse de race. This
situation was given legal recognition in Article 25 of Henry IV's
edict on the taille of March, 1600, where exemption from the taille
was granted to the issue of fathers and grandfathers who had served
the public in an honorable charge. ^

To reinforce their claims to

true nobility, many magistrates purchased letters of nobility and
acquired a fief.

The growth of heredity and venality did nothing

but strengthen a traditional view that the judges of the Parlement
were vested with some degree of nobility by virtue of their offices.
In the seventeenth century, only the exact quality of the noblesse
of the magistrates was still being debated, and the question was
resolved for members of the Paris Parlement when a royal declaration
of 1644 granted all members of the court, including the gens du roi
and the greffier civil, full nobility transmissible to their heirs
upon reception into the court.

59

'^Franjois Bluche and Pierre Durye, L 'Anoblissement par charges
avant 1789. Les Cahiers nobles, nos. 23-24 (2 vols.; Paris, 1962-63),
II, 15-17, 23-24.
59
The question of the nobility of the robe and the parity of its
prestige with the noblesse de race is uncertain and complex in the
extreme. Variable factors include the lineage of family, mode of
living, status of the office held, and length of service within the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38
Three centuries of evolutionary development had "brought the
Parlement of Louis XHE's era to full institutional maturity; with
only a few minor marks of further organizational ageing, the Parle
ment of the early seventeenth century would essentially be the Parle
ment disbanded in 1790.

To the casual observer, the organization of

the adult court might seem chaotic and even unworkable.

Complex and

specialized the Parlement was in the seventeenth century, but the
entire structure of the court followed a highly functional pattern
conforming to the needs of the kingdom and the law it administered.
Considering the Old Regime's occupation with social distinctions and
dignities, it would be surprising not to find considerable differen
tiation accompanying the diversity of chambers and personnel; in
reality the growth of the court had meant the rise of a hierarchy
of prestige and status among the judges.

This development might have

boded badly for the court's unity had not parallel developments of
Parlement or other institution. The diffuse and uncertain social
situation of the high magistrature is well summarized by Lloyd Mootes
"In 1610, the judicial and financial officials were neither truly
nobles nor commoners, but rather most often bourgeois in background
and noble in aspiration. In the Estates General, they sat with
commoners as the Third Estate, yet the members of the sovereign courts
and the bureaus of tr€soriers had the privileges of noblemen by virtue
of their offices (and in some cases by noble birth or acquisition
of noble lands). Contemporary writers on officeholding, such as
Charles Loyseau, also asserted that after two generations in the
same office in one of these high corporations, this 'personal
nobility' became hereditary or true nobility. By the 1640's, the
monarchy was actually conferring hereditary nobility on firstgeneration members of the parlements of Grenoble and Paris, and on
officials in some chambres des comptes and bureaus of trfsoriers."
Moote, Revolt of the Judges, pp. 26-27. The question of the status
of the high robe has been studied in an unpublished doctoral
dissertation by Cornelius Sippel, III, entitled "The Noblesse
de la robe in Early Seventeenth-Century France: A Study in Social
Mobility" (University of Michigan, 1963).
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venality and heredity strongly reinforced a pre-existing corporate
sense of being the foremost judicial institution of the monarchy.
By the seventeenth century, then, the Parlement had travelled a long
path to secure an exalted niche in the kingdom's government and society.
It remains to be seen how the court's elevated socio-political place
related to other monarchical institutions and to the Crown itself.
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CHAPTER II

THE PARLEMENT AND THE LAW
The jurisdictions and functions of Louis XIII's Parlement
reflected the evolutionary developments brought by 300 years of
separation from the curia regis. The court had sprung from the
king’s council to fulfill the demands of judicial specialization,
and the Parlement had remained indelibly stamped as a judicial body,
staffed by legalists dispensing justice in the name of the king.

In

the seventeenth century the quality and nature of royal justice dis
pensed by the Parlement were much the same as they had been in the
thirteenth century, but the Parlement's jurisdictions in criminal
and civil matters had been limited and delineated by the creation
of other judicial institutions and by the rise of an elaborate
hierarchy of royal bureaucrats and corporations.
The judicial authority of the Parlement cannot be separated
from the theoretical foundations of feudal sovereignty and from the
historical actualities of the monarchy.

In theory the justice pro

vided by the Parlement of Paris was grounded in the basic principles
of feudalism, which considered justice to be a quality emanating
from the person of the lord.

Above all the king was regarded as a

supreme judge, not as a warrior as might be expected.

Early

Capetian coinage depicted the king as a judge; hundreds of years
later, the same tradition was expressed by Chancellor Michel de
40
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L*Hospital when addressing the Estates General of 1560:
Kings have been elected fslc~| primarily to render justice,
and the act of making war is not as royal as that of judg
ment because tyrants and oppressors make war as much as
kings and very often the evil do it better than the good.
Thus, the seal of France is not stamped with the figure of
the king armed and on horseback, as in many other places,
but seated on his royal throne, rendering and administering
justice. Because of this, the good woman who petitioned
King Philip for justice and was told by him that he had not
the time to hear had good reason to reply to him: You should
not be king!
The king, as primus inter pares, enjoyed sovereign rights over his
vassals, who in turn exercised feudal rights of their own.

Justice

was early considered a quality both personal and dispensable, the
rights of which usually accompanied the grant of any beneflcium. be
it land or office.

Thus in the early Gapetian period the number of

cases subject to royal justice was very small, being generally limited
to issues arising out of the royal domain and all infractions of
feudal law involving the king's vassals.
astical, seigneurial, or municipal courts.

Other cases went to ecclesi
The passage of time and

of feudal conditions, however, encouraged a steady broadening of the
definition of royal cases to include many types of major crimes
occurring within and without the royal domain proper.

The reclamation

of the Angevin lands and the activities of baillls and s6n§chaux were,
as noted above, substantial factors in accelerating the growth of
2
royal judicial competence.
^Michel de L*Hospital, Oeuvres completes (5 vols.; Paris,
1824-1826), I, 380-81.
^Esmein, Cours Slementaire d'histoire du droit franqais.
pp. 254-61, 330-38; Pages, Les Institutions monarchiques, pp. 5-6;
Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 50-55.
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By the thirteenth century, royal justice was assuming a dichotomous nature.

Theoretically, the king continued to retain all rights

of sovereign justice, but in fact necessity demanded that justice
should be delegated to specific persons to be exercised in the king's
name.

Thus was introduced at an early date the distinction between

justice retenue and justice dSlgguee. between justice retained in the
king's hands and that delegated to his officers.^
The first institution to which kings delegated their judicial
rights was the Parlement of Paris.

Since the king had chosen to dele

gate part of his sovereignty directly to his court, the Parlement
became the first "sovereign court" of France, and in this capacity
the court claimed both appellate and first instance jurisdiction over
all the medieval realm.^ By the l600’s the jurisdiction, or ressort,
3

The relationship between delegated and retained justice is
examined in the little known article by Glasson, "Le Roi, grand
justicier," I-II. It is important to note that in theory the rights
of justice freely delegated by the king could be freely reclaimed by
him; in practice, however, long usage and tradition tended to negate
the possibility of reclamation of rights once delegated and institu
tionalized. In the words of Olivier-Martin, "This delegation was
not an alienation. Tribunals did not constitute a 'judicial power'
in the modem sense of law, distinct and independent of the king.
They rendered the justice of the king ’as the discharge of his con
science,’ but the king remained personally responsible. He could
always judge himself no matter what affair, be it that retained in
his possession, be it that handed over to a competent tribunal. []ln
so doing]] he committed no abuse of authority; he only returned to his
general function of justiciar." Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit
fratals, p. 519.
The term "sovereign court" was never formalized; it seems to
have been first employed by Louis XI during the decade of the 1470's
and was frequently, though unofficially, utilized after this time to
designate the Parlement, provincial parlements. the Chambre des comptes,
and other supreme juridical institutions. Olivier-Martin, Histoire
du droit francais. p. 528.
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of the Parlement of Paris had "been pared down by the creation of other
provincial -parlements, but it remained far and away the superior court
of the land.'’ Its appellate jurisdiction extended over all of central
Prance and included the right to hear cases on appeal from lower courts
in both civil and criminal matters.

As a court of first instance, the

competence of the Parlement was wide and diverse.

All crimes committed

against the king and the kingdom— the so-called cas royaux— went
directly to the court unless other arrangements were made.

This most

important category of offenses included violations of royal safe con
duct, illicit bearing of arms, treason, lese-majestf, rebellion, and
counterfeiting.^ Certain, persons were privileged by birth or by virtue
. ^In the early seventeenth century, the jurisdiction of the Parle
ment of Paris extended over Champagne, Brie, the Ile-de-France,
Picardy, Maine, Anjou, Touraine, Poitou, Aunis, Angoumois, the Beauce,
Orleanais and Salogne, Berry, Lyonnais and Forez, Bourbonnals, Morvain,
and the Magonnais, or more than one-third of the kingdom. In terms of
lesser jurisdictions, this territory included the gouvemement of the
Somme towns and the ballllage of Vermandois; the ballllages of Senlis,
Valois, Nantes, and Montfort-l'Amaury; the prSvot§ of Paris (bailliages of Poissy, Montlhgry, -pr&votS royale of Villeneuve, bailliage
of the Palais); the bailllages of Sens, Auxerre, Meaux, and Melun,
in Champagne; those of Touraine, Maine, Anjou, s€n€chauss6e of Poitou;
the comtg of La Marche; the sSngchaussSes of Lyon, Moulins, and
Auvergne (with the mountains of Auvergne); the bailliage of Magon; the
ha-^niages of Orleans, Chartres, and Blois; of Bourges, Saint-Pierrele-Moutier, and the gouvernement of La Rochelle; Angoumois. F. Aubert,
"Le Parlement de Paris au XVI siecle," Pt. I, Nouvelle revue historlaue du droit francals et Stranger. XXIX (1905), 753-54. Pts.
II and III of this article appeared in XXX (1906). Henceforth cited
as Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, II, III.
^Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 744-4-5. In a situation
where personal sovereignty and the sovereignty of the State were unsep
arated, or poorly distinguished, the term lese-majestS encompassed
both crimes of personal offense against royalty and crimes against the
public function of royalty (la chose publique). that is, against State,
commonwealth, or kingdom. Until the seventeenth century, at least, the
basic definition of lese-majestf consisted of any violation of the five
universally recognized powers of the king: making law, creating offi-
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of their office to take their case directly to the Grand'Chambre: the
great officers of the Grown, all officers of the Parlement, and
faculty members of the University of Paris, among others, enjoyed this
cherished right of committlmus.^ A large body of other persons could
claim the right to be judged immediately by the Grand'Chamfare.
including ecclesiastics and members of charitable instil tions, all
gentlemen, royal secretaries, and magistrates in lesser jurisdictions
directly under the Parlement.

The Parlement, with the assistance of

the peers, constituted the Court of Peers, competent to judge all
causes, civil or criminal, which concerned them.

Finally, the Parle

ment might hear any ordinary case committed 6r evoked to it through
royal orders.^

cers, making peace or war, having the last ressort in justice, and
striking money. La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des parlemens. Bk.
XIII, Ch. XXIII, No. 1. Richelieu would considerably expand the
definition of crimes of lese-majest§ to include pamphleteering,
military failure, and conspiracy. For a general description of
lese-ma.iest€ as it was in the early l600's and the changes wrought
in its definition by Richelieu see W. F. Church, Richelieu and Reason
of State (Princeton, New Jersey, 1972), pp. 178-79.

n
Those permanently privileged with the right of committlmus
were ennumerated in Article 56 of the Ordinance of Moulins (1566).
These categories were flexible, and the passage of time brought a
steady expansion of the privilege. Isambert, Anclennes lois francalses. XIV, 203-04; Marion, Dictionnalre des institutions, p. 122.
®The king could freely modify the competence of any tribunal
in any case by authorizing the issuance of lettres de committlmus
which removed, or evoked, contention from the competence of one
tribunal and shifted it to another, to the Requetes in the Parle
ment, or to the royal council. The opportunities for abuse should
be manifest, and in fact the inability of monarchs to resist the
practice of evocations to the royal council was evident throughout
the Old Regime. During the period of Richelieu's administration,
Chancellor Siguier was known to expedite evocations for those
procuring manuscripts for him. Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit
franyalse. pp. 523. 526.
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Over the course of centuries, the kings of Prance continued to
delegate their judicial rights by creating a wide range of judicial and
quasi-judicial organs.

These institutions tended to appear and multi

ply in keeping with the demands of the moment rather than through any
coherent plan: almost never were the relations of newer bodies with
older ones plainly set out by a single act of legislation specifically
shaping their final organization and ultimate competence.

Presumably,

therefore, the judicial structure of seventeenth century Prance was a
simple emanation of royal will, but in reality it was a maze of overq

lapping and often contradictory jurisdictions.

This specialization

and complexity which accompanied the growth of the Renaissance mon
archy would be reflected in the multiplication of sovereign courts at
the top of an ever proliferating bureaucracy of royal officers.

To

cite '.it one example out of many, in 1*&3 Charles VII, wishing to
re'.:;:$nize provincial rights in Languedoc, elevated the court of the
*The institutions of French society and government in the sevente^.ih century can be studied in a broad selection of literature, and
only the most applicable works will be pointed out here. Institutions
as they existed in the sixteenth century are delineated in Doucet,
Les Institutions de la France, and in Zeller, Les Institutions de la
France. For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one should
consult the authoritative dictionary compiled by Marion, Dictionnalre
des institutions de la France aux XVII et XVIII slecles. An old
but still very useful work dealing with the early seventeenth century
is Jules Caillet's De 1*administration en France sous le minlstere du
f»a.rdlna1 Richelieu X?aris, 1857). Three distinguished historians of
the Old Regime have also contributed authoritative works on adminis
trative history. See in particular Plre Adolphe ChSruel, Dictionnalre
historicue des institutions, moeurs et coutumes de la France (2 vols.;
Paris, 1910) and Histoire de 1 ’administration monarchicue en France
depuls l'avenement de Philippe-Auguste .jusqu'a la mort de Louis XIV
(2 vols.; Paris, 1855)» Pages, Les Institutions monarchiques; Vieomte
Georges d'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue (4 vols.; Paris,
188^-1895).
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comte de Toulouse into the status of a royal -parlement to serve the
south of Prance.

Other creations and elevations followed., and by the

end of Louis XHI*s reign there would be no less than nine provincial
parlements.1^
The creation of other provincial parlements actually reduced
the jurisdiction of the Parisian court only slightly. The provincial
parlements were presumed to offer a court of final resort in criminal
and civil matters within their province, and they sometimes claimed
that their title of parlement and their attributions as sovereign
courts equated them with the Paris Parlement in a kind of corps.

The

Parlement of Toulouse, especially, maintained a theory of "union and
classes," according to which the various parlements were united as
one sovereign body divided into several classes for commodity of
justice in distant parts of the realm.11

At opportune moments, the

T?he other provincial parlements and their dates of creation
were: Grenoble (l453)» for DauphinS; Bordeaux (1462), for Guyenne,
Gascony, PSrigord, Limousin, and Saintogne; Dijon (147?), for most
of Burgundy; Rouen (1499), for Normandv; Aix (1510), for Provence;
Rennes (1553), for Brittany; Pau (1620), for B€am and Navarre;
Metz (1633), for Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The organization of these
provincial parlements imitated on a lesser scale the structure of
the Parlement of Paris. A great historian of French institutions,
Marcel Marion, has noted the contradictory nature of these provincial
parlemehts. "They are," he wrote in 1923, "something like a trans
action between the provincial spirit and royal power; they are an
inextricable m&lange of the spirit of decentralization and the spirit
of centralization." Dictionnalre des institutions. p. 427. Excellent
detail on the origin and transformation of the provincial courts may
be found in Oliver-Martin, Histoire du droit franqals, pp. 530-31;
Baein, Cours glgmentalre d*histoire du droit framgals, pp. 377-83;
and Fawtier and Lot, Les Institutions royales. pp. 472-502.
“ The principal exponent of this idea in the seventeenth century
was Bernard de la Roche-Flavin, conselller in the parlements of
Toulouse and Paris. His Treze livres des parlemens de France
represents a vast collection of data on the theory and practice of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47
Crown recognized the supposed equality and unity of royal parlements.
Thus, Chancellor Michel de L'Hospital could say "before the Parlement
of Paris in 1560 that "if a king could, as has "been done at other
times, administer sovereign justice through a single parlement. he
would do it. The diverse parlements are only diverse classes of the
parlement of the king."^

In reality the equality and unity of the

the parlements in the early l600's; modem historians generally
regard the Treze llvres des parlemens as a standard reference on the
sovereign courts. B o m in Saint Cemin in 1552, La Roche-Flavin
became a doctor in law at Toulouse at eighteen and a lawyer at nine
teen. He was received as a conseiller in the PrSsidlal of Toulouse
on September 1, 1574, "under a false certificate of age." He was
received as a president in the Requetes of the Parlement of Toulouse
on January 19, 1581, but the second president of the chamber con
tested his right to the seat. The case having been remitted to the
royal council, La Roche-Flavin went to Paris, where he was located in
1583. About this time he bought one of twenty offices of conseiller
in the Parlement of Paris created by edict of May, 1581, to make up a
sixth Chambre des enquetes. The sixth chamber never materialized,
but the twenty new offices were distributed among the other five
chambers. La Roche-Flavin was received into the first Chambre des
enquetes on February 8, 1583. In the meantime, having won his case
before the council, he returned to Toulouse where he stayed until his
death in 1627. Henry III made him a conseiller d'Etat. He had printed
at Bordeaux in 1617 his Treze llvres des parlemens de France, which
was badly received by the Parlement of Toulouse in spite of the au
thor' s.tendency to equate the court with that of Paris. By decision
of June 12, 1617, the Toulouse court ordered his book destroyed in his
presence as "containing facts contrary to the parlements and several
officers therein." He was also fined 3,000 livres and suspended from
his office for a year. B.N. Ms. fr. 7555bis. fols. 374-76. Having
been a conseiller at both Toulouse and Paris, it is not surprising
that La Roche-Flavin found both courts equal in standings "The parle
ments of France are all equal in authority in jurisdiction. . . . I
have often seen [the Parlement of Toulouse]] refuse several edicts, in
number more than eighty, received from the Parlement of Paris, al
though there were up to six or seven .iussions." Treze llvres des
parlemens, Bk. XIII, Ch. VIII, Nos. 1-2.
12
De L ’Hospital, Oeuvres completes. I, 36O. Also cited in
Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 418, after registers of the Parle
ment for September 7, 1560.
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parlements was ephemeral in the seventeenth century.

The Parisian

court, considering itself to possess a jurisdiction of universal
appeal over all the kingdom, often solicited, and won, appeals
against the other parlements. The provincial courts' pretensions
were further punctured by the historical circumstances surrounding
the foundation of the Parlement of Paris, which was older, which
remained the original Court of Peers, and which enjoyed an infi
nitely greater role in affairs of State.
At the time the Parlement was assuming most of the judiciary
functions of the curia regls. a Chambre des comptes was undertaking
supervision of the royal finances.

The origins of the Chambre des

comptes are as ill-defined as those of the Parlement, but it seems
that the Chambre. like the Parlement, was a product of functional
specialization within the council.

Definitively constituted in

1320, the Chambre came to be charged with maintenance of the royal
bookkeeping and exploitation of the domain.

It was also given the

right to hear and adjudicate disputes arising out of its adminis
tration.

The auditors found judicial fees more alluring than

checking rows of figures, and by the seventeenth century the Chambre
was much more a judicial than an administrative agency.

It exercised

sovereign jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the royal accounts
13
A.
Lloyd Moote, "The Parlementary Fronde and Seventeenth
Century Robe Solidarity," French Historical Studies. II (1962),
330-48. Moote concluded that even during the crisis of the Fronde
cooperation between the Parlement of Paris and other sovereign courts
outside the capital was minimal. The actual course of events, however,
in no way lessened the possibility that the high robe officers might
put away their differences when confronted with issues affecting them
all, such as renewed, of the paulette.
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or administration of the domain.

The Chambre also registered and

recorded bursal legislation bearing on its jurisdiction.

To the

Chambre went all lists of salaries, pensions, and gratuities; all
declarations of homage and fealty; letters of ennoblement, legiti
mation, and naturalization; and concessions for fairs and markets.
The Chambre des comptes was additionally expected to register docu
ments which were sent to the other sovereign courts, such as
treaties of peace and royal marriage contracts.

Like the parlements.

the number of chambres des comptes tended to increase, so that by
the beginning of the seventeenth century, there was a total of eight
chambres scattered over the kingdom.

14

14
The Chambre des comptes of Paris pretended to be older than
the Parlement and prided itself on being the oldest sovereign court
of the realm, having split off from the council even before the Parle
ment. None of the pretensions of the Chambre. however, affected the
supremacy of the Parlement as the foremost sovereign court, a situ
ation which was conclusively confirmed by the reign of Louis XIII.
In the seventeenth century, the prestige and social standing of men
and corporations, and thus very often their actual authority, could
be read in the precedence exhibited on formal public occasions. A
complete list of the precedence of personnages from the king down to
provincial notaries is given in D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchic
absolue. I, Appendix I, "La PrSseance,” kz6-Jl• According to this
listing, the First President of the Parlement immediately followed
the grand maitre de France, a high honorary Crown officer who followed
the Chancellor, cardinals, princes of the blood, and dukes and peers.
The First President was thus the highest ranking member of the bureau
cracy. Next came the chambellan de France, the First President of
the Cham'hrft des comntes, three officials of the royal household, and
then the presidents a mortler of the Parlement. This elaborate and
highly formalized ordering procedure by no means prevented recurrent
contention. A fine example of this struggle for recognition may be
found in an altercation which took place on August 15, 1638, in Notre
Dame de Paris cathedral. After completion of the services celebrating
the Feast of the Assumption, as the Parlement and the Chambre des
comutes prepared to leave in procession, there was a dramatic con
frontation over precedence. The First President of the Chambre
insisted on marching at the left of the First President of the Parle
ment, only to be told that he must follow behind the other presidents
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The Chamhre des comptes of Paris was forced to share its
competence over financial matters with the Parisian Cour des aides.
Unlike the Chambre des comptes or the Parlement, the Cour des aides
could not claim to be descended from the royal council; its prestige,
matching its pedigree, was therefore something less than that of the
capital's other sovereign courts.

This court was actually an out

growth of the needs of the Hundred Years' War.

The Estates General

1 mortler. The First President of the Chambre replied that he would
take his accustomed place, and within the confines of the church the
heads of the two courts squared off against each other. The First
President of the Parlement seized his rival by the collar and repeated
his injunction to fall into line behind the other presidents: the
First President of the Chambre refused and answered with his fists.
The First President of the Parlement went so far as to seize a halberd
and threatened to ikill his opponent, which he might have done had he
not been restrained by three or four bystanders. Another conseiller
in the Parlement drew a sword and yet another produced a baton;
several in the Parlement ordered the hulssiers to arrest De Marie,
the First President of the Chambre. De Marie, however, was led away
before he could be taken into custody and the procession was reorgan
ized amid considerable confusion. Each side had to present its case
to the King, who ordered that in the future the Parlement would leave
Notre Dame by the great door and the Chambre des comptes by the small
door. An account of this incident, following the records of the
Chambre des comptes. can be found in D'Avenel's Appendix to Richelieu
et la monarchle absolue cited above. The registers of the Parlement
mention nothing of the incident, merely noting that the court attended,
which evidences that the judges may have been in the wrong. The same
affair is briefly recounted in Frangois Bluche, Les Magistrats du
Parlement de Paris au XVIII slecle (Paris, i960) , p. 273, and in
Fayard, Apergu historic:ue, II, 111-12. Bluche continues his account
by noting that "the innumerable official manifestations, Te Deum.
baptisms, marriages, or burials of princes are pretexts to mark the
superiority of the Parlement. The court is obsessed by the game of
precedences. If the First President accords an audience to the corps
de ville and to the Chatelet. he is careful to take the right hand to
that of the prSvot des marchands and to the lieutenant civil."
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of 1355 had granted the Crown certain aides. or subsidies, to wage
the war, and the court had arisen to adjudicate disputes in the
collection of these taxes.

In the seventeenth century the court was

still judging extraordinary finances, then generally deemed to include
the tallle. the gabelle. wine aides, customs duties, and various
market fees.
The Grand Conseil was the newest and smallest of all the sov
ereign courts of Paris.

It had originated as a specialized branch of

the royal council which Louis XI had intended should receive all cases
evoked from other sovereign courts.

During the fifteenth and six

teenth centuries, the Grand Conseil had drifted away from the Conseil
8troit (the "limited” or inner council) to become the fourth sov
ereign court in Paris.

Because of its potentially superior cogni

zance, the Grand Conseil might have evolved into an institution
superior to the Parlement, but development in the direction of su
perior jurisdiction was frustrated by the continued royal practice
of committing evocations directly to the Conseil d'Etat, which grad
ually came to represent an authority higher than the Grand Conseil.
Thus in the seventeenth century the Grand Conseil represented an
institutional cul-de-sac, a body whose reason for being had been
rendered obsolete and whose competence reflected its artificially
prolonged existence.

In Louis XIII’s era the Grand Conseil was

generally charged with cases not suitable to the other sovereign courts
because of conflict between them or because of suspicions of bias.
Its other jurisdictions were a mishmash of miscellaneous duties, such
as reception of the oaths of fealty of the bishops and archbishops.
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Beneath the Parlement and other sovereign courts lay a quasihierarchical jumble of inferior jurisdictions which was much elab
orated over the simple royal apparatus of the medieval period.

At

the bottom of the judicial ladder were the prgvotSs. a vestige of the
Capetian era which, except for the prgvotg of Paris, had been reduced
to insignificance by the seventeenth century.1'* By the reign of
Louis XTII the bailliage and sgnSchaussSe courts offered the lowest
effective competence over minor civil and criminal matters.

Appeals

from these lower levels went first to the new prgsidial courts and
then to the parlements. The prgsidiaux were a product of a mid
sixteenth century effort to relieve the burden of appeals to the
parlements by locating intermediate royal courts in all large towns.
By the reign of Louis XIII, there were eighty-eight such prgsidiaux
offering to hear important civil and criminal cases in first instance
and having an appellate jurisdiction over baillls and s|nSchaux,
prSvots. and lesser officials.1^
Jurisdictions under the Old Regime, however, seldom functioned
according to the comfortably regular patterns established by legal
historians.

Numerous factors conspired to ensure that contention and

uncertainty were dominant features of legal affairs in general and
^ h e prSvotg of Paris had become the Chatelet. a significant
royal court which was the equivalent of the bailliage for the city of
Paris and its banlleu.
l6For details of the jurisdictions of the above agents, see the
dictionaries of Fawtier and Lot, Zeller, Doucet, and Marion;
Declarueil, Histoire ggn&rale du droit francals. pp. 636-42; Esmein,
Cours glgmentaire d1histoire du droit franqals. pp. 342-429; D'Avenel,
Richelieu et la monarchle absolue. IV, 1-27, and especially III,
Appendix IX, "Division judiclaire de la France en 1643," 458-62.
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individual litigation in particular.

Geographic boundaries of the

ressort of courts were never clearly established; the confusion
brought by diffuse districting was compounded by the attitude of
the financial agents who jealously guarded their right to adjudicate
issues involving taxes, financial officers, and royal accounts.

The

administration of the Eaux et forets had its own courts, as did the
Amlrautg, the rural constabulary, and royal mints, and after 1602
all cases involving points of honor among the nobility were sup
posed to be carried to a special Tribunal du point d'honneur. To
complete the judicial landscape, the jurisdictions of seigneurial
lords, of the Church, and of independent municipal bodies would have
to be added in overlapping and often contradictory fashion.

17

For the Parlement of Paris, however, one factor above all
others created confusion and antagonism and deeply troubled its
relationship with other royal agents.

This was the dichotomous and

still unresolved nature of sovereign justice at the highest level.
French kings always insisted that the delegation process was on
going, that they retained the right to create new courts or to dis17
'See, for example, the illustration drawn by Marcel Marion;
"The limits of the competence of ballliages and of prgsidiaux were
a perpetual subject of conflict between the two sorts of tribunals.
Even the distinction between one and the other was difficult, the
prgsidiaux being nothing other than ballliages to which had been
accorded the quality of prgsldial and which remained ballliages as
much as being prgsidiaux. The imprecision of limits of ballliages
and the great inequality of the extent of their jurisdictions was
the subject of lively complaints. . . . It happened that villages,
houses even, were divided into different ballliages. One could
point out the case of the individual near Valonges [in Normandy] who
being informed that he had been cited before a bailliage. crossed
into another room, which was not of that jurisdiction, and from
there recounted his exploit and put up a denial of competence."
Marion, Dictionnalre des institutions. pp. 32-33.
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pense justice personally, in council, or "by specially commissioned
agents of their own choosing.

The relationship between justice

already delegated to officers and that retained by the Crown was
defined only by precedent, and in the seventeenth century no
acceptable definition of .justice or^i
existed in theory or in fact.

re and justice extraor^

-re

What was clear was an historical

tendency for the Crown to intervene in normal processes of justice
when and if kings saw fit to do so; by the l600’s there existed a
long series of precedents for these questionable practices.

Louis

m i and Richelieu, however, would press the uses of extraordinary
justice beyond the limits of past reigns in fulfillment of cen
tralization and absolutism.

The instruments and agencies of Louis'

era were no different from those of the past, but the extent and
ruthlessness of their application increased notably, so notably that
one modem historian has termed the reign one of "governmental
revolution."1®
Royal intervention in the normal processes of judicial affairs
took on a bewildering variety of forms.

It has already been seen

how cases of especial interest to the king, royal family, or private
parties might be evoked, or transferred by royal letters, to another
covert, special body, or to the council.

A more spectacular practice

was the establishment of extraordinary commissions for trials of

1®For a development of the thesis of "governmental revolution"
during the reign of Louis XIII, see Moote, Revolt of the Judges, pp.
36-63, and the same author's article "The French Crown Versus its
Judicial and Financial Officials, 1615-83," Journal of Modem History.
xxnv (1962), 146-60.
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State.

These investigations and trials, often extending over long

periods of time and involving eminent personages, were frequentlyentrusted not to the Parlement alone hut to mixed bodies of com
missioned judges from the Parlement, Grand Conseil. other -parlements.
and high Crown officers.

This practice, one of the most odious of

the Old Regime by modern standards, had begun as early as the four
teenth century and persisted throughout the seventeenth century.

The

justification for the constitution of such panels, whether for the
trial of Jacques Coeur in 1453, for that of marSschal Louis de
Marillac in 1632, or for that of surintendant des finances Fouquet
in l66l, remained the same.

Nominally intended to hasten the

processes of justice and to relieve the Parlement of the burden of
lengthy affairs, the Crown in fact habitually resorted to commissalres to obtain amenable decisions.

19

The formation of chambres de justice was another favorite
instrument of the monarchy in dealing with corruption and inefficiency
in royal finances.

Such chambers had been put together under Francis

I from 1527 to 1542, under Henry IV in 1597, 1601, and 1607, and
they would be resurrected under Louis Xtll in 1624,

Many other

extraordinary matters were considered to fall under the competence
of irregular chambers* the heretics implicated in the Affair of the
Placards in 1534 had been dealt with by a specially constituted body,
19Jacques Richou, Histoire des commissions extraordina.1
sous ltanclen rSgime (Paris, 1905), and G. Dupont-Ferrier, "Le
Role des commissairgs royaux dans le gouvemement de la France
spScialement du XIV au XVI8 siecle," in Melanges Paul Fournier.
Bibliotheque du droit, no. 1 (Paris, 1929), pp. 171-84, are
essential to any study of commlssalres.
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and similar chambres ardentes were assembled against the Protestants
between 15^7 and 1560.

If the commlssaires were drawn from the

sovereign courts for investigations in a particular locality, the
20
proceedings might be called Grands .jours.
Appointment of temporary boards and chambers was closely
related to the appointment of individual commissaires d&partis who
operated in cooperation with, or outside of, the normal processes
of justice and administration.

Kings could, and did, invest a

variety of officials with individual judicial commissions.

By the

end of the 1500's, the maitres des requites were favored for these
commissions, a situation which led them to claim a monopoly on the
service, but almost any high official might serve.

21

During

Richelieu's ministry, maitres des reauetes serving with commissioned
powers increasingly took the title of intendant. though the dis
tinction between a coamlssaire and an intendant was not always
clear.

Occasionally even the king himself, or his representative

the chancellor, might administer justice directly, as in the case
of Siguier's mission to Normandy in 1639 to deal with the revolt
of the Va-nu-pleds ,2^

20Richou, Histoire des oommlRsj ons extraordlnalres. pp. 97-131;
Doucet, Les Institutions de la France. I, 175.
“ The claims of the corps of the maitres des reauetes sure set
forth in Mousnler, Lettres et mSmoires adressls au chaneelier Seguier,
I, 1*6.
22Even after Louis XEEI's reign, French kings continued to
render justice personally on diverse occasions. Louis XEV some
times came to audiences hearing petitions addressed to him and
judged them himself. The same exercise of royal arbitraire. or
prerogative, could be found in the use of lettres de cachet. These
sealed royal letters ordered agents of the Crown to execute all sorts
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Whatever their title or quality, the extraordinary powers
granted commissalres were hound to alienate regular royal officers
whose jurisdictions were closely supervised or violated..

This was

particularly true in the instance of individual commlssaires. whose
chevauchges sometimes exposed the shortcomings of the officers and
subjected them to immediate councilliar control from Paris.

The

intrusion of commlssaires into regular jurisdictions also ate into
the income that judicial officials derived from the gplces. comof orders, from imprisoning recalcitrant sons to interning suspicious
aliens. Popular history usually emphasizes the infamous aspects of
lettres de cachet, but in the eighteenth century, at least, many of
than seem to have been issued in the interest of families and at
their request. In any case, the normal administrative uses of
lettres de cachet were infinitely greater than their use as puni
tive instruments. Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit franqals.
pp. 519-21. The mission of Chancellor Sgguier to Normandy indi
cates the severity and magnitude of the Va-nu-pied affair. The
measures taken by Sgguier were proportional to the threat posed,
as indicated by the account rendered by a commlssalre accompanying
himi "'Today, January 7. 16^0, began [_the administration of] justice
in this city of Rouen with the execution of five rebels, of whom
one named Gorin was broken alive and the other four hung, after
having had la question ordinaire and extraord 1naj re in order to
know their accomplices; they had been condemned to this torture
by monseigneur the Chancellor alone, without other judges or advisers
nor formality other than that of information, depositions, and con
frontations, without having seen or heard the condemned, and without
having given any decision other than verbal.' Sgguier, docile instru
ment of the rigors of Richelieu, answered judges who were astonished
at this violation of forms, 'that he had condemned these unfor
tunates verbally and militarily; that he considered the thing as
necessity and that they still had arms in hand, in which case it
was out of service to the King, his authority, and the public
good to make some examples and to pass over ordinary forms.’"
Chgruel, Histoire de 1*administration monarchique en France. I,
297. quoting B.N. Ms. Dupuy 5^-550.
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pulsory legal fees paid to judges by the litigants in court actions.
More subtle but no less real was the long-term threat that the com
mlssaires might become regularized, thus effectively displacing the
existing bureaucratic structure.

This seems to have happened during

the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as the baillis came to be
permanently located as supervisory agents over the prfvots; the
process was repeating itself during the late sixteenth century as
the use of intendants became more common.

23

Many officers directed

their appeals against commlssaires to the parlements. which lent a
ready ear because they felt affronted by the same financial and
judicial abuses.

Resistance usually took the form of demands that

the intendants or other commlssaires register their commissions in
the regular courts before executing them.

The relationship of com

mlssaires with the parlements and other officers grew steadily more
awkward during the reigns of Henry IV and Louis Xtll, and the
question of irregular commissions became a critical issue as the
Crown continued to expand and regularize the use of intendants and
judicial commissions.

In 1600 the Parlement of Paris took a step

towards formalizing the differences between the maitres des requetes
and other parlementalres by stripping all but four of the maitres of
214,
their seats in the Parlement.
As a concession to the regular
officers after Henry IV's death in 1610, Marie de Medlcis revoked
^PagSs, "La VSnalitS des offices dans I’anclenne Prance,"
487-79; Roland Mousnier, "Etat et commissaire," in La Plume, la
faucllle et le marteau. pp. 179-99.
24
Marion, Dictonnalre des institutions. p. 359.
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fourteen extraordinary commissions and fifty-eight that had been
verified in parlements.2-* Representatives of all the sovereign
courts in the Assembly of Notables of 1626 complained of the use
of intendants. and by 1648 the issue of commlssaires would be a
principal one during the Fronde of that year.

26

The problem of sovereign justice and the jurisdiction of the
Parlement would have been complex and delicate even if the court
had been confined to a purely judicial role.

But in fact the

Parlement was never exclusively a judicial body.

By 1625 the

court had been an autonomous institution for nearly 300 years,
yet even these three centuries of development had not led the court
into specialization in the judicial role.

Indeed, the history of

the Parlement had always been marked by quite the opposite tendency,
producing a body which not only adjudicated private disputes but
which also administered, legislated, and conserved law in a way
quite unknown to modern governmental institutions.
The diversity of the Parlement's functions was due in part
to a blending of judicial and police powers which typified most
administrative agencies of the monarchy.

Under conditions of the

Old Regime, the modem differentiation between the administration
25
Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal due de Richelieu, M&nolres.
ed. Petitot and Monmerqiifc (10 vols.} Paris, 1823). I> 75*
2<*Moote, "The French Crown Versus its Judicial and Financial
Officials," 147-51; Paul Doolin, The Fronde (Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1936), pp. 10-21; Jeanne Petit, L'AssemblSe des notables. 1626-1627
(Paris, 1937), PP. 256-70.
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of justice and the exercise of police powers was unknown.

In the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even the words police and
administration were used interchangeably to encompass both the
concept of judgment and enforcement of public order; the same
qualities of judgment and administration were vested in one agency
without arousing a concern for human rights so evident today.^
Writing in 1895> Georges d*Avenel described the blurred attributions
of the Old Regime as a "confusion of powers" and noted that
under Richelieu, the administrative attributions of the gens
de .justice are so multiple that one in truth does not know
to what areas they do not extend. . . . The Parlement of
Paris busies itself in detail with the cleaning of streets
and the collection of trash, forbids Madame Pibracq to
remarry for the seventh time, and accords to Madame D'Effiat
the prohibitions she seeksgto prevent her son Cinq-Mars from
marrying Marion de Lorme.
Confusion of powers meant that the Parlement was charged with a
27
'Gaston Zeller poses the question of the relationship between
police powers and administration in this wayt "Is this to say that we
should be authorized to translate, on each occasion, nolice for admin
istration? It is so, and for many reasons. The language of the six
teenth century is still badly fixed, and the same term often had
several quite different meanings. This is the case for police." A
little further Zeller notes "the notion evoked by the word police
recovers well our modem notion of administration." and he con
cludes by maintaining that "justice and police find themselves in
the same hands. Police, although clearly distinct from justice, and
in a large measure opposed to it, is readily considered as a depen
dence of it, or at least as an indispensable complement. It bears, in
fact, a power of execution . . . without which justice is impotent."
See Gaston Zeller, "L’Administration monarchique avant les intendants,"
Revue historique. CXEVII (l9^7)> 181-85. The same problem of
semantics and its relationship to the attributions of judicial bodies
is treated in Georges PagSs* "Essai sur Involution des institutions
administratives en Prance du commencement du XVI siecle a la fin
du XVH ," Revue d*histoire moderae. new series, I (1932), 8-57.
^^Richelieu et la monarchie absolue. IV, 130-32.
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wide range of administrative functions outside its judicial sphere
hut within the role of maintaining public order in the kingdom and
especially in the city of Paris.

To carry out its administrative

and police functions, the Parlement frequently resorted to the arret
de r&glement. a judicial or administrative decree.

Some arrets

simply covered technicalities and omissions in the law, but others
closely resembled modem court injunctions in their regulatory
effects.

Whatever their nature, and there were many types, the arrets

de r£glement gave the Parlement an important legislative power since
all of them carried the force of the king's law and were enforced by
officers of the court as well as the police forces of the capital.2^
The presence of the Parlement in the capital, representing as it
did the sovereign authority of the king at the highest level, meant
that the people of Paris looked to the court to provide leadership
and guidance in matters that would today be considered the province
of municipal administration.

This was particularly true in an age of

continued crisis and royal mobility which frequently found the king
and council out of the city in times of local or national emergency.
Just such an instance occurred in 1^99 when the Pont Notre-Dame
linking the Ile-de-la-CitS with the right bank collapsed, pitching
houses, shops, and occupants into the Seine.

To satisfy an outraged

public opinion the Parlement acted Immediately, imprisoning the
mayor and most of the town council who seemed to be responsible for
29
^Zeller, HL'Administration monarchique," 185-86; Olivier-Martin,
Histoire du droit franyals. pp. 538-^1; Aubert, "Le Parlement de
Paris," II, 58-63.
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the mishap.

The court launched an investigation into the disaster,

then temporarily took over operation of the municipal administration
pending the outcome of the inquiry.

The final decision of the

court deposed the culpable officials and ordered new elections
conforming to a special arret issued for the purpose.

Prom that

time forward the court exercised a permanent supervision over all
details of Parisian elections and found itself qualified to inter
vene in many aspects of daily administration.^0
At other times of crisis, the court took active charge of
municipal affairs and sometimes even extended its leadership into
a considerable political role.

In 1512, for example, the court

directed the city's defenses against the menace of an English
invasion.

Again in 1525* just after the Battle of Pavia, it was

the Parlement which exercised a preponderant influence in national
as well as local government.

On March 7, immediately after

receiving news of the catastrophe in Italy and the captivity of
Francis, the Parlement took steps to direct the defense of the
country.

Under the initiative of the court, a steering committee

of twenty-three members was formed on March 10* nine members of the
Parlement, six deputies of the city, three from the Chambre des
comptes. the Bishop of Paris, a monk, an abbot, and two represen
tatives from the University.

This committee met several times and

drew up a lengthy list of thirty-three articles which it recommended
30
Zeller, "L*Administration monarchique," 192-93; Shennan,
Parlement of Paris.86-89. Relations between the court and the city
of Paris are described in a lengthy article by Felix Aubert, "Le
Parlement et la ville de Paris au XVI siicle," Revue des Etudes
historioues. VII (1905), 224-487.
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to Louise of Savoy, the regent in Francis’ absence.

The regent

accepted the proposals of the covert and promised to implement as
many of them as possible.31
On a more mundane, but no less necessary, basis the Parlement
came to supervise almost every aspect of municipal affairs.

All

during the sixteenth century the court acted as watch-dog over city
elections, and it closely audited the city's financial affairs,
particularly scrutinizing the administration of royal rentes, or
state revenue bonds issued on the credit of the Hotel de ville.
Payment of interest on these rentes was always behind schedule;
during the ministry of Richelieu the Parlement was compelled to
intervene in disorders growing out of non-payment of arrears in the
rentes. The prevention of crime was always of first concern to the
magistrates who, in the interest of public order, found it necessary
to regulate hospitals, public lighting, care of the poor, prostitution,
vagrancy, public spectacles, and any other activity or institution
connected with public security.

Preservation of the physical well

being of Parisians was also interpreted to Include provisioning of
the city’s markets, especially the bread market, to ensure a constant
supply of quality foodstuffs at reasonable prices.

Adequate provision

of bread, however, was but one aspect of the alimentary administration
undertaken by the Parlement.

The commerce in fish and salt was so

extensive and so important to the city that a special chamber, the
31Zeller, "L 'Administration monarchique,” 19*4-95. Maugis,
Hlstolre du Parlement. I, 555-60.
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Chambre de la mar6e, was set up in the Parlement to regulate the
fish trade and adjudicate disputes arising out of it.^2 Finally,
the judges were responsible for the upkeep of Parisian streets,
bridges, and quays, an obligation which often revolved about the
seemingly insoluble problem of cleaning the byways of the city.^
The traditional affiliation between the Parlement, the municipal
government, and the public welfare of Paris continued during the
ministry of Richelieu much as it had in past years.

Always influ

ential in urban matters, the judges’ patrimonial supervision of
charity and law enforcement virtually became dictation in times of
crisis like those which appeared in 1631.

The course of that year

produced an exceptionally tragic combination of plague, vagrancy,
and violent crime in the Paris basin corresponding with difficult
times found elsewhere in the kingdom.

The registers of the Parle

ment testify that between January, 1631, and March, 1632, trying
conditions frequently overwhelmed the resources of the city fathers
who sought relief in the Parlement's sovereign authority and prestige.
On many other occasions the court seized the initiative, either
ordering the officials of the Chatelet, Hotel de vllle, and neigh
borhood quarters to appear before the parquet and account for
deficiencies in the city's administration, or pursuing independent
32
On the Chambre de la marfle see supra, p. 18.
33
Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 86-95; Zeller, "L'Adminis
tration monarchique," 188-97, Aubert, "Le Parlement et la ville de
Paris," passim.
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courses of corrective action.
A virulent outbreak of violent crime towards the end of January,
1631, signalled the beginning of that somber year's cheerless court
calendar of urban affairs.

On January 29th officials from the

Chatelet were hailed into the Parlement to explain an increasing
number of murders, thefts, and violences that were occurring daily
in spite of arrets given by the Parlement.

The officers from the

Right Bank countered that the forces provided them were insufficient
for the job at hand, and the court agreed to ask the King to assist
in erforcing its arrets against vagabonds, gens sans aveu. tobacco
vendors, pages, and lackeys carrying swords.

t Zl

Five days later,

a serious Smotion populaire involving several hundred persons
took place in front of the house of one Jean Bryois, a farmer of
the aides.

35

Once again the lieutenant civil and his assistants

maintained that they had done everything possible to stop the riot
and announced that an investigation was underway.

The Parlement

ordered the Chatelet to continue its inquiry and made "express pro
scriptions and prohibitions against assembling, bearing arms, or
loitering by the wayside under any pretext at pain of being declared
criminals of llse-ma.1estg and perturbators of the public repose.
"5I I

B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891» fols. 68-69, January 29, 1631.
■^This riot followed rumors of an impending increase in the aides
on wine in Paris. Jean Bryois, sieur de Bagnolet, had been a fermler
ad.iudlcatalre des aides since 1628. On the Bryois Affair, see infra.
P. 433.
36B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9891. fols. 69-70, February k, 1631.
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Further, the officials of the Chatelet. the Hotel de ville, and the
city watch were to patrol the city to enforce justice, putting the
captains and bourgeois of each quarter under notice to take up their
arms in prevention of further riots.

The decision was to be an

nounced, as was customary, to the sound of trumpets at the city's
intersections so that no one could plead ignorance.
As the spring of 1631 progressed, a particularly ^lastly reason
for violent crime raised its ugly heal.
plague.

Paris was infected with the

On Saturday, May 24, the lieutenants civil and crlmlnel

appeared before the parquet to present a morbid report on the state
of affairs at the Ch&telet. where two jailers, the greffler's clerk,
and others had died of the plague.

The officers had come to the

Parlement to request a mass evacuation of the Grand Chatelet prison.
Those imprisoned for debts up to 300 livres would simply be released;
those held for debts in excess
the custody

of 300 livres would be turned

overto

of their creditors if they wanted to take charge

otherwise they, too, would be set free.

ofthem,

The officers also wanted

permission to judge pending criminal affairs immediately and to send
other prisoners to various prisons until the sickness abated.

The

Parlement agreed on all points.^®
During the summer months the sickness apparently ebbed, only to

•^B.N.

Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891# fol. 70, February 4, I63I.

■^B.N.

Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 102, May 24, 1631.
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return with a grisly vengeance in September.

On the 12th of that

month -procureur ggnSral Mathieu Molg notified the Chambre des
vacations that the Saint Victor and University quarters were "greatly
infected" and that it would be necessary to open the poor house of
Saint Marcel to accommodate the sick from these quarters.

The

expense of this operation, together with the rising costs of the
overloaded H8tel Dieu and Hopital Saint Denis, would require new
revenues.

The Parlement responded by authorizing a one-year boost

in municipal poor taxes to cover the costs of maintaining the Hopital
Saint Marcel.

The court thought some further assistance might be

expected from the Archbishop of Paris and the city's clergy, who
would be asked to solicit voluntary contributions through their
sermons.

39

By September 24 conditions in the environs of Paris

had worsened to the point that MolS asked the Parlement to cancel
the annual fair at Saint Denis planned for October 8. The Parlement
immediately complied.

40

Still more bad news was announced in the

Palais on October 15 when MolS presented a lettre de cachet officially
reporting grim economic facts that most Parisians already knew: a
poor grain harvest had necessitated a ban on all exports from the
kingdom.

41

The short grain supply soon affected city services.

•^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891. fol. 147, September 12, 1631.
/l
Q

B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891» fol. 150, September 24, I63I.
4lMol§, MSmolres. II, 74.
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When the Parlement ordered the streets of Paris cleaned on November
17f it also had to order additional supplies of grain for the cart
horses.

42

Because of the poor harvest, Paris became a refuge for rural
ne'er-do-wells seeking jobs or charity in the city.

This migration

occurred every year after the fall harvest, but in 1631 the number
of wanderers was greater than usual.

Together with the plague, the

influx of these frightened and desperate people drove the incidence
of crime upward during the late fall and winter of 1631. The Parle
ment habitually took a simplistic and unimaginative approach to such
circumstances by berating the Chatelet for its failures instead of
attempting any lasting reform, without expanding the city's meagre
force of archers, or even without remonstrating to the King.

Instead,

the court preferred to renew oft-repeated injunctions about public
safety.

On November 17, the officers of the watch were once again

enjoined to throw vagrants out of the city, to put a stop to thievry,
and to better care for the poor and plague sick.

Next day the

lieutenant criminal and some conseillers of the Chatelet were back
before the bar on a rumor that they had made some difficulty over
sentencing repeat offender vagabonds to the galleys.

The parle-

mentalres decided that all such trials should be carried out summarily
upon a report from the head of the city watch at eight o'clock each
morning.

First President Le Jay, himself a former lieutenant civil

42
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq.. 9891, fol. 160, November 17, 1631.
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with three years experience, stiffly reproached the officials before
him, saying "their negligence was the reason why there was no
security in the city either in the morning or the evening because
of thefts" and "that if they did not want to acquit their duties
([in such cases] the court would be constrained to take jurisdiction
over them.”

Such admonitions given without adequate social

palliatives were foredoomed to have little lasting effect.

Exactly

five months later, on March 17, 1632, MolS presented fresh complaints
about murders, thefts, and assaults which were being committed at
all hours.

The Parlement reacted as it had before,

conforming to previous arrets, ordered and orders that all un
enrolled soldiers, vagabonds, and others who were not domestics
actually living in the houses of seigneurs should be ousted
from the city, vicomtS, and ur6vot§ of Paris within twentyfour hours after the publication of the present decision,
permitting the lieutenant civil, lieutenant crlmlnel, lieu
tenant criminal de robe courte. and prSvot d.efl’lsle to
imprison them without heeding their excuses.
Maintenance of public order certainly included the regulation
of ideas, media, and spiritual matters which might disturb the
tranquillity of Frenchmen; in pursuing this role the court found
itself entangled in the affairs of the Sorbonne.

During the sixteenth

century the court had to intervene in the elections of rectors on five
occasions, three times to put an end to violence and twice to control
43
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 162, November 18, 1631.
Le Jay had bought the post of lieutenant civil at the Chatelet after
the death of Frangois Miron in 1^10. He remained there three years,
purchasing a presidency in the Parlement in 1613.
44
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 186-87, March 17, 1632.
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irregularities in procedure.

Prom medieval times the Parlement fixed

the times of lectures and the dates and methods of examinations,
helped shape the curriculum, regulated qualifications for degrees,
seconded appointments to professorial chairs, and issued a host of
arrets dealing with the unseemly and unruly behavior of students.^
The role of the Parlement as public censor began about the time
of the Reformation and grew in proportion to the threat posed by
Protestant heresies.

In 1523 the court went so far as to draw up

a list of prohibited books.

Over the course of the sixteenth century,

the court's index llbrorum prohibitorum was broadened to include works
as diverse as Rabelais’ Pantagruel and Calvin's Institutes. Towards
the first part of the seventeenth century the court became somewhat
less paternal in its censorship, but never did it abandon its firm
opposition to any work which smacked of heresy or anti-Gallicanism.
After Henry IV’s murder, the problem of Jesuit Ultramontanism
increasingly displaced reformist doctrines in the magistrates’
attentions.

In June, 1610, the Parlement condemned the de Rege

et Regis institutions of the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana for
praising in express terms the assassination of Henry IV.

Con

demnation of other Jesuit works followed: Cardinal Bellarmine’s
Tractatus de Potestate summi pontlflcls In temnorallbus went to
the public hangman in November, 1610, and Suarez’ La Defense de la
fol cathollque. apostolloue. contre les erreurs de la secte
^^Maugis, Histolre du Parlement. H , Appendix H , "Du controle
et de la reformation des universitSs par le Parlement au XVIe siecle,"
352-57; Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 91-93; Aubert, "Le Parle
ment et la ville de Paris,"~56^-71.
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d*Angleterre followed soon after.

46

Suppression of these Jesuit

works did nothing to reconcile the principles of the Order with those
of secular authority; the issue of Jesuit literature would appear
once again in the 1620's when the Parlement attempted to suppress
an Ultramontanist work by the Jesuit Santarelli.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the Parlement had achieved
an illustrious reputation as the highest tribunal in the kingdom.

As

sovereign judges, the magistrates had dealt out justice in the
greatest civil and criminal cases in the history of the monarchy; in
judging such cases, many of which were wrought with implications for
the welfare of the Grown, the court established a renowned reputation
as defender of the monarchy and unifier of the kingdom.

In 1476,

for example, judges from the Parlement had condemned the comte de
St. Paul, Constable of Prance, for conspiring with the due de
Bourgogne against the king.

In 1528 the court adjudged Charles II,

due de Bourbon and Constable of Prance, guilty of lfese-majestd and
ordered his arms and heraldry effaced, deprived him of the peerage
of Bourbon, damned his memory, and confiscated his property in the
name of the Crown.

The list of greats condemned for crimes against

the Crown continued throughout the Wars of Religion and into the
seventeenth century.

In 1602 the Parlement deemed the marfischal

Biron guilty of crimes against the king and dauphin, and again in
46
Sherman, Parlement of Paris, pp. 94-96; Glasson, Le Parlement
de Paris. I, 120-21; Richelieu, Mlmolres. I, 59-61, 202-03; Aubert,
"Le Parlement et la ville de Paris," 471-76; Roland Mousnier, The
Assassination of Henry IV, trans. Joan Spencer (New York, 1973),
pp. 101-03, 251-58.
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1605 the court found Louis Delagonia, sieur de Merigues, guilty of
47
lese-ma.iestg.
As administrators, too, the court had acted in less
spectacular ways to defend the interests of the Grown and to main
tain law and public order on a daily basis.

The court continually

ministered to the needs of Parisians, supported Gallicanism and the
Catholic faith, supervised higher eductation, and upon occasion
organized the defense of the capital.
By the reign of Louis XIII, then, a long tradition dictated that
the Parlement was the proper repository and guardian of the law of
the kingdom.

Bearing in mind the diffuse nature of sovereignty,

justice, and the qualities of public functions under the Old Regime,
i.e., those qualities that D’Avenel labeled the "confusion of powers,"
it was virtually certain that the magistrates would be drawn into any
matter of legal import to the Crown.

As J. H. Shennan has noted,

"this institution more than any other could remind the king of his
primary obligation to rule justly.

For to rule justly implied

respect for the law, and the law of the kingdom and the countless
civil and criminal judgments based upon these laws were enshrined in
48
the parlement*s official records."
In historical terms, the long political traditions of the
Parlement might be traced back to its parent body, the curia regis.
47
These examples and a host of others dating from 576 can be
found in B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 208-44, "Des punitions et peines
ordonn§es contre divers grands, et personnes plus considerables en
France."
48
J. H. Shennan, Government and Society in France. I46l-l66l
(New York, 1969), p. 14. See infra, pp. 97-98, for a description
of the court's records.
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which had expressed all aspects of Capetian authority.

In spite of

two and a half centuries of institutional autonomy and despite the
transformation of its personnel, the Parlement never escaped the
stamp of its councilliar origins.

The ancient council had advised

and administered as well as judged the kingdom, and over the course
of centuries the Parlement had continued to do likewise.

This

situation was dramatically symbolized in the ceremony of the lit de
justice when king, peers, and court solemnly assembled in a plenary
session which re-enacted a meeting of the old curia regis.

Lits de

justice were exceptional expressions of the councilliar quality of
the court, but on a daily basis the kings of France had continued to
treat their high court as a consultative body, sending it legislation
for preliminary examination and demanding of it advice on thorny
legal problems.

In so doing, the monarchy created a long tradition

of consultation which would, by the 1500's, be transmuted into an
important check on the absolute prerogatives of royal legislation.
The practices that led to the Parlement's famous right of regis
tration and judicial review began in a modest way with the sending of
royal documents to the court for review and examination.

The pro

cedure centered upon the court's practice of registering and
publishing royal letters and ordinances.

This ceremony was a public

one held in the Grand*Chambre, where all the judges were assembled
to hear the new enactments read out and solemnly transcribed into
the Parlement's registers.

The practice had a dual purpose: new

enactments were properly publicized, and inscription in the court’s
registers provided an authentic and permanent record of all royal
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legislation.

The custom of registration began soon after the

Parlement acquired its separate identity, as revealed by early
registers: "Given at Paris in our Parlement, the year of grace
1325 > in the month of March . . . read and published in the Parle49
ment and the assembled chamber."
The formula varied somewhat in
coming decades, but the essential phrase lecta et •publicata remained
very nearly the same throughout the history of the court.

In time,

registration and publication came to be regarded as marlM ng the
formal legality of royal law, and after registration the Parlement
disseminated copies of the new law or letters to all subordinate
jurisdictions.
Prom the middle of the fourteenth century the formula of regis
tration began to alter in subtle but important ways which represent
a modified procedure.

As early as 1366 one can find evidence of the

right of the court to participate with members of the council in
discussion and correction of the text of ordinances: "Seen, read,
and corrected [italics Maugis] by lords of the Great Council and
deputies of the king's Parlement."**'1' In 1376 another royal ordinance
was published and registered with reservations inserted by the
procureur gSnSral and approved by the court to protect the rights of
^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 522-23.
^Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francals. pp. 541-42;
Esmein, Cours glSmentalre d*hlstoire du droit francals. pp. 507-11;
Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 159-^0.
■^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 523, quoting registers of
the court for July 25, 13*>6.
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the king.^
Out of the scrutiny of royal acts and the modification of them
arose the procedure of remonstrances. During the early fourteenth
century the Parlement presented informal, verbal complaints to the
king about those aspects of his legislation which conflicted with
established law or which the magistrates deemed ill-advised.

The

time of troubles which came with the minority of feeble-minded
Charles VI (1380-1422) strengthened the practice of remonstrances
into a recognized, though badly defined, part of •parlementalre pro
cedure.

Llts de .justice and unions of the court with the council

were frequent during this time and enhanced the Parlement's consul
tative traditions, as did commissions drawn from the court which
prepared edicts and staffed chambers working on the reformation of
justice.

The court was permitted, even expected, to advise the

Crown on law submitted to it; on the other hand, the remonstrances
were expected to be concise and not impede the registration process.
The court, too, was expected to maintain at least the forms of
humility and respect as indicated by the ritual formula tres humble
et tres resuecteuses remonstrances (very humble and very respectful
52
"A tergo litterarum predictarum, erant scripta verba que
secunturt Presentes littere lecte fuerunt et publicate in camera
Parlamenti, salvo et reservato procuratori regio de impunandc dlctas
litteras pro jure regio et dlcto jure super hoc, loco et tempore,
persequendo, de quo dictus procurator regius protestatus est."
Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 525» quoting registers of the court
for March 28, 13737
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remonstrances).^
Obviously the king was not always willing to see the magistrates'
point of view and comply with their recommendations, nor could he
allow them to block proposed legislation by their refusal to
register enactments.

Consequently, as early as 1392 kings began

the practice of issuing royal lettres de .iussion when the Parlement
remained obdurate after having received a reply to its remonstrances.
Lettres de .iussion emanated from the king's person and ordered
immediate and unqualified registration in a prescription which would
change little from the first known example*
We summon and rigidly enjoin you that not withstanding the
debates and allegations of our said procureur. nor others
however made or done, and the said support of cause, you
should obey our said other letters, and register or have
them registered point by point without any difficulty what
soever, according to their form and tenor . . . because
it pleases us to be thus out of-pur special grace, certain
knowledge, and royal authority.
The court was then presumed compelled to register without
further contention, but if it complied, it was only reluctantly and
with a careful note of the compulsive circumstances: lecta et
puhlicata de expresso mandato dominl regio (read and published
at the express mandate of our lord king).^
^Ibld., 523-25; Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francals. pp.

543-44.
54

Isambert, Anclennes lols franpalses. VI, 703.

^Esmein, Cours gl&aentalre d*histoire du droit franpais. p. 513.
A more vigorous expression of the same compulsive circumstances was
that registration had been made de l'expres comTna.ndf»Tnent du roi,
plusleurs fois r§lt§r§ (at the express command of the king, several
times repeated). Olivier-Martin, Hlstoire du droit franpals. p. 544;
La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des parlemens. Bk. XIII, Ch. XVII, No.
14. The court’s memory for forced registrations was very long and
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If the court remained recalcitrant sifter lettres de .iussion. the
king had other resources.

He could reinforce letters hy sending them

in the care of an important prince or councillor; if the court
resisted these measures, the final and ultimate royal alternative
was for the king to come in person and force registration hy holding
a lit de .justice. On these solemn occasions the presence of the king's
person, minor or not, was considered sufficient to ensure the court's
immediate registration without further discussion or dissension.

Thus

hy the instruments of royal letters or royal appearance in court, the
king preserved his authority, while the procedure of remonstrances
conserved the councilliar heritage of the court and acknowledged the
Parlement's role in political matters.^
The development of the apparatus of negotiation was interrupted
during the first third of the fifteenth century hy the breakdown of
centralized authority.

Like all Frenchmen the magistrates were riven

between the contestants for royal power, and after 1418 the adherents
of Charles VII left Paris and constituted a separate narlement at
Poitiers.

With the triumph of Charles and his return to Paris in

was, in fact, ingrained in official practice. In the seventeenth
century La Roche-Flavin wrote that "when the court, after several
refusals, .iussions. and remonstrances, is constrained to publish
some edict prejudicial to the public with the accustomed clause
at the very express command of the king, it then makes a deliberation
that each year following tres humble remonstrances will be made to
the king to revoke such edict until it should be revoked.” La RocheFlavin, Treze livres des narlemens. Bk. XIII, Ch. XVII, No. 16.
“^Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francals, p. 5^* Esmein,
Cours glgmentalre d'hlfltolre du droit francals. p. 512.
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in 1436, the two courts were reunited, but it was some time before
the prestige of the court was restored.
The last fifty years of the fifteenth century marked the final
evolutionary stage in the development of registration and remon
strance.

Until this time the court had often been associated with

the preparation of legislation, and it had occasionally even
formulated reform measures on its own initiative.

Under the

vigorous rule of Louis XI and Charles VIII, however, there was
an increasing tendency to exclude the Parlement from consultation
until final registration and publication were required.

The result

of this trend was a narrowing of the ways in which the consultative
function of the court might be effected.

The initiative for, and

drafting of, legislation fell more and more into the hands of king
and council; concurrently, the modifications of the court came to
be submitted as remonstrances after the reception of the final draft.
Even more importantly, the Parlement was forced into a negative and
critical position which had to be overcome by royal authority.
Remonstrances thus tended more and more to become the prologue to
prolonged negotiation and confrontaxion when the court objected to
proposed legislation.
The new pattern is illustrated very well by procedures followed
in 1493 and 1499 when the court received legislation without its
prior knowledge or consultation.

In July, 1493, Charles VIII

personally informed an assembly of the court that he had decided to
turn his attention to the reform of justice and had committed to the
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project several great and notable personages, including princes,
lords, prelates, barons, and his royal council.

This commission

had produced a new ordinance which was then read to the gathering.
The next day the King returned to the Parlement to have the articles
published in his presence and to receive the oath from those who had
to guard and keep the new law.

On this occasion, however, the First

President told the King that certain articles presented the day before
were merely the repetition of old ordinances to which some new pro
visions had been added.

After an exchange on this point and remon

strances by the avocat g€n€ral Le Maitre, Charles agreed to entertain
the court’s advice and remedy the difficulties.

Next day, in full

assembly, the court decided to request modification on several points
and proceeded to draw up the necessary revisions.

A little later

the King was presented with the modified articles, which were
accepted.

This done, members of the court then took the oath to

guard and keep the ordinance and proceeded to publish it.

‘57

Six years later, on April 15» 1499• Louis XII presented another
ordinance of reform for registration in the same manner as his prede
cessor.

The First President responded that the court would see to the

matter with all diligence.

This the court did, undoubtedly through

a committee of examination; the assembled court heard the committee’s
report on June 6. Even after seven weeks of work by rapporteurs in
committee, though, the full court still found four articles unac
ceptable and ordered them redrawn.

The revisions were apparently

■^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 540-41; the text of the
ordinance is in Isambert, Anclennes lols francalses. XI, 214-49.
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minor, for the very next day the reformed articles were presented
in a second plenary session and were approved.

Further action was

delayed until final publication in a lit de .justice on June 13.
After an emphatic speech in which Le Maltre rendered homage to the
two powers which had colloborated in giving law to the kingdom, the
avocat ggnSral required that the formula lecta. publicata. et
reglstrata should be written across the ordinance, "so that no
one should pretend cause of ignorance and that they [the articles]
should be perpetually formed and established."-^ After this was
completed, the First President took the opinions of all magistrates
and reported the results to the King, who ordered them written into
the register.

As had been the case in 1493, the First President

reserved the right of the court to inform the King should it be dis
covered upon usage that the ordinance needed to be corrected, en
larged, or reduced.

Then, with the doors of the Grand'Chambre closed

and the public retired, the eighty-four judges present swore on the
Scriptures, under the hands of the Bishop of Albi, to obey the new
law quantum fragilltas humana poterlt (as much as human frailty would
permit).^
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the procedures of
registration and remonstrance, like the publication of edicts, were
fixed in most essential aspects as they would be in the reign of Louis

^^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 543*
-^Ibld.. 542-43; the text of the ordinance is in Isambert,
Anclennes lois francalses. XI, 401-05.
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XIII.

The course of the sixteenth century would add nothing funda

mental to the apparatus of negotiation, "but previously accepted
practices underwent elaboration when the court confronted the
increased authority of strong Renaissance monarchs.

Francis I,

Henry II, and Henry IV were authoritarian rulers, jealous of their
rights, and were, moreover, engaged in many sensitive enterprises,
including waging a massive war and suppressing internal religious
dissension; they were not men to tolerate extended controversy and
benevolently allow their decisions to be frustrated by the Parlement.
If these rulers showed themselves ready to take council in matters
of a strictly juridical sort, they also showed themselves determined
in all matters directly interesting to their authority and govern
ment.

Amid the public calamities of the century, on the other hand,

the Parlement's political heritage, the growth of its complement,
and the aggravations and abuses of venality could not help but em
bolden the magistrates to make themselves more than ever the
universal interpreter of complaints, especially during the first
half of the century when the Estates General did not meet.^
The increasing complexity and intensity of the confrontation
between the court and Grown appeared early in the 1500's with the
Parlement's resistance to the Concordat of Bologna.

On June 8, 1517,

the Concordat itself was sent to the Parlement for registration; the
gens du roi concluded that further examination of the document was

^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 5^3-^5»
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in order and a commission was appointed to see to the matter.

This

decision meant delay, and on June 21 Francis wrote to the court to
demand immediate registration.

The magistrates continued to pro

crastinate even after the King sent his uncle, RenS of Savoy, to
assist in the deliberations; on the 24th of July the court finally
decided to refuse registration of the Concordat as against the honor
of God and King, as contrary to the liberties of the Galilean Church,
and detrimental to the well-being of the kingdom.

In particular the

Parlement objected to the violation of the electoral principle and the
payment of the annates which went contrary to the Pragmatic Sanction
of 1438,

If the King remained intransigent, the court held, it would

be necessary to convene a council of the French Church as had been
done in elaborating the Pragmatic Sanction.

From the magistrates'

point of view, the situation was simply that both the King's policy
and his method of procedure were arbitrary, and the Parlement was
bound to oppose him on both accounts.^1
Francis, on the other hand, saw his authority being undermined
by the Parlement's resistance and moved to overrride it.

On Feb

ruary 28, 1518, he conducted an interview with deputies of the court
at Amboise.

After hearing their remonstrance, the King replied

with stinging harshness "that there would be only a king in France,"
and that "they should take heed that there would not be a senate in
Prance as in Venice." The concordats should be published, "otherwise
^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, p. 195» Dufey, Hlstoire des
parlemens de France. I, 157-63.
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he would make them sorrier than they had ever been before.” The
proper function of the court was the administration of justice, to
which the judges should confine their attentions, seeing that it
"was as badly administered then as it had been a hundred years ago."
Francis continued in this vein, admonishing the judges that if they
did not obey he would have them "scamper after him like those in the
Grand Consell.11^
By maintaining that the Parlement was only a court of law,
which clearly it was not, Francis was again asserting an extreme
view of his own authority.

The magistrates were less willing than

ever to approve the Concordat and were forced into a decision only
after hearing rumors that the King was contemplating the creation
of a parlement at Orleans to replace that of Paris.

More than a year

after its initial presentation, the Concordat was finally registered
on March 22, 1518.

Even then the court insisted that final regis

tration should not abrogate the provisions of the Pragmatic Sanction,
that a prince of standing should present the document to the court,
and that the formula of registration should note the forced nature
of the circumstances. These provisions were accommodated.

In the

presence of the seigneur de TrSmoille, the King's chamberlain, the
court reluctantly entered the necessary words on its registers:
"Read, published, and registered at the express order of our lord
king several times repeated and in the presence of his emissary

^2
Dufey, Histoire des parlemens de France. I, 164-65.
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63 Even these conditions did not satisfy the con

specially sent."

sciences of the magistrates; on the 24th of March the court con
fided its protestations to secret registers separately and illegally
maintained for the purpose.

64

Relations between Francis and the Parlement remained tenuous
after the affair of the Concordat; indeed, the remainder of Francis'
reign would he filled with abusive creations of office, remonstrances,
.iusslons. and more or less forced registrations.

In 1519 the Parle

ment stalled Francis' attempt to enlarge the court by creating a
third chamber of Enquetes. and the creation was not registered until
1523.

Immediately after conceding this creation, the court objected

to the establishment of a records keeper for the Sorbonne and several
posts subordinate to the prgvot of Paris.

The years of Francis’

captivity (1525-1526) continued to be troubled ones as the court took
the opportunity of the King's absence to press for reforms in the
Church, finances, justice, and the army.^
Perhaps the worst conflict of Francis’ reign flared up during
the summer of 1526 between Chancellor Antoine Duprat and the Parle*^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 554; Dufey, Hlstoire des
narlemens de France. I, 156-72.
64
Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 550-54; Shennan, Parlement
of Paris, p. 195^
^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 552-55. Shennan, Parlement
of Paris, p. 197; Christopher Stocker, "The Politics of the Parle
ment in 1525." French Historical Studies. VIII, no. 2 (Fall, 1973).
191-212.
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ment.^

Over the objections of monks and canons, Duprat had been

named to the archbishopric of Sens and the abbacy of Salnt-Benoltsur-Loire.

When the offended Churchmen appealed their case to the

Parlement, the judges ruled in behalf of the electoral principle and
in favor of Duprat's rivals.

The wrangle between Duprat and the court

escalated into a major affair in which the Chancellor himself was
subpoenaed to appear before the bar of justice.

Despite repeated

evocations to the Grand Conseil and nullifications of parlementaire
arrets, the judges three times accepted the appeal of Duprat’s an
tagonists.

In remonstrances presented on July 27, 1526, the court

boldly claimed that "the procedure of remonstrances has been created
for cases of dissent.

When remonstrances are honest and reasonable,

they have traditionally reduced the prince to reason."^

Believing

Francis would soon return, the regent held firm and a temporary lull
came as the court was distracted hy prolonged discussion of a peace
treaty with England.
But in December, 1526, Francis returned to Paris and the case
of Duprat was re-opened.

Three conselllers and the procureur g€n§ral

were summoned into Francis' presence, there to confront the Chancellor

66

Antoine Duprat, appointed Chancellor of France on January 5»
1515* was a former First President of the Parlement. Despite his
magisterial experience, Duprat was a staunch defender of royal
prerogative. Duprat died at Nantouillet on July 9, 1535, after
having taken ecclesiastical orders in 1517.

67

Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 572.
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and his agents in the conflict.

After hearing both sides, the King

supported Duprat and stiff punishment was meted out to the four
ringleaders: all four ware banned from entering the court until the
King should next go there in person.

The King did not go until six

months later in a memorable lit de .justice held on July 27, 1527,
when Francis, still thoroughly at odds with the court, laid down a
specific and detailed denial of the Parlement's right to meddle in
affairs of State.

The Parlement was not in the future to consider

affairs other than those of justice; it was to receive annual letters
of confirmation of membership; it was prohibited from judging matters
involving archbishops, bishops, and abbots; all limitations proposed
by the judges during the regency and all appeals heard in contra
vention to royal wishes were negated.

The court was restricted to

making remonstrances presented in a manner benefitting royal authority
and was prohibited from creating any limitation to an ordinance or
edict of the king.

As a final surety, the clerk of the court was

ordered to present his registers within fifteen days to show that
he had struck out all offending passages recorded during Francis'
absence.

68

After the restrictive edict of 1527» one might conclude that the
Parlement would no longer be involved in high matters of State.
Nothing could be further from the faults, for the prohibitions of
1527 became a dead letter as a result of variable and often contra-

“ d m -, 580-8**; Isambert, Anclennes lols franyalses, XII,
279-80.
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dictory royal actions and attitudes.

Just six months after

restricting the court, in December, 1527. Francis sought the legal
opinion and backing of the Parlement in abrogating the Treaty of
Madrid.

After four days of deliberation, the Parlement reported

its common opinion which wholly satisfied the King on a.11 points.
Yet in August, 1539. after submitting the Ordinance of VillersCottorets to the court, Francis cut short review of the articles
and imperatively ordered its registration without delay.

On

this occasion Francis declared he found the court’s delay very
strange* the deliberation and decision made in his council was
fully sufficient, therefore publication according to form and tenor
should follow immediately.

In March, 1540, however, the King sub

mitted a detailed financial edict regulating the minting and value
of money. The court brought extensive modifications to the edict,
and apparently this modification process was tolerated by the Grown,
for the discussions continued for a year.^
The variable and contradictory relations exhibited between
Francis and his Parlement also characterized the remainder of the
sixteenth century.

Relations between Henry II and the court began

on a good footing and this amicability was sustained for several
years by Henry’s moderate attitude.

The first lit de .justice of

the reign was not held until 1549. and on this occasion the Chan
cellor exalted the role of the Parlement and was careful to set forth
^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 580*87, 640-41.
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its role in the State.

Thus officially recognized, the court

examined projects submitted to it and even returned to edicts of the
last reign.

The Ordinance of Villers-Cottorets, for example, was

reviewed once again.

In June, 1559» however, Henry solicited the

opinion of the magistrates in dealing with the Huguenot problem.
Most comments passed without special note, but three conseillers
seemed to take a permissive stand on the religious question.

Henry

was notably angered by the response of Anne du Bourg, who was con
sequently accused of heresy, tried before the Parlement, and
70
executed.'
The Du Bourg Affair signaled for the Parlement the beginning of
a long period of unsettled relations with the Crown which reflected
the troubled nature of the times.

The Wars of Religion showed the

court to be consistently hostile to heresy as identified with
tumult and armed revolt.

Moreover, the judges were staunchly loyal

Catholics; a defense of royalist tradition and the kingdom*s law
plus personal faith made the parlementaires firm, but not fanatical,
opponents of the Huguenot party.

Controversy arose because the

judges did not always agree with royal policy in dealing with the
religious problem.

Extraordinary tribunals such as the Chambre des

LuthSrlens or the Chambre de la relne were favorite royal instruments
for the extirpation of heresy; the court saw such commissions as
illegal and in November, 1558, forbade its presidents and conseillers
"^Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris. I, 21-26; Shennan, Parlement
of Paris, p. 207.
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to sit on any irregular panels.

71

Throughout the tumultuous period of the late sixteenth century,
the varied and sometimes contradictory relations between the court
and Grown continued as under earlier Valois.

In August, 1563, Charles

x IX was persuaded to declare his majority at Rouen, in the Barlement
of Normandy, rather than in Paris.

The violation of tradition

angered the Parisians and provoked them to draw up remonstrances
asserting that all royal ordinances had to be verified and registered
in the court at Paris before any other -parlement could have cog
nizance of them.

The supporting argument produced on this occasion

was that the Parisian court represented the Estates General and
therefore had primacy over all other -parlements. Such a line of
reasoning was demonstrably without historical validity, and it
produced an equally unrealistic response on the Crown's behalf.
"'Remember,'” the King told the deputies of the court, '"that your
company has been established only to render justice following the
ordinances of sovereigns.

Leave to the king and to his council

the affairs of State; beware of the error of regarding yourselves
as the tutor of kings, as the defenders of the kingdom and as the
guardians of Paris."

72

Continuing in the same vein Charles renewed

the injunction of Francis I against the practice of repeated remon^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 206-07.
^Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris. I, 30, quoting [JacquesAuguste^] de Thou, Histoire de France. IV, 553-5** 0*53-5*0; Maugis,
Histoire du Parlement. I, 608-09.
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strances once the first complaints of the court had been rejected.
Yet just three months after this order prohibiting delay, the
judges were presenting remonstrances once more, and in December,
1565, a royal declaration permitted the Parlement to make and repeat
any remonstrances it thought necessary.^
No less than Francis I or Charles IX, Henry IV sometimes found
the Parlement*s right of remonstrance and its meddling in matters
of State an irritating obstacle to Crown policy.

Most historians

acknowledge that Henrj possessed admirable qualities as a leader of
men, yet all of Henry's kindness, tolerance, and political acumen
were put to the test in dealing with extreme instances of procras
tination on the part of his court.

During Henry’s reign the Parle

ment continued its traditional role as defender of the monarchy and
guardian of the Crown's rights against outside interests, particularly
those of Jesuit Ultramontanism and Spanish influence.

Yet in the

name of the interest of Crown and kingdom, the Parlement often
raised difficulties over financial measures, objecting particularly
to creations of office and to increased borrowing through the issuance
of rentes as well as to the alienation of the royal domain.

On at

least one occasion the resistance of the court went so far as to
threaten the prosecution of the war against Spain* the fall of
Cambrai in October, 1595» was directly attributable to a shortage of
funds brought by the court's delay in registration of bursal edicts
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 615-19. Shennan, Parlement
of Paris, pp. 214-15.
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some months earlier.

7I I

The spring of 1597 witnessed the most severe crisis "between
Henry and his Parlement, and an examination of the course of events
is revealing in several respects.

In the middle of March, 1597, news

arrived in Paris of the collapse of Amiens’ defenses "before the
Spanish; despite energetic measures, the policies of the government
inspired very little confidence and spirits in the capital were
generally at a low ehh.

Under these conditions and with the King

away, the Parlement assembled in plenary session to draw up articles
complaining of the misery of the people and the misconduct of the
King's affairs.

At the same time the court received two financial

edicts for consideration; remonstrances on these, together with the
earlier articles, were presented to the King upon his return to
Paris on April 12.

The remonstrances of the Parlement were not well

received at such a critical juncture, and Henry insisted to deputies
of the court that his kingdom was in danger and that the Parlement
should immediately execute his will.

Reluctantly, on April 1^ one

edict alienating part of the royal domain was registered.^
No sooner was this registration completed, however, than the
Parlement ordered the arrest of one Nicolas Parent, a high official
in the administration of the gabelle. for "diversion of revenues."
Parent’s official papers were seized, he was imprisoned, then dragged

7kGlasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 91.
^Albert Chamberland, Le Confllt de 1597 entre Henri IV et le
Parlement de Paris (Paris, 190^), pp. 1-5.
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"before the Parlement to explain what was happening to the King's
salt taxes.

Henry, now lodged at Saint-Germain near Paris, summoned

representatives of the court to account for its treatment of Parent.
Neither the King's personal injunctions on this, the 26th of April,
nor lettres de .iussion on the 5th of May brought the magistrates to
comply with the royal will.^
An already tense situation was considerably exacerbated on May
10 when the court received an edict creating a prSsldent and ten
conseillers in the court, together with a lettre de cachet explaining
the pressing financial needs of the Grown.

Well aware that the

collective temper of the court was aroused, Henry’s letter offered
the judges a generous tripartite arrangement under which the Parle
ment, Chambre des comptes, and the Crown should supervise the expen
diture of revenues resulting from the creation.

The court refused

the edict and the offer of supervision; Henry retaliated by ordering
the exile of parlementalre ringleader Jacques Riviere.

77

With

tempers thus aroused on both sides, Henry received the court's

^^Nicolas Parent was a trSsorler des gabelles. It is quite
possible that the Parlement selected him or his administration for
rather brusque treatment because the court's wages were drawn from
the salt taxes and were far in arrears throughout the 1590's. On
the payment of the Parlement's wages at this time see Maugis,
Histoire du Parlement. II, Appendix III, "Note sur la question des
gages du Parlement apres 159^»" 388-93.
77
This seems to be the first instance of a judge being exiled
by royal action for disciplinary reasons. The practice would
become more common during the l630’s.
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deputies at the Louvre on May 13.

The scene was a memorable one.

In plain language the King told the magistrates of his wills
"I have sent you an edict which is of importance to me; it
concerns my State; peril is eminent; all of you know it. If
you delay, my affairs are lost, my State ruined. Instead of
working for the expedition of my edicts, 2rou address remon
strances on petty things. You have come to excuse a
recognizedp.error. Proceed to the verification, all things
ceasing."
In spite of repeated words to the same effect, the deputies persisted
in asking the release of Riviere, to which Henry replied:
"Return to the court. I wish to be obeyed and not to have
things delayed. I wish to be obeyed. My State is lost. I
will conserve it. When the Parlement has completed deliberation
and verified the edict, I will consider when it should be given
satisfaction; but I am King, I want to be obeyed."
Neither this bluntness nor further lettres de jussion persuaded the
court; Henry, having exhausted all other means, determined to use
constraint.

On May 21 Henry came to the Parlement to hold a lit

de .justice forcing the registration of ten financial edicts and an
eleventh declaration severely limiting the deliberative rights of
the court.

Citing the interminable delay caused by the rendering of

over 200 opinions and the retardation of justice brought thereby,
the declaration stipulated that in the future assemblies for
verification should be made up of the conservative senior judges
in the Grand'Chambre plus the oldest president and the dean of each
chamber of Enquetes and Requetes. a total of fifty men in all.®0
78Chamberland, Le Confllt de 1597. p. 36.
79
Ibid., citing registers of the court for May 14, 1597.
®°Ibid., pp. 55-61. A copy of the edict, which remained a dead
letter, can be found in B.N. Ms. fr. 18413, fols. 134-35.
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Even after the lit de .justice of May 21, the Parlement refused
to resign itself to royal orders.

Upheaval reigned among the

Enquetes. who, after having been shut out of public affairs, went
on judicial strike and refused to perform their duties.

The affair

was only slowly resolved after June 2, when Henry permitted Riviere
to return to the Parlement and agreed to suspend the recent
restrictions on the court in exchange for a voluntary loan and
acceptance of the creations of office.

The court agreed, but

acceptance of these conditions did not mean the sub rosa resistance
of the court came to an end.

Not until December was the last of

the eleven new officers received into the Parlement.^
The events of 1597 show clearly that the most diplomatic of
rulers might expect difficulty with the Parlement in times of
national crisis.

Henry IV had found, as Louis XIII would find

decades later, that the Parlement saw itself as the spokesman for
the nation's overburdened subjects.

In resisting the Crown’s

policies, the judges could maintain that they were only fulfilling
their traditional duty to inform the king of ill-advised legis
lation.

A clash was inevitable when these measures became necessary

for the preservation of the kingdom.

The conflict of interests

became all the more complex when the self-interest of the judges was
involved, as it was in the creations of office registered on May 21.
The exile of Riviere and the resistance of the court after a lit
de .justice were symptomatic of the willingness of both sides to

^Chamberland, Le Conflit de 1597. pp. 55-61; Maugis, Histoire
du Parlement. II, 223-27.
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carry their case to extremes; these extremes were to be further
accentuated under Louis XIII as the Grown pressed its policy of
absolutism at home and intervention in the Thirty Years' War abroad.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the internal pro
cedures of the Parlement in handling public matters were fully
developed in all essential respects.

Discussion of public affairs

was conducted according to the form of judiciary deliberations, the
pattern of which was followed down to the least detail.

Whenever

a royal project was revealed, whether an edict, declaration, or
lettre de cachet presented by the gens du roi, the court began by
scrutinizing the document in the Grand'Chambre to determine if all
chambers should be assembled immediately for deliberation.

If the

issue were not pressing, or if the court wished to delay, it would
be referred to a committee of rapporteurs (reporters), who examined
the articles and presented conclusions at the session following.
When the committee had finished its inquest, the results were
presented en conseil to the Grand'Chambre, that is to say, to the
Grand*Chambre acting "in council” rather than in a judiciary
capacity.

If the issue were of import, the Enquetes and Requetes

might be summoned to a frill session.**2 In either case final action

82The decision to assemble all the chambers lay in the hands
of the First President following the consensus of his colleagues the
presidents 3. mortier. The decision to convene a plenary session was
often of considerable importance because the younger Enquetes and
Requetes were more radical than the conservative Grand'Chamhriers
and were more inclined to favor measures opposing Crown policy. On
the other hand, tradition dictated that the younger judges were
entitled to participate in matters affecting public affairs; when
excluded, they often resorted to invasions of the Grand'Chambre,
judicial strikes, and other measures of protest.
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commenced, with a legal commentary by one of the gens du roi, who
was free to present all views but was duty-bound as the king’s
attorney to terminate his speech hy requiring registration or other
action favorable to the king according to the official formula
audlto et requirente procuratore general! (heard and requires the
procureur general). Then the chambers turned to secret deliberation
during which each magistrate offered his remarks in turn, according
to rank and seniority.^

If at least a quarter of an hour was

allowed for each judge, while the court counted from fifty to 150
present, it is not surprising that deliberations often filled entire
weeks, even at two sessions per day.

After all opinions were

received by the chief clerk, the president summarized them and offered
a conclusion according to the majority.

It was a general rule of the

court that all deliberations should be held in secret and that all
record lists of the votes (billets des opinions) be destroyed
immediately after tally in the interests of justice.

Very few billets

have in fact survived, a situation which makes reconstruction of
parties and factions within the court impossible.

8^

With sentiment

83rhe "style" or formal code of the court's discipline always
considered that it was a closed body, open only to members regularly
received and sworn in and bound by a solemn oath to keep and observe
the ordinances and to preserve silence on internal matters. Even the
highest personages of the land, members of the royal council, princes
of the blood, secretaires d'Etat. maltres des requetes. and peers of
Prance retired as soon as the court began to deliberate en consell.
Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 271-72.
Occasionally, however, billets des opinions were preserved
by the clerks for consultation upon need, and in some circumstances
the billets passed to another chamber, or even to the king or chan
cellor, when the court found itself divided over a trial or reso
lution. This was apparently the case for the only surviving billet
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of the court made known, the chief clerk was then ordered to tran
scribe the decision (arret) into the registers under the rubric
"It will be said . . ."or "The court orders . . .".^
Since the thirteenth century the Parlement had maintained con
tinuous registers in which the daily life of the Parlement was
recorded.

By the seventeenth century these registers were divided

into five major series: (l) Ordonnances. containing official and
final copies of royal laws, (2) registres du consell. in which
public and political deliberations were recorded, (3) registres
des plaidolres clvlls. for civil suits, (4) registres crlmlnels.
for criminal trials, and (5) unofficial and unacknowledged registres
secrets in which the court sometimes recorded observations and remonstrances prohibited by the Crown.

86

The first four series were con-

des opinions for the period 1624-1642, when on April 26, 1631, the
court debated the advisability of registering a declaration of March
30 against Gaston d*Orleans, brother of the king. On this occasion
thirty-four judges favored registration and thirty-four were for
remonstrances; the names of presidents and conseillers on both sides
are given in B.N. Ms. ft. 18413, fols. 127-12?v°.
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, xvi-xvii.
86

After 1636 a sixth series, the registres du consell secret,
appeared to supplement the registres du conseil. The distinction
between the judiciary matters recorded in the registres du consell
and the political matters in the conseil secret was often artificial
and somewhat arbitrary. The original archives of the Parlement of
Paris are conserved almost intact at the Archives Nationales, with
the exception of several registers which have been lost or mislaid
in other depots. The original registers make up the following series:
SSrle a" , Arrets. Consell. Plaldolrles. Enreglstrements des actes
royaux. Chambre du domains, Grands Jours. Coutumes reformges.
Correspondence. S6rle a . Minutes des Chambres des Enquetes. du
Conseil. SSrie
, Registres crimlnels. Sgrie
, Minutes des
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fided to the chief clerk and his staff who prepared them from rough
minutes; the secret registers were held apart by select conseillers
who transmitted than from generation to generation.

Unfortunately

for modem historians, almost all of the secret registers have dis
appeared, leaving only the registres du conseil to record public and
political affairs, and even these registers are deficient in the
extreme.^

Entries are riddled hy extensive and systematic silences,

such as the daily series recording the twenty-five or thirty sessions
considering the great ordinances of the sixteenth century; "The court,
all chambers assembled, discussed articles of the ordinance until
adjournment."

88

Later entries may clarify previous sketchy infor

mation, but nothing can replace material lost through fires, theft,
89
and alterations ordered by both Crown and court for various reasons. '
3a
*
chambres.crlmlnelles. Sfirie X , Registres des Requetes du Palais.
SSrle a , Minutes des Requetes. The Archives Nationales and the
Bibliotheque Nationale possess numerous collections of copies, of
extracts, and of tables of registers utilized by jurists. Worthy
of particular mention among these collections are those of the
parlementaire Lamoignon family (B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 7979-8500)
and those of Joly de Fleury (B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 2102-2477)*
The citations in this essay are to eighteenth century copies of
registres du consell and consell secret. B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890989*+ \Nov., 1o 23-No v ., 16*0) originally held in the library of
Lefebvre de Caumartin, Bishop of Blois (1719-1733).
^The entire curious matter of the secret registers of the
Parlement has been discussed bjr Madeleine Dillay in "Les ’Registres
secrets' des Chambres des Enquetes et des Requetes du Parlement de
Paris," Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Chartes. CVIII (1950), 75-123*
See also Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, xiii-xxv.
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, xvi-xvii.
89
Information on the registers of the Parlement may be found
in A. Grun's Introduction to Actes du Parlement de Paris, ed.
E. de Boutaric, I, i-ccxcvi, and in R. Filhol, "Les Archives du
Parlement de Paris: source d'histoire," Revue historique, CCXLII
(l9*l-7), *+0-6l. In 155*+ the registers of the court recorded that one
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In spite of their manifest shortcomings as historical source
material, the registers of the court provided the judges with archives
superior to any which the other institutions of the Grown possessed.
The royal council in particular had no systematic records until
rfeglaments of 1616, 1628, and 1630 ordered the secretaries and clerks
of the council to keep registers of petitions presented and decisions
reached; up until this time the papers recording the official business
of the council were considered the private property of the secretaries
dispatching or receiving them.

90

Even these reglements apparently

Bertrand Grebert, a parchmentmaker, was condemned by arret of Febru
ary 9» 14931 to be hung and strangled for having t o m out and sold
the parchment of the registre du consell for 1443-1451. Sometimes
the registers wore diverted for private purposes as reported on May
4, 1565. The chief clerk complained that agents were publicly
printing and selling copies of the remonstrances on an edict of Jan
uary, 1561, even though he had kept the original under lock and key
and in the custody of a single clerk who worked at home. The Parle
ment instituted an investigation, the results of which are not
recorded. Finally, after Francis I returned from captivity in 1526,
he ordered the clerk to bring him all registers made in his absence
so that the King might verify that dissenting remarks had been
scratched out. For these examples and others through the sixteenth
century, see Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, xvi-xxlii. The
destruction of oarlementalre records continued in the seventeenth
century. A disastrous fire on March 7. 1618, destroyed many records.
On May 13, 1631, Louis XIII ordered the greffier of the couirt to
bring him the sheet of the court's notes bearing the deliberations
made on April 26, 1631, when the court had refused to register a
declaration outlawing the King's younger brother Gaston d'OrlSans.
The greffier complied, and the King ripped up the page in the presence
of the judges. Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris. I, 138-39.

au
et
du
de
et

90
Roland Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi de la mort de Henri IV
gouvemement personnel de Louis XIV," in La Plume, la faucille
le marteau. p. 164; Roland Mousnier, "Les Reglements du Conseil
Roi sous Louis XIII," Annuaire-Bulletin de la SoclStg de 1'histoire
France. 1946-1947 (Paris, 1948), pp. 153-96; D’Avenel, Richelieu
la monarchie absolue. I, 46-47, 64, n. 1.
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did little to assuage the situation in the council, for only a few
of these registers were drawn up, and the council remained essentially
without systematic records throughout Louis’ reign.

91

In any case,

no minutes of any sort were permitted in the Conseil d’en haut which
made secret policy decisions.

The result was an obvious advantage for

the Parlement in legal disputes with the Grown which were largely
based on arguments of precedent.

92

Before the king and his ministers

might even be aware of an issue that had arisen in the Parlement, the
magistrates would have already searched through their archives, found
a suitable legal precedent for their case, and issued an arret which
might very well conflict with royal interests.^

^Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 164.
^Legal arguments on both sides sometimes relied on the citation
of precedents which were centuries old. See, for example, the list of
criminal trial precedents drawn up by Michel de Marillac while garde
des sceaux to lend authority to his essay "Mgmoire dressS par le garde
des sceaux de Marillac principalement contre 1*authority du Parlement.”
The precedents in this instance go back to some dubious ones in the
sixth century. B.N. Ms, fr. 75^9, "Extrait de 1’instruction, Juges,
et Jugements de plusieurs proces importants" (576-1560), fols. 24455• See also the arguments presented by garde des sceaux Chateauneuf
in addressing deputies of the Parlement at the Louvre on May 13, 1631,
in which reference was made to an edict of Charles VIII dated 1495.
W. F, Church has noted that both Richelieu and SSguier were careful
to prepare themselves with legal advice. To do this, they supple
mented official records with documents assembled for them from various
sources. Characteristic of these private archives are three volumes
stamped with the arms of SSguier now held by the Bibliotheque Nationale
asi B.N. Ms. fr. 18321-18323* copies and extracts from the registres
du conseil and consell secret of the Parlement; B.N. Ms. fr. I8367,
a collection of manuscript and printed pieces concerning the Parlement
from 1543; B.N. Ms. fr. 18410, a collection of accounts of 11ts de
.justice, speeches, and deliberations in the Parlements of Paris,
Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Rouen between 1369 and 1632.
^Moote, Revolt of the Judges, pp. 8-9.
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.The passage of the sixteenth century had witnessed a considerable
increase in the political ambitions of the Parlement since the time of
Francis I.

The system of venality and heredity of offices had greatly

strengthened these pretensions; the cohesion of the magistrates grew
steadily because of material interests which concerned all the judges.
The unity of the court was heightened, too, by continuation of its
traditional role as high councillor to French kings.

Periodic royal

prohibitions against meddling in affairs of State and the delaying
tactics of repeated remonstrances remained meaningless gestures as
long as monarchs continued to seek out and respect the opinions of
their judges.

The history of the rapport between court and Crown

was thus an increasingly complex one, characterized by spasmodic and
often contradictory patterns of royal behavior on the one hand and
tenacious insistence on the forms of legality by the Parlement on the
other.
Though the 1500*s had seen substantial, augmentation in the
political pretensions of the court, the constitutional framework of
what has been called the "traditional monarchy" had not been altered.^
Accepted theory dictated that the king was the living embodiment of
sovereignty in the kingdom.

His royal sacerdotum was divine, not of

Q/j,
The term "traditional monarchy" was used by Georges d’Avenel
to describe the corpus of theory and practice of French government
as it existed until the time of Richelieu. The chief characteristic
of this monarchy was a harmony and balance between the theoretically
absolute royal powers and the representative tradition as vested in
the local and national estates, the royal council, and the Parlement
of Paris. According to D'Avenel’s thesis, the assumption of power
by Richelieu marked the beginning of a fundamentally different
"absolute monarchy" in which royal prerogatives were abused at the
expense of the rights of subjects and their representative institutions.
See D ’Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchle absolue. I, 1-lHU.
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the people, having been mystically conferred by birth and confirmed
with the ceremony of coronation.

So endowed, the king was the unique

source of legislation in the kingdom— in the legal shorthand of the
seventeenth century, si veut le roi. si veut la loi (as the king
wishes, so wishes the law),9'* It was a crime of lese-ma.iest€ to
contest his ordinances and his absolute power.

These ordinances and

other legislation, however, assumed their ultimate form, efficacy,
and legality only after having been submitted to the thorough exami
nation of the Parlement acting en conseil.
Parlementalre doctrine held that the court’s deliberation and
control were born of experience and were imperative in order to
restrain the arbitrary exercise of royal authority.

The court saw

itself, as avocat gSnSral Le Maltre maintained in 1499» as "’the true
Senate of the kingdom, where edicts and ordinances of kings take their
96
final form and authority when they are published and registered."’
Over a hundred years later, First President Achille III de Harlay
reminded Henry IV of the same traditional usages '"Edicts are sent
to the Parlement not only for verification, but for deliberation
according to the ordinary forms of justice.’" ^

A few years later,

95This expression was at least as old as the thirteenth century,
when it can be found in the writing of jurisconsul Philippe de
Beaumanoir. Beaumanoir proposed only three limitations on the king's
authority* (l) the general interest of subjects (2) rule by con
sultation in tres grand conseil. or "very great council," and
(3) respect for the laws of God. See Esmein, Cours glSmentaire
d'histoire du droit franpals. p. 466.
9^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 5^3.
97
Ibid.. 522, quoting registers of the court for September 7,
1605.
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the jurisconsul La Roche-Flavin wrote that "the parlements have
not only heen established for the judgment of affairs and trials
among individuals, hut they have also heen destined for public
affairs and the verification of edicts."^

By the middle of the

sixteenth century, this point of view had heen positively affirmed
in written law.

Article 2 of the Ordinance of Moulins (1566)

maintained that
after our edicts and ordinances have heen sent to our courts
of parlement. and other sovereign courts to he published there,
we wish that they he attended to, all [other] affairs re
linquished, except that in case they determine to make some
remonstrance to us, in which case we enjoin them to do it
immediately. After such remonstrances, having made our will
known, we desire and-order that publication ensue without
recourse to others.
In summary, hy the l600's the court's formerly consultative
function had heen transmuted into a powerful constitutional strongpoint from which it could challenge, or even block, actions of the
Crown it deemed as arbitrary.

No more lucid or concise statement of

the court’s position in this regard can he found that in the words
of avocat g§n€ral Cmer Talon when addressing a lit de .justice on
July 31, 1648s
Formerly the king's wishes were never executed hy his subjects
without being first approved by all the great men of the king
dom, hy the princes and officers of the Crown; today this
political jurisdiction is vested in the Parlement; our pos
session of this power is guaranteed by a long tradition and
respectfully acknowledged by the people. The opposition of
our votes, the respectful resistance which we bring to bear
in public affairs should not be interpreted as disobedience
but rather as a necessary result of the exercise of our
^^Treze livres des parlemens. Bk. XIII, Ch. XVII, No. 1.
99
Isambert, Anclennes lols franyaises. XIV, 191.
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office and of the fulfilling of our obligations, and certainly
the king’s majesty is not diminished hy his having to respect
the decrees of his kingdom; hy so doing, he0govems, in the
words of the Scriptures, a lawful kingdom.
In short, the opinions of the court did not hind the king, hut they
should enlighten him; the just and wise monarch was expected to
respect the advice of the court when presented as remonstrances.

In

case of insoluble conflict, however, the sovereign nature of the
monarchy required that the king should prevail.

In the last instance

the king could restrict the right of remonstrances out of his own
authority.

As Cardin LeBret wrote in 1632,

It has heen asked if the king can make and publish all these
changes in law and ordinances hy his sole authority, without
the advice of his council or his sovereign courts. To which
it is answered that there is no doubt of it, because the king
alone is sovereign in his kingdom, and sovereignty is no more
divisible than the point in geometry. At the same time it will
always he well for a great king to have his acts approved hy
the uarlements and other principal officers of the Crown, who,0,
are obliged hy oath to serve and advise him with all loyalty.
Talon’s speech of 1648 reflected accepted parlementalre doctrine
of the era, hut his words, like the doctrine, failed to define at
what point the "respectful resistance" of the court became active
disobedience to the king's authority and therefore illegal.

Just as

■^Qmer Talon, Mfmoires, continues par Denis Talon, ed. J. F.
Michaud and J. J. F. Poujoulat (Paris, 1854), p. 260.
101Cardin LeBret, De la souveralnStS du Roy (Paris, 1632),
Bk. I, Ch. IX, p. 71, Cardin LeBret, seigneur de Flacourt, was b o m
in 1558 and pursued a distinguished legal career. Ke was avocat
ggnSral at the Cour des aides, then in the Parlement until 1619.
Being in the Parlement he was breveted as a conselller d'Etat in the
king's councils on May 7, 1605, and took the oath on June 8. In 1629
we was sent as intendant to Metz; during the 1630's he was associated
with several political trials initiated by Richelieu. In 1632 LeBret
published De la souveraln6t€ du Roy which expressed absolutist
thought current at the time. LeBret continued his councilliar career
during the l640’s and 1650's, dying dean of the council in 1655.
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the court's jurisdictions in private law were confused and over
lapped with administrative attributions, the Parlement's role in
the arena of public law was never set out within well-defined consti
tutional boundaries.

The court was traditionally presumed to be

the legal guardian of the kingdom's law, but in the seventeenth
century, the legal foundation of the monarchy was immensely flexible
and comprised many elements within the corpus of public law.
The immediate legislative capacity of the king has already been
identified as an adjunct of his sovereignty.

The place of the Parle

ment in this law-giving process has also been sketched out through
its historical evolution.

In time the products of royal law giving

were amassed in a body of royal ordinances, edicts, and declarations
which represented the legislative expression of past monarchs in
written form.

102

Seemingly concrete and lasting, written royal law

rtoyal ordinances, edicts, and declarations all had behind them
the same general authority of the king. The distinctions and termi
nology were never respected exactly and have no real juridical impor
tance. Esmein, Cours elementaire d'histoire du droit frangais. pp.
736-37; Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit frangals. pp. 3^5-53;
D ’Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue. I, 77-103. Five printed
collections of royal ordinances should be mentioned. The only com
plete collection of royal acts that were committed to print during
the ancien rSglme is found in the Salle des imprimSs of the Biblio
theque Nationale. This collection comprises the Actes royaux.
which are original copies of printed royal legislation. The volumes
of the Actes royaux are bound and catalogued in the French fashion
according to dimension, subject matter, and year issued. Access to
the Actes royaux may be gained through A. L. T. Isnard, Catalogue
ggnSral des livres imnrlmSs de la Bibliotheque Rationale: Actes
royaux (6 vols.; Paris, 1910-196>7). In addition to the Actes royaux.
four other collections of royal ordinances should be mentioned.
Unfortunately for historians of the ancien regime, each has short
comings in chronological coverage or editorial quality. The best
presentation for the centuries embraced (l051-151^» reigns of Henry
I to Francis I) is Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisieme
race, published volume by volume between 1723 and 18^9 under the
successive direction of Eusebe de Lauriere, Denis-Frangois Secousse,
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from past reigns was actually open to extensive modification and
interpretation. Its provisions could always be overridden by new
monarchical utterances arising out of contemporary needs.
observation of written law was shaped by usage and custom.

Moreover,
Article 1

L. de Villevaut, Louis de BrSquigny, Claude de Pastoret, and J. M.
Pardessus. During the ancien regime this publication was made under
the initiative and authority of the royal chancellor. Publication
was resumed during the Napoleonic period under the patronage and
direction of the Acad§mie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres which
pushed it up to the twenty-first volume completing the reign of Louis
XII. Volume XXIbis (1847) contains a chronological table. In 1902
the AcadSmie des Sciences Morales et Politiques resumed publication
of this work under the title Ordonnances des rois de France: regne
de Francois I . In 1974 the work had been completed through 1537*
The Recueil g§n§ral des anciennes lols franyaises depuls I'an 420
.iusqu’a la~revolution de 1789. published from 1823 to 1827 by Jourdan,
Decrusy, Taillandier, and Isambert is best known under the name of
Isambert. The Anciennes lois franyaises include twenty-eight volumes;
a table appeared as Volume XXEX in 1833. The collection, though
representing the entire history of the monarchy, is highly selective,
incomplete, and marred by mistakes in editing and notation. The
deficiencies of the above collections are partially compensated
in two others prepared during the ancien regime. The Edits et
ordonnances des roys de France, depuls Louis VI. dlt le Gros, .iusques
i present, edited by Antoine Fontanon and ordinarily so designated,
first appeared in 1580. A second edition, revised and augmented by
Gabriel-Michel de la Roche Maillet, appeared in l6ll. The three
volumes of the l6ll edition, though selective and defective, repre
sent a useful supplement to Anciennes lols franyaises. as does
another collection, Recueil d'Sdits et d*ordonnances royaux. sur le
fait de la .justice et autres matleres les plus lmportantes. which
first appeared in 1^35 under the editorship of Pierre NSron and
Etienne Girard. Ordinarily known as Ngron and Girard, the Recueil
d*edits et d*ordonnances royaux subsequently appeared in 1647, 1656,
1666, and 1720. The last edition, revised and augnented by Claude
Ferriere and Eusebe Lauriere in two folio volumes supplemented
legal texts with extensive annotations and commentary. On the
printed editions of the royal ordinances see Alfred Franklin, Les
Sources de 1’histoire de France (Paris, 1877).
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of the Code Michaud of 1629 spoke of ordinances "not abrogated by
contrary usage" and so officially recognized usage as one form of
interpretation of the law.

10?

J Shaped in this way by custom, the

diffuse and flexible nature of French public law was to prove crucial
in the development of absolutism, for just and legal arguments could
be produced both for the absolutism of Richelieu and for the
Parlement’s challenge to royal arbitraire.
Above and beyond the written and customary law was a second
category of public law which was not subject to royal modification,
abridgement, or abrogation.

This category was the "fundamental laws"

of the kingdom which contemporaries and modem historians alike have
postulated as the authentic constitution of the monarchy.

Mathieu

MolS, First President of the Parlement, spoke of these laws in 1645
in saying "that there were two sorts of laws in the State: some
transient, species of laws of police which changed according to
occasion; the others fixed, certain, and immutable, under authority
of which the State was governed and royalty subsisted."

i 01l

Writing

two and one-half centuries later, historian AndrS Lemaire concluded
that the French kingdom was governed by these fundamental laws which
represented a constitution appropriate to the nature of the monarchy
and the historical circumstances surrounding its evolution.

Lemaire

cautioned that one should not expect to find a constitution in the
modem sense in which public functions are delineated by a written
document or collection of titles stipulating laws, rights, obligations,
103
^Isambert, Anciennes lols franyaises. XVI, 225.
1M l

Talon, Mgmolres, p. 148.
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and relationships "between prince and subject.

There was never a

formal juridical act or contract between Frenchmen and their kings
establishing sovereign relationships within the State.

In terms of

written law there was no constitution; a constitution, however, was
to be found in certain fundamental laws which kings themselves
professed to be inalienable and which could not be abrogated or
infringed within the context of legal rule.

These fundamental laws

were traditional and unwritten, but were nevertheless real and
binding, respected by nation and ruler, and explained and commented
on by jurisconsuls and historians throughout the centuries.

Most

importantly, the fundamental laws defined an unalterable framework
within which sovereign authority could be legally exercised; hence,
to violate the fundamental laws was to violate the true French
tradition and was, therefore, to be considered despotism.1^
By Louis XIII’s reign, a thousand years of tradition had
determined that the fundamental laws might be expressed according to
certain general propositions.

The first general principle maintained

that the fundamental laws themselves were an expression of custom,
usage, and tradition and were not rooted in a willful constitution
by the nation, by the prince, or by any pact.

In effect, this most

permanent and most fundamental part of the constitution was not the
free work of men.

"It is not Clovis, it is not Charlemagne," wrote

Lemaire, "who have constituted [italics Lemaire's] the monarchy; no
more so is it their Franks; rather, it is all of them, and it is
still more the innumerable facts, the multitude of circumstances, the

■^Andr§ Lemaire, Les Lols fondamentales de la monarchle fran9aise d'apres les thgorlclens de 1*ancien rSgime TParis, 190?), passim.
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climate, the race, the religion.”

From customary usage followed

a second principle that neither the king nor the people were per
mitted to change the constitution and to do so would be purely
destructive.

The stability of the State depended on the faithful

conservation of French traditions.

Thirdly, the true French

tradition could be found in certain propositions which had come out
of the specific historical application, development, or complement
of the general principles mentioned above.

These could be called

"derived" or "secondary" fundamental laws.

By the end of the six

teenth century the body of derived or secondary fundamental laws
had reached full development, and political theorists were beginning
to apply the term lois fondamentales to describe the basic
unalterable principles of the monarchy.

Reduced to their essential

provisions, the universally recognized fundamental laws around
1600 were:
The State is a pure monarchy: the sovereign power is one and
belongs to the king alone.
Royalty is hereditary by virtue of a law of succession
appropriate to it. It passes without division or diversion
to the oldest male child of the preceding king, or to the
nearest male heir after him. Candidacy is admitted following
the order of primogeniture; women, descendants through women,
bastards and their descendants are excluded. Also barred are
foreign princes whose accession would bring the kingdom under
foreign dominion. The monarch cannot dispose of the Crown,
either to living persons or by testament. Domain and Crown
are inalienable. The properties of the prince who accedes
to the throne are amalgamated with the domain of the Crown.
The king is major at thirteen years and one day. A regent
106Ibid., pp. 279-80.
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governs in case of minority, absence, or insanity of the king
under royal authority, that is to say, without power in his
own name. The king can make provision for a regency. If this
has not been done, the regency is, in principle, attributed
to the heir presumptive of the minor, absent, or insane king.
The king never dies.
The king of Prance is Catholic. He assumes a certain respon
sibility for the Church in the kingdom as conservator of the
Gallican Liberties.
The nation is divided into orders. In the Estates General
and provincial estates, votes are taken by order.
Provinces and communities are endowed with certain liberties.
Custom or individual statutes determine the nature and extent
of these liberties.
The king governs par tres grand conseil (with a very great
council), that is, with the subordinate cooperation of a
greater or lesser part, more or less representative, of
the nation. '
Of these fundamental laws, only the nature of the last two
would be in question during the early seventeenth century, and only
the question of tres grand conseil involved a basic restriction
on the development of absolutism.

Nevertheless, this single issue

was of immense significance because the Parlement*s resistance to
absolutism would be founded largely upon the claims of the court to
act as tres grand conseil to the king.

The traditional interpretation

10W
, pp. 279-83. The expression tres grand consell was
as old as the thirteenth century. Philippe de Beaumanoir proposed
counsel as one of three major limits on Crown authority. In some
form or another, most theorists after Beaumanoir recognized the need
for limited monarchy and most saw limits as a combination of three
forms: divine law, fundamental law, and natural law. Parlementalre
La Roche-Flavin likened the Parlement to the Roman Senate whose
advice and counsel was essential to the glory and endurance of the
Roman State. The same comparison could be found throughout the
Renaissance period, strengthened until 1515 by the coincidence of
the numbers of personnel sitting in the court with the one hundred
members of the ancient Roman republican Senate.
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held that the king’s tres grand consell had been successivelyrepresented by primitive Prankish commitatus and tribal assemblies,
then by the court of the first Capetians, next by the court of the
first Capetians, next by the Estates General, and finally by the
provincial estates and the Parlement of Paris.

At times the king

had convoked assemblies of notables for purposes of advice or reform,
but these usually represented a reduced form of the Estates General,
a less extended version of the tres grand conseil.
By the first decades of the l600's, only the Estates General
and the Parlement of Paris represented institutions with the
potential to act as tres grand conseil, and there were indications
that the Parlement, in spite of the abuse of remonstrances, was more
effective than the Estates General in offering council and support
to the monarchy.

The court had the advantages of a traditional

legal heritage and three centuries of continuous existence; it was
permanently and conveniently located in the capital; its procedures,
however clumsy and prolonged, were no less effective than those
of the Estates General.

By the end of the sixteenth century, these

advantages were becoming more apparent.

In 1593 the Parlement had

acted decisively to defend the validity of the Salic law and to
ensure that the French throne would be occupied by Henry de Bourbon,
the legitimate heir; on June 28, 1593* the court resolved to draw up
108Lemaire, Les Lols fondamentales. 282 , 302-15 . The possibility
that the royal council, the linear and nominal descendant of Frankish
institutions and the curia regis. could fufill the function of tres
grand conseil diminished after the thirteenth century as it became
clear that it was an instrument of the king’s government. AndrS
Lemaire ignores it as a potential expression of tres grand conseil.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

a decree defending the fundamental laws of France and requiring
that the throne pass to Henry de Bourbon.

At the same time an

Estates General convened by leaders of the Catholic League was
wavering in its allegiance between the attraction of legality and
the influences of Spain, of the due de Mayenne, and the League.1^
The Parlement demonstrated no vascillation; upon hearing of Henry's
conversion to Catholicism the court promptly confirmed him as
rightful king of France.

Upon Henry's death in 1610 the regency of

Marie de Medicis was immediately confirmed by the Parlement and
not by an Estates General, and by usurping this role, the prestige
and authority of the court received a substantial b o o s t . F o u r
years later, in l6l4, when the regency seemed about to founder
on the rocks of inept statecraft, the Estates General was convened
to lend its advice.

But the orders utterly failed to agree on any

major point and the meeting was adjourned without positive result.
After the failure of the meeting of the Estates of l6l4, the Estates
General's worth as a councilliar body was in serious doubt, while the
prestige of the Parlement stood at a new high:
It was in keeping with the developments of the previous century
that the Parlement should once more assert its superiority
over the Estates-General, but the political significance of
what it had done on this occasion ^Henry's death] was sufficient
^■^Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris. I, 68-76; Shennan, Parlement
of Paris, pp. 230-32.
^^Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 119-20; Shennan, Parlement
of Paris, p. 242. In 1484 the regency of Anne and Pierre Beaujeu
for Charles V IH was extensively discussed by an Estates General of
that year; in 1560 an Estates General approved the regency of
Catherine de Medicis for Charles IX. The question of the regency of
Marie de Medicis was never submitted to the Estates General.
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to convince the court that its political function should he
hoth central and permanent. There was nothing novel about
this conviction save the emphasis, and the new emphasis was
all important, for it could no longer be doubted now that
the Parlement alone shouldered the responsibility for
representing to the king the myriad ri^rts and privileges
of his subjects, for offering the only constitutional form
of opposition to royal actions, for preserving the traditional
balance of the French State.
As the course of events was to show, the Crown recognized the
deficiencies of the Estates, and they were not convoked again until
1789. The disappearance of the Estates left the Parlement with
widened opportunities and a heightened sense of responsibility to
advance its claims; immediately after the collapse of the Estates
in 1615, the court began to press its case for a greater role in
affairs of State.112
111Shennan, Parlement of Paris, p. 2^3*
112Roland Mousnier, "L'Evolution des institutions monarchiques
en France et ses relations avec l'Stat social,” in La Plume, la
faucllle et le marteau. pp. 215-30* Along with the development of
feudalism on the land and the coming of the intendants. the author
holds the disappearance of the Estates General to be one of the
three great institutional modifications of the seventeenth century.
Mousnier rightly notes that this "disappearance” was in reality
merely a suspension and did not mark any change in the juridical
status of the body; the Estates General continued to exist in theory,
but the king simply did not convoke them.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE PARLEMENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY CRISIS
If the reign of Louis XIII could be characterized as having a
single distinguishing feature, a quality impressive in both intensity
and duration, that feature would be the atmosphere of political and
economic crisis which hung over the reign from beginning to end.
This atmosphere became apparent after Henry IV's violent end and
intensified after the failure of the Estates General of 1614.

As

the second decade of the century came and went, the peace, prosperity,
and general progress made during Henry's rule disintegrated into
civil war and religious strife.

Vascillaticn and badly directed

statecraft typified the regency of Marie de Medicis, whose uncertain
and unfortunate policies produced nothing but a resurgence of old
religious tensions and a revival of the political ambitions of the
great nobility.

The declaration of Louis XIII's majority in October,

1614, changed nothing since the government of Prance continued to be
dominated by Marie and her Italian confidant, Coneini.1 The thrifty
oneini and his wife, who took the Florentine name of Eleonora
Galigai, were the favorites of Marie de Medicis and exercised the
preponderant influence in French government after the death of Henry
IV. Concini enjoyed every favor the Queen Mother could bestow; he
sat In council; he received immense riches and many titles, including
that of marquis d’Ancre, and was later made a marSschal de France.
Concini's highest personal goals were those of power and selfenrichment; these dubious qualities plus his Italian origins made him
odious to the common people. The Huguenots hated him for his Ultra
montane Catholicism, and many nobles were jealous of his influence
114
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care of Sully in the finances gave way to waste, inefficiency, and
outright corruption in fiscal matters; the savoir faire and
political acumen of Henry were replaced by la politique de largesse
and other clumsy manoeuverings. In l6l6 alone, Marie was compelled
to grant the governorship of Berry and 1,500,000 livres to the
prince de CondS in exchange for his good will; over 6,000,000 livres
2

were distributed among his confederates Soissons and Bouillon.

Changes after Louis' coup d'etat of April, 1617, meant little.

The

inept Concini was replaced by the due de Luynes, Louis' falconertumed-favorite, but neither Luynes nor Louis were able to bring
firm direction to the government.

By 1624 it seemed that the fabric

of French society, so laboriously rewoven by Henry and Sully, might
in the innermost circles of government. During Concini's pre
dominance, which lasted until 1617, the young Louis XIII was shunted
into the background, ignored, and even insulted by both the Queen
Mother and by D'Ancre. In l6l6 and 1617 Louis fell under the influ
ence of his falconer, a lowly Provenjal by the name of Luynes, who
was personable and sympathetic to Louis' frustrations. On April
24, 1617, Louis, urged on by Luynes, attempted to have Concini
arrested. Concini was killed resisting arrest, and his wife was
later tried and executed for witchcraft by the Parlement of Paris.
The feeble leadership of Concini did not come to an end with his
demise, for Luynes proved incapable of dealing with fractious nobles
such as the prince de CondS and was unable to resolve the fundamental
conflict between Louis and his domineering mother. For the early
years of Louis' reign, see especially C. J. Burckhardt, Richelieu and
His Age. Vol. Is His Rise to Power, trans. Edwin and Villa Muir
(London, 1940), henceforth cited as Burckhardt, Richelieu. His Rise to
Power; Victor TapiS, la France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu
(Paris, 1967); and J. H. MariSjol, Henri IV et Louis XIIlTL598-1643).
Vol. VI, Pt. 2, of Hlstoire de France, ed. E. LavisselParis, 191137
Henceforth cited as MariSjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII.
2Burckhardt, Richelieu, His Rise to Power, p. 75.
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once again unravel into its constituent threads.-^
The crisis conditions which appeared in Prance after Henry IV's
death were scarcely unique in the Europe of the time.

To the con

trary, it is clear that the French situation was part of a larger
general European crisis of the same period which troubled most
states.

In England, religious and political turmoil during the

reigns of James I and Charles I indicated the breakdown of the
Elizabethan Compromise and the onset of a constitutional crisis of
the first order; this crisis climaxed in civil war in 1641.

At the

same time, severe political crises appeared in Denmark, Sweden, the
Netherlands, and Spain.

Open Spanish-Dutch warfare in the Nether

lands was resumed in 1621 when the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609
expired; the war in the Low Countries merged with the Bohemian Revolt
of 1619 to become part of an all-European Thirty Years' War.

Cata

lonia, Naples, and Sicily flared into revolt during the 1640's, and
3

A complete bibliography of the reign of Louis XIII would be far
too lengthy to present here. The best point to begin is with the an
notated bibliography of Louis AndrS and Emile Bourgeois, Les Sources
de l'histoire de France. XVII siecle (8 vols.; Paris, 1913-1934)•
The Catalogue de l'histoire de France's eleven original volumes
(Paris, 1855-18?o7 and five supplemental volumes are indispensable
for research among the printed sources held by the Bibllotheque
Nationale. Also very useful are W. F. Church's "Publications on
Cardinal Richelieu Since 1945," Journal of Modern History. XXXVII
(December, 1965)1 421-44, and Jacques Lelievre's "Esquisse d'une
bibliographie d’histoire du droit public frangais au XVII siecle,"
XVII siecle. Nos. 58-59 (1963)» 83-104. To these may be added the
bibliographies provided by MariSjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII. Ex
tensive bibliographies are also provided by Carl J. Burckhardt in
Richelieu and His Age. Vol. II: Assertion of Power and the Cold War,
trans. Bernard Hoy (New York, 1970), and Vol. Ill: Power Politics
and the Cardinal's Death (New York, 1970). The first volume in this
series does not include a bibliography. See also the sources listed
by Georges MongrSdien in La JoumSe des dunes (Paris, 196l).
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as far away as Russia, upheaval and disorder prevailed in a general
"time of troubles" associated with the foundation of the Romanov
dynasty.
Amid the considerable discussion about the exact nature and
meaning of the "crisis of the seventeenth century" which has appeared
since the thesis of general crisis was first proposed in the 1950's,
certain salient causes and symptoms have been above debate.

His

torians are now in agreement that the first half of the century was
a period of pervasive and widespread economic depression in some
way connected with the Price Revolution and shifting trade patterns
of the last fifty years of the sixteenth century; a depression .in
economic activity was continued and aggravated by the Thirty Years'
War in Germany, by the collapse of Spain as a world power, and by
stagnation in Mediterranean trade which brought the decline of once
prosperous Italian states.

h

4
The thesis of a general seventeenth century crisis was first
given coherent and comprehensive expression by E. J. Hobsbawm in "The
General Crisis of the European Economy in the Seventeenth Century,"
Past and Present. nos. 5 and 6 (May and November, 1954). Since its
initial appearance, Hobsbawm's thesis has been much elaborated and
detailed in a vast body of literature. Hobsbawm's original article
is included in a noteworthy collection of essays on the subject by
H. R. Trevor-Roper, Roland Mousnier, J. H. Elliot, and others
edited by T. H. Aston as Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 (London, 1965).
Additional evidence may be found in Jean Meuvret, Etudes d’histoire
Sconomique. Cahiers des annales, no. 32 (Paris, 1971), and in Roland
Mousnier, Fureurs paysannes: les paysans dans les rSvoltes du XVII6
siecle (Prance. Russle, Chine) (Paris. 196?). The most comprehensive
statement of the nature and effects of the crisis in all areas of
society, culture, government and economics can be found in Roland
Mousnier, Le XVI et XVII siecles, 3rd ed. (Paris, i960). A
critique of Western writing on the crisis from the Marxist stand
point may be found in A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The
Crucial Phase, 1620-1629, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge. England.
195877 pp. 4-81. See also the comments on the thesis of crisis
made by J. H. Sherman in Government and Society in France, pp. 62-70.
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The seventeenth century depression was fundamentally economic
in character, but it also had important political corollaries: it
was inextricably tied to the working out of a new balance of power
between the dynasties of Bourbon and Hapsburg as well as the
emergence of what has been termed "the modern State," a form of
monarchy in which royal governments enjoyed substantially more
authority and effectiveness than ever before.

Englishmen of the

time knew the political crisis as a clash between royal prerogative
and parliamentary rule; after a half century of tension, nine years
of civil war, and the execution of a king, Parliamentary supremacy
and limited monarchy triumphed.

On the continent, governmental

development took a different path.

In Prance, the principles of

monarchical authority were victorious over representative insti
tutions, corporate and individual rights, and regional particularisms
in what is conventionally termed an "age of absolutism."

The

Spanish Hapsburgs attempted to emulate the French model of central
ization, but Olivares’ Union of Arms failed to weather revolts in
Naples, Portugal, and Catalonia.'’ Disintegration of the German
Empire during the Thirty Years’ War was confirmed at Munster and
Westphalia.

Though the Hapsburgs maintained a firm hold on the

crown lands, they had to admit the permanent loss of the United
Provinces which had emerged during the War as a great mercantile
^On the political turmoil which characterized the mid-century
decade, see R. B. Merriman, Six Contemporaneous Revolutions (Oxford,
1938)* Merriman was unable to fit the revolts in Naples, Catalonia,
Portugal, the English and Dutch revolutions, and the Fronde into a
common international pattern of cause and effect.
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power.

As a result of these changes and others, after mid-century

Prance asserted herself as the major European land power while the
Dutch and English contested control of the seas.
In Prance prevalent European conditions were reflected in an
era of popular uprisings which seem to have "been hoth a reaction to,
and symptomatic of, general crisis conditions within the society,
economy, and government of Louis XIII.

Recent studies by Roland

Mousnier and Boris Porschnev have confirmed that peasant revolt was
endemic in the kingdom throughout the 1620*s, 1630’s, and 1640's;
the same historians and their students have shown that disturbances
in the countryside were often related to urban gmeutes (riots) and
to resistance to royal policies on the part of peasants, townsmen,
nobility, provincial assemblies, and even royal officers.

The

frequency and intensity of outbursts shows a general correlation
with economic conditions as well as with the progress of absolutism
and centralization during Louis’ reign.

As early as 1617 and 1618,

popular turmoil boiled to the surface each year in one part of the
kingdom or the other; the frequency of these disturbances increased
throughout the decade of the 1620’s to reach a crest in the period
1637-1639.

In November, 1623» there were popular riots lasting two

days at Rouen; at Poitiers In 1624 urban rioters attacked the houses
of royal officials with stones and firearms.

In May, 1624, a more

serious affair broke out around Figeac and Cahors in Guyenne where
a peasant army looted and pillaged the countryside for days on end.
In the years following 1625 such upheavals became commonplace.

In

1626 there were troubles at Troyes; in 1628 at Amiens and Laval; in
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I63O, a spasm of revolts shook Angers, Dijon, Caen, and Lyons,

The

decade of the l630's brought no relief, rather, the fury and mag
nitude of gmeutes and .jacqueries increased.

There were riots in

Paris in 1631 over the imposition of a new aide on wine and in 1638
over the non-payment of interest on the royal rentes. or bonds, and
the rural revolts of the Croquants of Pgrigord in 1637 and the
Norman Va-nu-pieds in 1639 were more serious than any preceding ones.
In the uprising of the Croquants. for example, no less than 6>000 to
7,000 men took up arms against the authorities, and in their final
stand more than 1,000 were killed.^
The causes of disaffection were numerous and complex.

Some of

them certainly lay buried deep in the history of the country.

Robert

Mandrou, especially, has seen the tensions of Louis XIII's era as a
product of the adjustment of "collective mentalities" to long duration
changes in social conditions.

For Mandrou, social conflict had two

orientations: one a great "dialogue a trois voix among the noblesse
d'gpge. the noblesse de robe, and the bourgeoisie marchande, the other
noland Mousnier* s Fureurs paysannes is the best general source
on French rural revolt. See also the same author's "Recherches sur
les soulevements populaires en France avant la Fronde," in La Plume.
la faucille et le marteau. pp. 335-69; Boris Porschnev, Les Souleve
ments populaires en France de 1623 a 164-8 (Paris, 1963); Monique
Degame, "Etudes sur les soulevements provinciaux avant la Fronde:
la rSvolte du Rouergue en 164-3," XVIIe siecle. no. 56 (1962), 3-18;
Robert Mandrou, "Vingt ans apres, ou une direction de recherches
fgcondes: les rSvoltes populaires en France au XVIIe siecle," Revue
historique, CCXLII (July-September, 1969)> 29-4-0; J. H. Salmon,
"Venality of Office and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth-Century France:
a Review of a Controversy," Past and Present, no. 37 (July» 1967).
21-4-3; Tapig, La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, pp. 200-07;
Marigjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII. pp. 432-34-.
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a violent expression of popular upheaval in town and country.^
Weakened by the Wars of Religion, the old nobility found its
dominant position increasingly embarassed by economic decline and
threatened by the opportunities opened up to the bourgeoisie for
social advancement into the newer noblesse de robe.® Continuing
the theme of continuity with the past, Mandrou has also observed
that the disturbances of the reign were not the first nor the last
of such outbursts, and that it is therefore necessary to see them
in a sequence of preceding troubles and those reaching at least
to 1676. In brief, it is the long perspective which is important.
In addition to economic crisis, he maintains, historians of popular
unrest
should be equally attentive to locations and cartography: the
West, Normandy, Guyenne, the Center (Marche, Berry, Bourbonnais),
there is the area most often touched, the most often afflicted
by a continuity of troubles. Can one see here a consequence of
the larger participation of these provinces, bordering the ocean,
in the vigor of the "long l6th century": the ebbing of the years
1620-1680 having provoked a more noticeable slump here than in
more continental, more developed regions? But these zones of
rural and urban agitation of the 17th century are also the
provinces in whichgthe religious wars were most ardent in the
preceding century.
Victor TapiS has also pointed out that popular unrest was rooted
deep in the collective psychology of the past:
In truth, there was scarcely a province in Prance which had not
received from the past some traditions of civil war, some
7

Rgbert Mandrou, Classes et luttes de classes en Prance au dfbut
du XVII siecle (Messina and Florence, I9S5J, p. 13.
8Ibid.. pp. 29-62.

9

..

Robert Mandrou, "Les Soulevements populaires et la sociSte
fra^aise du XVII siecle," Annales: Economies, sociftfs, civili
sations. XIV (1959), 761.
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because they had been Protestant, others because they had
been Leaguers, and, going further back into history, Bur
gundian, "Armagnac," or Breton. The slightest return of
tranquillity or of peace effaced or contained these memories,
but as soon as the ravages of misery broke out anew, these
sore spirits were resurrected with the confused legends of
the wars of other times.
As in past times of great distress, the failure of strong and
able leadership during the regency encouraged civil disorder,
especially among the great nobility who took the opportunity to
raise their provinces against royal authority and among the
Huguenots who saw a potential revocation of the Edict of Nantes
in the flaccid policies of Marie de Medicis.

Out of these motives

and for mere private gain, armed bands crossed and criss-crossed
large areas of the countryside throughout the second and third
decades of the l600's.

Whether carried out by peasants or princes,

by rebels or royalists, the depredations of marauders accentuated
the misery and hardship of the poor and the uncertainty of the
times.

Richelieu was able to bring the anarchy of a warring

feudality and the rebellion of the Huguenots under control by
1630, but after this time the kingdom was threatened by foreign
Invasion.

In 1636, the infamous "Corbie Year,” Spanish forces

crossed the frontier, ravaging and pillaging to within ninety
miles of the capital.
The role of economic causation and its relationship to the
crisis of Louis’ reign is not yet fully explored or understood.

The

10Tapi§, La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, p. 372.
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economic and demographic indicators available for the first half
of the century are scanty and widely scattered; it is to be expected,
too, that conditions varied greatly from year to year and from
province to province.

For these reasons, it is not surprising that

the general French scene is as yet unclear.

From the studies

available at present, it appears that from 1615 the course and
relationship of prices and wages were generally unfavorable to
urban craftsmen and artisans.

During the first third of the century,

at least, prices were generally rising and wages lagged behind the
rise.

For the rural peasantry, the rise in prices may have meant

prosperity to those with a disposable surplus of foodstuffs.

It is

more probable, however, that rising prices were a reflection of
shortages and increasing demand linked to a rising population.

The

first half of the century was marked by frequent violent cyclical
variations brought about by seasonal shortages and poor harvests.
Such fluctuations were certainly characteristic of the entire agri
cultural history of the Old Regime, but the amplitude and frequency
of short-term oscillations were often abnormal during the first
half of the 1600’s.11
The studies of Goubert for the Beauvais and Mousnier for the
kingdom as a whole indicate that the French population was rising

13-For the general economic conditions of Louis' reign see the
works previously cited in notes 3 and 4 and Pierre Goubert, Beauvais
et le Beauvaisis de 1600 a 1730 (2 vols.; Paris, 1961).
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Un
steadily until the decade of the l640's. In the Beauvais, for most
parishes, the level of population reached a figure in the 16&0's
that was not equaled until the beginning of the nineteenth century.
On the eve of the Fronde the total population of the kingdom was to
reach or even surpass twenty million, a height that had not been
attained since the fourteenth century.

Between the fourteenth and

seventeenth centuries, the French population had oscillated between
a minimum of fifteen and a maximum of twenty millions; these limits
were relatively fixed and were closely related to disease, famine,
and the limited agricultural productivity of the French economy.

By

the era of Richelieu the demographic level may have outstripped
production techniques, for as Mousnier maintains, "Prance is above
all an agricultural country, and the agricultural technique of the
times does not allow enough productivity [for population] to exceed
the maximum level, nor is it regular enough to avoid abrupt jolts."

12

The seething unrest of Frenchmen is easily understood when the
fiscal demands of the Crown and the distribution of the royal tax
12Roland Mousnier, "Etudes sur la population de la France au
XVIIe siecle,” XVII siecle. no. 16 (1952;, 535* • See also Goubert,
Beauvais et le Beauvaisls. passim; Pierre Goubert, "Recent Theories
and Research in French Population Between 1500 and 1700," trans.
Margaret Hilton, in Population and History, ed. D. V. Glass and
D. E. C. Eversley (Chicago, 1965T7 pp. ^57-73; Jean Meuvret,
"Demographic Crisis in France from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth
Century," trans. Margaret Hilton, in Population and History, pp.
507-22. The conclusions of Mousnier and Goubert are reinforced by
the findings of Jean Meuvret for the latter part of the seventeenth
century in "Les Crises de subsistance et la demographie de la France
d'Ancien RSgime," Etudes d*histoire Sconomique. Cahiers des annales,
no. 32 (Paris, 197l), pp.*271-78.
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burden is considered.

Henry IV and Sully had managed to accumulate

a sizable surplus through careful direction of the finances, but
Marie de Medicis abandoned their stewardship.

Henry's nest egg was

consumed a few years after his death, and the expenses of govern
ment began to edge upward, a trend sustained after Louis' coup d'gtat
of 1617. The costs of civil wars and campaigns against the Huguenots
supported the rise during the 1620's; no sooner were these major out
lays suspended than Richelieu began a costly involvement in inter
national politics, secretly buying alliances, influence, and infor
mation.

After May 19 , 1635, when France's war turned from cold to hot,

it became necessary to conduct a financial campaign paralleling the
military and diplomatic effort.

The inevitable result was a dramatic

escalation of revenues collected.

After the figures supplied by

Mallet, royal revenues averaged about 40 ,000,000 livres a year during
the 1620’s . In 1632 this rose to 57 ,000,000 livres. becoming
72.000.000 in 1633 and 120,000,000 in 1634.

In the critical year of

1635, the total revenues collected amounted to no less than
208 .000.000 livres. a figure dropping the next year to 108,000,000 and
stabilizing at about 90,000,000 livres per year until the end of the
reign.

It should be noted that these revenues represent sums bons aux

trSsorlers de l'Spargne, that is to say, monies accounted for by the
central treasury.

What sums beyond these were spent in unaccounted

ways for fortifications, military logistics, garrisoning of troops, and
so forth remain unknown.

13

13

See Appendix I. Numerical data taken from the tables of JeanRoland Mallet, Comptes rendus de 1*administration des finances du
royaume de France pendant les onze demieres annfies du regne de
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The enormously increased taxation of the 1620's and 1630's was
distributed inequitably among various social classes so that injustice
was added to exaction.

The taille. principal direct royal tax, fell

almost exclusively on the peasantry.

During the first three decades

of the l600's, this tax remained virtually stable at a level of about
8.000.000 livres assessed under Henry IV.

By 1633» however, the Crown

found it necessary to increase the amount of the taille. and by 1637,
the year of the Croquant revolt in PSrigord, the taille produced about
20.000.000 livres, or twice the amount it had during the 1620's.

Much

the same was true of the indirect taxes which also bore heavily, though
not exclusively, on the rural and urban lower classes.

Like the

taille. the aides. traites. entries, octrois. and gabelles remained
relatively constant until 1632, when they began to rise substantially.
The average amount collected through these indirect taxes during the
1630's was about one-third greater than the amount taken in each year
14
during the 1620's.
Heavy taxes burdened the peasantry, but they
also affected the landed nobility as well, for increased royal
collections meant a decreased ability to pay the seigneurial dues.
Except for this factor, the nobility and clergy remained largely
exempt from levies.

The important special case of taxes on the royal

Henri IV, le regne de Louis XIII. & soixante-clnq annSes de celul de
Louis XIV TParis, 1789), pp. 198-212. The factor of monetary
inflation is difficult to estimate but must be taken into account.
D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue. II, Appendix IV, "Le
Prix de la vie en France," 392-426, suggests that the livre lost about
twenty-five percent of its value between 1600 and 1645.
14
Mallet, Comptes rendus des finances, pp. 198-212.
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officers and on office holding will he considered later.^
The research of Roland Mousnier and Boris Porschnev and their
students supports the probability that popular unrest was closely
related to economic hardship and the burden of taxation by showing
that the majority of risings began as an attack on royal fiscal agents
which sometimes became a general clash between rich and poor.

In the

countryside revolt visually began with assaults on persons and property
representing those who affirmed new taxes or exercised the office of
Slu where these officials were newly introduced into pays d'gtats.~^
Sometimes, as Porschnev has pointed out, the peasants attacked those
persons or property representing any king of feudal oppression: on
these occasions the seigneurs. their chateaux, its frui't trees or
vines were the victims of peasant wrath.
be discerned in urban areas.

Much the same pattern could

Symbols of municipal or royal authority

or economic well-being associated with tax collections, such as the
hotel de ville. greniers de sel. and the houses of royal officials, the
1-*See infra, pp. 141-45.
"^After 1627 the Crown attempted to introduce its own tax agents
for the taille. the Slus, into the pays d ’Stats of Dauphine, Bur
gundy, Provence, and Languedoc. The reform, had it succeeded, would
have eliminated the provincial rights of these provinces in matters
of finance and gone far to introduce administrative uniformity
throughout the kingdom. The reform, however, was maintained only in
DauphinS, where the estates ceased to meet. Georges Pages, la Mon
archic d’Ancien Regime en France de Henri IV a Louis XIV (Paris,
1928), p. 104; Marigjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII. pp. 402-06.
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mayor, or tax assessors, were set upon.

17

Popular risings before the Fronde were, then, indicative of a
profound economic and demographic crisis in French society.

The

causes of the crisis were complex, because natural factors inter
acted with man-made ones to intensify the troubled nature of the
times.

Riot and rebellion were a response to increased taxation

feeding the maw of internal and foreign war; they were also probably
associated with long-term movements in prices and a crisis in the
ability of gens de rien to eke out a subsistance; they were directly
linked to a general crisis in government and society brought by the
challenge of the Grown to local and individual rights and privileges.
Roland Mousnier has shown that unrest provoked by such conditions
cut across all class lines when, peasants followed their seigneurs
into rebellion.

In these instances, which Porschnev*s Marxist view

cannot accommodate, the vertical ties of clientage, patronage, and
mutual benefaction proved stronger than horizontal barriers of
socio-legal division.

The peasantry and artisans, most numerous

and most touched by suffering, provided the dynamic for violence,
but the nobility, and even ecclesiastics, were often indifferent to,
and sometimes actively involved in, demonstrations of discontent.
In this crisis, the King could not even rely on his officials
to enforce Crown policies.

Mousnier, together with his students

17
Mousnier, "Les Soulevements populaires avant la Fronde,"
in La Plume, la faucllle et le marteau. pp. 335-$+; Porschnev,
Les Soulevements populaires de 1^23 a 1648, passim; Degame,
"Les Soulevements provinciaux avant la Fronde," 3-18.
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Monique Degame and Ren§ Pillorget, have provided ample evidence
to show that royal officials at all levels often incited and some
times organized resistance to policies of absolutism and central
ization.

Frequently, it seems, when called upon to implement orders

from the council or from intendants. the officers of the venal
bureaucracy preferred to defend their own and local interests rather
than execute their obligations to King and State.
At Aix-en-Provence in 1630 and 1631, when the royal government
attempted to transform the province into a pays d1election, it was
president Coriolis of the Parlement of Provence who, along with other
officers of the court and bourgeois of the town, directed the revolt
of the Cascavoeux. The revolt, which infected most of Provence during
the winter of I63O, coincided with a period of poor harvests, plague,
and the passage of troops into nearby La Rochelle and the duchy of
Savoy.

The Parlement of Aix was also particularly disturbed by the

expiration of the paulette at the end of 1629; when lntendant Dreux
d’Aubray arrived in the province to enforce establishment of the j§lus,
one faction of the parlement headed by Coriolis and his nephew
directed agitation and violence against the lntendant.

Some of the

rebels swore to cut their throats rather than see the Slus intro
duced into the province; several houses of financiers were burned
while the bourgeois garde de ville of Aix refused to march against
the rioters."*"®

l8Ren§ Pillorget, "Les ’Cascavoeux*s L'Insurrection aixoise
de 1’automne I63O," XVII siecle. no. 6^ (196^), 3-30; Mousnier,
"Les Soulevements populaires," pp. 355-56.
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Many of the same conditions could be found at Moulins in the
summer and fall of 1640.
and his money stolen.

A royal tax collector had been murdered

In quelling the ensuing disorder the governor,

the comte de Saint-GSran, encountered continual difficulty with local
municipal and royal officials.

In writing Chancellor SSguier on

August 11, Saint-GSran accused the lieutenant-gSnSral of the
PrSsldial of Moulins, who was also mayor, of having abandoned him
at a moment of need.

On August 15, the governor wrote Seguier

again to say he had been obliged to imprison an Schevin of the city
who had let a rioter escape from his custody.

He accused the judges

of the prSsidial of favoring those in revolt, and he asked for
commissaires to investigate and prosecute the affair.

This was done.

An lntendant. Humbert de Chaponay, was sent to Moulins to deal with
the guilty.

He informed SSguier after his arrival that it would be

necessary for him to judge the guilty himself "because of favors
and protection that all these murderers and thieves receive on the
part of the principal officers and magistrates of this city who openly
favor their crimes against the will of the King plainly manifested to
19
them."
Chaponay added that he hoped to administer a "severe and
exemplary chastisement" to the culpable to ensure the safety and
security of the King’s subjects.

20

Whether or not Chaponay had his

1^Mousnier, Lettres et mSmolres adressSs au chanceller SSguier.
I, 481, from B.N. Ms. fr. 17374, fol. 72-73, De Chaponay in Moulins
to SSguier, January 23, 1641.
20
Ibid. See also Mousnier, "Les Soulevements populaires,"
P. 357.
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way with the troublemakers is not recorded.
The same pattern of official instigation and bourgeois co
operation was found in many other cases, even among the sovereign
courts of the provinces.

As early as July 15, 1630, garde des sceaux

Michel de Marillac could write concerning troubles at Laval and
Angers that
"I do not think it would be possible to imagine anything more
prejudicial to the authority of the King, or to his affairs,
especially in the present state £of affairs^. All are filled
with sedition in Prance. The parlements punish no one for it.
The King has given judges for these trials and the -parlement
stops the execution of these judgments, and consequently the
seditions are authorized. I do not know whether to hope or to
fear from that, seeing the frequency of these upheavals, of
which almost each day brings us a new opinion."
Marillac's accusations of parlementalre indifference to sedition were
not without cause, at least among the provincial parlements. The
revolt of the Parlement of Aix in I63O-I63I has already been
mentioned.

At Dijon in 1630 the Parlement of Burgundy bore a heavy

responsibility in the uprising of the Lanturelus; at Bordeaux in
1635 the bourgeois guard stood aside while the parlement incited
disorder.

Involvement of the sovereign courts was obvious, too, in

the troubles at Rouen in 1639 where the attitude of the parlement
was such that the King interdicted its functions, along with those
22
of the Cour des aides.

better of Michel de Marillac to the King or to Richelieu,
dated July 15, 1630, and quoted by Georges Pages in "Autour du
'Grand Orage's Richelieu et Marillac, deux politiques," in Revue
historic ue. CLXXIX (1937), 72-73, citing Archives des Affaires
Etrangeres, M§m. et documents; Prance, T. 795bis. fol. 290.
22Mousnier, "Les Soulevements populaires," pp. 356-57; MariSjol,
Henri IV et Louis XIII. pp. 431-34; TapiS, La France de Louis XIII et
de Richelieu, pp. 368-83.
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Monique Degarne has described the interaction of royal officials
and their common animosity towards the intendants in the revolt of the
Croquants of Rouergue in the summer of 16*4-3. The causes of the up
heaval in Rouergue were much the same as elsewhere* plague, poor har
vests, rising taxation, and inequitable division of the taille
appear prominently here.

The reports of intendants plus lists of those

arrested indicate that most participants in the troubles were ordinary
peasants, vine workers, laborers, artisans, and tradesmen,
sprinkling of nobles was also involved.

A

The rebellion in Ville-

franche-en-Rouergue had the support of the presidial of the city
and a faction which centered about the city fathers; the local court,
together with the city magistrates, were suspended from their
functions by royal order after July, 1643.

The prgsldial did not

content itself with inciting disorder in Villefranche, for reports
of the Intendants show that it maintained a constant liaison with the
nearby Parlement of Toulouse.

That parlement. second oldest and most

prestigious after that of Paris, showed itself thoroughly sympathetic
to the rebel cause.

On June 5» conselller Juillard reminded the

court of seizures made in enforcing the taille. The fault for local
disorders, he said, lay not with local officials but with the
exactions of the intendants. At least some of the judges addressed by
Juillard were hardly disinterested observers of these intendants and
the collection of the taille. being themselves landlords who had not
paid the taille for years.

This evasion was patently illegal in

Languedoc, a pays de taille rgelle where all landholders were liable
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for payment.

Following Juillard.’s speech the court issued an arret

which suspended all commissions not verified in the parlement.
Conscious of the undisguised hatred thus demonstrated towards him,
intendant Jacques Charrenton wrote SSguier on June 29 that
"Messieurs of the Parlement of Toulouse are proposing to
make great complaints against me out of hatred for the views
I have given His Majesty concerning that which they have done
contrary to the authority and service of the King. I heg you
to consider that they direct it more towards the intendancy
than towards my person, angered at having a controller of
their actions so near and so exact."
Degame concluded that several other groups of royal officers such
as the trSsoriers de France showed an animosity no less great in
■ok

regard to the intendant for similar reasons.

Several general reasons can immediately be identified for the
behavior of the judges in the Parlement of Toulouse as well as other
royal officials found in collusion with resistance to the King’s
authority.

All of these causes had an ancient common ground in the

establishment of the royal bureaucracy during the fifteenth and six
teenth centuries, in the introduction of venality and the paulette,
and in subsequent effort of the Grown to tax its officers as well as
to supervise their growing independence after 1610.

In recovering

from the debilitation brought by the Hundred Years' War, the
Renaissance monarchy had strengthened its ties with Frenchmen

23

%

Degame, "Les Soulevements provinciaux avant la Fronde,”
18, quoting B.N. Ms. fr. 18378, fol. 141.
24
Ibid. See also the primary documents provided by Mousnier
in Lettres et mSmolres adressgs au chancelier SSguier. II, Appendix
III, "MSmoires sur diverses seditions,’’ 1112-132.
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everywhere in the kingdom by gradually assembling an elaborate
bureaucracy to conduct provincial administration in the king's name.

25

Quite typical of this process was the fashioning of machinery to
collect deniers extraordlnalres such as the taille. which were now,
more than ever, imposed by regal right outside the domain.

By the

end of the sixteenth century, this financial machinery extended
through several levels, from the Slus at the grassroots through the
receveurs at provincial level to the four intendants des finances in
P a r i s . A t the same time, the Crown further consolidated its grip
on the countryside by erecting a sophisticated judicial apparatus
which was utilized not only for the execution of royal law but also
for administrative tasks in conjunction with noble governors.

27

Particularly noteworthy among these tasks was the court's function of
disseminating knowledge of new royal legislation within their juris-

25
•^"Renaissance Monarchy” is here used to encompass the reigns
between Charles VII (l422-l46l) and Henry III (1574-1589). The
qualities of the Renaissance Monarchy and its bureaucratization of
Prance are discussed by J. Russell Major in Representative Insti
tutions in Renaissance Prance (Madison, Wisconsin, I960),pp. 3-20,
and by Christopher Stocker in "Office as Maintenance in Renaissance
France," Canadian Journal of History. VI (1971).
^Certain provinces, those deemed pays d'Stats, remained out
side the region within which the royal financial officials operated.
In these, collection of the taille and other impositions royaux
were made through the estates of the province. In all areas of the
kingdom, indirect taxes such as the gabelles. aides, and traltes
were never collected by royal officials but were farmed under con
tract to traltants and feralers whose private agents collected in
the king's name. These exceptions to the regular financial apparatus
limited its operations but in no way affected its original raison
d'etre.

27

Gaston Zeller has postulated that Renaissance administration
was largely effected through the combined activities of the
gouverneurs and the provincial parlements. See Zeller, "L'Adminis
tration monarchique avant les intendants."
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dictions, ensuring that subordinate courts as well as subjects were
kept abreast of declarations, edicts, and arrets posited as law.
Like the Parlement of Paris, the nine provincial parlements put down
brigandage, regulated commerce, ministered to the poor, and dealt
with myriad details of fairs, markets, bridges, roads, education, and
health within their ressorts. The administration of these functions
made the royal courts, especially the parlements. vital links between
the centralized royal authority in Paris and the various provinces
that made up the kingdom.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the royal bureau
cracy had demonstrated its worth to king and country.

It had

accumulated numbers large enough to make Prance the most thoroughly
bureaucratized of the great European states while establishing a
reputation for loyalty and effectiveness in furthering the king’s
interests.^

Beyond this, the establishment of a regular civil

service had helped fill the royal treasury, provided a means of
maintenance for Crown servants and clients, and had laid down a
ready path for social, advancement through an otherwise restricted
social system.

As long as the Renaissance monarchs respected local

privileges and customs, sought to impose a modicum of taxes, and

28ln 1505 the royal bureaucracy— officers as well as clerks,
sergeants, notaries, and miscellaneous agents— counted about 12,000
members in a nation of 15.000,000 inhabitants and 480,000 square
kilometers, or one official for each 1,250 inhabitants and for each
forty square kilometers. Major, Representative Institutions in
Renaissance France, p. 5. This figure had risen to about 40,000
by the early seventeenth century, or one official for every four
hundred subjects in a kingdom of about the same extent. Moote,
Revolt of the Judges, p. 6.
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associated their central authority with decentralized provincial
institutions, the royal bureaucracy proved highly effectual.

Unfor

tunately for the interests of Louis XIII and Richelieu, however, the
civil service policies and governmental institutions which had proven
sufficient In the Renaissance Monarchy showed themselves to be of
limited value, even restrictive and ennervating, to royal authority
in an age of absolutism.

The helter-skelter pyramind of courts,

bureaus, officers, and jurisdictions piled up since medieval times
had quite adequately answered the limited needs and objectives of
Renaissance rule, but this jumble was less amenable and often antag
onistic to exactions demanded of-it by Louis and Richelieu.
What accounts for the independence exhibited by royal officials
during Louis' reign? At the outset it should be noted that there was
not, and could not be, any universal explanation.
was far from monolithic.

The bureaucracy

The interests of an §lu in Orleans were

vastly different from those of a president in the Parlement of
Brittany, and both had little in common with a secretaire du rol
in Paris.

True, all of the officers could claim to participate in

the public power of the Crown, but real uniformity ended there.

The

entire body of officials was broadly split vertically along func
tional lines into financial and judicial officers.

Both categories

were fissured irregularly across horizontal lines of power, prestige,
tradition, and anclennetS. Embedded in the diverse mass were curious
anomalies like the mattres des requetes. presumably magistrates but
just as often fulfilling the role of administrators.

Almost all of
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the officers were touched by the paulette, which represented their
common interest in office holding.
exceptions and exemptions.

Yet even the paulette had its

A few officers were still outside its

regime in the seventeenth century.

Others, like the sovereign judges,

were so prestigious and so powerful politically that they were able
to escape many of its more onerous aspects.

Despite this mSlange

of various identities among the officers, some common factors for
opposition to royal policies can be suggested.

29

Part of the answer lies in the consistently ad hoc policies
the Crown pursued in instituting, organizing, and recruiting its civil
servants.

In multiplying the number of parlements, for example by

creating the Parlement of Normandy out of the former ducal exchequer,
or by making that of Burgundy out of the erstwhile ducal court, the
Crown almost inevitably elevated pre-existing local institutions to
the status of royal parlements.^

In so doing, kings successfully

flattered local ambitions, eased the transition to centralization,
and seemingly created stronger bonds with the province, but the
particularist traditions of the courts so elevated were actually only
given royalist trappings rather than truly transmuted by their
assumption of the king's name and seals.

The personnel of the

provincial courts continued to be drawn in large measure from the
29
On this question see especially Moote, "The French Crown Versus
its Financial and Judicial Officials" and the same author's Revolt of
the Judges, pp. 3-63.
^°See supra, p. k6, n. 10.
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locality; the law practiced before such courts continued to be as much
the local custom as the royal ordinances.

The same paradoxical

assimilation of local offices by royal personnel had infiltrated other
parts of the bureaucracy by the l600's.

The glus. originally medieval

agents locally designated by the various diocese to collect subsidies
they had granted the king, had been integrated into the royal bureau
cracy during the fourteenth century as the most humble financial
31
agents of the nays d*Election.
Sometimes royal offices had resulted
from other ad hoc circumstances.

The prSvots and baillis, for example,

had originated as independent commissioned delegates of the king,
wholly under his control and at his disposal.

These commissions had

gradually been subverted into regular heritable offices by the
fifteenth century, usually being held as honorary sinecures by local
gentlemeh.

32

When the interest of these officers conflicted with

that of the Crown, it is hardly surprising that regional ties,
familial orientation, material values, or customary law sometimes
proved more tantalizing than allegiance to a distant king.
Self-interest and independent attitudes among all officials were
greatly encouraged by traditional mores of office holding in
Renaissance France.

Since medieval times, offices had been distributed

by king and noble alike among loyal retainers, servants, and clients.
^Marion, Dlctionnalre des institutions. p. 198; Fawtier and Lot,
Les Institutions royales. p. 276; Rodolphe Dareste, ia Justice admin
istrative en France. 2nd ed., rev. and comp, by Pierre Dareste
(Paris, 1898), pp. 39-42.
■^Marion, PictipmiairR des Institutions, pp. 32, 453; Fawtier
and Lot, Les Institutions royales. pp. 141-44; 148, 194-96; Dufey,
Hlstoire des -parlemens de France. I, 5»
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The understood intention was that the recepient should exploit the
position for personal and familial ends, i.e., for his maintenance.
Salaries were usually low or non-existent, hut ample opportunities
existed for the officer to compensate himself through legal fees,
court costs, or charges for his public services.

Sometimes this

meant that the discharge of official obligations would be wanting,
or at other times excessive, but disadvantages of the system were
held to be of little consequence when placed alongside advantages
accruing to the donor.

Offices were a convenient and honorable

bequest, suitable for nobleman as well as commoner, and the gift of
them a highly satisfactory means of acquiring followers devoted to
one's service.

33

As survivance established itself, so too did the tendency for
a family to capture a royal office and regard it as part of its patri
mony.

During the sixteenth century, the distribution of offices

gradually became "royalized" and subjected to sale rather than gift.
The independence of functionaries was further fortified after l6(&
by the introduction of the paulette. which simplified and sanctioned
centuries-old practices.

Through the purchase of office, individuals

and families found rich opportunities for public service, social
advancement, and material reward, but at the same time kings also
came more and more to understand that the regalian right to create
offices had a potential to produce revenue even after posts had been
33
Stocker, "Office as Maintenance," passim.
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sold and seemingly alienated.

Officers, in short, could he taxed

for their cherished privileges.
The net result of Renaissance practices and the introduction of
venality was the creation of a "new feudality" based on office
holding, a theme first developed by Georges Pages in 1928 when he
wrote that
royalty had long availed itself of officers in order to divest
the feudality of public power, to leave the one-time masters
of the soil nothing but the privileges of honor and useful
rights. But the officers did not work solely for royalty.
They had come to form, by their own admission, a semi-indepen
dent body which doubtless lent its support to the Crown, but
which also assumed to know royalty's interests even better than
it knew them itself, and thought to enlighten and control it.
Then venality of officea— it, too, the work of kings— assured
heredity to them. A little later, royalty perceived that it
had reconstituted by its own hand a kind of new feudality.
Roland Mousnier returned to the same expression in summarizing the
situation in the civil service at the beginning of the sixteenth
century:
Officers of all categories are recruited especially among the
notable and rich families of each locality. If one recalls
that certain families monopolized several offices, where they
are well enough rooted to provide for them like a patrimony,
and if one considers that they join the authority given by
riches and long residence with the investment of royal authority,
the part of public power that they possess, then perhaps one
could conclude that these families share with the king the
administration of the kingdom, that royal authority is greatly
tempered by ownership . . . that the kingdom is under the subordination-of rich families and that it looms as a new form of
feudality.
At least as late as the Mars of Religion, however, the "new feudality"
34
Pages, La Monarchle d'Ancien RSgime en France, pp. 123-24.
■^Mousnier, La VgnalltS des offices. p. 33.
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worked for, instead of against, royal interests.

Until this time

the admission of proprietary rights of office holders was a minor
matter in comparison with the revenues returned.

And perhaps equally

important during troubled times like those endured by the last Valois,
the "new feudality" tended to exclude private parties from the dis
tribution of royal offices for their own advantage and profit.^
Thus by the second decade of the l600’s, the French bureaucracy
contained within itself diverse and not always harmonious possi
bilities.

In the past it had usually served its royal masters well.

During the fifteenth and especially during the sixteenth centuries,
the bureaucracy had become an acknowledged and accessible path for
upward social mobility.

It was a useful instrument for the diffusion

of royal orders and a potential source of revenues.

The Crown

recognized its need for servants, as well as the necessity of re
warding and providing for these servants, but it chose to associate
them with, rather than to separate them from, a gnawing fiscal
appetite.

The venal system worked well enough for both parties as

long as officials were not required to unduly violate their local,
kindred, or propertied interests.
The latent possibilities for insubordination which slumbered in
the venal bureaucracy were awakened to active widespread resistance
when shaken by the crisis of Louis' reign.

The first symptoms of

an involvement by the officialdom in the crisis appeared in 1614
^Stocker, "Office as Maintenance," 42-43.
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when, after a general assault on venality by the clergy and nobility
in the Estates General, it seemed that the Crown might act to
suppress the paulette. Unnerved by this possibility, the sovereign
courts launched a cacophony of protests.

Deputations from the Parle-

ment of Paris saw the King on January 2, 1615, to be followed two
days later by deputies from the narlements of the provinces.

Under

pressure from the officers, threatened by overtures made to the Paxlement by the prince de Cond§, and uncertain as to how to replace the
lost revenues of the Parties casuelles. Marie decided to delay
suppression of the naulette until 1618
By 1618, however, Louis had seized the reins of government
from his mother, and for personal reasons he decided to allow the
droit annuel to lapse.

On January 15, 1618, an arret du Consell

revoked the annuel and dispensations from the forty days clause.
A storm of remonstrances from the Parlement and the Chambre des
comptes of Paris ensued, but Louis held firm.

Usually pious and

Idealistic, Louis felt obliged to honor promises made to the Estates
General three years before; furthermore, the suppression of venality
appealed to his sense of justice and thus to the well-being of the
kingdom.

Eternally jealous of his regal rights, too, the freedom

to dispose of offices fitted in well with Louis' concept of his
kingly obligations.

38

-^Mousnler, La VSnalitS des offices, pp. 275-76.
38Ibid.. pp. 281-82.
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This kind, of royal idealism, however, was destined to survive
just two and a half years.

The revolt of the Queen Mother in 1618,

followed by religious civil wars, inaugurated an era of growing
deficits in the balance of royal revenues which compelled a restor
ation of the droit annuel. After 1624, with a drift towards abso
lutism at home and military involvement abroad, fiscal exigencies
became pressing, then imperative.

At first the Crown reacted to

these pressures as it had at similar times in the past.

It raised

taxes, floated loans, debased the currency, and finally sought
refuge in still more extraordinary measures.

During the 1630's

the monarchy came to the end of its financial rope, and swinging
over the pit of bankruptcy, its fiscal policies became more and more
irregular.

A study of Appendices I-III will indicate why these

fiscal techniques poisoned the rapport between the Crown and its
servants.

Between 1604 and 1620 (with the exception of the period

1618-1619), the paulette had represented a regularized tax on the
officers (the droit annuel) amounting to one-sixtieth of the assessed
value of the office; at the same time the creations of office
remained relatively restrained so that total income from the Parties
hovered around eight to ten percent of royal income.

During the

1620's, however, the Crown discovered that it could effectively wring
its own bureaucracy for funds after additions to the taille and
indirect taxes on the peasantry could no longer be countenanced.

It

did this primarily through a combination of adroit management of the
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paulette, forced loans from the officers, and creations of office.39
Recourse to these singular practices hegan to manifest itself
after the rebellions of 1618-1620.

In exchange for renewal of the

paulette privilege, in July, 1620, the officers were required to
advance the Crown five percent of the value of their office within
nine months and one percent annually thereafter for the remaining
eight years of the agreement.

The initial five percent loan would

be returned to the officers as a deduction made against another flat
fee of twelve and one-half percent due at first resignation, tech
nically for the privilege of survlvance. Resistance to these un
precedented terms was too great, however; the officers, led by the
sovereign courts, refused to pay.

Adjustments had to be made.

In

February, 1621, the sovereign courts, maitres des requetes. and
trSsorlers de France were satisfied by an agreement giving them the
right of heritability upon payment of a droit annuel of one-sixtieth
and a resignation tax of twelve and one-half percent.

In compen

sation for losses so engendered, the Crown raised the exactions
levied on lesser officials.. This discriminatory treatment toughened
the resistance of the lesser officials so that a final settlement for
them was not arrived at until March, 1621.

At that time, judicial

officials below the sovereign courts were subjected to an immediate
loan of three percent and other officials five percent.

All were

liable to a resignation tax of twelve and one-half percent.

The

officers accepted these terms, and the custom of negotiating the

39Ibld.. pp. 393-415, 420-27, 645-63.
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terms of the -paulette was horn.
Extortionate techniques were revived in 1630-1631 when the
Crown again elicited huge sums through manipulation of the -paulette
and hy threats to abolish survivance all together.

When all agree

ments were eventaully completed after more than two years of nego
tiation, the officers of finance had been squeezed for a loan of
twenty-five percent.

The highest judges received the same prefer

ential gratuity that they had been granted in 1621, while those from
the -prSsidlaux and lower courts were forced to pay seventeen to
twenty percent in loans plus the usual droit annuel of one-sixtieth.
These dealings proved to be so profitable and the demands of war so
great that the contractual term of nine years was not allowed to run
its course.

In 1636 the agreements of I63O-I632 were scrapped, and

all functionaries except the Parlement of Paris were asked to make
an immediate payment of the droit annuel due across the next six
years.^

Once again, discriminatory treatment was utilized to split

the magistrature across its horizontal layers to prevent a unified
resistance from developing.

The sovereign courts were exempted from

any advance; other officers were assessed various amounts during the
course of complex bargains effected after 1637*

42

40Ibid., pp. 284-91.
^The Parlement was granted the -paulette through a- special
concession in connection with the agreement to register some edicts.
See infra, p. 522.
^^Housnier, la Vgnalltg des offices, pp. 291-301* Mousnier
has described the exact requirements presented on each occasion that
the paulette was renewed during the 1620’s and 1630's.
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While dangling the -paillette before its officials, the Crown also
extracted funds from the upper echelons of its financial officials
by forcing them to lend money in exchange for salary increases or
for the right to collect higher taxes. The officer's increased income
was considered to represent interest on a loan to the Crown capi
talized at ten to fifteen percent.
large sums.

The result was the generation of

For example, in 1637 the receveurs des tallies had to

accept 250,000 livres in hereditary salary increases; among them the
receveurs had to collectively remit 3»500,000 livres to the
treasury.

43

The wage increases were compulsory; the officers had

either to accept them or to see their offices suppressed.

Having

once contributed a lump sum to the treasury, the officers' woes were
not over, because old salaries as well as increases were usually far
in arrears.

Moreover, the salaried interest returned on offices,

never very large, was further eroded by a reduction of one-fourth
universally applied to the wages of all royal officials in l639> 1640,
and 1641, a cut which rose to three-eighths in 1642-1643.^
Throughout the crisis years of the 1620's and 1630's, the Crown
also expanded the practice of creating hundreds of new offices for
sale.

Because no complete lists of civil servants exist for the first
^Ibld.. p. 412.

44
Ibid., pp. 455-62. These efforts to cut costs were applied
to the sovereign courts. See B.N. Ms. Melanges de Colbert 326,
fols. 2-14v , for reductions made in the pensions, special salaries,
and gratuities given the judges of the Parlement during the early
1640's.
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half of the l600's and because of suppressions, modifications, and
unsold offices, it is impossible to accurately estimate either the
total number of royal officials or the exact additions to their ranks
during Richelieu's ministry.

Even French authority Mousnier has

contented himself on this point by saying that "it is certain that
the number of offices was very great,” and that "it is difficult to
know it [the number] with precision."^ Nevertheless, it is plain
that sales of office were crucial to royal finances during the l630's,
for between the years 1627 and 1642 there were no less than one
46
hundred forty-five creations of offices.
Most of these acts pro
vided for the sale of several offices, created wholly new insti
tutions, or established entire categories of new positions.

The

very substantial yield from these operations is shown in Appendix
III.

In 1630, creations of new offices brought in twenty percent

of royal income; in 1633» twenty-five percent; in 1636, nineteen
percent; in 1642, six and one-third percent.^
Royal officers feared and opposed new creations as eroding their
own investment.

The effects of this policy of venality seem at first

to contradict these fears, for all during the first thirty-five years
of the century there was a steady rise in the value of almost all
^Mousnier, La Vgnalltg des offices, p. 128.
^Ibld.. pp. 130-32.
47
'For the derivation of these figures, see notes to Appendices

I-III.
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offices, high or low.

A twelve-fold rise in the prices of offices

in the Paris Parlement during the epoch 1597-1635 has already been
noted.

48

It is interesting, though, to observe that at Paris the

price of offices did stabilize for a time after 1635•

The price of

a conselllership was 120,000 livres in 1635 and the same in 1637;
perhaps this was due to a large creation of twenty conseillers in
December, 1635-

In the Parlement of Rouen a similar relationship

between the prices of a conseillership and external factors can be
traced through a continuous series of reliable figures:
1593
7,000livres
1622 40,000
"
1626
66,000
1628
68,000
1629
70,000
1631
74.000
1633
84,000

1634
1636
1637
1640
1641
1642
1643

80,000
79,000
85,000
67,000
25,000
55,000
62,500 livres

Mousnier believes that at Rouen the prices of offices were influenced
by new creations and by the politics of the paulette. The dip inprices after 1633 could be attributed to threats of creations in
1633 and 1635, and there was a recovery in 1637 due to a reduction
in newly created offices and the prolongation of the droit annuel
for six years under the generous conditions of 1604.

The fall in

price after 1640 could be accounted for by the interdiction of the
court after the Va-nu-pleds affair of 1639 and by the creation of
forty-six new conseillers and six presidents in 1641.

49 On the other

48
See supra, p. 35*
^Mousnier, La Vgnalltg des offices, p. 361.
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hand, there are also figures to show that the value of two offices
growing in political significance in Richelieu's government, those
of the maitres des requites and the secretaires d'Etat. escalated
without check during the first four decades of the l600's.

Prom

1621 to 1642, the price of an office in the corps of mattres des
requites went from 102,000 to 180,000 livres; the extremely influ
ential office of secretaire d'Etat attained 180,000 livres in 1608,
350,000 in 1622, and 700,000 in 1643.5° For the less important, hut
far more numerous, offices comprising the hulk of the bureaucracy
Mousnier gives few figures because few continuous series are
available.

He suggests, however, from fragmentary evidence that

"it is possible that they increased much less in price, and that the
price of certain ones, especially in the category of offices of
judicature, diminished."^ Mousnier concluded by asking, "Is there
not a contradiction between the great heights we have found, which
implies great demand, and certain traces of slump that we have

52

encountered?"^

Nothing of the sort, he says, because

height and slump do not concern the same offices or, for the
same offices, are not produced under the same circumstances.
Those of the conseillers of the narlements. in particular,
increase in price since they are the least undermined by
edicts of creation, and the most favored by the conditions
of the fdroit] annuel. They also contract as soon as the king
throws new ones on the market; for them, too, as soon as the
5°Ibid.. pp. 360-63.
51Ibid., p. 364.

5 W
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officers enter conflict with the king, sales slow down or
cease. There is no contradictions there are different con
ditions, and it is always necessary...to take into account the
times, the places, and the events.
All of the above evidence suggests that the combined operations
of the Parties casuelles became steadily more important as a source
of revenue for the Grown as Richelieu's ministry progressed.

Further

study may show that along with the greatly expanded operations of the
traltants. fermiers. and financiers, the wholesale effort to tax the
bureaucracy was part of the transition to the financial establishment
of the early modern State in France.

By 1600 the great private

Renaissance banking houses had been ruined; in any case their capacity
would have been sorely strained by the demands of the Thirty Years'
War.

Certainly the ordinary tax base of the monarchy was inadequate,

falling as it did upon a basically inelastic agrarian economy whose
productivity was limited by the techniques of the times.

Perhaps

during the first half of the seventeenth century new national systems
of credit were being organized in which tax farmers and royal officials
together supplied the government with the vast s m s of ready money it
required.

tjL

Without pursuing these possibilities, however, other conclusions
53Ibid.
54
e
p
A thesis supported by Mousnier in Les XVI et XVII slecles.
p. 168. No satisfactory study presently exists of the financial
operations of Louis XIII's government. Some promising beginnings
have been made by Julian Dent in Crisis in Financet Crown. Fina.np.iers.
and Society in Seventeenth Century France (Newton Abbot, England,
1 9 7 3 X S e e also AndrS Chaleur, "Le Role des traitants dans 1*admin
istration financiere de la France de 1643 a 1653," XVIIe siecle, no.
65 (1964), 16-49.
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appear reasonably justified.

Squeezed by loans and threatened by

the loss of the investment, the officials of Louis XIII's France
found themselves drawn towards an attitude of evasion, corruption,
insubordination, and even connivance at insurrection.

The attraction

was made all the easier by the assault on Renaissance traditions of
independent, exploitative office holding which were remote from
modem conceptions of dutiful obedience among civil servants.

In

effect. Louis and Richelieu pressured not only the traditional feudal
independence of the noblesse d'Sptje but also the "new feudality” of
the Renaissance bureaucracy.

And, as with the monarchy's reduction

of les grands, the objective was never the destruction of an estate
but its subjection to royal will and royal needs.
As has been seen the French bureaucracy was far from being a
compact, uniform, homogeneous group.

Hence, the effects of royal

policy and the tactics of bureaucratic opposition were necessarily
as varied as the officers' duties, powers, location, and opportunities.
Magistrates at all levels largely had to content themselves with ju
dicial retribution— presentation of remonstrances, delay in verifi
cation of edicts, contrary decisions, procrastination in receiving
new colleagues, and, upon extreme provocation, going on judicial
strike.

Reduced salaries and heavier taxes might be made up to a

degree through increases in the Spices (court costs) and other
judicial fees paid by litigants.

As a result the power and impact

of resistance among lesser judicial officials was of correspondingly
less consequence than among the sovereign courts, especially the
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sovereign courts of Paris.
Financial officials, on the other hand., found greater chance
to recoup their losses through shady dealings, a factor that the
Crown itself liked to take advantage of when assessing the droit
annuel. survivance dues, and forced loans.

Other types of official

behavior were also incomptable with the needs of the royal adminis
tration.

Elus. receveurs. trgsorlers-ggngraux. and trgsoriers de

France sometimes reacted to royal pressures by delaying the assess
ment of vitally needed taxes or by contriving a variety of mal
versations.

Friends, neighbors, kin, and the locally powerful or

rich were treated with favoritism; the poor and unprivileged suffered
the consequences of official rapacity.

In normal times, behavior of

this sort was more or less acceptable, but it rapidly became in
tolerable when it short-changed the treasury or stimulated popular
revolt.
What was perhaps typical of the behavior of some was reported
to Chancellor Sgguier by lntendant De la Fertg from Mortagne (Perche)
in August, 16361
In the execution of the commission which it has pleased you
to give me . . . I have uncovered the greatest thefts on the
widest scale and in the most arrogant fashion which I have
ever heard of, because I think that in this Election £of Perche^
they have stolen more than one hundred thousand 6cus in various
years. The complaints-of poor people and the proof have come
to me from all sides. 5
lntendant Alexandre de Seve, in Auvergne, could report that he had
found the accounts of several receveurs "in such disorder that some-

^Mousnier, Lettres et mSmoires adressgs au chancelier Sgguier.
I, 29^, from B.N. Ms. ft. 17372, fol. 152r , De la Fertg in Mortagne
to Sgguier, August 7, 1636.
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times it has been necessary to tour the parishes in order to get at
the truth," and that he had found an embezzlement of 25»000 livres
in a single account which had been examined by the Ghambre des
comptes. ^

And in an edict of May, 1635» the King denounced the

attitude of the staffs making up his provincial bureaux des finances:
For some years, they [the trgsoriers-ggngraux^] have made them
selves so obnoxious in the execution of our edicts and com
missions that it seems that they want to directly oppose and
frustrate them, from which we have received a very great
prejudice to our affairs by the delay which they bring to
them.'5'
The edict went on to outline a shuffling of personnel in the bureaux
des finances for each of the ggnSralitSs along with the addition
of new officers called lntendants-ggngraux.
Though a common front among the officers was unlikely, the
capacity of the civil service to obstruct royal policies remained
enormous.

Evidently something more them mere reform in existing

institutions or periodic manipulation of the paulette were required
to deal with the complex crisis conditions of the 1630's, and in fact
56Ibid., 618, from B.N. Ms. fr. 17381, fols. 25-26, De Seve
in Riom (upper Auvergne) to Sgguier, January 18, 1644.
^Isambert, Anciennes lols franqalses. XVI, 443.
-*^The ggnSralltg was a district in the financial administration
that virtually coincided with a province. Since this edict provided
that new officers called intendants-ggngraux would be added to the
bureaux des finances, historians long believed that the edict of
1635 actually instituted the much more important and widely known
intendants de justice, police, et finances, or more simply, the
intendants des provinces. The error in identification was perhaps
originated by the editors of Anciennes lois francalses, who mis
takenly associated the creation of the venal offices in the bureaux
with the Crown's use of the commissioned agents called the Intendants.
See Isambert, Anciennes lols francalses. XVI, 442, n. 1; Dareste,
La Justice administrative, p. 97» n. 1.
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long before the edict of 1635 Louis XIII and his ministers had
adopted more effective methods of government to combat the inade
quacies that characterized the bureaucracy.

Two of these measures

amounted to significant milestones in the evolution of the royal
administration.

At the center of government, the royal council was

narrowed as princely councillors were excluded from it.

While this

took place during the late 1620's, Richelieu was gathering around
him a reliable team of creatures dependent on him and devoted to his
interests.

Several of these men, professional administrators all,

found their way into the posts of secretaire d'Etat or surintendant
des finances from which they came to supervise the tasks of daily
government after 1630.

At the same time, the organizational struc

ture of the Consell d'Etat became distinctly more specialized along
functional lines of finance, internal administration, and justice.
Carefully distinguished among the men who conducted business in the
Conseil d'Etat were those with the right to attend the exclusive
Consell d'en haut. now, more than ever, an intimate circle of the
King's most trusted advisers.

These changes and others had produced

by 1635 an efficient and loyal central control mechanism for the
implementation of royal authority.

59

Centralized authority, however, had to have direct contact with
the problems besetting it.

To suppress revolt, try dissident nobles,

59
^ Orest Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII
(Oxford, 1963); Mousnier, "Le Conseil du roi"; D'Avenel, Richelieu
et la monarchie absolue, I, h-O-56; Dareste, La Justice adminis
trative . pp. 53-93.
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handle military logistics, assure tax collections, and supervise
recalcitrant officers, Louis XIII and his ministers returned to a
time-honored expedient, the use of the extraordinary commissioned
agent.

There were two distinct species of these coniniiRsa.iTPs

operative in Louis XIII's era.

One type, drawn from the ranks of

the conseillers d'Etat and maitres des requetes. found themselves
assigned to short-lived judicial panels or chambres charged with
political trials and financial investigations, usually in or near
Paris.

Intendants. on the other hand, were also drawn from among

the conseillers d'Etat or maitres hut operated individually as
commlssaires dgpartle in the countryside.

The efficacy of both types

came from the complete control the king had over them, and it was
this same quality of control which so clearly distinguished the
commission from the office. ^

This control was both legal and

Regular officers such as the maitres des requetes were usually
chosen to hold commissions, though conseillers d'Etat. parlementaires.
and other gens de robe were occasionally selected. Because of this,
some authors have tried to controvert the differences between
officiers and commlssaires. J. H. Salmon has written, after A. D.
Lublinskaya, Vnutrenniva Politika Frantsuzskogo Absolyutlzma. 163316^9 [The Internal Politics of French Absolutism, 1633-lG^j
(Moscow and Leningrad, 1966), that "the clear distinction drawn
by Mousnier between the holders of venal office and the commlasal-ras
must also be questioned. The intendants. with one exception, were
drawn from the maitres des requetes. who sat in the parlement and,
under the chancellor's direction, provided the administrative staff
for the business of the royal council. These officials owned their
offices, although they did not posses fsic] any property rights in
the additional posts they might he granted as commlssaires. Thus
the chancellor had full power to revoke their commissions as
Intendants but he did not directly control their tenure of office
within the collegiate body of the maitres des requetes." "Venality
of Offices and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth Century France," 33.
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personal.

Commissioned powers were non-venal, temporary, and

immediately revocable.

In selecting their hearers, considerations

of ability, political reliability, and callosity could rule supreme.
The effectiveness of most commlssaires was further enhanced by the
fact that they were drawn from the ranks of councilliar personnel,
making them in effect striking arms of the council.

The extent of

the powers vested in commlssaires varied with the job at hand, but
a general three part enabling formulary remained the same: the King
recognized some particular administrative problem, empowered the
commlssalre to deal with it as he saw fit, and admonished all

officers and subjects to cooperate with him to the fullest extent.
So wielded, royal power could cut through time and distance as well
as circumvent the most perverse bureaucratic ineptness, corruption,
or insubordination.
The most common cnmmissaitb found in Louis XIII's Prance was
the lntendant. and because the intendants played an important role
in both controlling and provoking the Crown’s functionaries, some
understanding of their origins and operations is requisite to any
explanation of the bureaucracy’s part in the crisis of the reign.
Although much remains unclear about the origins and functions of the
early intendants. it is certain that the idea of sending individual
fiommlssalres into the provinces did not originate during Louis XIII's

reign.

The expedition of such agents was nearly as ancient as the

monarchy itself, Charlemagne having sent members of his court into
the countryside as mlssl dominie1 to bring justice and royal authority
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directly to the diverse peoples of his empire.

In lieu of a regular

civil service, the missi dominicl effectively satisfied the rudi
mentary requirements of the Carolingian Empire.

The collapse of the

Empire brought with it a recession in royal authority which lasted
well after the establishment of the Capetian dynasty in the former
Frankish kingdom.

In recovering and extending central authority

over their growing domain, the early Capetians returned to the use
of commlssaires on mission.

The prSvots. the earliest royal officers

in the domain, as well as the balllls who followed and supervised
them, probably originated as commlssaires whose tours had become so
protracted and regularized that they were finally fixed in one
location as permanent officials.

Sons followed fathers in the same

area, and these once temporary agents were gradually transformed
into the basic elements of the bureaucracy.^
As the bureaucracy grew, however, and as survlvance took hold
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Grown found it
harder and harder to adequately oversee thousands of officials
scattered over many provinces.

The normal difficulties of communi

cation and distance were carried to impossible levels by the decay
of orderly government after 1560.

Under these conditions the com-

missalre was again the logical solution to the Valois* need to make
their presence felt in distant or troubled areas of the realm.

From

6lThe thesis that parts of the royal administration developed out
of the regularization and fixation of commissaires is presented by
Pages in "La VSnalit§ des offices dans l’ancienne France,” 477-95.
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the early sixteenth century, maitres des requetes had been selected
for chevauchSes through the countryside to inquire into the conduct
of officials as well as to bring immediate relief to humble subjects
entangled in lengthy judicial proceedings or oppressed by inequitable
or iniquitous tax collections.

During the Wars of Religion these

duties of the maitres were confirmed and regularized at law.

The

three great ordinances of OrlSans (Article 33)i of Moulins (Article
7), and of Blois (Article 209) authorized maitres des requetes to
make their tours and "to receive complaints from all persons and to
insert them in their proces-verbaux" for presentation to the council
upon return.^

In addition to the chevauchges of the maitres.

other commlssaires were sent out irregularly to deal with financial
and military problems.

The edicts on the taille for 1583 and 1600

conferred on these Intendants de justice, police et finances es
armges the right to hear appeals from taxpayers concerning the
division of the taille between parishes and among the inhabitants of
each parish.

Henry IV found various commlssaires dgpartls an indis

pensable instrument in rebuilding his kingdom, and under him the use
of commlssaires was further expanded, with many designated as
lntendant. lntendant de justice, or lntendant de finance. The use
of intendants continued throughout the early part of Louis XIII's
rule, employed, as in the past, to enforce the collection of new
taxes, to reinforce controversial legislation, to assist military

^Isambert, Anciennes lois francalses. XIV, 73, 191-92, ^30-31.
The phraseology employed in each ordinance is virtually the same.
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operations, or to oversee the regular officers in their duties.^
Considering the Crown’s historical reliance on cnmmlssait o s . it
is not surprising that Richelieu frequently resorted to the use of
the temporary judicial commission to handle crucial administrative
problems.

A necessity for constant and thorough management of the

machinery of justice became evident to the Cardinal well before the
Day of Dupes, brining Richelieu to outline specific recommendations
to deal with what he later described as "the thorny objections of
the narlements which obstruct all things."

64

In several memoranda

prepared for the King, and later in -the Testament -politique, the
Cardinal sketched out plans to send both panels and individual
commissioned agents into the provinces.

As early as 1625» Richelieu

had toyed with the idea of an ambulatory chambre de justice which
would tour the countryside as a travelling assize, hearing com
plaints about malpractices in the regular courts and hastening the
overlong processes of justice.

According to this plan, the chamber

would be a form of grands jours made up of members of the sovereign
courts: four conseillers from the Parlement of Paris, two from
Toulouse, and one each from each of the other six -parlements. It is
worth noting that the presidency of the chamber would have been in
^Zeller, Dictlonnalre des institutions, pp. 116, 142-45;
Doucet, Dictlonnalre des institutions. I, 425-36; Edmond Esmonin,
Etudes sur la France des XVII et XVIII6 siecles (Paris, 1964), pp.
25-2(3; Mousnier, "Etat et commissaire," in La Plume, la faucllle et
le marteau. pp. 179-80; Dareste, La Justice administrative, pp. 94-

100.
64
Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal due de Richelieu, Testament
•politique, ed. Louis AndrS (Paris, 1947). p. 246.
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the hands of two conseillers d'Etat. which would effectively place
control of hearings and audiences in the hands of members of the
council and thus beyond the interference of regular magistrates.^
Ten. years later, Richelieu returned to the same scheme in the Testa
ment politique, proposing
to send into the provinces from time to time chambres de .justice
composed of conseillers d'Etat and maitres des requetes care
fully chosen to avoid the thorny objections of the parlements
which obstruct all things, in order that this company, receiving
complaints which could be made against all sorts of persons,^
no quality being, excepted, could immediately deal with them.
Richelieu's plans for the touring chambre de .justice never
materialized, probably because the use of individual intendants
proved more practical and effective in coping with what increasingly
became a fiscal crisis after 1635.

The Cardinal himself certainly

recognized the practical advantages of individual commissaires in
both the judicial and financial role, since he wrote in the Testa
ment politique that
because it is impossible to send such companies into all the
provinces at the same time . . . I think that it would be very
useful to frequently send into the provinces some carefully
chosen nonselllers d'Etat or maitres des requetes. not only
to carry out the functions of lntendant de .justice in capital
cities . . . but [also] to go into all provincial places to
inquire into the behavior of judicial and financial officers,
to see if impositions are levied in conformity with the
ordinances and if the receveurs vex the people with injustice,
to discover the methods used in exercising their charges.
Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal due de Richelieu, Lettres.
instructions diplomatiques et paplers d'etat du Cardinal Richelieu,
ed. Georges d’Avenel (8 vols.; Paris, 1835-1877), II, 160, 179-80.
^^Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 246.
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to learn how the nobility governs, to stop the course of all
sorts of disorders and especially the duress of those who,
being rich and powerful, oppress the weak and poor subjects
of the King.
A more precise statement of the activities of the intendants during
the 1630's can hardly be found.

During this decade the intendants

steadily grew in numbers and powers to become the most powerful
agents of the king in the countryside.

After December, 1633»

Intendants were sent out to regulate division of the taille among
parishes and households.

By instructions given in May, 1634-, these

commlssaires were expected to judge appeals from excessive taxation,
redivide the taille if necessary, and to scrupulously inquire about
local economic conditions in order to inform the council about future
rifilements. These missions naturally resulted in friction with glus,
bureaux des finances, and trSsoriers de Prance when their bureaucratic
inadequacies, injustices, and peculations were exposed.

Despite the

fact that the officers' shortcomings were becoming more and more
obvious, it seems that at least until the mid-l630's, the lntendant*s
role was intended to be that df overseer and supervisor, rather than
executor, of administrative tasks.

The government did not intend to

supplant the ordinary officers but sought to extract useful, honest
service from them.^
These intentions did not prove workable.

Hostilities between

officials and intendants continued to grow, as did the king's fiscal
^Ibid.. pp. 246-47.
^^Mousnier, "Etat et commissaire," pp. 184-87.
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needs.

The reform of 1635 in the bureaux des finances proved to be

a failure.

These factors, along with popular uprisings and military

activity, pushed the Crown towards a reliance on intendants instead
of officers.

Sometime between 1637 and 16*4-1— losses in the inten

dants * reports to Chancellor Sgguier make it impossible to be more
exact— the Intendants underwent a crucial transformation.

They

began to carry out, rather than merely to supervise, the division
and assessment of the taille; this, in turn, brought their intro
duction into all the ggngralitgs. The reglement des tallies of
August 22, 16*4-2, confirms that by this time the council had entrusted
the Intendants with the essential power to levy the taille. tallIon,
crues. and other impositions destined for the maintenance of troops.
Commissions for the collection of these taxes were jointly addressed
to Intendants and trgsorlers de Prance. The trgsorler was reduced
to the role of technical councillor.

The lntendant now had the right

to preside over the bureau de6 finances and to tour the glectlons
in company with a trgsorier. If he or the glus proved perverse, the
intendant could make the division in conjunction with other officers
or notable persons.

In addition to the assumption of these immensely

important financial responsibilities, the Intendants were also saddled
with a host of miscellaneous duties which brought them into conflict
with ordinary officers.^
Introduction of the Intendants. therefore, further aggravated
a civil service already alienated by unprecedented conditions of

^Ibid., Esmonin, Etudes sur la France, pp. 25-26.
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office holding.

According to the testimony of Richelieu’s MSmoires.

upon Henry IV’s death in 1610 Marie de Medicis had found it expedient
to placate the animosity of ordinary officials towards commissions
hy suppressing fourteen extraordinary commissions and fifty-eight

70

others verified in the parlements.

This gesture seems to have been

purely a temporary one, founded upon Marie's momentary need to woo
the officers, for the use of commissions continued unchecked through
out the next decade.

For reasons that will be seen later, the Parle-

ment of Paris hardly mentioned the issue in its great reform remon
strance of 1615, but in 1626 thirty First Presidents and gens du roi
of the sovereign courts in attendance at the Assembly of Notables
utilized the opportunity to demand suppression of the intendants de
.justice. In Article 1*4- of a twenty-three point charter of grievances,
the parlementaires spoke out on their own behalf and that of the less
articulate judges beneath them:
Your narlements receive a great prejudice from a new usage of
intendants de .justice which are sent into the jurisdictions and
territories of the said narlements . . '. their functions, which
they hope to hold for life, which are without legislative base,
establish a chief and supernumerary of justice and are created
without paying any finance. They correct the heads of sub
alternate courts and overcharge your salary costs, forming a
kind of justice calling parties by virtue of their [royal]
mandate and seizing clerks of court. From this [behavior]
comes a variety of disadvantages, among others, the undermining
of the jurisdiction, censure, and vigilance of your parlements.
officers of the s6n6chaussSes. ballllages. prSvotSs. and other
subaltemate judges. Moreover, they take competence of various
cases, appeal from which they direct to your council.
^°Richelieu, Mgmolres. I, 75.
^Petit, L’AssemblSe des notables. Appendix 5, "Articles de
Messieurs les officiers des cours souveraines,” pp. 266-67.
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In this article, the magistrates catalogued most of the complaints
against the intendants. and one may assume that it more or less
accurately reflected the contemporary magisterial view since it was
issued by representatives of all the -parlements. The judges indi
cated a number of affronts.

They felt the intendants' powers were

dubious because they were based on councilliar authorization and not
legislation.

Furthermore, as agents endowed with the dernier ressort,

their powers conflicted with those of the parlements. which made them
both a "chief" and a "supernumerary" of justice.

From the officers'

point of view, this could only result in illegal practice and injury
to their functions.

Beyond this, the absence of venality and the

ambitious attitudes of the intendants added insult to injury.
The protest of 1626 went unheeded, and the Assembly of Notables
represented the magistrature's last opportunity during Louis' rule
to present a united front against the intendants. Nevertheless, the
provincial parlements continued to be the implacable enemies of the
Intendants. as the intendants' reports to Sgguier testify.

With the

expanded employment of these commissalres. it seemed that the Crown
was assiduously seeking to reduce their functions, a reduction which
could only mean diminished prestige and income.

This point of view

was at least partially substantiated after 1637 when the intendants
began to assume the administrative responsibilities of the Jilus,
bureaux des finances, and trSsorlers de France. Lacking the power
of remonstrance, the protests of these officials remained more muted
than those of the sovereign courts even though they were more offended
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72
by the intrusion of the intendants.
The reaction of the officers to the intendants represents the
final link in a circular chain of cause and effect which deeply
entangled the civil service in the crisis of Louis' reign.

The stage

for this national crisis was set by natural conditions of depression
prevailing in Prance in the first decades of the century: rising
population, limited production, periodic famine and plague.

Factors

like these were accompanied and compounded by long-term adjustments
in economic and social relationships between the noblesse d'Spee,
noblesse de robe, and the bourgeoisie; the anxieties of these groups
as well as the peasantry were sharpened by the absence of able
leadership after Henry IV’s death.

Amid this setting Richelieu

determined to follow an ambitious and expensive policy which placed
serious demands on the resources of the country.

The decade of the

1620's represents a period of counterpoise: the problems of the

TJespite their inability to bring pressure on the Crown under
Richelieu's ministry, the trSsoriers and §lus had resources that
would become significant during the Fronde of 1648. Since 1599,
the trgsoriers de France had been organized into a professional
association, complete with dues and representatives in Paris charged
with defending their interests. In 1641 the §lus had been allowed
to follow the trSsorlers in organizing a permanent syndicate; like
the company of trgsoriers. the §lus had a charter, dues, maintained
a secretary in Paris, and were recognized by the Cour des aides.
Chambre des comptes, and the Conseil d'Etat. During Louis XIII's
rule, at least, the influence of these financial officers seems to
have been minimal. Vith the outbreak of the Fronde, however, the
trSsoriers and §lus succeeded in influencing the courts of Paris
to demand the withdrawal of the intendants. Roland Mousnier,
"Recherches sur les syndicats d’officiers pendant la Fronde:
TrSsoriers generaux de France et Slus dans la Revolution,” in
La Plume, la faucille et le marteau, pp. 301-33; Moote, Revolt of
the Judges, pp. 93, 129-30, 143, 147, 160.
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Huguenots, the nobility, and national leadership were resolved, but
the material and spiritual expenses of these achievements substituted
other equally grave problems in French society.

After the Day of

Dupes the French crisis broke in force as the effects of Richelieu's
policy worked themselves out.
For the officials, these effects were represented by signifi
cant departures from past governmental practices.

Finding the

traditional tax base to be inadequate, the Crown turned to new sources
of wealth in the tax farmers and officials.

Having traditionally

enjoyed a certain independence in their offices, the officers were
now confronted with stringent demands both on themselves and on the
country.

T o m between official obligations and their natural sym

pathies, the civil service proved insufficient in meeting royal
expectations.

The Crown then resorted to the use of commissalres

who, in effectively answering the requirements of centralization,
further ulcerated the feelings of the officers.

The larger elemental

relationship at work during the height of the crisis has been sum
marized by Salmon in writing that
it can be said, at least, that . . . the tensions within the
ruling classes took the form of antagonism towards the commlssaires of the central government; the demands of foreign
war increased the financial burden on the lower classes and
often coincided with famine and pestilence; the consequent
risings of the masses further divided the upper classes^and
increased the monarchy's reliance on the commjssal-rps.'
Exactly how the officers* role affected other elements in society is
^Salmon, "Venality of Office and Popular Sedition," *+0.
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still being debated.

As Salmon has noted,

further agreement [about the role of the officials] is prevented
by differing assumptions about the articulation of society. To
Mousnier the integration of venal office-holders within local
communities provided the focus for risings; to Porschnev the
exploitation of the peasantry resulted in spontaneous lowerclass revolt in which a class of ''feudalized1' bourgeois office
holders momentarily made use of peasant initiative. Both
explanations assumed that French society in the seventeenth
century experienced a critical change of direction which fore
shadowed, if it did not predetermine, the subsequent history
of the ancien rSgime.
Salmon might have added that agreement on an explanation would be
rendered problematical, since the officialdom, like society, encom
passed a variety of different elements whose part in the crisis was
shaped by a diversity of locations, public functions, traditions,
and social ranks.
In light of the involvement of the royal officers in the crisis
which gripped France during the early seventeenth century, the
relations between the Crown and the Parlement of Paris assume a
crucial importance in the development of French absolutism.

If

during the first half of the century, there was any single insti
tution of French government which might have offered a serious
challenge to the development of absolutism, that institution was
the Parlement of Paris.

Far more than any provincial sovereign court

or corporation of lesser officers, the Parlement possessed the unique
potential to block the augmentation of royal authority and limit the
use of the king’s prerogative.

In 1610 over 300 years of continuous
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evolution had endowed the Parlement with a heritage of power,
prestige, and respect in public affairs unsurpassed by any other
institution of the kingdom.

Supreme court, administrative and police

agency, counsellor to kings, the court had grown with the monarchy
and powerfully aided its development.

Unlike the sovereign courts

of the provinces, the Parlement of Paris was a truly national body:
among the •parlements it alone had sprung from the curia regis and
it alone could claim the councilliar heritage this ancestry implied.
Sitting as the Court of Peers, the greatest figures in the land were
cognizable before it; in common cases its legal jurisdiction was
recognized over all the central portion of the realm.
Yet more importantly for the exercise of royal authority, the
court had a singularly eminent niche in the realm of public law.
The court was recognized by French kings as the foremost guardian
of.their ordinances and as legal counsel in times of crisis.

Though

theoretically the power to legislate was exclusive to the sovereign
alone, in reality the Parlement had also come to have a singular
part in the legislative process.

By the seventeenth century it was

a hallowed legal tradition that the Parlement*s approval was requi
site to the legality of royal law.

Whether or not that approval was

enthusiastic and sincere or forced and merely technical was also
highly meaningful to the success of any law, so great was the Parle
ment 's influence on lower courts, jurisconsuls, and the legal com
munity at large.

Therefore, in a monarchy resting upon a foundation

of law, the Parlement*s procedures of registration and remonstrance
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represented important limitations on royal power unmatched by any
other governmental institution.

Moreover, after 1615 its respon

sibilities as well as its ambitions were sharpened by the demise
of other traditional representative institutions such as the Estates
General.
Defense of a traditional and balanced monarchy, however,
represents only the institutional face of the court.

Especially

after the reign of Henry IV, the judges of the Parlement were
passionately involved with the preservation of their interests.

As

the highest magistrates in France, the judges' offices brought them
an official standing equal to that of the Crown's great officers
and only just below that of the Chancellor and ministers of State.
Even without the ownership of their offices, the judges would have
been deeply engaged in conserving their corporate position; when the
factors of venality and the naulette were added during the sixteenth
century, preservation of precious personal and familial property
rights was mingled with corporate interests.

By the early l600's

the magistrates knew their own interests as well or better than their
public responsibilities, and during Louis XIII's reign defense of
interests and discharge of responsibilities brought the Parlement
directly into a collision with Richelieu's extension of royal power.
Since the Parlement's elite social position and its firm con
stitutional foundation endowed it with qualities, duties, and
interests not shared with any other corps in the State, the court's
unique place in the body politic ensured that its relations with
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royal authority would assume an exceptional place in the crisis of
Louis' reign.

The Parlement's individuality ensured, too, that in

a general encounter of French officials with Crown policy the court's
nature would generate a role quite unlike that of other, lesser,
institutions.

Issues which sent ripples of anxiety through the

bureaucracy as a whole sometimes failed to affect the Parlement at
all, or touched it only tangentially, while at the same time the
contentions coming out of parlementaire politics were not necessarily
those raised by officials in other parlements. other sovereign courts,
or the civil service at large.
The paulette provides a ready sample of how the Parlement stood
apart in matters affecting the bureaucracy.

Throughout the ministry

of Richelieu the Parlement demanded, and got, exclusive treatment
in paulette negotiations befitting its elevated status.

Discrimi

natory handling of the Parlement did not originate with Richelieu,
for when the paulette was renewed in 1620 the Parlement, along with
the other sovereign courts, refused payment of the new and higher
rates born in the declaration.

After eight months of wrangling with

his judges, Louis consented to give the sovereign courts their
privileges on the same terms which had prevailed since 1604.

The

magistrates had only to pay the former droit annuel rate pegged
at one-sixtieth instead of contributing the three percent loan
extracted from subordinate magistrates or the five percent taken
from the financial officers.

A favorable precedent had been set,

a precedent which Richelieu found difficult to abandon.

In the
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paulette negotiations of 1630, 1636, and 1639 the parlementalres
were eventually treated more leniently than other officials,
receiving either outright exemptions or markedly lower assessments.
The malleability thus induced was deceptive and shortlived.

Across

the eighteen years of the Cardinal's ministry, discrete treatment
heightened the Parlement's privileges, inflated its collective ego,
and stoked the fires under its resolve to defend its immunities.7"^
More than any other institution, the Parlement was the victim
of judicial abuses which were an outstanding feature of Richelieu's
absolutist practices.

These abuses took on many guises, but all had

75The use of the paulette as a disciplinary measure has been
subject to a variety of interpretations befitting its complexity.
Mousnier suggests that the royal policy of using the paulette to
divide and rule was a successful one when considered for the bureau
cracy as a whole over the reigns of Henry IV and Louis XIII. "This
passion of the officers for the droit annuel." he writes, "their
anxiety that it might not endure, enables the king to hold them in
line. In order to have the annuel, the greatest number of officers
remain loyal to the king and maintain the people in their loyalty.
To have the annuel and to have it under better conditions, the
sovereign courts separate themselves from the other officers, weak
ening the ’fourth estate,' that of the gens de robe who aspire to
the government of the kingdom, prostrate themselves before the
sovereign, [and] register bursal edicts and even political edicts."
A little further, Mousnier continues that "fiscal exigencies become
such that until the end of the reign of Louis XIII, the question of
the annuel was added to that of creations of offices to provoke dis
content, resistance, and rebellions all over the kingdom. Without
the division that the annuel, accorded under unequal conditions,
maintained between the officers of the sovereign courts and the
others, the situation, already bad, could have become very dangerous."
La VgnalitS des offices. pp. 307-08. See also the remarks on pages
599-600 and those in Les XVI et XVII siecles. pp. 168-69. Lloyd
Moote, conversely, has written that "while one can agree sub
stantially with Mousnier's emphasis on the immensity of the task
before the monarchy, it is debatable that the financial security
of the official hierarchy provided a satisfactory solution. The
story of the Fronde indicates that bribery was not always suffi
cient." "The French Crown Versus its Officials," 147.
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a long historical tradition and most were intimately related to the
rapid evolution in the royal council which accompanied the growth of
absolutism.

Prom its emergence in the fourteenth century, the Parle

ment had been engaged in a running contest with royal efforts to
set the council over the sovereign courts as a superior judicial
body.

Despite periodic attempts to redress the situation, by the

seventeenth century the council had appropriated many attributes of
a sovereign court,, legitimately adjudicating necessary appeals to the
king but also issuing evocations for prerogative judgment and
pronouncing judicial arrets which quashed decisions of the sovereign
courts.

Under Richelieu the practice of evocations was utilized to

shield tax farmers, privileged communities, and favored individuals
from the processes of ordinary justice.

Councilliar authority was

of immense consequence in public affairs, because by wrapping the
arbitrary judicial power of the king in the cloak of legitimacy
provided by the phrase fait par le roi en conseil, the Parlement’s
deliberations could be cut short, effectively shutting the court out
of affairs of State.

This had happened in 1615 when the court assumed

a posture of State reform, issued a great remonstrance, and proposed
to assemble the peers; it would happen again in I63I on two important
occasions involving the use of commlssalres.
In fact, when the institutional veneer is stripped away, this
issue of judicial arbltralre is revealed as the nuclear problem in
the establishment of absolutism and centralization in the French
monarchy, for it represents the essential opposition of royal power
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confronting the older, limiting agents of a traditional monarchy.
The triangular association between the king's judicial arbitraire.
councilliar development, and the functions of the Parlement has been
succinctly summarized by J. H. Shennan in writing that during the
reign of Louis XIII
the new men [the secretaires d'Etat] in the King’s Council
could have little patience with the Parlement's cumbersome
political machinery, the inadequacy of which had been revealed
on more than one occasion during the reign of Henry IV. . . .
Increasingly, as the king consolidated his control over the
state, the chief cause of tension in the kingdom was to become
the struggle between two opposite needs, that of the sovereign
to take whatever political measures were deemed necessary by
his professional advisers and that of the Parlement, which
sought to maintain the king in his obligation to respect the
law. The crown's future was to be bedevilled by the pull of
these opposite forces and ultimatelxAts inability to solve
the dilemma was to decide its fate.
Thanks to the power of councilliar arrets. by the end of 1632 the
Crown had established a shaky victory on the issue of councilliar
superiority.

This victory, while not yet consolidated, was doubly

meaningful, because it also helped break the Parlement's resistance
to commlssalres. the instrument par excellence of the absolute
monarchy in criminal justice.
The monarchy’s reliance on judicial commissions was a spec
tacular and infamous practice which could be traced to the Parlement's
unique jurisdiction over cases of lese-majestS and those of the dukes
and peers.

This competence created embarrassment when Richelieu

sought to root out conspiracy in high places or to attack his
political enemies through judicial procedures; since the Parlement

Parlement of Paris, pp. 24-8-49.
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was not likely to return the thoroughly reliable verdicts required
in such trials, the Cardinal turned to the use of pliable handpicked
judges selected from among councilliar personnel and armed with
total powers.

The Parlement complained loudly of resulting injustices

in the trials of marSschal Louis de Marillac (1631), the due de la
Valette (l639)» and in the operations of the Chambre de 1*Arsenal
(1631), only to have their remonstrances cut short by arrets du
Conseil or by the King's personal orders.
Richelieu’s high criminal commissions hardly concerned magis
trates outside the Paris Parlement, and sensing that the provincial
•parlements would prove pliable in cases with little impact on their
rights, Richelieu sometimes referred sensitive cases to them for
prosecution.

This was the case in 1632 when the Parlement of

Toulouse summarily condemned the due de Montomorency, a duke and
peer, to death for rebellion and lese-ma.iest§. In the same way in
1633 the Parlement of Dijon condemned and executed in effigy the
dues d'ELboeuf and Montpensier for having fled the kingdom with
Gaston d'Origans.

In the same year the new Parlement of Metz

executed Francis Alpheston and Blaise Rouffet Chavagnac for plots
against Richelieu's life.

By complaisantly rendering decisions such

as these, the behavior of the provincial -parlements provided a
curious, yet logical, contrast to their colleagues in Paris.^
I n com parison w it h t h e i r s ta n d a g a in s t j u d i c i a l commiswai -res.

77

Le M ercu re f r a n y o i s . X IX , f i r s t p a g in a tio n , 4 7 -4 8 ; F a y a rd ,
Aperqu h i s t o r i q u e , I I , 91-93; C hurch, R ic h e lie u and Reason o f S t a t e ,
p p . 234-36, 319.
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the judges in Paris seem to have heen little concerned with the
intrusion of the intendants which so aggravated the other elements
of the civil service.

This was probably because the intendants

usually operated in outlying areas of the kingdom which fell under
the jurisdiction of other -parlements. because the intendants were
not regularized in all g§n§ralites until sometime after 1637, and
because their functions tended to develop in the direction of
financial rather than judicial tutelage.78 Nevertheless, the
registres du conseil and conseil secret show that the Parlement
occasionally protested the use of mattres des requetes as individual
commlssaires extraordinalres. a term the court preferred over intendant. An instance of this occurred on July 15, 1626, when the
procureur gSnSral reported that some maitres had undertaken the
execution of commissions not verified in the court and "in order
that this disorder cease, required that provision be made for it.

79

The court put the matter into deliberation and
made very express prohibitions and inhibitions to all maitres
des requetes. conselllers [d'Etat?], and other officers, and
to all others of whatever quality and condition that they might
be, of executing any commission or of performing any act of
justice by virtue of letters bearing an attribution of juris
diction for whatever cause that might be, in civil or criminal
matters, which have not been verified in the court, at penalty
of ten Hjousand livres fine and of suspension from their
charge.
A survey of the intendant's letters to Sgguier in the period
1633-1642 indicate that most of them were written in provinces in the
south of Prance or along the northern frontier. Mousnier, Lettres et
m&nolres adressgs au chancelier SSguier, I, passim.
79B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 748, July 15, 1626.
80B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 748, July 15, 1626.
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The judges followed this up by admonishing all minor officers of
justice to ignore the maitres* commissions.

The next day orders

were issued that prisoners held in the Fort l'Eveque prison by virtue
of such commissions should be transferred to the Conciergerie in the
Palais under the Parlement's surveillance.®'1'
In February, 1631, the Parlement encountered the problem of
commlssalres once again, this time because of a criminal prosecution
made by a certain mattre des requetes named Le Maistre against one
Antoine Brillet, an avocat du roi in Angers.®2

Brillet had appealed

to the Parlement, which took up his case on the legal grounds that
"the said Le Maistre, being of the corps of the said court [of Parle
mentJ could not be prosecuted in [anyl other place."®^

On February

7, the matter was discussed and handed over to the gens du roi who
took it to the garde des sceaux. The next day, February 8, the gens
du roi reported back to the court that "the king had found the affair
Qh
of consequence and that he wanted to deliberate on it in council."
In the meantime all maitres had been forbidden to consider it further.
The court was not satisfied.

On February 11, the judges sent remon-

to the King about the use of commissaires in Brillet's case, along

81B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 750-51, July 16, 1626.
®2Probably Louis Le Maistre, sieur de Bellejambe, received as
a maitre des requetes in 1626, who held commissions in Picardy
between l6j6 and 16^3, and died in 1666. Mousnier, Lettres et
mgmoires adressgs au chancelier Seguier, I, 152-55. The case may
have come out of troubles in Angers during July and August of I63O.
®^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 72, February 8, I631.

8k

B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 73, February 8, 1631.
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with two other examples.

On February 12, the garde des sceaux

answered the remonstrances by repeating the King's word that matters
would be suspended.

At this point the issue disappears from the

court's registers, undoubtedly pushed aside by far more pressing
matters surrounding the trial of Marillac and the flight of Gaston
d'OrlSans from the kingdom.®-*
Mention of commlssaires did not reappear in the court's registers
again until September, 1631, when the court attacked the Chambre de
1'Arsenal. Sitting irregularly in Sully's munitions plant, this
assembly had been created in mid-June under the disguise of an
investigation into counterfeiting.

The Parlement had no objections

to these endeavors, but hy November it became quite clear that the
maitres des requetes at the-Arsenal were becoming a kangeroo court
dedicated to the administration of prerogative justice for all sorts
of crimes.

The Parlement found the operations of these commlssaires

intolerable and moved to block them.

After a stormy affair during

which narlementalre deputies were summoned into the King’s presence
at Metz and there thoroughly browbeaten, the court was forbidden to
consider matters of State.

This injunction was interpreted to in

clude not only the Chambre de 1'Arsenal but discussion of any com
mission, and since no further debate on the problem appeared during
Richelieu’s ministry, it was a significant victory for the principle
of absolute monarchy.
A final example drawn from the early years of Richelieu’s

®-*B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 75ff., February through
July, 1631.
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ministry serves to underline the self-serving attitude that prevailed
among all the -parlements and their foremost dedication to affairs
concerning only their locality and their privileges.

Sometime during

l625» Richelieu conceived the creation of a centralized royal
administration over colonial, marine, commercial, and naval affairs,
a jurisdiction which since medieval times had been diffused among
ports, provincial estates, -parlements. and even individual seigneurs.
Such royal naval authority as there was belonged to the grand amiral
de France et Bretagne, a dignity dating to the Renaissance Monarchy
and conferred as an honorific right upon a great noble family.
Guyenne and Provence each had their own admirals and admiralties
independent of the grand amiral. These ancient authorities exercised
a chaotic pattern of rights to maritime justice, port duties, salvage
rights, customs, and naval service.

Richelieu rightly understood

that France could have neither successful colonies, a thriving waterborn commerce, nor a powerful navy without first having centralized
coordination and direction securely in the hands of a royal appointee.86
The Cardinal launched his project late in 1626. By edicts of
August and October Richelieu was granted the imposing title of grand
mattre, chef et surintendant ggn&ral de la navigation et commerce de
France. Far more than a grandiose label, the office carried with it
uniform authority over the administration of ports, seamen, and

B o ite u x , R i c h e lie u , " g ran d m a ltr e de l a n a v ig a tio n e t
du commerce de F ra n c e " ( P a r i s . 1955). p p. 9 8 -1 0 0 ; D o u c e t, Les I n s t i 
t u t i o n s de l a F r a n c e . I , 1 2 0 - 2 2 .
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maritime justice.

The grand mattre was charged with drafting con

ventions with those wishing to form commercial companies, colonial
endeavors, and those engaged in land or sea traffic, as well as
preparations for war, coastal security, and the protection of sea
traffic.

These edicts, in effect, created a sort of ministry of

marine for the first time.

They were complemented by a further

edict of January, 1627» suppressing the office of grand amiral and
uniting its functions with those of the grand mattre. ^
All of Richelieu’s ambitions for maritime enterprises, however,
hinged about the reception of the -parlements required to register
the new arrangement.

These courts included that of Paris, for

binding legality over all the kingdom, and the parlements of the
coastal provinces of Brittany, Guyenne, Normandy, Languedoc, and
Provence, to bind each of their regions.

A comparison of the

reaction of the Parlement of Paris, which had little to lose in the
affair, with the courts of the coastal provinces, reveals once again
the singularly elite independence of the Paris Parlement as well as
its influence over its lesser bretheren.

Richelieu first presented

his program to the Parlement of Brittany in August, 1626, forecasting
that that province's maritime interests and extreme particularism
would raise the greatest objections.

This proved true.

In spite of

repeated injunctions, the Bretons refused registration for months
and in March, 1627, decided to delay any further action until the
provincial estates could meet at the end of the year.
87

This procras

B o ite u x , R i c h e l i e u , " g ran d m a t t r e , " p . 1 0 0 ,
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tination was intolerable to the Cardinal, who turned next to the
Parlement of Paris.

That court had relatively little interest in

overseas affairs nor had it yet been soured by the domestic travail
that would follow the Day of Dupes.

On March 8, 1627, -procureur

gln&ral MolS received the edicts of August and October; the court
smoothly registered them on the 13th, and Bichelieu took the oath
of office as grand ma?tre on the 18th.88 This registration probably
prompted other courts to fall into line, for the Parlement of Rouen
registered without difficulty on April l6th, the Parlement of Rennes
on the 24th— but with reservations— and the Parlement of Bordeaux
on the 16th of May.

The courts at Toulouse and Aix never approved

the measures, and Richelieu's authority as grand mattre was not
recognized in Languedoc and Provence until 1631.

89

The Parlement was moved by royal financial operations in a very
particular way.

In the government of the ancien rSglme. no single

body was invested with the "power of the purse" to be found in the
contemporary English Houses of Parliament.

To be sure, this entire

concept was inappropriate to the French mode of government as it was
practiced in the seventeenth century.

Approval for royal levies

could come in a variety of ways reflecting the hodge-podge of
responsibilities in the kingdom's government.

Certain royal levies,

for example, had virtually come to be considered a Crown prerogative
by the l600's.

In contrast to his brother-in-law across the Channel,

88Ibid.. pp. 102-04; Molg, MSmolres. I, 419-48.
^Boiteux, Richelieu, 'grand maftre." pp. 102-04; Lublinskaya,
French Absolutism, pp. 288, n. 1, 289, n. 1.
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Louis XIII could decide in council the amounts and division of the
impositions, those taxes like the taille. taillon. and subslstance
which had been approtioned and imposed by royal right for so long that
they had been accepted as customary.

But the assessment of im

positions was readily enforceable only in the pays d*Elections:
Brittany, Languedoc, Provence, and scattered border provinces
jealously guarded their right to consent to taxation through their
provincial estates.

Other taxes, among them the indirect gabelles.

aides, traites. and octrois were created and assessed in a compli
cated way which essentially gave the Crown control over them.

After

conception and gestation in the Conseil des finances, the creation
of new indirect taxes or increases in their rates nominally had to
be submitted to the Cour des aides or Chambre des comptes for
registration, but the resistance powers of these courts were sub
stantially less than that of the Parlement.

Additionally, after

registration the collection of indirect taxes was always farmed out
through contractual arrangements made in the Conseil des finances,
which furnished another opportunity for the Crown to interfere with
their application.

Hate agreements made between Crown and farmer

behind the closed doors of the council room usually remained a matter
for conjecture, and in reality the farmers often simply collected
whatever they could.

If subjects complained about this and sued in

a royal court, the Crown could shield the farmer by an evocation
to the council.

The Parlement, therefore, could really do very little

about the taille. which was assessed without parlementaire consul
tation, and the judges were equally impotent to combat the rise in
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aides, traites. gabelles. and other indirect taxes.

In any case,

since the magistrates were exempt from these duties, their own status
was not directly jeopardized by alteration in tax rates.
In a last category of revenues, though, the Parlement of Paris
could wield a negative kind of veto "power of the purse."

When the

monarchy was in great fiscal need, as it visually was in the 1630's,
the Parlement's right of verification could be brought into play
to sidetrack or even to modify edicts alienating the domain, issuing
rentes on the Hotel de ville of Paris, or creating offices.

The

Crown's heavy reliance on these types of measures during the financial
crisis of the l630's and l640’s made it proportionately vulnerable
to narlementalre politics.
The Paxlement was especially aroused when the Crown attempted
to enlarge its ranks.

Prom 1597 until 1631 the Crown had circum

spectly honored the integrity of the court and resisted the temp
tation to add new posts to it, even though the value of narlementalre
offices would have made such creations a lucrative proposition.

In

December, 1630, an effort was made to create two maitres des requetes
and five conselllers. but the Parlement protested and the edict was
not registered until eight months later in a lit de .justice.^0 Even
then the court won a reduction in the number of new conselllers from
five to four.

In 1635» however, with fiscal needs skyrocketing, the

Conseil des finances decided to offer twenty-four conseillershins

^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 59-60, 119-33» December
30, 1630, and August 13, I63I.
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for sale.

When the edict was presented in a lit de justice held

December 20 , 1635» violent agitation broke out which rapidly es
calated into a major confrontation with the Grown.

Before matters

were smoothed over with a compromise, five judges had been ordered
out of Paris and the Chambre des enquetes had gone on judicial
strike against the new conseillers. Though a reduction in the
number of creations to seventeen had been conceded, the Parlement
raised continual trouble with the reception of men into these new
positions for another decade.
As the ministry of Richelieu matured, royal relations with the
Parlement remained stormy.

In August, 1636, at the height of the

so-called "Corbie Year," some members dared to raise dissension
while the kingdom was demonstrably in danger from a Spanish invasion.
In 1638 the court became embroiled in a reduction of the interest
on government bonds based on the credit of the Hotel de ville of
Paris; excitement surrounding the rentes blended with the affair
of the conseillers and with creations of -procureurs and maitres
des requetes to maintain tension at a high level.

After years of .

embittered relations, the Crown acted decisively to end the court's
resistance; a royal declaration registered in a lit de justice of
February 21, 1641, conclusively restricted extrajudicial activities
of the judges and limited their right of remonstrances.

This edict

was untested by any major disputes to that parlementaire politics
were calm until the death of Louis in 16^-3 resurrected the judges'
political ambitions once again.
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The extent and intensity of that resurrection during the regency
of Anne of Austria was unmistakably exhibited on May 13, 164-8, when
the Parlement issued a startling arret decreeing a union with the
other sovereign courts of the capital, summoning them to send
deputies to assemble in the Chambre de St. Louis within the Palais.
The subsequent events in this, the Fronde parlementaire. represented
the nadir of the seventeenth century crisis in France and the greatest
institutional challenge to royal authority that the Bourbons faced
before the Revolution of 1789.

The Parlement's pre-eminent part in

the Fronde has been extensively studied and need not be repeated
here.

91

*
The arret d'unlon of May 13 had not spelled out the precise

purpose of the union, which only became evident during the summer.
Between June 30 and July 29, thirty-two deputies of the courts,
fourteen of the from the Parlement, addressed themselves to a complete
overhaul of the judicial and financial administration of the kingdom.
The principle of monarchical sovereignty was never controverted, but
by the end of July the judges had formulated twenty-seven articles
expressing their major grievances against two and a half decades
of councilliar government, the use of commlssaires and intendants.

91The bibliography of the Fronde is extensive and only the most
important works need be mentioned here. The latest essay, A. Lloyd
Moote's The Revolt of the Judges, is presently definitive for the
participation of the Parlement. The constitutional questions of
the Fronde are treated in Paul Doolin's The Fronde (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1936). Ernst Kossman, La Fronde has been superceded
by Moote’s study but remains valuable for its diverse insights.
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excessive taxation, farming of the taille. forced verifications,
creations of office, arbitrary imprisonment, and other abusive
practices associated with the absolutistic administration of Richelieu
and Mazarin.
But however dramatic and revealing the articles of the Chambre
de St. Louis were, they were only the culmination of many years of
strained relations between the Crown and its chief servants which
reached well back into Louis XIII's rule.

As the most recent

historian of the Fronde has pointed out,
in 1610 a major revolt by officiers against the royal admin
istration was still inconceivable to the king, his officials,
and his other subjects. What made that revolt finally possible
were the drastic governmental policies forced on a hesitant
monarch and his consummate politician-minister by internal
strife and foreign war. Without knowing or willing it, Louis
XIII and Cardinal Richelieu prepared the Fronde by under
taking an administrative re,"'lution which profoundly changed
the way in which the government of France functioned.
The expression "administrative revolution" used by Mo’ote to describe
the policies of Richelieu may be questioned when applied to the
Parlement of Paris, for the history of the Parlement between 1624
and 1642 reveals no significant administrative innovations in
regard to that distinguished corps.

The instruments of Louis XIII's

and Richelieu's narlementalre policy, with the exception of juggling
the paulette. were nothing more than a continuation of the means,
methods, and tactics used by strong monarchs since Renaissance times
to circumvent or override the Parlement.

Nevertheless, there can be

92Moote, Revolt of the Judges, p. 35-
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little doubt that the seeds of rebellion which flowered in Paris
in 16^8 were planted during the preceding reign and had their roots
deep in the conflict between the Parlement’s defense of "the true
French tradition" and the rise of what is conventionally called
absolute monarchy.

The real distinction of this conflict lay in

the unparalleled intensity of the discord inspired by the leader
ship of a minister determined to make the king supreme in France
and Prance supreme in Europe.
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CHAPTER IV
RICHELIEU, ABSOLUTISM, AND THE PARLEMENT
The principles of absolutism so intimately associated with the
ministry of Richelieu and with the seventeenth century as a whole
were implicit in the French monarchy from the earliest Capetian era.
The French had very early arrived at the idea that the king held
his power from God and not from the people.

Merovingian, Carolingian,

and early Capetian kings were popularly elected by tribal assembly,
but no one questioned that the essence of royal sovereignty was
divine and that this Christian basis of royal power was conferred in
the ceremony of coronation when the royal sacerdotum was mystically
bestowed by a high Churchman.

Having been once divinely ordained,

the power of the king could not in theory be checked by any earthly
or secular restraints.

The extinction of the ritual of election

after Philip Augustus and erosion of Papal pretensions after Philip
the Fair further strengthened the reality of royal power.

The

theoretical implications inherent in divine right monarchy were
explored as early as the fourteenth century and had been more or
less fully developed by jurisconsuls during the sixteenth century.
Little elaboration would take place after this time.

When legal

commentators of the seventeenth century wrote that Louis XIII was in

187
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principle absolutus legibus, or above all earthly law, they merely
reiterated a view expressed by Beaumanoir in the thirteenth century
and probably held before his time.1
Yet at the end of the sixteenth century, as in the thirteenth,
the moral and practical limits to royal authority were extensive and
very real to king and subjects alike.

The prince had to take into

account certain checks in exercising his divinely ordained obligations:
every jurisconsul maintained that the sue of royal authority was
legitimate only within the bounds of divine law, natural law, the
fundamental law of the realm, or some combination of these.

Inter

pretation of the fundamental law varied, but all commentators
agreed that the government of France was a monarchy in which sovereignty
resided in the person of the king, that the Crown must devolve upon
the nearest male Catholic heir, and that the king should not alienate
the royal domain.

Traditionalist writers, certainly in the majority

before Richelieu's ministry, equally maintained that the lawful
monarch must respect the principles of tres grand conseil and conserve
the traditional customs, privileges, and rights of subjects, both
individually and collectively.

Every monarch should be aware of his

divine obligation to "rule justly," that is, with due respect for the
general principles of good kingship and with a scrupulous eye for the
web of ties which held every estate, council, municipality, guild,
province, corporation, and court of justice in obedience to the
sovereign.
^livier-Martin, Histoire du droit francais, p. 346; Lemaire,
Les lois fondamentales, pp. 1-35; Francois Dumont, "Royaute Francaise
et monarchie absolue au XVTIe siecle," XVIIe siecle, nos. 58-59 (1963),
3-29; See, Les Idees politiques en France, pp. 7-11.
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How then did the "absolute monarchy" of Louis XIII diverge from
the expectations of the traditionalists?

One brief answer has been

provided in a recent article by Francois Dumont. 2 The absolutism of
the seventeenth century was, he maintains, a "recovery of the true
nature" of the essential monarchial principle through the abridge
ment of traditional usages which restricted the exercise of that
sovereignty. 3

This fulfillment process was the determing charac

teristic of the French monarchy of the seventeenth century, but it
remained incomplete, even under Louis XIV.

"Absolutism" in France

never meant absolute power, for down to the Revolution kings
continued to face limitations on the exercise of arbitrary power.
The "absolute monarchy" of Louis XIII was, therefore, only rela
tively absolute in comparison with the usages of traditional monarchy.4
The contribution of Richelieu to the growth of French absolutism
has been treated in a wealth of literature devoted to the Cardinal's
personality, career, and the mechanisms of his ministry.5 Though the
^'3h Royaute Francaise et monarchie absolue au XVIIe siecle,"
3-29.
3Ibid., p. 18.
^Roland Mousnier and Fritz Hartung arrived at virtually the same
conclusions in "Quelques problemes concemant la monarchie absolue,"
in Relazioni del X Congresso Intemazionale di Scienze Storiehe, Vol.
IV, Storia Modema (Florence: 1956), pp. 3-55.
5See n. 1, p.
. In addition to the works listed, mention
should also be made of Gabriel Hanotaux1s multi-volume Histoire du
Cardinal Richelieu (6 vols.; Paris, 1933-4-7). More recent publications
can be found in the very thorough annotated bibliography prepared by
W. F. Church, "Publications on Cardinal Richelieu Since 1945: A
Bibliographical Study," in Journal of Modem History, XXXVII
(Dec., 1965), 421-44.
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person and influence of Louis XIII remain less well known than those
of his chief minister, it is now conventionally accepted that
Richelieu's policies were largely responsible for the transformation
which took place in the monarchy before mid-century.

The contribution

of Richelieu to this transformation lay not in the novel formulation
of absolutistic theory, already well established by his time, nor in
the development of new instruments of Crown authority, for the
effectiveness of his agents had been proven by long usage.

Rather,

the singular ingredient provided by the Cardinal lay in his immense
qualities of intellect, leadership, and ambition for power.

These

were allied with the relentless pursuit of a program to augment royal
power in the interests of the glory and grandeur of the French
State. Early in the Testament politique, the Cardinal succinctly
laid down the four principle objectives of his ministry.

"I

promised him [the King]," Richelieu related, "to employ all my
industry and all the authority that he pleased to give me to ruin
the Huguenot party, humble the pride of the great nobility, reduce
all his subjects to their duty and to raise his name among the
nations to the place it should have."^
The moment for such a program was opportune.

Upon being called

into the council in April, 1624, Richelieu found respect for royal
authority at a low ebb.

A dozen years later, writing retrospectively

in the Testament politique, Richelieu described the conditions he
found prevalent in 1624:
^Richelieu, Testament politique, "Succincte narration," p. 95.
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When His Majesty resolved to give me entry into his councils and
his confidence in the direction of his affairs, I could say with
truth that the Huguenots divided the State with him, that the
great nobility conducted themselves as if they were not his
subjects, and the most powerful provincial governors as if they
were sovereign in their charges. I could say that the bad
example of one and the other was so prejudicial to this kingdom
that the most regulated companies (the parlementsl sensed their
derangement and in certain cases diminished your legitimate
authority as much as they could in order to bring theirs beyond
the bounds of reason. . . . I could say that foreign alliances
were mismanaged, individual interests preferred to those of the
public and, in a word, the dignity of the royal majesty was so
disparaged and so different from that which it should be through
the fault of those conducting your affairs that it was almost
impossible to recognize it.?
By this time the French crisis had been deepening for a decade;
during these years the monarchy had drifted without real direction in
spite of Louis' intense desire to be the image of his respected and
effective father.

Some of the country's problems could be attributed

to economic conditions which accompanied the general European crisis,
but weakness and division in the innermost circles of government
encouraged disorder, increased mismanagement of finances, and lessened
the prestige of the monarchy.

Louis, while intelligent and willing,

was crippled by severe psychological imbalances which prevented him
from adequately filling his father's shoes.

Insecure and suspicious,

timorous and yet ever desirous of esteem, Louis represented a mass
of contradictions within himself which infected the administration
of the kingdom.

It was essential that he rely on firm and able

ministers, yet until 1624 Louis had been either unable to find such
men or unwilling to submit to their tutelage.

The chief influence in

Louis' life, and thus also in the councils of State, remained the
domineering and inept Marie de Medieis.

Under these circumstances

7Ibid., pp. 94-95.
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it is not surprising that Richelieu entered an arena characterized
hy cross purposes and absence of long range policies.

Although the

uncertainty and conflicting currents at the highest levels of
French government remained throughout the first years of Richelieu's
ministry, the thrust of his policies soon became clear and, after
1630, dominated the entire French political scene.
The essential statement of Richelieu's response to the diffi
culties of the kingdom can be found in his Testament politique, pre
pared during the 1630's and dedicated to Louis.

Unlike Richelieu's

M&moires, which were intended as a massive history of the reign, the
Testament politique combined documents, personal remembrances, and
oral information with projects of reform, notes on the parlements,
and maxims of conduct into a unique statement of Richelieu's
political philosophy.® As he noted in his dedicatory epistle to
Louis, the Testament was
conceived in the shortest and clearest terms of which I am
capable, as much to follow my own inclinations and customary
manner of writing as to accommodate myself to the temperament
The long and acrimonious debate over the authenticity of the
Testament dating to the eighteenth century has now been reduced to a
question of the exact mechanism of its preparation. The most con
vincing proof of the authenticity of the Testament was provided by
Gabriel Hanotaux in 1880 through the publication of Maximes d'Etat
et fragments politiques du Cardinal Richelieu. The phraseology of
the maxims and many passages in the Testament are almost identical,
and Hanotaux drew them from an original manuscript with marginal
notations indicating their inclusion in the Testament. For the
origin and composition of the Testament, see the Introduction to
the Louis Andre edition and extensive commentaries listed in Church's
"Publications On Cardinal Richelieu Since 1945."
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of Your Majesty, who has always desired that one come to
the point in a few words and who gives as much credence to
the substance of matters as he distrusts the long discourses
that most men use to express them. 9
The Testament is, therefore, a highly personalized rendition of views
Richelieu though necessary to transmit to his sovereign "for the
regulation and guidance of your realm."10 Never theoretical, these
views were essentially expressive of Richelieu's experiences in the
hard school of political necessity.

As Henri See has remarked,

"they expose his doctrine, scarecely doing any more than expressing
his political practices."^

S€e's observation is bolstered by the

clear connection between the Testament and Richelieu's maxims of
statecraft, discovered and published in 1880 by Gabriel H ano t a u x . ^
Of the ideas which made up the Cardinal's Weltanschauung, the
prism through which all others should be seen is the nature and
expression of authority within the State.
foremost an authroitarian.

Richelieu was first and

"In fact," writes a recent commentator,

"it may be said that an all-encompassing concept of authority
provided the foundation of his entire political system."1^ As an
aristocratic high Churchman moving in the intellectual currents of

^Richelieu, Testament politique, "Au Roi," p. 91.
10Ibid., pp. 90-91.
1:LSee, Les idees politiques, p. 48.
^ As MflYimfis d'Etat et fragments politiques du Cardinal Richelieu,
ed. Gabriel Hanotaux (ParTs, 1880). ’
See supra, p
^Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, p. 83.
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the Baroque milieu, it is hardly surprising that Richelieu found the
highest expression of authority in the time-honored principles of
divine right monarchy.

Inherent in the concept of divine right was

a theoretical framework which provided for a pre-existing, eternal,
and divinely ordained hierarchy of authority extending from the
highest to the lowest members of society.

This hierarchy, of course,

agreed closely with the realities of society and institutions as they
existed in the Cardinal's time.

At the head of the earthly hierarchy

was the king, "the true image of God," whose "monarchial government
more than any other imitates that of God . . . , all sacred and
profane political philosophers teaching that this type of regime
surpasses all those which have ever been put into practice."1^
Above all other considerations it was important that the king
be powerful.

Richelieu put this in straightforward terms.

"Power,"

he wrote at the beginning of a long passage in the Testament, "is
one of the most necessary things to the grandeur of kings and to the
success of their government,

and those who have the principal

conduct of a State are particularly obliged to omit nothing which
might contribute to rendering their master so a u t h o r i z e d . P o w e r
took on many forms, all of which contributed to the entirety of the
prince's respect and public image.

The prince should be powerful

by his reputation; he should maintain sufficient military forces

•^Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 307.
15Ibid., p. 372.
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to ensure respect among other princes; he should enjoy adequate
revenues; he should possess the hearts of his subjects.
Richelieu realized very well that the human element in monarchs
was often distracted or disinterested in the exercise of power, and
he made provision for it.

"If the sovereign cannot or does not wish

to have his eye continually on the map or the compass, reason makes
it desirable that he give the charge of it to some individual above
all the others," to a first minister who would have "superior
authority," because "there is nothing more dangerous in a State than
various equal authorities in the administration of affairs."^
Though the minister might be powerful, as Richelieu was, and have
the principal conduct of affairs, as Richelieu did, ultimate
authority still resided in the king:

"V/hatever authority that a

minister might have, it cannot be great enough to produce certain
effects, which require the voice of a sovereign and an absolute
p o w e r . T h e unity and direction provided by one person were
essential.

All government of many persons was to be avoided, as

reason
showed clearly that that which is committed into the care of
many was much less assured than decisions of one . . . because,
while there are many wise men of probity, the number of fools
and evil ones is always the greater. Experience teaches every
one that there are no revenues more badly managed than those
of communities.

l6Ibid., pp. 306-07.
l7Ibid., p. 276.
18Ibid., p. 399.
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Indeed, Richelieu recommended that the maximum number of royal
councillors should he four, and that one should have superior authority
"which moves all the others while being moved only by his own intel
ligence.

The recommendation matches almost perfectly the actual

power structure which emerged in Louis1 council after 1635, when
Richelieu directed the activities of two surintendants des finances ~
and two favored secretaires d'Etat who formed the core of the
Conseil d1Etat.
Absolute royal power did not mean despotism or the abuse of
power, for the king was subject to the will of God, to high moral
obligations, and to the satisfaction of the public interest.

The king

should constantly be aware that his power is from on high; kings as
kings "are obliged to carefully use their power to the ends for
which they received it from heaven, and what is more, not to abuse
it by extending the exercise of their royalty beyond the limits
which are prescribed to them. "2<‘1 The power of kings also had
practical limitations, for the indiscriminate use of power would
cause the loss of it.

As Richelieu warned the king in 1629, "kings

who avail themselves of their authority to despoil or oppress those
who are inferior to them in force, without any right other than the
force of their arms, will lose themselves by the abuse and the
excessive extent of their power."21

19Ibid., p. 306.
20Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," 193-94*
21Ibid.
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Above all, the public interest should be the sole criteria for the
exercise of regal authority; public interest should always prevail
over private ones:
Public interests should be the unique objective of a prince and
his councillors, or, at least, both are obliged to give them
special consideration and to weigh them more than those of
individuals. It is impossible to conceive of the good that a
prince and those of whom he makes use in his affairs may do if
they religiously follow this principle, and one cannot imagine
the evil that happens to a State when private interests take
precedence over public ones and the latter are ordered according
t o th e f o r m e r .22

Below the king ranged a great interlocking mosaic of units
arranged in an organic whole which made up the State.

This definition

of the State is particularly important in light of his philosophy of
reason of State.

While not spelled out in the Testament or other

writings, it appears that for Richelieu the State and society were
one and the same.

The State, then, is the assembly of constituted

bodies of which the kingdom is composed, the ensemble of communities
not the government and the functionaries opposed to the rest of the
nation.

Richelieu's conventional organization of the State and its

units is apparent in Part I of the Testament, in which the minister
successively treated the clergy, nobility, and Third Estate.

Each

of these orders had a well-defined place in the social pyramid; to
each belonged certain duties, privileges, customs, and traditions.
The three great social orders were further subdivided into lesser
groups, corporations, and colleges, each with an established and
22Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 330.
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divinely ordained niche in the scheme of things.

The royal officers

found themselves in the uppermost level of the Third Estatej below
them ranked men of commerce, professional people, and peuples has.
Regardless of station in life, he it high or low, the individual
could only find fulfillment in his place, performing his God-given
duties to the best of his ability and obeying those superior to him.
Obedience was crucial, since around it hinged the good of the polity:
Kings are kings only as long as their authority is recognized
and they demonstrate their favor. They cannot ensure the effect
of these if they are not religiously obeyed, since an individual's
disobedience has the potential to disrupt a design from which
the public would receive much benefit. Obedience is the true
characteristic of the subject.2^
In the early seventeenth century, however, Frenchmen of all classes
were not in obedience to the Crown,* they were, in Richelieu's view,
oblivious to the needs of the State, which, in effect, came more
more to mean the interests of the king and the Bourbon dynasty.

''One

of the faults of France," he wrote as a maxim, "is that no one is
within his duty.

The soldier speaks of what his captain should do.

The captain imagines faults in his mafttre de camp. Neither the one
nor the other are doing their duty."2 ^

This behavior was especially

evident during the decade of the 1620's, and it is worth noting that
three of the four major goals announced for the Cardinal's ministry
23lbid., pp. 150-235.
^Richelieu, Lettres, II, 321. A marginal notation on articles
proposed to the Assembly of Notables in 1626.
25Richelieu, Maximes d'Etat, maxim LV, pp. 33-34. A similar
passage can be found in the Testament politique, p. 300.
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at the beginning of the Testament were directly concerned with the
submission of Frenchmen to royal authority.

Achievement of the

fourth objective, international glory and grandeur for the King
of France, was also highly dependent on accomplishment of domestic
tranquillity.
Out of Richelieu's view of royal power and the definition of the
State came the famous doctrine of reason of State.

Phrased in its

simplest and broadest definition, reason for State meant the appli
cation of man's natural rational faculties in guiding the State's
affairs.

In Richelieu's words, "Man having been made reasonable, he

should act only by reason, since to do otherwise would be contrary to
his nature and thus contrary to He who is the author of i t . I t
logically followed that reason should be the guiding principle for
the statesman; to employ the capacity of reason meant to institute
the reign of reason in every action and "to wish only for that which
is reasonable and just."27 Strict adherence to this principle
could only result in orderliness and obedience, since "it is impos
sible that subjects will not respect a prince if they know that
reason is the guide for all his actions."2®

In essence, Richelieu

held that "authority constrains obedience, but reason persuades for

2%ichelieu, Testament politique, p. 325.
27Ibid.
28Ibid., 326.
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Reason of State was, however, nmch more than reason guiding the
State.

It actually meant the establishment of dual standards of

justice and morality concerning private actions and those involving
the welfare of the State.

Because of the philosophical and ethical

considerations implicit in the concept, voluminious commentaries
have been produced on the morality of reason of State.

For the

purposes of this discussion, only the application of the doctrine to
issues affecting the Parlement of Paris will be examined in detail.
These issues were extremely important, even critical, however,
because they represented the nexus of the struggle between absolutism
and the usages of the traditional monarchy.

It was in the adminis

tration of justice that reason of State found its purest and most
contested expression, for it was through the apparatus of justice
that the laws of the State were enforced, that obedience of subjects
was secured, and that the interests of the State and all within it
were fulfilled.
In Richelieu's vocabulary, as in that of his contemporaries, the
concept of "justice” included not only the adjudication of private
disputes between members of the polity, but also the function of the
police of the kingdom, the maintenance of order, and the pursuit of
certain administrative obligations.

Taken in this broad sense, the

highest responsibility of the French Crown, as with all governments,
was the maintenance of justice within the State.

This was, according

to Richelieu, a divine commission, accorded to kings and magistrates
for the preservation of the common good:
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God has not wished to leave vengeance in the hands of
individuals, because under this pretext each would exercise his
passions and trouble the public peace. He has put it into
the hands of kings and magistrates, according to the rules
that He has prescribed for it, because without example and
chastisement there is no injustice and no violence which will
not be impudently committed to the prejudice of the public
repose.
This concept of justice also had strong overtones of social
conservatism.

As an aristocrat, a Christian, and a Churchman, Richelieu

held it was the king's obligation and duty to preserve the status quo
in society, with each order and estate in its traditional place.
Reduction of orders and individuals to obedience did not mean an
equivalent reduction of social privileges; to the contrary, enforcement
of justice meant preservation of the existing social order:
As a whole can subsist only through the union of its parts in
their natural order and positions, so this great realm cannot
flourish if Your Majesty does not eompell the bodies of which
it is composed to continue in their order, the Church holding
first place, the nobility the second, and the officials who
lead the people the third.
Here Richelieu was specifically concerned about the threat to the
integrity of the State presented by "certain officiers" of the
magistracy who, with the attitudes of nouveaux arrivistes, were
pretending to an unjustified prominence in the social and political
order:
I say this {the above] boldly, because it is both important
and just to arrest the course of the enterprises of certain
officiers who, inflated with pride, be it because of great
property that they possess or the authority which their
official duties give them, are so presumptuous as to want to

^^Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," p. 195.
^Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 256.
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have the first place when they should only have the third. This
is so contrary to reason and contrary to the welfare of your
service that it is absolutely necessary to stop the progress of
such undertakings, since otherwise France can be nothing more
than she has been . . . a monstrous body which, as such, can
have neither subsistance nor duration.32
This reference was almost certainly made concerning the hautes roMns
in the parlements and financial courts who in Richelieu's day were in
the process of elbowing their way into the Second Estate.
From the nature of justice and the regal duty of enforcing it,
the Cardinal went on to the most effective means of administration of
police and justice.

In conducting the kingdom's affairs, Richelieu

argued that two principles, the use of rewards or punishments, should
guide both minister and monarch.

The latter principle, however, was

to be much preferred over the former and, in the event, inspired the
policy most often followed in public matters.

"I put punishments,”

he wrote in the Testament, "before rewards, because if it were
necessary to do without one or the other, it would be better to
dispense with the last rather than with the first.”33 Here Richelieu
again manifested a fundamental suspicion of human nature:
Experience teaches those with long practice in this world that
men quickly forget rewards and, when heaped with them, they
expect even more, and often become both ungrateful and ambitious
at the same time. It teaches that punishments are a surer means
of constraining a person within his duty, since people are less
likely to forget what has made an impression on their emotions.
This is more powerful over most men than reason, which has little
effect over many minds.34

32Ibid.
33jbid., p. 338.
3^-Ibid., p. 339.
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The point is made plain:

what mattered was that the law he enforced

in the interest of obedience.

Many times Richelieu reiterated the

certitude of punishment as a restraint to the violation of law.

In

1629 he advised Louis that "kings should be severe and exact to
punish those who trouble the police and violate the laws of their
kingdom."35 Indulgence, he later wrote in the Testament, "had often
brought it

the kingdon

to very great and deplorable circumstances."3&

Not to rigorously enforce the laws of the State was to undermine the
authority of the king, disrupt the body of the State, and lead to
further disorders.

As Richelieu wrote to Louis in 1629,

It is so dangerous to act with indifference to the execution of
the laws of the State that I can only remark that it seems His
Majesty could not have enough warmth and vigor for the obser
vation of his, particularly the edict on duels. One could truly
say that His Majesty and his council will answer for all the
souls lost in this diabolical way if they could stop them by
the rigor of penalties due such a crime. There is nothing so
ordinary [now] as to commit an error in a matter of State, as to
disobey a commandment of the king, as to ignore the the exe
cution of his edicts, his ordinances, and arrgts of his justice.
Up until now such disorders have been committed with impunity,
but deficiencies of this nature are of such consequence by
their example and aftermath that if one is not extraordinarily
severe in chastising them, the estates cannot subsist.37
Severity was never pleasant, and it would be far more agreeable to do
without it, but other choices were even less palatable.

It was much

preferable to be strict with the enforcement of law than to live in
a state where the laws were weakly enforced or enforced erratically
and without reason:
-^Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," p. 196.
36Ri.chelieu, Testament politique, p. 340.
^Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," pp. 192-93-
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It is, said the consul Fronto, a great pity to live under a
prince who never wants to remit the rigor of the law. But
it is still greater [a pity] to live in the country of another,
under whom all things are allowed and who, "by pusillanimity or
nonchalance, pardons without discretion all things done there
contrary to law and to r e a s o n . 38
Enforcement of law required not only certainty and severity but
application without favoritism, for one of the worst evils that
could come to any state was a government which employed favor over
justice and reason.

As the minister wrote in the Testament, "A

kingdom is in a bad state when the throne of this false goddess
(favor) is raised above

r e a s o n . "39

The same thought is projected in

another maxim which reveals the close association, even inter
changeability, in the minister’s mind between reason and justice:
"Very often in the court of princes, the throne of justice is set
a step below that of favor."4°
Consideration of all these factors meant that the administration
of justice was a delicate matter, for prudence, insight, wisdom, and
resiliancy of will were all requisite.

The king must be neither

too lenient and bring on disorder, nor find himself a tyrant by
excessive punishments.

The question of prudence was particularly

important in crimes involving the State where the good of all was
involved:
For example, he [the prince] can pardon someone of a passing
thought of troubling the State, if he is truly repentant of it,
and if he has the appearance of not repeating the error. But
^Richelieu, Maximes d'Etat, maxim CXXXIX, p. 63.
^Ibid., maxim CXVII, p. 53, n. 8; Richelieu, Testament politique,
p. 361.--4°Ibid., maxim CXVII, p. 53.
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if he recognizes that one is continuing in his malevolent
design, he is obliged in all conscience to punish it, and he
cannot pass it by without trespass. He can remit a disobe
dience of one of his subjects, but if by reason one could see
that in the future he would abuse this pardon to boldly scorn
his commandments, if he believes that by forgetting this fault
it will give cause for others to disobey after his example, to
the prejudice and repose of the State, he is obliged to punish
this crime, and cannot exempt it without committing a greater
one.41
From these assertions it was only a small and logical step to
distinguish between crimes involving the State and others of a
purely private nature.

In making this distinction, the application

of reason of State led to a double standard of justice which
Richelieu was unafraid to

express inthe baldest of terms.

The

passage in the Testament enouncing this doctrine is based on earlier
Tnflyt ms of State which Richelieu had probably maintained early in his
career.

The final version reads:

Ordinances and laws are wholly useless if they are not
followed by vigorous
execution,and although in the courseof
ordinary cases justice requires authenticated proof, it is not
the same in those which concern the State, because in such
cases what appears to be conjecture must sometimes be held
sufficiently convincing, since plots and conspiracies formed
against the public well-being are ordinarily conducted with such
cunning and secrecy that there is never any conclusive evidence
until they strike, by which time they are beyond remedy. It
is necessary in such occasions to sometimes begin by acting
whereas in all others it is necessary to have enlightement
through due process of law by witness or by irreproachable
evidence.

^Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," p. 194^Richelieu, Testament politique, pp. 343-44- Earlier versions
of the same philosophy can be found in two maxims of State published
by Hanotaux; the passage of the Testament politique is certainly
developed from these maxims which were incorporated almost verbatim.
The first of these maxims reads: "In affairs of State, it is not
like others; in the one it is necessary to begin by information
through legal process, in the other by execution and possession."
Hanotaux notes that this paragraph in the original was struck out

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206

The implications in the maintenance of such doctrines -were
manifestly great and are made all the more significant since
Richelieu unhesitatingly pursued them throughout his career.

The

minister was aware of the dangers inherent in the application of
reason of State to matters of justice, and he sought to qualify
and justify the risks.

In defending his philosophy of justice,

he wrote that
this [passage above] seems dangerous and in fact it has something
perilous which can only be corrected by the perception of a
judicious and penetrating mind which, wise in the course of
affairs, should certainly know the future by the present, as
mediocre judgments through the observation of things. But in
as much as the consequence of this maxim is dangerous only
for the individual, it does not cease being admissible, seeing
that the loss of individuals is not comparable to the public
well-being and the danger can fall only on some individuals
whereas the public receives its benefit and advantage. This
maxim is good for great minds and could open a path to tyranny
to mediocre one s .
Essentially, then, Richelieu was cognizant of the dangers in his
position, but he was also confident that a minister of superior
perception could negate the attendant risks through prudence and
by stopping short of the most arbitrary measures.

The lynchpins of

with a marginal notation "Testament." Hanotaux, Maximes d'Etat, maxim
LXXX, p. 42. The second maxim is similar to the first: "In the course
of ordinary affairs, justice requires clarity and evidence of proof.
But it is not the same in affairs of State where it is necessary to
act siunnw rerum. Often conjectures must take the place of proof,
since great designs and notable enterprises never make themselves
known other than by success or attempt which can then receive no
remedy." Hanotaux, Ma-rimas d'Etat, marim CXXTV, p. 56.
4 %ic h e l i e u , Maximes d'Etat, maxim CXXV, p. 57. An almost
identical passage can be found in the Testament politique, p. 344.
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the system were the perspicacity and judgment of the prince and his
councillor without which reason of State would collapse into
despotism.
This brief summary of Richelieu's political philosophy illus
trates the extent to which Richelieu was willing to violate traditional
values and processes of justice in the kingdom.

They are also

suggestive of a novel standard of political justice raised up to
justify the abridgement of historic limits on royal power.

These

standards, sometimes defended under the guise of State needs, have
often been held to be unwarranted and unconstitutional in the context
of French precedents.

Henri See, twentieth century student of

French political ideology, has gone so far as to remark that "that
which is striking in the government of Richelieu is a very marked
tendency to despotism.

Without hesitation and without scruples,

he put himself above all legal f o r m s . H o w e v e r debatable these, or
other moralistic comments may be, the result of the Cardinal's
ministry was a ruthless distortion of previous procedures of justice,
a warpage of customary usages in favor of the immediate needs of
the monarchy and the State.
Nowhere was the Cardinal's employment of the mechanisms of
justice in the establishment of absolutism more evident than in his
development and application of the charge of lgse-majeste. At the
beginning of Richelieu's ministry, the definition of treasonous be
havior had been subject to hazy interpretation and considerable

4^Les jdees politiques, p. 48.
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flexibility.

Before the seventeenth century, charges of lgse-

majeste had usually been leveled against noble conspirators, rebellious
Huguenots, and regicides.

In the absence of any clear distinction at

law between the security of royal persons and that of the commonweal,
a great many rather ordinary crimes could also be construed as
l§se-majest§ if they flagrantly contravened the king's will or seemed
to threaten public well-being.

The charge could be used to describe

violations of dueling laws, and it served equally well against
perturbateurs du repos public, or "disturbers of the king's peace."
Most often, however, it carried implications of treason.

An ordinance

issued at Villers-Cotterets in 1539 attempted to define the offense as
"conspiring, plotting, or acting against our person, our descendants,
or against the common weal (rgpublique) of our kingdom."45 Forty years
later, the Ordinance of Blois elaborated the meaning of lese-majeste
by applying it to those who
henceforth enter into any association, collusion, agreement, or
offensive or defensive tie with princes, potentates, republics,
or communities within or without the kingdon, directly or
indirectly by themselves or through intermediaries, verbally or
in writing, or who make any levy or muster of gens de guerre
without our express permission, leave, and license. 56”
A declaration issued shortly after Henry IV's death reinforced
prohibitions against private levying of troops, amassing of arms and
munitions, or establishing strongpoints.47

^Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, XII, 590. This edict
is not to be confused with the longer and more famous Ordinance of
Villers-Cotterets of the same year.
46Ibid., XIV, 424, art. 183.
47 Ibid., XVI, 6-8.
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Thus defined at the beginning of Richelieu's ministry, l§semajeste provided a ready legal means of suppressing the disloyalty
which then plagued the kingdon.

The Cardinal understood quite clearly

that the charge would play a large part in his plans for strengthening
royal authority over insubordinate subjects, and soon after entering
the council he began to formulate recommendations for clarification
and expansion of the concept of treaonous behavior.

These proposals

were among a package of reforms presented to an Assembly of Notables
held at the end of 1626.4^

The Assembly's timing was opportune for

a discussion of high treason.

The Chalais conspiracy had been broken

during the preceding summer and a leading conspirator, the comte de
Chalais, executed in August.

Deputies to the Assembly were carefully

selected to produce the desired results.

Dominated by thirty

judicial officials of the sovereign courts, but also attended by a
baker's dozen from each of the First and Second Estates, the makeup
of the Assembly served as a useful sounding board and propaganda
agency for a wide variety of reforms.49

The preponderance of

judicial officials among the nobility increased chances that possibly
controversial revisions in the definition of lSse-majeste would find
a sympathetic reception, and in fact this proved to be the case.
4®0n the Assembly see Jeanne Petit, L'Assemblee des notables,
1626-1627 (Paris, 1937), and the account of Paul Ardier, L'Assemblle
des notables tenue a Paris es annees 1626 et 1627 (Paris, 1652).
49>rhe delegates are listed in Petit, L'Assemblee des notables,
Apprendix III, pp. 233-4-5. The Parlement of Paris sent three
representatives: First President Nicolas de Verdun, second president
Jerome de Hacqueville, and procureur general Mathieu Mole.
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In the early weeks of 1627, with the Assembly in full swing,
Richelieu delivered several specific measures against conspiracy.^
The Cardinal's objectives were twofold:

to widen and sharpen older

ordinances regarding treason, and to muster popular opinion behind
a tough policy of enforcement.

To directly propose such before an

assembly of judicial officials alone would probably have carried
easily, since the judges' esteem for harsh laws was notorious, but
objections could be expected from the nobles and Churchmen present.
Accordingly, Richelieu adopted a devious manoeuvre:

it seemed to

him, he told the Assembly, "more expedient to impose severe penalties
and to immediately enforce them without moderation than to retain
the austerity of the former ones, to which, nevertheless, one never
intended to s t o o p . M a r g i n a l notations on original drafts, though,
reveal that the Cardinal probably never had any sincere intention of
leniency.^2

in any case, the lawyers of the parlements carried the

The entire program of measures complete with Richelieu's
marginal notations on them are presented in Lettres, II, 315-22. The
printed version is based on D'Avenel's examination of five copies of
the propositions. See Lettres, III, 315, N. 1.
^Ardier, L'AssemblSe des notables, p. 132.
5^See, for example, the notation on one manuscript draft beside
the article on disobedience that "There is a complete proposition
under the title of amassing arms and levies. It seems to me that it
is not necessary to think of lesser penalties, but to accumulate all
and especially to render the deprivation of charges more prompt and
without semblance of trial fsans figure de procSsI." Richelieu,
Lettres, II, 321, n. 3- On another copy of his proposals he wrote
that "Kings are kings only as long as their authority is recognized
and they demonstrate their favor. They are unable to ensure the
effects of these unless they are religiously obeyed, since
disobedience by one individual is capable of arresting the course of
a plan whose effects will benefit the public." Lettres, II, 321.
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day for se v e r i t y . T h e Assembly decided to retain all the rigor of
the old ordinances— an infamous death with confiscation of property
and offices— and asked for their enforcement.

In this way Richelieu

managed the public's approval for his politics of repression while
shifting some of the opprobrium for such policies onto the shoulders
of the Assembly.
It only remained for the Assembly to sharpen the definition of
crimes of lSse-majeste. Without much discussion a comprehensive
article was drafted conforming closely to former motifs.

To be

declared contumacious rebels liable to confiscation of body, property,
and charges were all those who raised troops without the king's
permission; who amassed reserves of arms, powder, or lead; who founded
or kept cannon without royal commission; who entered into leagues or
associations among subjects or foreigners; those who fortified cities,
strongpoints, or chateaux; those who might hold public or secret
assemblies without permission.

The last provision was even extended

to the governors and lieutenants-generals of the provinces, great and
powerful noblemen who often used their posts as springboards to
rebellion.

Similarly declared rebels were any French subjects who

departed the kingdom without first notifying local magistrates.
Finally, tacked onto the end of these proposals was a genuine
innovation.

All slanderers, authors, editors, and printers of

defamatory libels or pamphlets could be charged with lSse-majeste.
53
^
As indicated by Petit, Assemblee des notables, p. 197, n. 9,
the presidents of Rennes, Pau, and Rouen favored more severe
penalties. The reaction of the deputies from Paris is not recorded.
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Thus formulated by the Assembly, these provisions were incorporated
into law in Articles 170-78 of the Code Michaud of 1629, and even
though the Code was not put into effect, its statutes represented
French law on lese-majest§ for the remainder of the reign.
Having secured a firm legal foundation on which to act, Richelieu
operated within accepted law whenever possible but did not hesitate to
choose wholly arbitrary measures when these were necessary to further
his objectives.

Louis' full confidence came late in 1630, and after

this time Richelieu repeatedly employed accusations of lSse-majeste
against his own political enemies as well as those plotting against the
monarchy.

The two categories were hardly differentiated in the

minister's eyes, but conspirators often had another view.

For them

it was not a question of disloyalty to Louis but resistance to an
erosion of traditional feudal values brought on by a tyrannical
Cardinal.

No serious moral dilemma arose in instances of outright

armed rebellion, as in the due de Montmorency's raising of Languedoc
in 1632, but grave questions were raised in the minds of many when
Gaston d'Orleans fled the kingdom in 1631.

Negotiations with foreign

princes and domestic treason soon ensued.

The King's brother and heir

was above prosecution for lgse-majeste, but Richelieu ruthlessly
pursued his clients, followers, and servants who had chosen allegiance
to him over loyalty to Louis.

Feudal principles had always upheld

such behavior as justified, but in Richelieu's view the claims of the
State were higher than those of personal loyalty.54
^W. F. Church has brilliantly developed this theme in
Richelieu and Reason of State, pp. 176-84-
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The increase in royal power envisioned by the Cardinal
inevitably meant a confrontation with the Parlement of Paris which
represented the highest and most prestigious judicial and administra
tive corporation below the royal council.

If the Cardinal's goals

for the kingdom were to be met, an adjustment of the traditional
role of the court within the structure of the monarchy would be
necessary.

Since the court's heritage included a voice in the

management of royal affairs, Richelieu found it necessary to curtail
its interference in matters of State and to whittle down its
independent councilliar role.

Yet the Cardinal's philosophy is

regard to the Parlement and its role within the monarchy was not
determined solely by considerations of royal power, the implemen
tation of reason of State, or any calculated readjustment of
relations between Crown and court.^5

Indeed, his outlook on, and

treatment of, the Parlement represented a sophisticated blend of
the realization of ideal goals for power with an aristocratic
familial background and a high measure of shrewd political know-how.
By birth and genealogical lineage Richelieu was, and always
considered himself, an aristocrat.

His father and paternal ancestors

were authentic, if humble, noblesse d'epee from Poitou; among his
forebears was Francoise de Rochechouart, Richelieu's paternal
grandmother, a representative of one of the great families of the
realm.

On his mother's side, however, Richelieu had to acknowledge

5%or was it largely dependent on the circumstances of the
moment, an impression generated by George D'Avenel in his massive
four volume Richelieu et la monarchie absolue.
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members of non-aristoeratie robe families from the Parlement of Paris.
The Cardinal's mother, Suzanne de la Porte, was the daughter of
Francois de la Porte, a distinguished avocat before the court.
Richelieu's maternal grandmother was Claude Bochart, member of an
outstanding parlementaire dynasty which, beginning in 14-66, sent
seven consecutive generations into the sovereign courts of the king.-^
The influence of old family ties apparently remained strong
after Richelieu assumed a political career.

In 1628 Jean V Bochart,

Seigneur de Champigny and de Noroy, Richelieu's distant relative,
was made First President of the Parlement, even though he had not
previously been a president & mortier and had pursued an active
career with the royal council as an intendant and surintendant des
finances rather than rising through the ranks of the Parlement.
According to at least one source, Bochart's appointment as First
President was made through the influence of Richelieu.^7
-^Gabriel Hanotaux and Due de la Force, Histoire du Cardinal de
Richelieu (6 vols.; Paris, 1933-47), I, 41-43; Francois Bluch,
L'Orlgine des magistrats du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe si&cle
rParis, 1954), pp. 95-96; Jean-Baptiste de l'Hennite-Souliers and
Francois Blanchard, Les eloges de tous les premiers presidens du
Parlement de Paris depuis qu'il a este rendu sedentaire jusques a
present; ensemble leurs genealogies, epitaphes, armes et blasons~
(Paris, 1645), pp. 85-86.
57B.N. Ms . fr._11427, "Memoires sur les families du Parlement,
de la Chambre des comptes, de la Cour des aydes, du Grand Conseil
et du Conseil," fol. 60, notes of Champigny "that Cardinal Richelieu,
his relative, made him surintendant des finances, then First President
of the Parlement in 1628." The appointment remained largely an honor,
as Champigny never actually presided over the Parlement. His duties
were assumed by Nicolas Le Jay, the second president 8. mortier.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

215

Of noble extraction on his father's side, Richelieu naturally
assumed the social and political attitudes associated with his
noblesse and with the station of a bishop and cardinal.

Important

among these attitudes was one common to both upper estates, that the
royal officers in general and the robins in particular were parvenus
intent on climbing the social ladder by any means possible.

Such

class attitudes are most plainly reflected in the Testament politique
in which, as has been seen, the Cardinal demonstrated a certain
condescension and even arrogance towards those of the Third Estate.
Yet however imbued with the aristocratic outlook of his order towards
ordinary officers and magistrates of the robe, Richelieu had to be
able to master his hauteur in favor of a more realistic appraisal
of the standing, merit, and ability of the judges in the Parlement
and other sovereign companies.

However ambiguous the social status

of the judges in these courts may have been in the early seventeenth
century, no one doubted their elevated standing.

Elite social

position was reinforced by enormous political power and prestige, so
that as a realistic and pragmatic statesman Richelieu was compelled
to grant the sovereign judges a sincere, if grudging, respect.
Respect of this sort can be found in the Cardinal’s comments upon the
death of the famous and very able Achille III de Harlay in 1616.
Richelieu devoted a long passage in his M&noires to eulogizing the
virtues of the late First President, noting his probity, integrity,
and "inflexible courage in matters of justice.
-^Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal Due de Richelieu, Memoires, ed.
Petitot and Monmerque, Collection des memoires relatifs a l'histoire
de France (10 vols.; Paris, 1823), I> 379-80.
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men retained passions of loyalty towards their former institution.
It is probable, though, that experience with the court instilled in
them some professional understanding and respect, if not loyalty, for
their former colleagues.

These feelings were doubtlessly reinforced

by a web of familial ties with sons, sons-in-law, brothers, brothersin-law, uncles, and other relatives serving in the Parlement.
Out of the attitudes associated with Richelieu’s robe and
aristocratic ancestry evolved a technique of negotiation, compromise,
management, and supervision in the interests of royal authority of
the State.

As in other areas Richelieu's parlementaire policy was

completely dependent upon Louis' authority, confidence, and co
operation.

Until 1630 these factors were uncertain, but after the

Day of Dupes they matured into a working relationship in which
Richelieu fulfilled what the King desired but was incapable of
achieving himself.

In foreign affairs this meant statesmanship dedi

cated to the greater grandeur of France; in dealing with the men in
the Palais de Justice it meant sustained application, a shrewd
awareness of human nature, and the facility for daily give-and-take
while keeping long-range goals in mind.
Louis himself had none of these qualities.

In trying to deal

with the judges' legal dodges, severe weaknesses of Louis' personality
were revealed to everyone around him and even to himself in
moments of introspection.

At the bottom of these limitations lay

contradictory psychological shortcomings in the King's character.
On the one hand, Louis had inherited a troubled, insecure, and
mercurial temperament incapable of calm, rational, and methodical
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Thus by family background and social station, Richelieu entered
public service with a due respect for.the high robe as a profession and
for the magistrates’ traditional place in the monarchy.

Among other .

factors the influence of robe personnel among Richelieu’s associates
should not be discounted, though the degree of this influence is
certainly debatable.

Many of Richelieu's creatures had at one time

been associated with the milieu of the Parlement which supplied
many royal administrators.

This was true, for example, of Pierre V

Seguier who had been a president A mortier from an important
parlementaire family before being made garde des sceaux in 1633 and
Chancellor in 1636.

Three of the four most important and influential

royal councillors*after 1635 also came from a parlementaire family.
The Le Bouthilliers, who supplied two of Richelieu's most devoted
creatures in the Conseil d'Etat, Claude and Leon le Bouthillier,
were trained in the Parlement.

Claude le Bouthillier, whom Richelieu

helped make secretaire d'Etat in 1628 and surintendant des finances
in 1632, had begun his career as conseiller in the Parlement in 1613.
Leon le Bouthillier, Claude's son and also a creature of Richelieu,
had been conseiller in the Parlement before coming into possession of
his father's office of secretaire d'Etat in 1632.

Finally, Claude

Bullion, surintendant des finances between 1632 and 1640, began a
lengthy civil service career as conseiller in the court.^

Time

spent in the court, of course, does not necessarily mean that these
^Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII, pp. 27-44;
Maugis, Histoire du Parlement, III, 309; Francois Blanchard, Catalogue
de tous les conseillers du Parlement de Paris, deftuis l1an mil deux
soixante jusques A present (Paris, 164^), pp. 117, 123-
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negotiation with the Parlement.
his mother.

In this Louis was the sad heir of

But Louis was also the child of Henry le Grand, Henry

the well-beloved, Henry the image of the great and just king.
second Bourbon was not unintelligent:

The

he knew M s father’s repu

tation and willed it for Mmself. Unfortunately, when treating
with M s judges this craving for self-respect all too often became
a singleminded desire for obedience.

Often, too, it was frustrated

by eruptions of impatience and a temper pathetically petulant in
its outraged helplessness.
Examples of this behavior were legion, the most famous being
an interview between Louis and deputies from the Parlement held at
Metz on January 30, 1632.

The audience climaxed months of the

most obstinate sort of indifference to royal orders regarding the
nhamhrA de 1*Arsenal, and Louis' patience was at an end.

The hearing

began smootMy enough, but when First President Nicolas Le Jay
tried to justify the court1s actions, Louis lashed out that "you
were established only to judge between Master Peter and Master John,
and if you go on with your enterprises, I will cut your nails to the
quick,

The incident has rightly been noted by almost every

Mstorian of the period as characteristic of the lack of rapport
between Louis and M s judges.
Whatever faults Louis had, he was still the embodiment of
sovereignty, and as King M s subjects were presumed to have more
respect for M s person or M s signature than for any miMster.

As

M s ministry progressed, therefore, Richelieu preferred to set the
60Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, p. 395; Glasson, Le
Parlement de Paris, t, 144.
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King or the symbols of his authority against the Parlement rather
than address the court himself.

Only once, in January, 1634> did

Richelieu officially speak during a lit de justice, and this
occasion, it should be noted, was a non-controversial one.

During

everyday interviews, too, the Cardinal preferred to be unobtrusive.
Richelieu's hand, though, guided and directed the King wherever
possible.

Most of their joint decisions were probably worked out

in conversation, but sometimes the prompting took the form of
lengthy memoirs like the "Avis au Roy" of 1629.^

Sometimes, too,

Richelieu dictated letters or speeches of the King intended for the
Parlement.

As early as 1627, Richelieu wrote to the Parlement under

Louis' name to hasten the passage of several fiscal edicts needed for
the siege of La

R o c h e l l e . 62

This practice became more frequent after

1630 as Richelieu assumed primary control of parlementaire policy.
When a prolonged bout with the judges ended with a visit to the Louvre
on March 17, 1636, Richelieu wrote out Louis' lines in the

s c e n a r i o . 63

A year later, on March 1, 1637, the Cardinal again cued the King when
he had to lecture a deputation about disrespect for his edicts.
On this occasion he wrote:
The King, having heard Mrs from the Parlement, will tell
them:
That the edict about which they have made remonstrances was
registered in his presence, and that it concerns his authority
that it should be executed;

6 1R ic h e l i e u , L e t t r e s , I I I ,

1 9 3 -2 0 2 .

62see infra, p. 238.
63Richelieu,

Lettres, V, 429-30.
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That they have solemnly promised to obey him and have
received concessions from him on these grounds;
That if the kings his predecessors had once conceded
that the company should not include registry clerks in the
resale of the domain, they had done it at a time when the
necessities of the State were not as great as they are at
present;
That since venality did not prevent the officers in question
from being faithful, discreet, and capable, one should be able
to say the same of presidents and conseillers;
In conclusion, Messieurs, reason requires that I be obeyed,
and I want to do as reason requires.64
In general Louis tried to follow Richelieu's guidance in regard
to the Parlement, but sometimes this tutelage tested his own faith
that severity would cure all.

Before the meeting at Metz, for

example, Richelieu and Louis had tried to break the court's resistance
by sending five judges into exile.

The subsequent meeting had

inflamed Louis, but a settlement was reached a few weeks later and
Richelieu advised the King to release the offenders.

Louis rather

skeptically accepted the advice in a remarkable letter which provides
an insight into the way he thought the judges should be handled:
Mon cousin,
I will gladly agree to that which you have asked of me in
regard to the five robes, although it is pleasurable to see them
take a little stroll following my court. The more one eases up
with such men, the more they abuse it. When one of my musketeers
is a quarter of an hour late to drill, he goes to prison. If one
disobeys his captain when he gives some command into his keeping,
he is demoted, and in case he should disobey it jthe order) he
loses his life. It will be said that the robes longues will
freely and boldly disobey me, and that I will remain down wind

64Ibid., 758-59. On the back of the original one of Richelieu's
secretaries wrote, "That which the King said to USPS from the Parle
ment of Paris, the 1st of March, 1637." The original note is in the
handwriting of Chancellor Seguier, but it was almost completely redone
in the margin by a secretary writing under Richelieu's dictation. The
first line of the revision is in the Cardinal's hand. See D'Avenel's
notes 2 and 3, p. 758.
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of it, and that these seigneurs will win their case while
pretending to leisurely take breakfast in their huvette [the
Parlement's refreshment bar] and then spend three hours seated
on my fleurs de lys. By an arrest [du Conseil?| given at Ste.
Menehould, it will not be thusl It is ordered that you will be
less ready and less apt to have pity on these seigneurs after
they have been penalized for having erred in that which they owe
to the master of the shop, who is fonder of you than ever. At
Ste. Menehould, this 12th of February, 1632.
Since the minister's relations with the Parlement were ulti
mately determined by his place in the King's confidence, the evolution
of Richelieu's philosophy in regard to the court should be correlated
with the overall progress of his political career.
three phases is evident.

A sequence of

The concurrence of the last two of these

phases with Richelieu's public service and with the growth of French
absolutism after 1624 is unmistakable and reinforces conventional
opinion that Richelieu's career should be organized into three parts:
the pre-ministerial period to 1624; a rise to power, 1624-1630;
mature ministry, 1631-1642.
The first of these periods, 1610-1624, encompasses the regency of
Marie de Medicis and the prevailing influence of Concini and the
due de Luynes.

During this time governmental policy drifted without

firm purpose or long-term direction; the royal council was dominated
by the Queen Mother and a faction known as the "Gray Beards" left
from Henry's reign.

With the exception of extensive and important

parl^iyntaire remonstrances after the Estates of 1614 and dissension
over the paulette in 1618 and 1620, relations between the Crown and

65B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9775, fol. 53- Another copy is in
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 7223, fol. 116. The nature and application
of the Ste. Menehould arret remain unknown.
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the Parlement were generally untried.

The court's demands of 1615

were suppressed by an arret du Conseil while at the same time the
feelings of the judges were placated by promises and by the renewal
of the paulette on favorable terms.

For the remainder of the decade

and into the 1620's the court held itself aloof from the intrigues
of the princes which dominated domestic politics of the period.
In the period before 1624, Richelieu was in a position of
political responsibility only briefly and had no opportunity to
develop a wor-ing rapport with the Parlement.

As a shrewd observer

of men and events, however, the future minister undoubtedly developed
a realistic appraisal of the Parlement's public functions in rela
tionship to royal power.

A more detailed assessment of Richelieu's

views during this time is difficult because of a paucity of docu
mentation.

His written references to the Parlement during the

period before 1624 are extremely limited, being confined to occasional
passages in the M&noires. There seems to be no revealing evidence
in the Cardinal's correspondence before his ministry.

Even the

MSmoires, setting forth his version of the history of the reign,
were prepared during the 1630's and consequently were colored by
later intervening experiences which tended to alienate the minister
from the Parlement.

Moreover, the M&noires touch only the most

important parlementaire affairs and very often the account of these
is obviously based on official documents.

It is also highly probable

that the Memoires were drawn up in part to justify the Cardinal's
program and to help immortalize his accomplishments.

All these
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factors detract from the value of the Memoires as a source of
parlementaire relations, but given their limitations, occasional
passages help reveal Richelieu's attitude towards the Parlement in
the historical situation preceding his ministry.^
Examination of the scanty material available shows the Cardinal
early as a political realist with considerable insight into the
historical role of the Parlement, as well as a politician with a
thorough understanding of the contemporary distribution of public
powers within the monarchy.

The Parlement had a long history of

supporting the Crown in times of crisis as well as subjecting it to
criticism; by the time the Memoires were assembled in the 1630's, the
negative aspect of the court was much more evident to Richelieu than
its positive qualities.

Nevertheless, looking back from twenty years

after, Richelieu objectively noted instances during the regency when
the Parlement entered the realm of affairs of State to uphold royal
rights, maintain the Crown's authority, and, in general, to preserve
the integrity of the monarchy.

The Cardinal's remarks concerning

these occasions are particularly important when his absolutist royal
position is b o m in mind.
Richelieu acknowledged the Parlement's role in public
affairs, for example, when the court intervened in the crisis which
followed Henry TV's assassination.

As Richelieu recorded in his

M&noires, upon Henry's death Chancellor Brulart de Sillery let
^An excellent conmentary on the Mgmoires and the Testament
politique may be found in Church, Richelieu and Reason of State,

wmrm

-----------
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himself be intimidated by threats on his life coming from the comte
de Soissons and hesitated to affix seals to the declaration con
firming Marie as regent.

In these pressing circumstances the

Parlement did not hesitate to act.

Henry had been killed at four

o'clock in the afternoon of May 1-4; upon receiving the news, First
President Achille III de Harlay clambered out of his sickbed,
assembled the Parlement, and led deliberations as to what should be
done.

Before seven o'clock on the same evening, the court had, in

the Cardinal's words,
concluded unanimously that it would be better to do too much
than too little on this occasion, when it would be dangerous
to have arms crossed, and that they could not be blamed for
declaring the will of the late king as it was known to all
of them who had the honor of being near him. On this basis
and others similar, they exceeded in this encounter most
usefully the limits of their power.^
The last sentence is most interesting.

Richelieu freely recognized

that in this critical time the Parlement had overstepped the limits
of its authority and had done it in the public interest:
Upon Chancellor Sillery's hesitation to act the Parlement
did not do the same; to the contrary, the public interest
compelled it to pass beyond the limits of its power to assure
the regency to the Queen, although the parlements had never
become involved in similar affairs.®®
In effect, the Cardinal admitted that the unprecedented action of the
court had been justified; the action met with Richelieu's approval,

6?Richelieu, Memoires, I, 42.

41

k^ Ib id . ,
. An account of the events of May 14 and the Parlement's large role in these events can be found in Roland Mousnier, The
Assassination of Henry IV, trans. Joan Spencer (New York, 1973), PP*
2 1 - 2 3 , 50-60. The lapse in Chancellor Sillery's courage is not
mentioned by Mousnier.
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and he acknowledged that the court had acted with the best interests
of the kingdom at heart.
In the unsettled period of tension which followed the establish
ment of the regency, there were other occasions for the Parlement
to demonstrate its usefulness and loyalty.

Richelieu carefully

recorded, for example, the Parlement's suppression of Jesuit works
which smacked of regicidal doctrines and thus threatened the public
order of the kingdom.

On June 8, 1610, immediately after Henry's

death, the Parlement condemned de rage et Regis institutione by the
Spanish Jesuit Mariana to be burned by the public hangman as
containing passages praising the assassination of tyrants.

In

1612 a new work by the Jesuit Becanus surfaced in France.

This

book was condemned by the Parlement, and two years later Suarez1
La Defense de la foi catholique, apostolique, contre les erreurs de
la secte d 1Angleterre was ordered burned by the Parlement as teaching
it was permissible for subjects to conspire against the person of
sovereigns.

On this occasion the court went further than before.

Four Jesuit fathers were summoned before the court and enjoined
to make known the Parlement's decisions through their sermons.

While

containing no overt comments of approval, the context of Richelieu's
remarks show that he considered the Parlement's censorship beneficial
in damping the religious fervor of the Jesuits and in preserving
royal authority amidst Ultramontantist

d o c t r i n e s . ^9

69Ibid., 59, 61, 149, 202-03.
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In 1614 Richelieu participated in the Estates-General of that
year as representative of the First Estate.

His account of the

Estates is largely concerned with the difference of the three orders
over the issue of the paulette. In this instance Richelieu dryly
recorded the rancor without noticeable prejudice to the Third Estate,
which desired the continuation of the droit annuel opposed by the
First and Second Estates.

The entire work of the Estates had, the

Cardinal reported, no result except to subject the provinces to
the payment of their deputies and to let everyone see that the
excessive corruption of the regency had not been rectified.7*^
Following the failure of the Estates of 1614, the Parlement
of Paris took advantage of the opportunity to present a massive
series of remonstrances calling for reform in the government. Richelieu
presented an exact account of the remonstrances.

Unfortunately the

account is plainly based on official documents with almost no personal
comment and thus Richelieu's authentic opinion is almost impossible to
discern.

The affair was touched off, according to Richelieu's account,

by the great princes who sought to explicit the Parlement to their
advantage:
[.After failing the Estates] they turned then towards the Parle
ment and tried to produce there the effect that they had not
been able to in the Estates. They sowed in this body jealousy
against the government, persuading them the judges that after
having been of service in the declaration of the regency, they
had not been given the part they deserved in the great affairs
treated there. These words were not without their promise to
assist them to maintain their authority, and to support the
occasions when they should be near their Majesties.”1

70Ibid., 245.
71Ibid., 245.
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The agitation of the princes was successful.

Four days after the

adjournment of the Estates, the Parlement assembled and demanded a
convocation of the peers, dukes, and great officers of the Crown,
together with the Chancellor, to advise on propositions to he made
for the service of the King.

This decision was quashed by an arret

au Conseil, the text of which the Memoires largely reiterated, and
was reinforced by a personal reprimand at the Louvre on the 9th of
April.

These admonitions notwithstanding, the Parlement proceeded

to draw up lengthy remonstrances and presented them on the 22nd
of May, together with "some weak examples to prove that at all
times the Parlement had taken part in affairs of State, and that
kings had been accustomed to send them treaties of peace so that
they might give their

a d v i c e . "72

These remonstrances were rejected

by an arret du Conseil and another royal warning to the gens du roi
at the Louvre.

With this suppression the remonstrances of 1615 re

mained quashed, and Richelieu's account comes in an abrupt end
without concluding remarks which might elaborate his opinion on
these events.73 With the passing of the remonstrances of 1615,
relations between Crown and court stabilized and remained relatively
undisturbed until the suppression of the paulette in 1618 excited

72Ibid., 246.
7^The text of the remonstrances of 1615 and related arrets du
conseil may be found in Male, Memoires, I, 20-57. A comparison
with ihe account in Richelieu's MSmoires indicates many similarities
to these official documents, probably indicating that the Cardinal's
version was based on them.
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the Parlement once again.

Unfortunately, Richelieu's Memoires present

no comment on this affair or on other encounters before the Cardinal
entered the council in 1624.
After Richelieu entered the council in April, 1624, a second
phase in Crown-parlementaire relations gradually became evident.

As

Richelieu's policies emerged between 1624 and 1630, friction between
the royal council and the court began to increase; the deterioration,
however, took place slowly and factors other than the Cardinal's
influence played an important part.

It should be remembered that

Richelieu's entry into the council in no way guaranteed his security
before the King or ensured acceptance of his recommendations.

The

King remained nervous and psychologically insecure in separating
himself from his mother; he continued to rely on her advice as well as
on that of the devfrt party until the Day of Dupes (November 10, 1630).
This indecisiveness was mirrored in the royal council which remained
divided between the party of the bons francais and the devftt faction
led by Pere Berulle and Michel de Marillac.74
^Along with Vincent de Paul and Francois de Sales, B6rulle was
one of the chief figures in the great Catholic revival of the early
1600's. A mystic and visionary, Berulle had introduced the
Carmelite Order into France and founded the Oratorian Order. In
political matters Berulle was deeply attached to Marie de Medicis,
to the King's younger brother Gaston d'Orleans, and to the Marillac
brothers. With these, as with others of the dlvSt party, Berulle
was hostile to England and favored an Ultramontanlst and pro-Hapsburg
policy of peace and co-existence within the framework of a greater
Catholic Europe. Michel de Marillac, b o m in Paris in 1563, had
followed a career as a magistrate and statesman; he had as well a
sincere interest in religion and affairs of the Church. In 1586, at
the age of twenty-three, Marillac had entered the Parlement of Paris
as a conseiller. At first an ardent supporter of the Catholic
League, Marillac rallied to the cause of Henry IV and with his sup
port was made a rnattre des requites in 1595. Marillac continued to
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The factions of the hons francais, with whom Richelieu asso
ciated himself, and the devftts, who came to he his political enemies,
had coalesced out of the complex politics of the early period of
Louis' reign.

Neither group was an organized party; rather, each

was a loose fraternity of important persons in Church and State
holding like opinions on the issues of the times.

Each group was

relatively small and largely confined to the court circle.

The

hons francais strongly resembled the former politique faction that
had represented moderate Catholic opinion during the Wars of Religion.
Like the politiques, the hons francais were numerous among jurists,

serve both Henry and his wife, and he was rewarded with the dignity of
conseiller d'Etat in 1612. Attached to Marie de Medicis, he was
charged by her with the establishment of the Carmelites in the
Parisian faubourg Saint-Jacques. Thanks to the influence of the
Queen Mother, he was made surintendant des finances along with Bochart
de Champigny in 1624 and garde des sceaux in 1626. Between 1626 and
1629 Marillac was principally concerned with drafting a revision of
French law which became the ill-fated Code Michaud of 1629. Along
with his brother Louis, who had pursued a military career, Marillac
fell from grace after the Day of Dupes in 1630, was arrested, and
died in prison in 1632. The principal characteristics of Marillac's
personality were piety, solemnity, severity, and high personal inte
grity. After his imprisonment in 1630, Marillac produced translations
of the Psalms and a famous translation of the Imitation of Christ
by Thomas a Kempis which went through more than fifty editions. The
bibliography on Michel de Marillac is not extensive. The best
complete biography is that of Edouard Everat, Michel de Marillac:
sa vie, ses oeuvres (Riom, 1894). Supplementing this was two short
works by nineteenth century lawyers. See Camille Amaud-Menardiere,
Essai sur Michel de Marillac (Poitiers, 1857), and Euxpere Caillemer,
Etude sur
Tufa-rilln~ (Caen, 1862). The anonymous collection
entitled Documents historiques sur la famille de Marillac (Paris,
1908), contains some very worthwhile pieces, though the commentary
is often a panegyric on behalf of the Marillac family. Standard
histories of the reign and of Cardinal Richelieu may be used to
supplement these biographical essays. Especially noteworthy is
George Mongredien, La Jouraee des dupes (Paris, 1961). See also the
important article "Autour du 'grand orage': Richelieu et Marillac,
deux politiques" by Georges Pages which appeared in Revue historique,
CLXXXIX (1937), 63-97.
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Galileans, magistrates, and royal officers.

In foreign affairs they

favored a vigorously anti-Hapshurg foreign policy, even at the
expense of Papal relations and international Catholic interests.

In

domestic affairs the hons francais maintained the tradition of
religious tolerance established by Henry IV and put the interests
of religion after those of the State and of France.

The dgyfrts,

conversely, put the interests of Catholic Christianity before those
of the State, especially in foreign affairs.

Wishing to unite

Christian interests in Europe, the devots essentially strove to recover
the res publica Christiana of pre-Reformation Europe. Since this
would require the leadership of the Papacy and co-existence, if not
outright co-operation with the Hapsburg Empire, good relations with
these powers were desirable above the national interests of France.
With peace abroad, royal attention could be directed towards domestic
reform and improvement of the lot of the common folk.

The conflicts

with Richelieu's objectives should be obvious.^
The dichotomous nature of forces at work within the council was
crucial for Richelieu's relations with the Parlement before 1630.
Between 1626 and 1630 Michel de Marillac, devot and political rival of
Richelieu, held the post of garde des sceaux.

As such Marillac's

position vis-a-vis the court was at least as important as Richelieu's
in the capacity of chief minister.

In the absence of an effective

^Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, pp. 9-10; Tapie, La
France de Louis XIII, pp. 138-41; Mongredien, Ia Joum(?e des dupes,
pp. 3-4^7 The last work is particularly valuable for its vivid, and
incisive portraits of the principals in the politics of the 1620's.
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chancellor, the garde des sceaux was hoth officially and personally
interested in the course of daily affairs of justice and administra
tion.^

It was Marillac, for example, who presided over the sessions

of the Assembly of Notables.

Between 1626 and 1630 Marillac1s

letters to Mathieu MolS, procureur ggngral of the Parlement, indi
cate that he, and not Chancellor D'Aligre, conducted most official
business with the court.

The King and Richelieu also wrote Mole

directly, but the frequency of their correspondence was much less
than that of Marillac.’77
In addition to frequent contacts with the Parlement, Marillac
was especially interested in reform of the central administration
and of justice.

Between 1626 and 1629 he was absorbed in the

revision of French law which was to become the Code Michaud.

At

exactly the same period he was also attempting to reform the royal
council by a series of rSglements.7^ As a result of his reform
Etienne d'Aligre, Chancellor of France from 1624 to 1635, never
enjoyed an active or influential role in public affairs. Disgraced in
1626 after having been frightened during the appearance of a conspi
racy by the eomte de Chalais and others, D'Aligre was stripped of all
official duties, including custody of the seals which were given to
Marillac. Marillac remained garde des sceaux until just after the Day
of Dupes, when he was replaced by Charles d'Aubespine, Marquis de
Chateauneuf. Chateauneuf remained just two years and was replaced by
Pierre V SSguier, former president & mortier of the Parlement. With
the death of D'Aligre in 1636, S^guTer became chancellor and custody
of the seals reverted to him.
77
See Mol§, Memoires, I-II, passim.
7®The reglements for the council of Louis XIII have been published
with a scholarly annotation by Roland Mousnier in Annuaire-Bulletln de
la societe de l'histoire de France, 1946, pp. 96-211. The authorship
oF some reglements remain unknown, but there can be little doubt that
Marillac played an important part drafting those drawn up between 1624
and 1630. See the comments of Georges Pages in "Autour du 'Grand
orage,'" pp. 65-66.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

232

efforts, his insistence on observance of rigid technicalities, and a
dry and harsh personality, Marillac's relationship with the Parle
ment was never very good.

Nor could the court easily forget

Marillac1s participation in the League.

On January 16, 1589,

Marillac had accompanied Bussy-Le Clerc, chief of the League faction
in Paris, into the Grand'Chambre with arms in hand to conduct three
magistrates to the Bastille.
for this misstep.^

The Parlement never pardoned Marillac

The factors of personality were undoubtedly

aggravated by the garde des sceaux1s firm denial of the Parlement1s
competence in matters of State exposed in several letters to Mole, in
addresses to the Parlement, and in his "MSnoire dressg par le garde
des sceaux de Marillac, principalement contre 1'authority du
Parlement," a manuscript now held in several copies by the Bibliothfeque Nationale.^

Marillac's absolutist views are made abun

dantly clear in the memoir, where he wrote that
^Documents historiques sur la famille de Marillac (Paris, 1908),
p. 186.
^®See, for example, Marillac1s letters to MblS in the latter's
Mfinoires, I, 482,490-93, and the account of the lit de justice of
■Tanna-ry 15, 1629, in Le Mercure frangois, XV, 1-28, second pagination.
The manuscript memoirTs in B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 1-145. The
"M&noire contre l'authorite du Parlement" is one of the strongest
extant statements rebutting the authority of the Parlement. Because
of its clarity, vigor, and scholarship, it apparently became very
popular among constitutional lawyers of the Old Regime. Several
other copies can be found in the Biblioth^que Nationale at Ms. fr.
7550, 18366, and Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 7979. Marillac probably composed
it as a legal brief in 1628 or 1629, intending to use it against any
resistance put up towards his cherished Code Michaud. Influences
of the memoir are, in fact, readily visible in the speech Marillac
delivered in the lit de justice held for the Code Michaud on January
15, 1629.
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It is necessary to pose a fundamental certainty, that the kings
of France are the legislators of their State, making laws and
ordinances, revoking them and descending to this tactic of
revocation whenever it pleases them, because they themselves
are the law of their kingdom, and are above their laws and
ordinances, and take advice and council from whomever they
please . . . not only because that conforms to reason and to
justice, but also because such is the usage of the kingdom,
and only quasi-kings have practiced otherwise, and such has been
the manner of laws, ordinances, and the State of several
centuries.®1
In another passage the garde des sceaux pungently denounced the
pretensions of the judges to check the power of rulers:
The greatest number of companies and of the persons composing
them live in this belief that they are the mentors of kings,
the protectors of peoples, and mediators between the people and
kings, and that kings cannot make any law in their kingdom which
has not passed their judgment and examination; and they make
other speeches and thoughts of this nature, not only without
foundation, but also contrary to the fundamentals and usages of
the State, contrary to the dignity of the Crown, and manifestly
contrary to the highest essential of the grandeur, dignity, and
authority of the kings of France. There is need to enlighten
people, to wipe out this error, and to show that the power of
our kings is independent, having no necessity of taking advice
from either company or person.82
Strong views such as these only encouraged divisiveness, and the
mutual antagonisms between Marillac and the court culminated in a
struggle lasting months when the completed Code Michaud was submitted
to the Parlement for approval.

Officially registered in a lit de

justice held January 15, 1629 the massive ordinance was immediately
subjected to criticism by the court, and though the Parlement even
tually submitted its reluctant approval, the compilation of law was
discarded after Marillac was disgraced in 1629.

8l B .N . Ms . f r . 7549, f o l . 76.
82B .N . Ms . 7549, f o l . 91.
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The relationship between Marillac, Richelieu, and the Parlement
during the 1620's was a curious one.

Unlike later gardes des sceaux

Chateauneuf and SSguier appointed by Richelieu after 1630, Marillac
remained independently minded in most matters of governmental policy.
Yet both Richelieu and Marillac were in fundamental agreement when
dealing with the Parlement.

Both respected the court, but both

firmly believed in the supremacy of royal authority.

This agreement

on parlementaire policy, however, was totally negated by Richelieu's
militant anti-Hapsburg policy, his moderate religious view, and his
overwhelming ambition to eliminate his dSvot rival from Louis' favor.
This abiding distaste for the Marillac faction, not disagreement over
the Code Michaud, accounts for Richelieu's failure to uphold the
document.
After achieving a place on the royal council, therefore,
Richelieu had to reckon with Marillac as well as with the Parlement's
pwoer and prestige.

Though Marillac dealt with administrative

details, much policy making was left to the Cardinal.

The court

showed itself either amenable or indifferent to the implementation
of much of Richelieu's early program.

No significant difficulties

were raised over legislation providing for the razing of nanstrategic fertifications in the hands of great nobility, nor did
the Parlement become involved in the crushing of the Chalais
conspiracy in 1626 and the subsequent execution of the comte de Chalais.
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Likewise, the court raised no serious objections to the establishment
of a chambre de justice against corrupt financiers in 1624.^
Even though the Parlement's potential for obstructionism was
probably more evident to Richelieu after he entered the royal council,
he continued to acknowledge that the court was, within bounds, useful
and necessary in maintaining the Crown's authority.

This utility

view of the period 1624-1630 contradicts that of Glasson and
consequently that of Sheiman who relied on Glasson's earlier work for
his evaluation of this period. Glasson held that parlementaire oppo
sition to Richelieu was aroused immediately after his entry into the
council in 1624 by the creation of a chambre de justice aimed at
investigating corrupt financiers lending money to the government and
that antagonism between the Cardinal and the court was maintained at
a high level during the 1620's: "As soon as he was master of the
ministry Q_.e_., in Glasson's view, 162/Q he established a chambre de
justice to research abuses committed in the administration"oF75niances.
Richelieu desired that this commission be made permanent, but the
Parlement resisted and with success. Extraordinary commissions
continued to be established in similar situations, and it was before
these that Richelieu tried his political enemies. Was the jurisdiction
of these commissions illegal and irregular, as certain historians have
written, or was it not a simple application of the justice retained
by the king? That which is certain is that they were constituted with
judges whose opinions were known in advance, and that this complete
lack of impartiality rendered these extraordinary commissions odious.
When instead of questions of State it was a matter of religious affairs,
the Cardinal was in rapport with the justice of the Parlement, always
disposed to safeguard that which it called the liberties of the
Galilean Church. On this point, but only on this point alone, the
Parlement and the Cardinal were of accord; in all other relations,
mistrust ruled and each surveyed the other with care." Glasson, Le
Parlement de Paris, I, 133-34. In implying that Richelieu was master
of the ministry after 1624, Glasson has glossed over the role played
by Michel de Marillac and the influence of the d£v6t party, both of
which remained substantial until the Day of Dupes. Richelieu's tenure
remained uncertain until after 1630, and while he urged the creation
of a chambre de justice in 1624, it was not a creation aimed at his
political enemies but an attempt to squeeze money out of reluctant
royal creditors. The chambre was indeed an extraordinary commission,
but unlike later such panels, it was concerned with financial matters
and not with affairs of ISse-majestS or political rivalry. In fact
the Parlement did not resist the creation or the operation of the
chambre of 1624, nor did it raise objections to many other of Richelieu's
early endeavors such as the abolition of dueling, the razing of for
tresses, and suppression of the Huguenot faction.
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became manifest at the beginning of 1626 when a dispute erupted among
the clergy of France over libelous statements printed in a polemical
pamphlet entitled ttysteres politiques. The Parlement of Paris inter
vened in the affair and prohibited the clergy of France from
assembling to discuss the matter further because it brought into
question the authority of the king.

In his Mgmoires Richelieu

•recorded the delicate nature of the affair and his recognition that it
was necessary to placate all interests, including that of the Parle-

The Parlement stirred itself up against the Church, and the
matter of the dispute concerned the authority and person of
the king. It was necessary to heal the schism, unite the
clergy, maintain the authority of the Church, and not to
violate that of the Parlement which on many important occasions,
is necessary to the support of the State.
Some time later, when the Parlement refused to completely defer to
a royal evocation, Richelieu advised the King to proceed carefully in
dealing with the court:
He (the Cardinal] advised [LouisJ that it was not only at
present that the parlements wanted to take cognizance over
general affairs; that they never considered that they had not
been instituted for that, and that the great companies are
useful to strictly execute that which was deliberated and
resolved by a few £l.£., the royal council], being with the
multitude of councillors in the State as it is with doctors
in regard to the sick, where a great number is detrimental.
No sooner had the affair of the Uysteres politiques blown over
than the clergy and the Parlement again became involved in a wrangle
over Jesuit literature which brought the authority of the king into

^Richelieu, Memoires, III, 20.
85Ibid., 21.
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question.

During the first part of 1626, copies of Traetatus de

Haeresi by an Italian Jesuit, Santarelli, began to circulate in
France.

Two chapters of the book debated the supremacy of State

over Church, and the Parlement condemned Santarelli’s work as
seditious and ordered it burned by the public hangman.

At the same

time the Provincial of the Jesuits and a contingent of the Order
were summoned before the court to be interrogated about the matter.
Richelieu, realizing very well the possible implications of a
confrontation between the Order and the Parlement, advised Louis to
use both praise and restraint with the Parlement:
He (the Cardinal] believed that it was good that His Majesty
should praise the Parlement for the action it had taken in
having the book burned and preventing such pernicious doc
trines from spreading through the kingdom, but that it was
necessary that care be taken that they the judges did not
pass a point which could be as prejudicial to his service as
their actions had been useful to it. The reason for this
counsel in sum was that it was necessary to reduce the Jesuits
to a state in which they could do no harm by their power but
also one in which they could not be brought to do harm through
despair.56
Over the implimentation of measures to order the kingdom and
strengthen royal authority, however, the relationship between
Richelieu and the court gradually grew strained.

In February, 1626,

an edict providing stem punishment for dueling was presented to the
Parlement for registration.

The court registered but only after

protests that the penalties proposed were too light in comparison with
those currently held as law.^

The Parlement proved even more

86Ibid., 26.
^The remonstrances presented on the edict of dueling are
printed in Richelieu, Maximes, 78-79.
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reluctant to approve wartime financing necessary to fund a terminal
campaign against the Huguenots, even though the sentiment of the
judges were sincerely Catholic.

In April, 1627, several financial

edicts, including creations of office, were presented for regis
tration.

The Parlement balked and procrastinated while the govern

ment stood in need.

Out of the delay came a remarkable letter to

the court signed by Louis but actually dictated by Richelieu before
the siege camp of La Rochelle:
I am here in the middle of winter, in continual rain, in the
midst of a great and perilous sickness, personally acting on the
spot, sparing neither my person nor my health, all in order to
reduce my subjects of La Rochelle to obedience and to oust
from my kingdom the root and seed of troubles and emotions which
oppress it and have afflicted it for more than sixty years.
Instead of each contributing the most hidden and precious of his
means to advance such a worthy and useful plan, they ^in the
courts]] obstruct assistance, they terrify those the financiers
who can help; this is nothing other than causing my armies to
perish for want of funds, and by this means to renew the courage
and the forces of those in rebellion. If enemies do this one
could not doubt their intentions; but I incur these hindrances
from my principal officers who should have the foremost and
most lively sentiments for the enduring success of my enterprises
. . . . After so many miracles for which He has brought to
prevent the fruition of their [Protestant] enterprises, and the
granting to me of time to combat and pursue them, I hope and
expect of the same bounty that he will hush all these contra
dictions, and that all ray subjects and ray officers will learn
that their welfare and their repose consist in obeying me.°®
Richelieu's reaction to the court's resistance was a natural one.
As relations deteriorated during the late 1620's, the minister's
attitude towards the court became more estranged.

While he retained,

and would always retain, a due respect for the Parlement's power and

^fole, M&moires, I, 4-78-82. A text of the same letter, together
with an important explanatory footnote commenting on the authenticity
of the note, can be found in Richelieu, Lettres, II, 717-21.
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and prestige, by 1626-27 it was becoming more and more evident that the
court stood in the way of many of his goals.

The shift in estimation

can be read from two memoranda prepared in 1626 and in 1629.

In

February, 1626, Richelieu had insisted to Louis that the Parlement
should verify edicts coming out of the peace to be made with the
Huguenots and the Assembly of Notables of 1626.

The minister

recommended that "the Parlement should verify the edicts of itself,
or in the presence of the King with eulogy; I hope that this will
be successful.

If it is, it will be nothing small, these great

and sovereign companies being the first grounds ^premier motive] for
the content or discontent of the p e o p l e . T h r e e years later, after
the Parlement*s obstructionism had become clearer to him, Richelieu
took a more negative view.

In an omnibus "Avis au Roy" of 1629, the

Cardinal emphasized the necessity for a strong royal authority, the
need for obedience from all subjects, and the absolute need "to
abase and temper the sovereign companies which through assumed
sovereignty every day oppose themselves to the good of the kingdom."99
When the Day of Dupes began a third and most crucial phase in the
Parlement*s relations with the Crown, a phase which would last nearly
a dozen years and which represented the critical period when absolutism
was securely founded in the French monarchy.91

^^Richelieu, Lettres, II, 194-97.

On November 10, 1630,

The quotation is from p. 197.

90Ibid., III, 181.
910tnly A. D. Lublinskaya has ventured to assert a contrary thesis.
With French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629, Lublinskaya has
maintained that the period 1620-29 was the "crucial phase" of French
absolutism. She thus violates the conventional view of the career of
Richelieu and the growth of French absolutism by asserting that "so
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Louis finally and reluctantly chose between his First Minister and the
dgy6t clique surrounding his mother, the Marillacs, and Marshal of
France Bassompierre.

Now secure in Louis' favor, Richelieu assumed

full direction of royal policy.

In the months following, the Parlement

of Paris, along with the rest of France, found itself embroiled in
the aftermath of the Cardinal's victory.

One of his first acts was to

appoint Nicolas LeJay, formerly second president \ mortier, to fill
the First Presidency left vacant by the death of Jean Bochart de
Champigny in April, 1630.

The seals taken from Marillac on the Day

far as French absolutism was concerned, the 1620's were decisive for
its development in the seventeenth century. This is usually linked
with the name of Richelieu, who is alleged to have sharply altered the
political course followed by his predecessors. Our study of the
political struggle of 1620-4 gives grounds for considering that there
was no change of course as such and that Richelieu basically followed
a path marked out already before his time. It is, however, beyond
question that he achieved unprecedented success. It seems to me,
though, that this success was decided by the profound changes in
French society itself which took place between 1610 and the 1620's.
Without these changes this greatest statesman in the history of
absolutist France would probably have had to while away his life in
some out-of-the-way bishopric, with no opportunity to display his
outstanding talents, or else to end his days in imprisonment or
exile.” Lublinskaya, French Absolutism, p. 332. The weaknesses in
Lublinskaya's thesis are numerous. She has not dealt with or des
cribed the "profound changes" in French society between 1610-20;
she is restricted by a Marxian framework of class orientation and
economic interpretation; she has not considered the mounting economic
crisis which accelerated throughout the 1630's and 1640's. Addi
tionally, she has ignored the financial crisis brought by the
belligerent French foreign policy which became increasingly evident
after 1630. Lastly, the constitutional tensions which accompanied
the growth of absolutism were much more pronounced during the
1630's than during the 1620's.
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of Dupes were handed over to Charles d'Aubespine, Marquis de
Chateauneuf, a reliable supporter.

The vanquished, including such

substantial figures as the Queen Mather, the King's brother, the
Marillacs, and Bassompierre were arrested or fled the country.
Richelieu determined to scourge them and their entourages with
every means at his disposal, and in doing so he collided directly
with the Parlement of Paris.

The use of extraordinary commissions

increased abruptly as the justification of reason of State was
applied through extraordinary tribunals to deal with those guilty of
l£se-majest€. Marie and Gaston, heir-apparent, were invulnerable to
severe treatment, but their followers were not.

Immediately after

the Day of Dupes, Marshal Louis de Marillac was arrested and brought
before a panel of mafrtres des requites for trial on charges of
peculation and malversation.

In March a declaration was drawn up

against those in the following of Gaston d1Orleans who had fled the
country with him.

A few months later the infamous Chambre de 11

Arsenal was created to prosecute ldse-majeste among the servants and
pamphleteers in the service of Marie and Gaston.

The Parlement fought,

these judicial operations at every step with traditional weapons:
it prepared remonstrances, refused registration of edicts, denounced
the conmrfssaires, and held drawn-out plenary sessions.

These were

met in turn by tough royal countermeasures in the form of personal
warnings, arrets du Conseil, lits de justice, and exiles of
magistrates.
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After 1632 the Crown managed to establish a shaky victory over the
issues of councilliar authority and the use of comnrissaires extra
ordinaires. The most serious phase of the French constitutional
crisis was now past.

The court, however, accepted its defeat with

bad grace and sullenly refused to co-operate with the royal council.
Therefore, throughout the remainder of the 1630's Richelieu had to
anticipate friction with the Parlement at every turn.

As has already

been seen in Chapter III, the court's obstinate attitude was especially
crucial as the country geared itself for war.

Each move in the

international arena required additional funding, and this funding often
had to pass the scrutiny of the Parlement.

The Crown's unprecedented

reliance on extraordinary finances thus gave the court an unusual
amount of leverage in fiscal matters.

Quarrels over the rentes of

Paris in 1634 and 1638 as well as creations of office in 1635, 1638,
and 1640 made this leverage very apparent.

But issues less serious

than these matters of State also provoked resistance, and sometimes
this foot-dragging had the air, if not the substance, of a personal
grievance with the Cardinal.

This was true, for instance, in the

Parlement's hesitancy to approve the foundation of the Academie
Frangaise.
The question of the Academie began early in the 1630's with
Richelieu's decision to found an exclusive company devoted to
literature

and the French language.

His objectives were several.

An Academy of the Arts would serve cultural purposes; it would
provide a ready honor for writers and litterateurs; it had
possibilities for propaganda; it would certainly embellish the State
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with glory and grandeur.

Less obviously, the Academie would

function as a kind of favored corps or guild and as such it might
facilitate governmental supervision of the printing trade, a function
up to this time largely vested in the Parlement’s enforcement of
censorship.
The official foundation of the Academie was drafted as a
declaration dated January 25, 1635.^

This document founded the

organization, but its formal statutes took several months longer to
prepare.

It remained to have the edict verified in the Parlement.

The court found one reason after another to delay, and on December 30,
1635, lettres de cachet went to the court, to the gens du roi, and
to the First President Le Jay.^3

This nudging, though, failed to

carry much weight in the Parlement, which was at the time immersed
in heated discussions over a lit de justice held on December 20.
In addition to the letter, Richelieu personally summoned Mole to
Conflans, told him that he desired the registration, and that having
signed the statutes he deemed them worthy of the privileges accorded.
The request was underlined by a threat to have the Grand Conseil
register the declaration.

Despite the best efforts of Richelieu and

Mole, however, the final verification did not come until July 10, 1637,
with the proviso ’’that the said assembly and Academie would consider
9^The text of the declaration is in Paul Pellison and Abbe Olivet,
Histoire de 1'Academie Frangoise depuls son etablissement jusqu1A
1652, 1*729 edition, reprinted in Cimber and Danjou, Archives
curieuses, serie II, vol. VI, pp. 75-214-. Pellison was historian
of the Academie under Louis XIV. He died in 1693^The lettre is in Pellison, Histoire de 1'Academie, pp. 106-07.
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only the ornament, embellishment, and growth of the French language,
and of books which will be done by them and by other persons
desiring and wishing it."^
According to the account of Paul Pellison, historian of the
Acadlmie under Louis XIV, the resistance of the Parlement mirrored
the feelings of others in the French population.

Richelieu, having

brought royal authority to a point higher than any one before, was
loved and respected by some, envied by others, detested by many,
and feared and respected by all.

Besides the fact that the Academie

was a new institution which stirred up controversy on its own merits,
it was widely regarded as the work of the minister and judged for
good or evil according to the feelings one had for him.

Some, says

Pellison, spoke of the plans for the Academie "with excessive
praise."

Others, more suspicious,

did not know if [whether] under these flowers there was not
some serpent hidden, and feared that at least this establishment
was only a new prop for his domination intended only for men
in his pay, bought to uphold all that he did and to observe
the actions and sentiments of others. It was even said that he
cut eighty thousand livres from mire of Paris to give them
each ten thousand livres pension, and a hundred other similar
things.95
These emotions among the population at large were reflected in the
Parlement except, says Pellison, "that there was less affection for
him in this company than elsewhere, and that most considered him as

^B.N. Ms. fr. 9893, fol. 130; Pellison, Histoire de l'Acad€mie,
pp. 107-08.
^Pellison, Histoire de l'Acadgmie, p. 110.
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the enemy of their liberty and a transgressor on their privileges."96
These sentiments produced a three-way division in the court over the
issue of verification.

The first saw nothing to mistrust in the

design but were too few to carry the day.

A second group, "too

devoted to the solitary study of the Palais and civil affairs,"
ridiculed the project as puerile.

The last party, numerous and

Influential, suspected everything emanating from the Cardinal and
feared the consequences of the Academie's competence over the French
language, literary world, and printing trade.

Together the last two

groups had managed to delay verification of the Academie's patents
for two years.97
The above brief sketch of the 1630's should underscore the
escalation of troubles with the court which began soon after the Day
of Dupes and continued for the next dozen years.

Throughout the

1630's the Parlement represented a substantial and ever-present
factor obstructing the realization of Richelieu's goals for the
monarchy.

Now in control of the royal council and more secure than

ever in the confidence of the King, Richelieu alone directed Crown
policy to be followed in dealing with the Parlement.

How did he

recognize and respond to the question of handling the court during
this the decisive phase of his ministry? His own answer is nowhere
expressed in more than general terms.

To obtain a broad statement of

of the philosophy which inspired the Cardinal's parlementaire policies
^Ibid., p. 113.
97Ibid.
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after the Day of Dupes, it is necessary first to consult the
Testament politique in which the Cardinal summarized twenty years of
public experience and set forth his recommendations based on these
e x p e r i e n c e s .98

The first three sections of Part I, Chapter IV, are

of exceptional interest, for here Richelieu outlined his views on
contemporary discorders in justice, his ideas on the reformation of
these disorders, and finally his plans to bar the judges from
encroaching on the royal authority.

Further insights must be

extracted bit by bit from his Memoires, correspondence, and papers of
state.
At the beginning of his discourse on the administration of
justice in the Testament, Richelieu acknowledged that the current
situation in the courts and among the magistracy was filled with
"disorders.” These were principally in the area of public law and
policy and not in the procedures of trial justice, about which he
said virtually nothing.

Richelieu's opening statement is particularly

interesting, for it sharply reveals the minister's general disdain
for the magistracy as a whole and the sovereign courts in particular:
There is no one who does not see that those who were established
to hold the just balance in all things have themselves so
charged one side [of the balance} to their advantage so that
there is no counterweight. The derangements of justice have
come to such a point that they cannot go any further.
According to the Cardinal, there were two abuses most in need
of reform:

venality and heredity of office.

Throughout his career,

9%ichelieu mentions the figure of twenty years of public
experience on page 245, which permits the assumption that the
Testament was begun after 1634.
^^Richelieu, Testament politique, pp. 230-31.
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Richelieu had condemned both practices as deeply rooted evils
which ideally should he avoided for the good of the State.

This

opinion can be found as early as 1614 when, before the Estates
General, Richelieu supported the opinion of the clergy and nobility
that venality and heredity should be abolished.

His views at the

time, and those of the First Estate for whom he spoke, are recorded
in his Memoires, in which he outlined three rather conventional
reasons for the abolition of these abuses.

Venality, he wrote, was

bad because it increased the number of offices at the expense of the
poor, who had to support them; venality encouraged increased fees
of justice, and even the undermining of justice itself, because those
who bought the offices tended to treat them as opportunities for
exploitation; the sale of justice for gold and silver detracted
from honor, the true reward of justice.

Richelieu even went so far

as to maintain that venality was contrary to the fundamental laws
and had been introduced by Louis XII in imitation of the Venetians
in order to fill the royal treasury.
These opinions apparently remained unchanged throughout the
second decade of the century and into the 1620's, as several memoranda
and advisory essays testify.

When drafting resolutions for presen

tation to the Assembly of Notables in 1626, Richelieu included
recommendations for the abolition of venality:
100Riehelieu, MSmoires, I, 222.
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Venality of offices, favoring price over virtue, and barring to
us the means of rewarding, of chosing and employing those of
our subjects who have rendered us more services, and who are
most capable of rendering them, be it under arms, in justice,
or other functions . . . we have, following the advice at one
time given by the Estates General of our kingdom, and the
resolution taken by it but retarded and obstructed by the
unhappiness of ensuing troubles, decided and resolved that in
the future it will no longer be permitted . . . to sell or
buy any offices, be it for money or for equivalent things, all
brevets and permissions obtained notwithstanding, which at
present, as then, we declare null and of no effect. 1
The Assembly of Notables accepted this proposition, but nothing was
done to implement it.

As late as 1629, Richelieu advised Louis that

it was necessary "not to re-establish the paulette when it will
expire in a year."1®2
Sometime after 1630 and before the preparation of the Testament
politique five years later, Richelieu’s idealistic outlook concerning
venality and heredity was modified.

In the Testament Richeleiu

continued to denounce the sale and inheritance of office, freely

1®1Riehelieu, Lettres, II, "R^glement pour toutes les affaires
du royaume," 177. The ellipses are presented as in the source.
102Ibid., Ill, "Avis au Roy," 180-81. It is difficult to tell
from the original passage if Richelieu intended to link this
abolition of the paulette with an effort to reduce the court's power.
The complete passage in the "Avis" reads " . . . not to re-establish
the paulette when it will expire in a year, to abase and temper the
companies of justice which by a pretended sovereignty set them
selves up every day against the good of the kingdom." The two
thoughts are linked in the original by a comma. Thus it is possible
that in Richelieu's mind the abolition of the paulette might contri
bute to reducing the court's pride and power. Certainly Richelieu
was aware of the potential disciplinary effect abolition of the
paulette would have.
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admitting that the system was filled with abuses and disorders.
By the mid-1630's, though, Richelieu had abandoned any pretense of
actually effecting any reform in the conditions of office holding.
The arguments presented in the Testament thus appear as shabby and
hollow efforts, to warrant a system which was patently ridden with
evils.

Richeleiu deplored the situation in the bureaucracy, but

his arguments were all directed towards justifying the system for
practical reasons.

The most apparent factor, and perhaps the

critical one in this change of mind, was the age-old exigency of
financial considerations. By the mid-1630's the Parties casuelles
produced a substantial and indispensable portion of Crown income
which made it unthinkable to-carry out a reform.

By this time, too,

the government could, not risk further alienating its officials by
suspending venality.
Richelieu's arguments against reform began with the claim that
abuses were inevitable in the provision of offices because all
offices depended on the king, that is, on favor and intrigue.

Hence,

it was better to provide for. these offices through sale and heredity
rather than through free royal appointment:
Although the suppression of venality and heredity of. offices
should conform to reason and to all the constitutions of law,
it is nevertheless true that abuses are inevitable in the .
distribution of offices so dependent on the simple will of the
king and by consequence on the favor and artifice of those who
find themselves- the most influential. This renders the way by
which provisions are now made more tolerable than that which
was utilized in the past because of the great improprieties
which always accompanied it. ^

•^Richelieu,

Testament politique, p. 233.
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Richelieu continued by developing a historical argument that venality
was as old as the monarchy and that to change a fixed institution
would be a dangerous thing.

The abuse of venality went back as far

as Saint Louis, who was known to sell offices, and "the complaints
which had been made about venality were common to all ages of the
monarchy."104 Francis I had established a regulated commerce in
offices, judging that "there was no better and more prompt expedient
to draw on the wealth of his subjects than to give them honor for
m o n e y . H e n r y IV, with good counsel, had added the scheme of
the paulette to the practices of venality, presumably with great
consideration and forethoughtj hence, the practice should not be
changed without reason for a design which promised better.

If the

monarchy could be newly established, reform would be possible, "but
prudence does not permit acting on the same basis in an old monarchy,
whose imperfections have passed into habit and whose disorders have
become, not without utility, part of the order of the State."1<^ )
Not only did Richelieu argue that reform would cause confusion and
disorder in the State, but reform would also bring the disaffection
of those holding office:
Only with difficulty could one change the established order for
the disposition of offices without altering the affection of
those who possess them, in which case it would to be feared
that instead of retaining the people in their duty, as they have
contributed no little in the past, they should contribute in the
future, more than any others, to their debauche.-^'

1Q^Ibid., p. 235.
105Ibid., p. 236.
106Ibid., p. 234.
107Ibid., pp. 236-37.
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The most potent moral argument against venality which the minister
had to counter was that the exchange of offices for money had led to
commercialization of justice.
of reasoning
the

Richelieu's response to this ling

was imprecise and

elusive.He merely maintained that

officers who had made such

large andgrowing investments were

not likely to commit gross injustices out of fear that they would lose
their investments:
I know well that it is commonly said that those who buy justice
in gross sell it in detail. But at the same time it is true
that an officer who puts the greatest part of his property into
an office will be not a little restrained from doing evil out
of fear that he will have
of losingall that he values, and that
in such case the price of
offices is an accurate token of the
fidelity of officers.^®
This argument might have had some validity if the judges had been
vulnerable to removal for misconduct.
Richelieu was well aware.

This was not the ease, as

Nor did the price of offices and their

value ensure fidelity and loyalty, for the most expensive offices
in the kingdom, those of the magistrates of the sovereign courts,
proved to be among the most intractable to royal authority during
the Cardinal's ministry.
After resorting to these rather dubious arguments in defense of
the status quo, Richelieu went on to reveal his personal sentiments
in regard to those holding offices.

These sentiments were, as

might be ejected, closely related to his own aristocratic birth and
correspondent inclination to contempt for those of lesser station.
108Ibid., pp. 234-35.
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This disdain is unmasked in several passages in the Testament in which
Richelieu linked the abolition of venality to a conservative social
dogma:
Instead of the suppression of venality and heredity opening the
door to virtue, it would open it to intrigues and factions and
to the filling of offices with men of low extraction, often
more stuffed with Latin than with property, from which would
come many indecencies. If one could enter office without money,
commerce would be abandoned by many men who, dazzled by the
splendor of dignities, would pursue offices and their own ruin
to the general effect that they would take from trade that
which renders families abundant.10^
Above all, Richelieu argued that low birth rarely produced good
magistrates.

Men without property or noblesse were difficult to

deal with and possessed an insuperable miserliness:
A low birth rarely produces the qualities necessary to magis
trates, and it is certain that the virtue of a person of good
station has something more noble about it than that which is
found in a man of petty extraction. The spirits of such men
are ordinarily difficult to manage, and many have an austerity
so pointed that it is not only perturbing but prejudicial.
It is with the first in regard to the second as it is with
trees which, being planted in good ground, bear better fruit
than those planted in poor soil.110
Finally, Richelieu stated in plain terms his belief that the magistrature should belong, as it had traditionally, to men endowed with
property and a certain honneur: "Consequently, rather than it being
necessary to condemn venality because it excludes men of low condition
from office, to the contrary, it is one of the factors which renders
it more tolerable."^11

1Q9Ibid., p. 237.
110Ibid., pp. 237-38.
m

Ibid., p. 238.
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In short, the financial exigencies of Richelieu's ministry, the
powerful opposition of the officers, and his own aristocratic outlook
combined to make any reform in venality and heredity virtually impos
sible.

Above all, if heredity and venality were abolished, the

Parties casuelles would suffer and office holding would be thrown
open to intrigue and favor seeking.

The Cardinal himself noted that

any change in contemporary conditions of office holding could have to
be delayed until peace time or pursed only with caution:

"Disorders

which have come about through public necessities and which are
fortified by reasons of State can be reformed only with time.

It is

necessary to proceed carefully and not to go from one extreme to the
other."

112

It would be far more preferable to continue the present

system than to risk incurring the wrath of the officials and to
chance disrupting vital sources of income.

This policy was, in fact,

consistently followed throughout Richelieu's ministry, and the
Parties casuelles operated in 1642 just as it had in 1624.
After considering the abuses of venality and heredity, Richelieu
devoted a brief portion of the Testament to the reform of abuses
within the corps of the magistrature. The brevity and superficiality
of the Cardinal's discussion, limited as it was to the need for a
certain maturity and education for judges, indicates that he was
little interested in earnest reform in this area and probably
regarded permanent correction as unlikely.

In acknowledging the

practice of receiving under-age judges, Richelieu confined his

112Ibid., p. 236.
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remarks to reiterating the importance of the standards established in
the ordinances. The gens du roi should be held responsible for
carrying out the requisite investigations into the candidate's
qualifications.

Other than an indication of the need for a certain

age and maturity, the Cardinal simply recommended that the magis
trates be well educated.

The principal means to this end was to be

the retrenchment of an established and widespread practice of
tutoring young candidates for the magistrature in the study of law.
Certain doctors were notorious for compelling their pupils to
memorize and parrot what they could not learn.

"Such men are,"

Richelieu noted, "like instructors in arms, who are only good for
teaching men their own ruin and hindering them from learning the
real excercises of the military, which can be learned only in the
army after much time and training."I13 Despite the Cardinal's
professed predilection against these professional coaches in law, he
had no scruples against utilizing one of them, a certain Claude
Colombel, in a scheme to force the Parlement to receive the new
conseillers created in December, 1635.

Rightly anticipating that the

Parlement would harass, and if possible, reject, any candidate for
the new seats during their entry examination, Richelieu had Colombel,
a noted professor of law, submitted for candidacy.
fulfilled every expectation.

The court

The judges embarrassed Colombel with

trick questions and tried to ridicule his knowledge of Latin.

113Ibid., p. 245.
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Only the intervention of the prince de Conde in the examination
made Colombel's eventual reception possible.-*--^
In the administration of justice, as in other aspects of govern
ment, Richelieu was inclined to support a government of men and not of
law, though he always sought the support of legal argument.

What was

of supreme importance to him was that those administering justice
should be gens de quality, that is to say, men of property, of ma
turity and experience, and especially of honneur. If the officers
possessed these qualities, the nature of the law itself would matter
but little, for the probity of those administering justice would
overcome all defects in the statutes of the kingdom:
Even when the laws are defective, if the officers are men of
property, their probity will be capable of making up any
default, and, however good that they may be, the laws will
be rendered fruitless if the magistrates neglect the execu
tion of them . . . .115
When the power and prestige of the court in public matters are
considered, when the traditional independence of the Parlement's
behavior is known, and after having seen Richelieu's attitude towards
the sanctity of royal authority, it is perhaps surprising to find
only a few short remarks in the Testament dedicated to the role of
the Parlement in the absolute State.

In opening his discussion

dealing with the Parlement's role in affairs of State and its
encroachment on royal authority, Richelieu immediately revealed that
words were necessary on such a subject when his intent could so

•^P&re H. Griffet, Histoire de r£gne de Louis XIII (3 vols.; Paris,
1758), II, 673-79.
115Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 2UU-
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easily be summarized:
It seems that there should be much to say on such a subject
[as the role of the court in matters of State], however, I
could say enough about it in three words [raison d'Etat?] if
I first say that it is necessary to do nothing other than to limit
the officers of justice to rendering justice to the subjects of
the king, which is the sole end of their establishment.
Indeed, this succinct motif would represent the key to Richelieu's
philosophy in regard to the court after 1630.
Justification for severely limiting the Parlement was, of course,
inseparably related to Richelieu's drive to augment royal authority.
The Parlement historically represented the values of a limited,
traditional, and constitutional monarchy.

The court had a long

record of.political ambitions associated with its remonstrances and
a critical attitude towards royal authority which Richelieu could
not abide:
It is a thing so ordinary to such companies to regard and to
look to the criticism of the government of states that it is
not to be remarked upon. All subordinate authority always
regards that which is superior to it with envy; if it dares
not dispute its power, it gives itself the liberty to decry
its conduct.117
Despite the court's long association with public affairs, an
association familiar to Richelieu, the court had no legitimate
claim to a place in the conduct of the State at the expense of
regal power:
It would be impossible to prevent the ruin of royal authority
if one should follow the sentiments of those who, being as
ignorant in the practice of government of states as they presume
to be wise in the theory of their administration, are neither
capable of thoroughly judging their conduct nor competent to
n 6 Ibid.., p. 248.
U 7Ibid., p. 249.
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to give decisions on the course of public affairs, which
exceeds their grasp.U8
Richelieu's objections to the Parlement's participation in
affairs of State were not limited to the court's criticism and
jealousy of royal authority, or its encroachment on the king's
prerogatives.

The Cardinal understood quite clearly the fundamental

weakness of the court in attempting to fulfill its limiting and
consultative role.

The court as an institution was plagued with

a hydra-like Achilles heel:

it could never represent itself as a

united and homogeneous body capable of acting as energetically or
decisively as a single minister or a few councillors:
It is necessary to bear with the imperfections of a body which,
having several heads [the chambresl cannot have a uniform spirit
and which, being agitated as much by diverse impulses as it is
composed of different factions, cannot be brought either to
understand or to tolerate its own good.^9
Everyone, said the Cardinal, recognized and disapproved of the
court's proceedings when it was carried away by some derangement, but
in rightly condemning it, it is difficult to bring a remedy to
it because in the great companies the number of bad always
surpasses the number of good, and even if all were found wise,
it still would not be a sure thing that the best sentiments
should find themselves in the majority, while judgments are
diverse in themselves.^2®
In summary, the Parlement's potential or real limitations on
royal power and on his personal goals for the French kingdom were an
anathema to Richelieu, who loathed any checks on royal authority
and who found the principle of wide counsel inadmissible in matters
ll8Ibid., p. 248.
119Ibid., p. 249.
12°Ibid.
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of State.

The Parlement stood in the way of the utilization of

reason of State to order the kingdom, to glorify the king's power, and
to provide the internal discipline and financial resources required
to lead the French to greatness.

For these reasons, it would he

necessary to compel the court to obey the royal will like other
institutions and subjects.

The court's initiative in matters of

State would have to be strictly delineated and the judges barred
from encroachment on what was properly the sphere of the royal council.
Yet as a political realist, Richelieu always recognized that
the Parlement was an integral and indispensable part of the monarchy.
The Parlement1s registration was essential for legislation, because
the court enjoyed immense respect among the king's subjects who
considered the traditional verification essential for authentic
legality.

The court, too, was useful in enforcing law decided by

others; for this function it was desirable to maintain the judge's
standing untarnished.

Finally, even Richelieu acknowledged there

were occasions when the Parlement's prestige and political power had
aided the monarchy; indeed, there were instances like those of 1594
and 1610 when the court's initiative had helped preserve royal
authority.
Additionally there was a certain personal factor to be accounted
for.

Richelieu had relatives in the court, and he knew well that the

Parlement served as a training ground for many conseillers d’Etat
and ma^tres des requites. Many of his creatures had come from
judicial careers in the court or from the ranks of the maitres des
requetes closely related by blood and professional duties to the
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parlementaires. Louis' chief minister could scarcely afford to
ignore the web of professional and familial ties which held the high
robe officials together in spite of grave institutional conflicts.
The same web of personal interest, as well as fiscal needs, regaled
against any permanent resolution of the question of venality.
Dealing with the Parlement was then a thorny problem, made all
the more delicate by the ever-pressing exigencies of a precarious
foreign policy.

Obviously, it was neither desirable nor possible

that the court be suppressed like the great Crown offices of Constable
and Grand Admiral, allowed to lapse in the same way as the Estates
General, or used as a sounding board like the Assembly of Notables.
Nor could the magistrates be unduly compromised by the abolition of
the paulette or excessively irritated by disciplinary measures.

One

critical question during Richelieu's ministry, therefore, would be
to determine what instruments and what policy would prove most
appropriate in furthering the interests of royal authority without
inordinately alienating the judges or undermining popular respect
for the legal qualities of the monarchy.
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CHAPTER V
THE PARLEMENT AND THE PRACTICES OF ABSOLUTISM
During the ministry of Richelieu the authority of the king, as
symbolized by his signature and seals, lay behind all administrative
and judicial decisibns.

By its very nature the essence of

monarchical government focused on the person of the king; royal
officers held their posts and executed their decisions in his name.
The king was in all ways the living embodiment of sovereignty, of
la chose publique, and the foremost public person in the kingdom.
Yet however fundamental the person of the king was to the monar
chical principle, his government could not have functioned without
constant advice on policy and assistance in daily affairs.

This

advisory and administrative requirement was institutionalized in the
royal council which, as the curia regis, the Grand Conseil, or
Consell d'Etat, had always surrounded the king and stood at the top
of the bureaucratic structure of the kingdom.

Its central and

supreme importance was rightly emphasized by Mousnier in commenting
that "the council of the king is par excellence the sovereign's
instrument for government.

It is in the council that he legislates,

that he judges as final arbiter, that he administers."^

Thus

representing the interface between sovereign and sovereignty, the

■^-Roland Mousnier, "Les Rfeglements du conseil du Roi sous Louis
XIII," Bulletin de la SociStS de l 1histoire de France (1946-47),
P. 93.
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role of the council became even more significant as government grew
more sophisticated.

In the seventeenth century the functions of the

council and its rapport with the Parlement became critical to the
inauguration of absolutistic practices of government.
From the misty origins of the monarchy in the Frankish tribal
assemblies, tradition demanded the consent of the king's peers in
decision making, especially in questions of law, and during the
medieval period the curia regis conserved this tradition by offering
its tres grand conseil to French kings. As long as the curia regis
remained the only court of appeal in kingdom, there could be no
question that it was the sole representative of sovereign justice.
This situation became more intricate at the end of the 1200's as
the Estates General came to share in representing the nation and as
the judicial and financial sections of the council became the
Parlement and Chambre des comptes. With the separation of these
courts came the question of the relationship between the justice
delegated to them and that retained by the king in council.
Contentions between the Parlement and the Chambre des comptes had
to be referred to some higher agency, as did decisions of these
courts returned in violation of law or the king's will.

According

to feudal and monarchical principles, the king's person remained the
highest authority in the land; therefore, his presence in council
necessarily continued to represent the natural judicial extension
of his being.

In legal and judicial terms the king in council was

the dernier ressort, the final and ultimate judge to whom one
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could appeal.

Decisions so rendered by him were denoted by the

formulary fait par la roi en son conseil, a rubric which, at least
during the medieval period, very accurately described the sovereign
nature of judgments given in the king's presence.

Contemporaries

grasped this fact quite readily, and increasing numbers of fourteenthcentury Frenchmen carried their appeals from Parlementaire verdicts
to the council.

Sometimes petitions were made directly to the

council for justice in first instance; at other times sovereigns
were unable to resist the temptation to evoke important matters
to their judgment among their barons.

For these reasons the council

continued to act as a superior judicial institution even after the
creation of the presumably sovereign courts.

The results were

immensely important for the history of French institutions, for
despite repeated efforts at regulation the Crown found it impossible,
and in some cases undesirable, to halt the steady growth of the
council's justice retenue. The sovereign courts naturally resented
and resisted such encroachments and conflict became a permanent
characteristic of institutional relations at the highest level.
A limited requirement for some final superior arbiter over the
Parlement was apparent even during that court's earliest formative
years.

Article 12 of the Ordinance of March 23, 1302, established

that "decisions rendered by the court [of ParlementJ will be
executed without appeal, and if there is some ambiguity or error,
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correction of it will be referred to the king or to the court
fsic, the c o u n c i l ] . Royal authority was evidently expected to
regulate the judges and provide for their transgressions of the
law.

These pronouncements took place in the Grand Conseil de la

justice, quite literally a great council meeting including the
king and as many barons, prelates, and officers as possible. 3
In addition to correcting questionable decisions and main
taining judicial orderliness, the development of evocations also
engendered problems at an early date.

The granting of such evocations

was another expression of justice retenue. On the authority of the
king and under certain circumstances, either party in a legal
proceeding might request that their case be heard before the king
in council rather than in the Parlement.

The usual grounds were

parents, or inequity because of kinship with the judges, but other
legal reasoning might be accepted as well.

When it is remembered

that the council followed the king in his perambulations among his
royal residences, the consequent hardships and inequity of this
procedure can easily be imagined.

Still more arbitrary were evo

cations initiated on the part of the king, the barons, or other
persons of influence to bring litigation into the council where its
outcome could easily be determined.
^Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, II, 761.
^Cheruel, Dictionnaire historique des institutions, I, 212.
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Charles V recognized this thorny problem and sought to guarantee
the integrity of the Parlement's jurisdiction by sending it royal
letters dated July 22, 1370, in which he prohibited evocations for
"the pleading of any petty causes."^

The nature of the remedy,

based as it was on royal will, was not such as to resolve the
difficulty which continued unchecked throughout the fourteenth
century.

Monarchial weakness during the Hundred Years' War disrupted

all normal judicial procedures and eroded royal authority, but as
the monarchy recovered its vitality during the fifteenth century the
judicial activities of the council was revived.

After the emulsion

of the English by Charles VII, the partisans of the king who had been
dispoiled by the English had their property restored to them.

All

judicial affairs related to these restitutions were categorically
evoked to the council.^
The constant multiplication of judicial attributions during the
middle of the fifteenth century eventually led to a division in
the heart of the council.

During the reign of Louis XI a special

judicial section of the council devoted exclusively to legal matters
heard on appeal to the king or evoked from the Parlement began to
^Isambert, Anciexmes lois frangaises, V, 546-47. The editors
of Anciermes lois frangaises note that these letters were some of
the most remarkable of the reign. See p. 546, n. 1.
^Dareste, La Justice administrative, p. 54, n. 4. Possibly this
categorical evocation was due to the political attitudes within the
Parlement of Paris, which in 1436 had just been reconstituted out of
the royalist parlement at Poitiers and the Anglo-Burgundian judges
who had remained at Paris.
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assume a semi-autonomous existence.

The conditions under which the

Grand Conseil emerged as a sovereign court thus almost precisely
duplicated those which had produced the Parlement two centuries
before.

The existence of a separate segment of the royal council so

denominated was clear by 1469, "because by this time the interests
of the king were being defended by a permanent procureur du roi.
Membership probably took in all the king's noble advisors, the
chancellor, and the six ma£tres des requetes. After 1483 the Grand
Conseil assembled on a regular basis and produced a continuous series
of archives to record its business, though it still perambulated
after the king in his wanderings.6
A new court's personnel and competence were defined by two
ordinances of the late 1400's, one issued under Charles VIII
(August 2, 1497) and the other under Louis XII (July 13, 1498).^
These acts show that the court was still considered an annex and a
dependency of the royal council from which it was still only imper
fectly separated.

The legislation of 1498 explained the raison

d'etre of the Grand Conseil by stating that the royal council,
being ambulatory, often did not possess a sufficient number of legal
specialists to deal with "the highest matters and affairs, . . .

^Noel Valois, ed., Inventaire des arrets du Conseil d'Etat
(r£gne de Henri IV) (2 vols.; Paris, 1886-189317 I, Introduction,
xxix.
^Isambert, Anciennes lois frangalses, XI, 292, 296-300. The
text of the legislation of 1497 has been lost, and Anciennes lois
francaises reproduces only the title and date. The provisions of the
earlier act are known, however, because the ordinance of 1498
repeated and confirmed the terms of its predecessor before going on
to ennumerate certain modifications.
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hereditary and beneficial as well as others" which came before it.8
Thus in 1497 Charles VIII had decided to add seventeen "clerical
men, experienced in the rendering of justice" who would serve
regularly as conseillers ordinaires alongside the chancellor,
maitres des requetes, and such great nobles who chose to attend.
Louis XII confirmed this arrangement in 1498, raised the number
of conseillers from seventeen to twenty, and attached a procureur
du roi, a clerk, and a secretary.9
The ordinance of 1498 officially erected the Grand Conseil
into "a corps, court, and college" which "will have sovereign
authority over all our kingdom, pays, lands, and seigneuries,
and {over] all that our other sovereign courts, established in
various places of our kingdom, have within their limits and
ressorts."10 The causes it could hear were those "that it pleased
the king to commit and send to it by lettres patentes.1111 The king
was reputed to sit in person in the Grand Conseil, hence its deci
sions were rendered under the rubric "le Roi en son Conseil" ("the
king in his council"). In fact, by the sixteenth century this
formulary had become legal fiction as the presidency was almost
always left to the chancellor.12
8Ibid., 297.
^Ibid., 298-300; Doueet, Les Institutions de la France, I,
102-03“
^Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, XI, 298.
11Ibid.
12Zeller, Les Institutions de la France, p. 113.
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These conditions made it certain, that the Grand Conseil1s
jurisdiction could function only at the expense of the Parlement1s,
and, in fact, bitter wrangles attest to the state of councilliarparlementaire relations during the late 1400's and early 1500's.
At this point it should be noted that the interventions of the
Grand Conseil were never very great in the area of criminal justice,
but almost all varieties of civil justice and many public matters
were referred to it on appeal, evocation, or in first instance.
The Grand Conseil arbitrated disputes between the sovereign courts,
regulated their judges, heard appeals against the acts of royal
officers, and entertained questions of fiefs and ecclesiastical
benefices.
Of these categories of cases, the sorest point of contention
between the Grand Conseil and the Parlement centered about royal
appointments to clerical benefices; in reality the Grand Conseil
achieved much of its importance by acting as a court of prerogative
justice in clerical affairs.

Because such affairs were entangled

with papal relations and the quest of the Crown to dominate the
Galliean Church, matters of clerical benefices were also matters of
the highest State concern.

Louis XI and his immediate successors,

therefore, categorically referred such cases to the Grand Conseil
for judgment with the assurance of a satisfactory verdict.
The clash over benefices began during the 1460's as part of a
larger controversy over Louis' regulation of the Galliean Church.
Immediately after his accession in 1461, Louis XI scrapped the
Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges by a simple arret in council which
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The move

was ill-counciled, if not illegal, and the Parlement strenuously
objected in lengthy remonstrances of 1465, which Louis ignored.^
The Franco-Papal detente was carried even further in If.72 when a
new concordat was arranged between Louis and Sixtus IV.

he status

of proposals in the agreement, however, was left shroud?, in
ambiguity since Louis changed his Papal policy several times during
the 1470's and because the Parlement did not register some of the
documents involved.

At Louis' death in 1483 the situation in the

French Church was confused and would remain confused until the
promulgation of the Concordat of Bologna in 1516.^
Inevitably the Parlement was dragged into the controversy which
raged over Papal relations, the Galliean Liberties, and royal
intercession in Church affairs.

The political positions taken by

the court and by the Crown were complex and need be described here
only as they affected the jurisdiction of the Parlement.

In

general that court considered itself the palladin of the Pragmatic
Sanction, which represented customary legal tradition in France.
Among other provisions the Sanction had asserted the principle of
canonical elections to fill major benefices.

The Crown's determina

tion to modify the Sanction and to dabble in clerical elections
with Papal approval made ecclesiastical appointments an issue of
the highest political sensitivity, and the contest over such

^The remonstrances are in Isauibert, Anciennes Lois Frangaises,
X, pp.
^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 180-81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

269

appointments was enmeshed in the struggle to control the Galliean
Church.

To ensure decisions favorable to its candidates and thus

to its policies, the Crown consistently wielded the most convenient
and effective legal weapons open to it.

It evoked cases involving

clerical appointments, the rSgale, the annates, and benefices to
hearings before the king in the Grand Conseil.
The Parlement adopted the argument that it was the sole
arbiter of disputes arising between secular and temporal authorities.
Certainly the court had customary law on its side; after the
Ordinance of Mbntils-les-tours of 1453> the Parlement could also
cite written law giving it competence over prelates and the r&gale.-^
The Parlement further fortified its claims on the unique grounds that
it was a corps mixte, made up of men both ecclesiastical and lay,
and therefore perfectly suited to the adjudication of clerical
affairs.1^

In practice these doctrines meant that the Parisian

court should hear all suits over the annates, regale, and causes
brought by candidates to Church offices.

The Parlement maintained

that it could not divide this jurisdiction, given it by the king,
of whom it was the sole representative, with any other body and
especially with the Grand Conseil. A singular statement of parlementaire superiority against the pretensions of other jurisdictions
appeared in remonstrances presented to Charles VIII in July,

15lsanjbert, Anciennes lois frangaises, IX, 204. The juris
diction over the r5gale is mentioned in Article 5, the prelates in
Article 7.
^Christopher Stocker, "The Politics of the Parlement in 1525,"
French Historical Studies, VIII, No. 2 (Fall, 1973), 200; Maugis,
Histolre du Parlement, I, 375.
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1489.

While these remonstrances were directed most notably against

contemporary abuses of evocations, they also serve very well as a
permanent general expression of the Parlement's stand vis-a-vis the
competence of the royal council, for these fifteenth century
principles were held to be equally valid in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries when the Parlement was again contesting the
authority of the council.

The remonstrances began with a recitation

of the Parlement*s foundation and its historical tradition:
"The court of Parlement comes before the king, in all
reverence, humility, and obedience, to remonstrate with him
concerning the following things:
Firstly, that his very Christian predecessors of holy
and good remembrance the kings of France . . . have ordered
unum solium judicii, that it is one sovereign court, the court
of the Parlement of Paris, of which it is written: Rex qui
sedet in solio judicii solo intuitu dissipat omne malum.
Item, that the said court is the true seat and throne of
the king, constituted and ordered of one hundred persons, of
whom he is the first and chief, modelled after the Senate of
Rome, which was constituted of one hundred men, of whom the
Emperor was one and the chief. And as long as the Senate
endured, the Romans always prospered, subjugated, and governed
the monarchy of the world.
Item, similarly, that in as much as it has pleased the
kings of France to uphold their Senate and court of Parlement,
the kingdom has always flourished and prospered in all things
by the great justice which is done there, without exception
to persons, in the name of the king and by him."
Having posited the Parlement's precedence and anciermetS, the
remonstrances went on to delineate its judicial competence:
"Item, that howevermuch the king has had for all his
kingdom many ordinary judges receiving appeals from one and
the other, all of them ministers and distributors of justice,
nevertheless preceding kings instituted and always upheld
one Parlement composed of one hundred men, of which the king
in his person is chief and the first, twelve lay and clerical
peers of France, his chancellor, four presidents, eight
maitres des requetes and the remaining conseillers making up one
mystical body made up of ecclesiastical and lay people all in
the authority of Senators, representing the person of the king,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271
because this is the dernier ressort and the sovereign justice of
the kingdom of France, the true seat, authority, magnificanee,
and majesty of the king.
Item, that the said court is founded, instituted, and
ordered in order to hear ordinary cases arising out of the
rights of the king, his authority and sovereignty, as much in
first instance in great matters and concerning the right of
regale which adheret floribus corone, as by appeal from the
- personnel of his |Chambre del comptes and the conseillers of
his treasury, from all his domain, and other great matters.
Item, also to know causes £arising out ofl the domain, the
rights, authority, and pre-eminence of the twelve peers of
France, the which, by plain right and in first instance cannot
be pleaded elsewhere.
Item, causes of archbishops, bishops, abbeys, and other
great benefices of the kingdom, by reason of which the prelates
owe an oath of fidelity, because it is a singular right
belonging to the king because of his crown, of which others
cannot and should not hear other than a sovereign court, since
the rights of the rggale and others belong to the king because
of his crown. Also to preserve the rights of the king, the
holy decrees and the statues of the Church, to repress,
punish, and correct all violations of fact, to hear abuses
made by ecclesiastical judges in making enterprises upon the
justice and law of the king or otherwise."
The remonstrances continued with a general statement of the
Parlement's superior competence over all other jurisdictions within
the kingdom, including, presumably, the royal council without the
presence of the king:
"Item, finally, to hear, decide, judge, and determine also
in sovereign and dernier ressort all appeals lodged, all
petitions, outcries, and quarrels of those oppressed; also to
hear sentences, judgments and writs of constables, marshals,
admirals, maftres des requites de 1'hotel, and of all baillis,
sSnSchaux, and those holding the Requetes du palais, and all
other judges whatever, ordinary or delegated, of the kingdom,
of whatever authority they have."
Having thus established their universal competence over all matters
of ordinary justice and administration, the judges went on to condemn
evocations to the royal council by pointing out that kings such as
Charles V had left them free to discern those which were just and
reasonable:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2?2

"Item, that the very glorious preceding kings of France
had always left the court in such respect and in such liberty
and franchise that they wished, ordered and commanded orally
- and in writing that they [the judges] should render justice and
that they should not obey letters, summons, or evocations if they
did not seem reasonable to them in their consciences."
The judges concluded with a specific condemnation of evocations to
the Grand conseil:
"Item also, that many have found the means to have their
causes evoked to the Grand conseil of the king, which evocations
are given to them very lightly, without regard to the status of
the trial, which is sometimes in valvis sentencie, sometimes
in inquiry before the ordinary judge, and without regard to the
state of the parties which are often greatly troubled by them.
Hence it is necessary for them to hire new counsel and to
leave those who had begun the conduct of matters in order to
follow the king, badly lodged, badly treated, in danger of
their persons, and of losing the letters and titles that they
have to carry. [[They] have no access to judges because they
know neither the place nor hour nor time, and can often hold
no counsel, which is a great disorder in justice and is con
ducive to parties abandoning all."1^
Appended to the remonstrances were a dozen individual cases illus
trating the abuse of evocations and the injustices that had arisen
out of the practice.
The remonstrances of 1489 remained without effect, but this
hardly deterred the Parlement from protesting Francis I's insistence
on continual expansion of the Grand conseil1s business. When the
court presented long remonstrances to Louise of Savoy in 1526, for
example, it included articles complaining about hindrances to the
■^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement, I, 374-76, quoting remonstrances
inserted into registers of the Parlement for July, 1489.
^Ibid., 377-79, reproduces the synopsis of these suits, the
majority of which were concerned with clerical affairs.
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to the decisions of the Parlement (Article 6); it also cited
evocations to the Grand conseil (Article 7) and the abuse of
commlttimus by the chancellor and maitres des requetes (Article 13).19
However, as long as Church-State relations remained politically
sensitive, the Crown could not resist resorting to evocations to
the council.

Such was the case in the stormy affaire Duprat already

recounted in Chapter II.20 Duprat, it will be recalled, had been
nominated by Francis I as Archibshop of Sens and Abbot of SaintBenoit le Fleury-sur-Loire in 1525; his clerical rivals had objected
to Duprat's unsuitability and sued in the Parlement.

Duprat and

Louise of Savoy had the affair carried before the Grand Conseil
where the Chancellor and his partisans reigned supreme.

The

Parlement refused to bow to repeated evocations and nullifications
handed down by the Grand Conseil; moreover, on July 27, 1525, it
created a commission to investigate the Chancellor's behavior and
to bring him before the Parlement's bar of justice.

On September 5,

the Parlement enjoined Duprat to come to the court before November 15,
and if he did not voluntarily appear, he would be compelled to
account for himself in person.2^ Here the Duprat Affair was inter
rupted by parlementaire consideration of a treaty with England.

So

^The text of this remonstrance has never been published,
though Maugis provides a lengthy summary in Histoire du Parlement, I,
561-63- The original occupies folios 321r-319v of register X*a 1527
in the Archives nationales. See Stocker, "Politics of the Parlement
of Paris," p. 195, n. 12. This article contains a penetrating
analysis of the remonstrances of 1526.
2QSupra, p. 85.
2lMaugis, Histoire du Parlement, I, 572-75.
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consumed, the month of October gave tempers a chance to cool, and
the wrangle lapsed until Francis' return from captivity in December,
1526.

The passage of six months did not lessen Francis' determina

tion to set his obstreperous Parlement straight for misbehavior
during his absence, and in the lit de justice of July 27, 1527, he
very firmly ruled that the Parlement could not hear issues arising
over bishops, archbishops, and abbeys.

These, presumably, would

be heard by the Grand Conseil. Jurisdiction over the Chancellor
belonged to the king alone.22
Thus confirmed in the lit of 1527, the powers of the Grand
Conseil formed the basis of a jurisdiction that continued to grow
through the next decades.

In 1527 it gained sovereign competence

over matters related to the dgcimes de la croisade; in 1528
competence over the administration of hospitals and charitable
institutions, the solde de 50,000 homines, and tolls were attributed
to the Grand

C o n s e i l . 23

More important than these was the attribu

tion of all cases involving royal and muncipal officers given in
an edict of October 25, 1529.2^

To these general attributions

were added very numerous evocations, often bearing on the most
important of matters.

In short, at the end of Francis I's reign

the Grand Conseil was demonstration a potential to supplant the

22pbid., pp. 582-83; Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 74-0.
23Doucet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 205. The dgcimes
de la croisade, a clerical tax for the crusades, went back into the
medieval period. The solde de 50,000 hommes was a supplement to the
taille imposed for the pay of 50,000 soldiers.
2'+Aubert, "Le Parlement," I, 74-1-42.
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specialization was being repeated within the heart of the council;
as before, once begun, the process showed itself irreversable. A
rSglement of 1557 indicates that by this time two weekly sessions
of a Conseil des parties ("council of contentious parties") were
being held to decide favored legal matters. Another rbglement of
1578 demonstrates that the Conseil des parties, along with a Conseil
des finances, had become identifiable subdivisions of the Conseil
d'Etat.

By this time the size of the Conseil des parties had grown

considerable.

The reglement of 1578 projected a body made up of

the princes, cardinals, marshals, great officers, governors of the
provinces, twenty-four conseillers ordinaires, and the presidents
and gens du roi of the sovereign courts.

It was to meet "in the

aeeustomed manner, on Wednesday and Friday at an hour after noon"

of Paris or a Rouen crowd. The custom since had great vogue under
King Henry II, so that there have been introduced men in the
entourage of the court who act as procurers and advocats in this
council just as in simple subaltemate jurisdictions. Indeed,
sometimes fees have been charged for judgments by the maftres des
requetes, a custom truly unworthy of this great tribunal of France,
because of which, Francois Olivier having been recalled as chancellor
at the accession of Francis II, the first thing that he recommended
was to eliminate from the Conseil Priv£ all such trial matters,
returning each to its own place. After his death this was very
religiously observed by his successor Michel de l'Hospital.
Dareste, La Justice Administrative, p. 56, quoting Pasquier,
Recherches sur la France, Bk. II, Ch. VI. In reality, says Doucet,
the existence o7“a. procurer of the king in the council antedated
the arrival of Poyet in the chancellery. His successors Olivier
and Hospital do not seem to have been able to check the judicial
activity of the council which continued to develop as before.
Doucet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 147, n. 2.
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Parlement; its highly irregular jurisdiction at mid-century has been
described by Roger Doucet as "filling the needs of the king to
impose respect for his will through the intermediary of judges whose
docility was always assured to him.

Henry II did nothing more

than to continue down this path; by an edict of September, 1552,
he confirmed all anterior measures in regard to the Grand Conseil.2^*
Even as the attributions of the Grand Conseil multiplied
through the first half of the sixteenth century, another portentious
development was surreptiously and fatally undermining its apparent
ascendancy.

Well before Francis I's accession, kings had deserted

meetings of the Grand Conseil to devote their attention to matters
of State in the inner council.

Absence of the king's person in the

Grand Conseil thus precisely recreated an ancient judicial dilemma:
however authoritative the Grand Conseil was reputed to be, it could
not challenge the essential sovereign quality lent the inner council
by the king's presence.

After 1500 private matters of justice began

to reach the king's ear in his Conseil gtroit or Conseil des affaires,
and by 1530 the number of private intrusions had reached a point
where a procureur du roi had to be appointed to argue the king's
interests.2^

This was a sure sign that a past proclivity for

^Doucet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 205.
26Ibid.
^Etienne Pasquier attributed the growth of the Conseil des
parties or conseil prive to Chancellor Poyet: "'Chancellor
Guillaume Poyet brought to the Conseil privg so many chicaneries
that although before him they had treated in this place only matters
of State, beginning with him it began to give ear to private
parties for matters which could have been decided in a Chatelet
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and had virtually an unlimited jurisdiction, since the members
themselves would decide which cases to hear and which to return to
lower courts:
His Majesty wishes that hereafter all cases will be returned
to the courts of Parlement and the Grand Conseil, except those
retained by the opinion of the council, of which a roll will
now be made to discharge the said council of the confusion of
cases there.2®
The development of the Conseil des parties enormously compli
cated jurisdictional problems and judicial procedures among the
sovereign courts, for after the middle of the sixteenth century
there were no less than three bodies having some claim to sovereign
justice in ordinary judicial matters.

Of these three, the standing

of the Conseil des parties was clearest.

Most intimately repre

senting the king's person, it obviously had the highest and most
sovereign ressort, a fact symbollized by the indisputable formulary
fait par le Roi en son conseil appearing on its arrets. But what
was the relationship of the Grand Conseil to the Conseil des parties?
What was the Parlement’s status in regard to both the Grand Conseil
and the Conseil des parties?

What was the competence of each? What

paths were appeals and evocations to take?

Questions like these

plagued the judicial scene and were made even more pointed after
1551 when the prfesidiaux were thrust into the judicial structure
just below the parlements.

^Etienne Girard and Jacques Joly, Trois livres des offices de
France (Paris, 1638), I, 624-25; Doucet, Les Institutions de la
France, I, 131-52; Zeller, Les Institutions de la France, pp.
111-14.
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Patterns of justice among the ordinary courts and the council,
already confused by conflicting jurisdictions, lettres de comrrrfttimus,
and evocations were made even more disorderly by an irregularity
peculiar to high criminal justice.

Faced with a frequent and tumul

tuous political opposition among the great nobility, royal kin, or
high officials, medieval and Renaissance monarchs were compelled to
give affairs of peculation, rebellion, conspiracy, and lhse-majest§
careful consideration.
were always at hand.

In these cases exceptional circumstances
Not only were the accused commonly persons

capable of disrupting the tenuous skein of public peace, but their
activities were usually conspiratorial and subject to conjecture
until put into effect.
a frail human form.

Evidence, if extant at all, too often took

Sometimes delicate problems of international

relations were connected with sub rosa scheming.

Almost inevitable,

too, the Crown had to take into account the tenacles of clientage,
the possibility of bribery, and the likelihood of political pressures
within ordinary courts.

Attendant to all these factors, of course,

was a need for prompt action and, not infrequently, a requirement
for exemplary punishments as well.
Early on, therefore, the monarchy preferred to commit sensitive
criminal trials bearing political consequences to a special kind
of handling commensurate with their danger to the State.

Across the

fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, a bewildering
variety of judicial procedures arose out of this discretion.
Nominally, of course, the Parlement held rights of sovereign
criminal justice, and upon favorable circumstances the court was
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allowed to conduct trials with political implications.

More

frequently, though, the Crown resorted to extraordinary procedures.
These procedures could theoretically have taken the form of evocations
to the Grand Conseil or Conseil des parties, hut in actual practice
councilliar justice and evocations from the sovereign courts were
almost always confined to civil suits, clerical affairs, and
financial matters.

The necessities of extraordinary criminal justice

were better served by commissaires, the variety of which was so great
that no exact pattern can be established.

Each case thus tried

presented its own individuality in charges pressed, quality of the
accused, judicial procedures followed, judges chosen, and punishments
meted out.

It is, however, precisely these qualities of extensive

usage and variability of form which render the history of commissioned
justice significant to the evaluation of Richelieu's practices in
the seventeenth century.

With commissaires, as with other aspects

of French law, precedent had its place in fixing legality.

However

morally reprehensible extraordinary justice was held to be, and
however much it was decried in written law, a long series of
precedents created a strong legal argument in favor of commissaires.
The utilization of commissaires by the monarchy certainly ante
dated the fifteenth century.

Quasi-legendary accounts going back

to 576 were recalled as judicial precedents by garde des sceaux
Michel de Marillac in the seventeenth century, but these, while
perhaps possessing a grain of truth, cannot legitimately be compared
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with practices in an age of institutionalized justice.29

By-

definition a choice between ordinary and estraordinary justice was
possible only with the permanent delegation of judicial functions,
and this did not come about until the fourteenth century.

Just at

the time the Parlement was assuming that delegation, a notable
example of extraordinary justice can be found in Philip the Fair's
prosecution of the Knights Templars between 1307 and 1314.

Neither

this instance, however, nor that of Joan of Arc in 1430 can fairly
be cited as typical, since the charges of heresy common to both
necessitated a referral to ecclesiastical courts.
Trial by commissaires for matters of State can be firmly dated
to at least 1409 when Jean de Montaigu, surintendant des finances
and grand maftre de la maison du roi, was accused of embezzlement
and turned over to a commission composed of a number of members of
the Parlement presided over by the prgvot of Paris.
de Montaigu confessed to the charges imputed.

Under torture,

His appeal to the

Parlement was rejected, and in spite of the appeals of his family
and manoeuvres of powerful persons, the surintendant was executed
on October 17, 1409.

From beginning to end, the Montaigu Affair

had political overtones if not ends.

The real causes of Montaigu's

29Marillac's citations are in B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 38-46
and 209-42.
•^Paul Bastid, Les Grands procfes politiques de 1'histoire
(Paris: 1962), pp. 72-118, has accounts of both triaTs. Participation
of the Parlement in the Templar Affair was limited to a decision of
1312 which put the Hospitalers of St. John of Jerusalem in possession
of the Templar's property. Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 104.
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fall were his fortune and too great ostentation shown in the
reception of his brother Gerard as Archbishop of Paris.

He was, in

Fayard's words, "a victim abandoned by the due de Bourgogne £jean
sans peur] to a people exasperated by an augmentation of taxes to
which Montaigu had contributed under the administration of the
due £ Louis] d'Orleans."31
The trial of Jacques Coeur in 1453 provides another character
istic use of eommissaiT*es in affairs of State.

B o m in 1397 in

Bourges, Coeur formed an association with two friends for striking
money in 1427.

At the same time he entered the commercial world,

adding banking and money-changing services to coinage operations.
From 1437 he was a money lender and trusted confidant to Charles VII.
In 1440 Charles named Coeur argentier au roi and ennobled him.

In

1442 Coeur was admitted into the Conseil Stroit et privS, the
innermost circle of the king's advisors.

Coeur seems to have used

his wealth well in the public interest.

Trusted by Charles, he was

employed on several important diplomatic missions to Genoa, Savoy,
the Papacy, and to England.

Coeur's rise to favor, however, had

generated jealousy among other councillors.

On July 31, 1451,

he was seized and accused of having poisoned the King's mistress,
Agnes Sorel, who had died under questionable circumstances.

When

this charge was shown to be fallacious, others were brought, including
selling arms to infidels, illegal export of French moneies to the
-^Fayard, Aper&u historique, I, 187. The decision is in
Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, XII, 218.
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Levant, having minted short weight money, and having kidnapped
persons onto his vessels.^2
To carry out Coeur's trial, Charles named twenty comrrri ssaifpg
extraordinaires drawn from the royal council and from the Parlements
of Paris and Toulouse.

First assembled at Lusignan, the commission

underwent several changes in the course of the trial.

There were

some professional jurisconsuls included but also some personal
enemies of the accused, among them Antoine de Chabanne, a former
capitaine des Scorcheurs; Otto Castellani, trSsorier at Toulouse
who hoped to replace Coeur as grand argentier; and one of Coeur1s
employees, Pierre Teinturier.

The work of the commission was

directed by the most intransient advocates of guilt, Chabannes
and Castellani.33 Before final judgment was pronounced, the evidence
was reviewed before the Grand Conseil, attended by the commissaires,
several other councillors, and notable persons.34
A final decision was rendered at Lusignan on May 29, 1-453, in
the name of the king by Chancellor Guillaume Jouvenel des Ursins.
Coeur was declared guilty of embezzlement, forgery, transport of
money to the Saracens, illicit exportation from the kingdom,
transgression of the ordinances, and other crimes of lfese-majeste.
He was sentenced to be deprived of all public and royal offices,

32Fayard,

Apergu historique, I, 219; Bastid, Grands proces,

pp. 120-2-4.
33The opinion of Bastid, p. 123.
3^B.N.

Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 38-39; Bastid, Grands proces,

p. 123.
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make an amende honorable, restore 100,000 ecus to the king, and
fined an additional 300,000 ecus. Finally, his property was
confiscated and he was sentenced to death, a judgment commuted to
banishment in perpetuity upon the recommendation of the Pope.
Fortunate to have excaped with his life from a sentence of lesemajeste, Coeur apparently determined to flee if possible.

In

November, 14-54, he escaped from prison and took flight to Italy.
Given a friendly reception by the Pope, Coeur entered Papal service
but died two years later on the Island of Chios.
The moral injustice inherent in procedures such as that against
De Montaigu or Coeur was not lost on contemporaries.

Even as

Jacques Coeur's trial entered its final stage, the first of many
condemnations of commissaires through the royal ordinances was
being prepared.

By the lengthy and important Ordinance of Montils-

les-tours, issued in April, 1453, judgments by comm-issaires were
forbidden.

Article 79 declared that

We [Charles VIl] desiring to expell outcries, rumors, and
scandals in order that our justice be governed and regulated
in honor and reverence, prohibit and forbide the people
of our Parlement that hereafter they should commission any
conseillers of our court to hear, acknowledge, or report in
our court any causes, be they great or small. If there be
such causes which by their nature cannot be treated in our
Parlement, we summon and enjoin the people in our Parlement
to return these cases before the judges to whom jurisdiction
belongs. If they should be causes which should be treated
in our court by their nature, or which for good cause

^Bastid, Les Grands Proces, pp. 128-29; Fayard, Apergu
historique, I, 220; Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, IX,
254-256.
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court has retained the jurisdiction, we desire and order that
the parties should be heard by our court and the case
decided.36
Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the same ordinance confirmed the
Parlement*s traditional jurisdiction, including l^se-majeste.
all appearances, then, the Crown had renounced the use

To

o f corrmrri ssaires

by giving its most binding word in a royal ordinance duly registered.
Ensuing decades would show how strongly the monarchy felt bound to
respect its own laws.
The Ordinance of 1453 was respected in the next great trial
of Charles' reign, that of Jean V d'Armagnac, son of the due d*
Armagnac, who found himself charged with llse-majeste before the
Parlement in 1457.

The circumstances of his case, while serious, were

really only marginally of political consequence.

For several years

D'Armagnac had pursued an incestuous relationship with his sister
Isabelle, by whom he had had several children.

Far from heeding the

cautions of King and Church, he had forceably installed his bastard
brother on the episcopal seat of Auch after having forced the chapter
through the indignities of a sham election.

The nomination was

made in spite of the King's warnings and insulted his authority,
behavior which constituted a crime of lfese-majestl. Prosecutions
were ordered, whereupon D'Armagnac requested a safe conduct pass
and a judgment before the peers as befitted the issue of royal
blood.

Charles accorded the safe conduct but denied judgment by the

36isambert,

Anciennes lois franqaises, IX, 235.
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peers because D'Armagnac held no fief in peerage.

In 1459 the

accused presented himself before the Parlement of Paris, which had
him arrested without regard for the safe conduct.

The Parlement

then allowed D ’Armagnac to leave prison under promise that he
would go no further than ten leagues from Paris.

After the vio

lation of the royal safeguard, D ’Armagnac did not hold himself
bound by a word of honor extorted from him, and when the moment
came for his trial, he fled to Brussels.

The Parlement condemned

him in absentia to perpetual banishment and confiscated his
property.37
Even before the condemnation of Jean d'Armagnac, however,
Charles VII had once again resorted to extraordinary judicial
measures in circumstances which quite clearly involved the security
of the kingdom.

In 1458 Jean, due d'Aleneon , was arrested and

accused of having undertaken criminal intelligences with the
English for a landing in Saintonge and Normandy.

The Duke was

first interrogated at Melun by the comte d'Eu, Constable of France,
to whom he refused to answer.

Further investigation and trial were

carried out at Montargis, then at Vendome, by a heterogeneous
commission made up of some of the princes of the blood; five peers
of the Church; the comte de Dunois; the Chancellor; Pierre de Refugl,
general de France; several counts and barons; sixteen lay and six
clerical conseillers of the Parlement; and several maxtres des

^Fayard, Aperqu historique, I, 222; Isambert, Anciennes lois
frangaises, IX, 365.
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requites. The crime of the duke was established by his own
confession and by irreproachable proofs.

D'Alengon maintained that

if he had conspired, it was at the instigation of the Armagnac
bastard and the Dauphin.

The allegation was examined with the care

it merited, but DTAlenjon could not substantiate it.

He was

declared guilty of lfese-majest£, and as such deprived of the honor
of dignity of a peer and condemned to death, but Charles, upon the
sollicitation of the due de Bretagne, commuted the sentence to life
imprisonment at Aigues-Mortes.38
The trial of the due d'Alenjon raised various questions on the
rights and prerogatives of the peers of France which the King
presented to the Parlement by way of Jean Tudert, a mattre des
requites. In particular Charles wanted a ruling on his right to
attend or to preside at such trials.

After having searched its

registers, the court responded that the King not only had the right
to attend the criminal judgment of peers, but that his presence
was necessary.

All the peers without distinction could attend

but could not entrust their place to others.

This was a confir

mation of earlier decisions made in 1379 at the trial of the due de
Bretagne and in 1389 at the trial of the King of Navarre.

Hence,

the trial of the due d'Alen§on was not the first time that the

A complete account of the trial of the due d'Alengon is in
L. Cimber and L.-F. Danjou, eds., Archives curieuses de 1'histoire
de France, depuis Louis XI jusqula~Louis XVIII (Paris: l£f34-40),
2nd series, I, 139-57, "Proems de Jean II, Due d'Alencon, Prince du
Sang et pair de France." See also B.N. Ms. Fr. 754-9, fols. 40-4-1;
Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 223; Dufey, Histoire des parlemens de
France, I, 53-54; Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, IX, 331,
339-54; Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 6-7.
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Parlement had participated in the judgment of a peer, but this trial
strengthened its claims to act as the court of peers.
esteem, and hopes were thus considerably augmented.

Its powers,
The monarchy,

on the other hand, had unwittingly confirmed a usage which would
reappear in similar circumstances one hundred eighty years later
when, in 1638, Louis XIII adjourned the judgment of the due de la
Valette to the royal council and presided over it in

p e r s o n . 39

Louis XI continued the erratic judicial procedures of his
predecessors, ruthlessly employing both regular and irregular benches
as it best suited his purposes.

Louis' authoritarian ways created

ample opposition among the grands, and trials of exceptional personnages were a prominent characteristic of his reign.

One of the

first of these occasions came in 1474, when Louis permitted his
Parlement en corps, assisted by the peers, to carry out a second trial
of the due d'Alenjon.

Having been freed upon Louis' accession in

1461, the duke had shown himself throughly unrepentant and unreformed.
Not only had he murdered one of those who had betrayed him years
before, but he had also been unable to resist further treasonable
correspondence with the English and had taken part in the League of
the Public Weal as well.

On the 18th of July, 1474, the Parlement

condemned d'Alenjon to death for a second time, but upon the inter
cession of the due de Bourgogne, d'Alenjon once again managed to
escape the ultimate penalty.^

39Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 223-24*
^ I b i d . , 239; Dufey, Histoire des parlements de France, I, 54;
Climber and Danjou, "Proems de due D'Alengon," 149-57.
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In November, 1-475, Louis de Luxembourg, the comte de St.-Pol,
Constable of France and brother-in-law to the king, was brought to
trial for laison with the due de Bourgogne and conspiracy to commit
rebellion.

The procedures followed seem to have been rather unusual.

The royal council, chared by Chancellor Pierre Doriole, reviewed the
case and sent it to the Parlement for judgment.

The Parlement chose

several commissaires to hear the case, including the Chancellor;
the First President; several mattres des requetes; several lay and
clerical conseillers; several procureurs and advocats au roi in the
court; and De Lhuille, captain of the Bastille.

On December 19,

1475, the Constable was condemned to death and beheaded the same
day.41
The year 1476 saw Jacques d'Armagnac, due de Nemours, delivered
into the hands of a commission for judgment on charges of high
treason.

The course of this trial was again highly exceptional.

Initial proceedings were undertaken by a small group of commissaires;
Chancellor Doriole; the First President of the Parlement; four
seigneurs; and a rapporteur from the chancellery.

Early in the

hearing the duke gave up his right to trial by the peers, and none
were summoned.

The king recommended to his select body that De

Nemours be made to talk freely, and under threat of torture he did
so, implicating several other great personnages.

Irritated by his

Chancellor's objections to his arbitrary attitude, Louis purged him

^B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fol. 224; Isambert, Aneiennes lois
franqaises, X, 726-27; Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 240.
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from the commission, along with several others.

At this point De

Nemours invoked clerical privilege, presumably bringing immunity
from capital prosecution and temporarily halting the course of
events.

Louis then had the Parlement transferred to Noyon, there

establishing his son-in-law Pierre de Beaujeu as president.

Beaujeu

and several others refused to deliver any opinion, and Louis packed
the bench with new commissaires to offset their neutrality.

Under

these exceedingly dubious conditions, De Nemours was finally
condemned and executed on August 4> 14-77.

His property was confis

cated and distributed among the judges.^2
Louis XI's disregard for judicial forms did not stop with the
fatally obesequious decision which had cost the due de Nemours his
life.

Adding insult to injury, Louis went on to remove three

conseillers of the Parlement who had not given him satisfaction in
the case, in spite of the fact that just ten years before he had
guaranteed the irremovability of magistrates in an ordinance.^
The Parlement complained, whereupon Louis rudely answered that
I thought, seeing that you are subjects of the Crown of France
and owe your loyalty to it, that you would not want to approve
such a good bargain on my hide. Because I see that your letters
do so, I now know that there are still those who would machinate
against my person; in order to guarantee themselves against
punishment, they want to abolish the terrible penalty found
there. It will be well for me to put an end to two things:

4-2fi.N. Ms. fr. 754-9, fols. 42; Isambert, Aneiennes lois
francaises, X, 777-78; Fayard, Aperqu historique, I, 240.
43fiy ordinance of October 21, 1467. See Isambert, Aneiennes
lois frangaises, X, 511. See also supra, p. 2h.
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first, to purge the court of such men; secondly, to uphold
the statute that I once made that no one should lighten the
penalties for crimes of l$se-majeste.44
"It was in this way," says Fayard, "that Louis XI himself violated
his own doings; in humbling the authority of the princes, he was
not inclined to raise up another

in the Parlement

like it."45

The uses of extraordinary justice receded drastically for
several decades after Louis' demise, in part because the opposition
of the great barons had been successfully broken.

Charles VIII and

Louis XII, therefore, had less need for judicial weapons to maintain
themselves.

Both men, too, seem to have been personally adverse to

disreputable measures.

On the whole, therefore, both were propor

tionally more respectful towards conventional mechanisms of judgment.
Thus the trial of Pierre de Rohan, mareschal de Gie, between
September 30, 1505, and February 9, 1506, was conducted not by
commissaires but before the Grand Conseil and then by the parlement
of Toulouse.

Both of these courts qualified as regular jurisdictions,

but the Grand Conseil, at least, was still in the orbit of the royal
council.

Presided over by the Chancellor, it was highly suseptible

to royal influence.

De Gie was pronounced guilty of some 100

articles of lese-majeste before the Grand Conseil in December of
1505, but the prosecution was unable to prove its contentions.

The

trial was then transferred to the parlement of Toulouse, where
royal interference manifested itself in the form of a special
^Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, X, 777, n. 1.
^Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 241.
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thirteen man chamber attached to the regular court.

In the spring

of 1506, this body found the mareschal guilty of a few minor charges.
Those concerning lese-majeste were dismissed.

In form, the whole

proceedings seem to represent something of a compromise between the
extremes of regular and irregular judicial process.46
The basis for the charges against the mareschal also departed
from past legal definitions of lese-majeste. Innocent of treason,
rebellion, or conspiracy, the mareschal1s dilemma had really stemmed
from a political rivalry between the Breton faction at the French
court, headed by Cardinal Amboise and Queen Anne of Brittany, and
a "nationalistic" or vrai francais faction including mareschal de
Gie.

Much more than the personal rivalry of the mareschal and

the Cardinal was at stake in the affair; rather, at issue was a
national question of the union between France and the Duchy of
Brittany, a union fervently desired by Louis XII but one which
had not yet been accomplished at the time of the mareschal1s trial.
Louis XII, who had already struggled to win Anne of Brittany's
hand, was continually constrained to cater to her feelings to avoid
imperilling the definitive incorporation of the duchy into the
kingdom.

It appears that Louis was willing to sacrifice De Gie to the

denunciations of the Bretons as a concession to preserve the more
profound interests of the monarchy.4?

46Bastid, Grands procfes politiques, pp. 132-33* 135-/41.
4?lbid., pp. 132-33, 142.
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Superficially Francis I, like Louis XII, was guided by good
intentions in matters of justice.

A story from early in the reign,

perhaps apocryphal but interesting nevertheless, relates that
Francis paid a visit to the tomb of Jean de Montaigu in the abbey
of Marcoussy.

Upon being shown the surintendant1s monument, the

King remarked to his guide, "What a pity that a man such as this
should have died at the hands of justice."

"Sire," responded the

monk, "he was not judged by justice, but by commissaires."
Francis is reputed to have been so impressed that he swore on the
great alter of the abbey that he would never permit anyone to die
through the judgment of commissaires.48

Whatever the authenticity

of the story, it illustrates very well contemporary attitudes
towards criminal commissaires. Strong monarchs like Francis,
however, felt no need to conform to public opinion, and the years
of Francis' rule were characterized by a revival of commissioned
justice reminiscent of Louis XI's reign.

While several decisions

of the period lacked the brutal executions exacted by Louis,
personal motives of jealousy, vengeance, or financial credit
remained, as before, entangled with genuine threats to the well
being of the monarchy.

4^Jean Imbert, Quelques procfes criminels des XVIIe et XVIIIe
si&cles (Paris: 1964), pf 7$, citing Pierre Dupuy,~Mimoires et
instructions pour servir a justifier 1' innocence de Messire FrancoisAuguste de Thou, conseiller du Roy en son conseil d'Etat, Arch.
Nat., ms. fr., s.d., tJ 816. The same remarks are given in Isambert,
Aneiennes lois frangaises, VII, 219, n. 1, and in Fayard, Aperqu
historlque, 1, 18$.
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The dilapidated state of the royal finances and the influence
of the Queen Mother apparently contributed to the downfall of
Jacques de Beaune, baron de Semblangay and surintendant des finances.
Commencing in 1522, the Semblangay Affair worked itself out through
two investigations made over a five year period.

In 1522 Louise of

Savoy, duchesse d’Angouleme, forced Semblangay to turn over 600,000
livres to her, monies which had been destined for the pay of
mareschal Lautrec's troops in Italy.49 Unpaid, Lautrec's Swiss had
disbanded and the Milanese district was lost to the French.

Upon

his return to France, Lautrec defended himself by declaring that he
had never received the sums promised him.

Francis summoned Sem-

blanjay, who declared that the funds prepared for Lautrec were not
sent because the Queen Mother had expropriated them for pensions,
her revenues and those of the King being held in common.

The duchesse

denied that the surintendant had said that the money given her should
have been sent to Italy.

On March 11, 1524, the King appointed four

cf>rnnrlssaires to carry out a civil suit investigation of Semblangay's
administration.50 This examination was largely resolved in the
49payard1s account gives this as 400,000 livres, one of several
divergent elements in this version. Aperqu historlque, I, 296-97.
50^n investigation termed a "bien Strange procSs" by Henri
Lemmanier, who has presented a summary account in Les Guerres d_'
Italie— La France sous Charles XIII, Louis XII et Francois I&r
C1492-1547), Vol.
of Matoire de France, ed. Ernest
Lavisse (Varis: 1911), 232-33. All the efforts of the agents of the
King and the Queen Mother were limited to asserting that the
surintendant had been wrong in confounding the accounts of the King
and his mother, and in having employed 600,000 livres which rightfully
belonged to the Duchesse d'Angouleme.
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surintendant1s favor:

the judgment of January 27, 1525, recognized .

that he had acted on the orders of the King and the Queen Mother.
Despite this, Semblangay was declared to owe the duchesse d’Angouleme
a total of 707-000 livres; on the other hand, the judgment attributed
a greater royal credit to Semblangay of 910,000 livres.
Semblanjay's troubles did not end here, however.

Having

extended immense credit to the State through his own efforts, he now
found himself pursued by debtors and creditors alike.

On January 27,

1527, he was arrested and a criminal investigation undertaken.
panel of commissaires was named by the King on May 27:

A

the First

Presidents of the parleaents of Paris, Toulouse, and Rouen; a maitre
des requites; two members of the Grand Conseil; two of the parlement
of Dijon; two auditors from the Chambre des comptes guided the
te c h n ic a l

end of things.

The charges of embezzlement, peculation

and forgery were drown from the tangled relations between the State’s
finances and those of its servant.

Semblangay was reputed to have

•fabricated false accounts indicating loans made to the State at
high interests, of which he would have received a part.

The real

basis for the charges was probably a matter of convenience in
relieving the royal finances:
It was very much a question of the Italian bankers of Iyons,
with whom Semblanjay had been in constant contact, and who
themselves had business relations with London, Venice, Nuremburg,
and Flanders. This kind of international syndicate disposed of
considerable resources, and sovereigns, always short of money,
were obliged to deal with it. Francis I owed huge sums to the

51Ibid., 233.
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Itfonese banks; lie was disturbed to see them carrying on deals
with Italy and Germany. He sensed in them a cosmopolitan
action which could at certain moments, become dangerous. In
striking down Semblangay, he indirectly struck at them.52
Whatever the reasons for the charges, the court showed no mercy
towards the old and respected surintendant who had directed the
finances of France for three reigns.

Condemned to death on August 9,

1527, he was hung at Montfaucon two days later.

By thus eliminating

the surintendant, the Crown also maliciously liquidated a considerable
portion of its debts to him.

Semblangay's condemnation had included

a fine of 300,000 livres to be deducted from royal debts owed the
surintendant. "One is thus right to think," concludes Henri
Lemmonier, "that they [Francis and the Queen Mother] here saw a means
of ridding themselves of an embarrassing creditor.
Equally strong personal motives were factors in the great
criminal trials of Admiral Chabot and Chancellor Poyet later in the
reign.

These affairs were closely interrelated, and both were

carried out by commissaires in traditional fashion.

The procedings

against Poyet are especially interesting since they mark one of the
few occasions when a chancellor was brought before a court of law.
The accusations directed against l'amiral de France Philippe de
Chabot de Brion, comte de Chamy and de Buzangois, were inspired by
52Ibid., 234.
^Ibid., 235. A different motive is presented by Fayard, who
attributes Semblangay's arrest and trial to the personal influence
of the Queen Mother. Fayard also asserts that the surintendant1s
papers were stolen, leaving him without the means to vindicate
himself. Apergu historique, I, 296-97.
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the personal motives of Constable Montmorency, Diane de Poitiers,
and the Dauphin.

Attacked by them, secret investigations were ordered

into the Admiral's affairs on September 23, 1538.

The commission

so charged was presided over by Chancellor Poyet, who was sold out
to the enemies of the Admiral, and included presidents a_mortier
Francois de Montholon and Jean Bertrand of the Parlement of Paris;
a prlsident des EnquStes and nine eonseillers of the same court; the
First President and four eonseillers from Toulouse; a president of
Rouen; two maitres des requites; D'Argentre, sln£chal of Brittany;
a mattre des requites of Brittany.

On February 1, 1541, the

Admiral was condemned to degradation, to banishment, and to the
confiscation of his property; to the restitution of 778,000 livres;
and finally to a fine of 15,000 livres for peculation, corruption,
and malversation.

A short time after this affair, in which Poyet

was implicated with "revolting partiality," the decision was nullified
by the K-tng (March, 1542), and Chabot's innocence was proclaimed in
council on April 19, 1 5 4 2 . On May 24, 1542, Francis restored the
Admiral's possessions, offices, and dignities.^5
The Chabot Affair did not end there, however.

Chancellor Poyet

had demonstrated considerable prejudice during the trial, and in
turn he was arrested (August 1, 1542).

On April 3, 1543, the Parlement

^Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 748. Fayard concurs with
Aubert in deeming Poyet a "man sold to the court." Apergu historlque,
I, 316. Neither account deals with the circumstances leading to
charges against the Admiral.
55Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 746-48; Fayard, Apergu
historlque, I, 316-17; several decrees may be found in Isambert,
Aneiennes lois frangaises, XII, 547,721,773,777-78.
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received orders to proceed against him without delay.
mission selected four days later was very numerous:

The com

Andrl Guillard,

a nwftre des requites; Francois de Lage, Antoine Minard, Jean
de Gouy, and Andre Baudry, presidents aux Enqugtes at Paris;
seventeen eonseillers of the Parlement; Pierre de Saignes and Jean
de Ausons, of the parlement of Toulouse; Pierre Boucher and Briant
de Talec, of Bordeaux; Dinart Rivalier and Felix Guerre, of the
parlement of Grenoble; Louis Pltremol, president de la Chambre des
Enqugtes of Rouen; five members of the Grand Conseil. On April 29,
1544, Chabot*s widow presented her request for justice, and the
interrogation of witnesses began on May 7.

On May 15, the Chancellor

had to answer grave accusations of abuse of power, falsifications at
seal, false judgments, and embezzlement.

Debates were lengthy,

and not until April 23, .1545, did an arrgt declare Poyet guilty.
He was deprived of his office and declared incapable of filling any
other, condemned to a fine of 100,000 livres, and ordered to live
five years under the surveillance of the Crown in the Tower of
Bourges.

Poyet was forced to give up his property in order to acquit

the fine, dying in shame and disgrace a short time after.^
^Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 749; Fayard, Apergu
historlque, I, 316-17; La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des parlemens
Bk. ittll, Ch. XXXII, gives a resume of the arrgt. fee constitution
of the commission can be found in Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises,
XII, 888.
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A few months after Poyet*s death in 1548, a commission investi
gated and judged charges made against Jacques de Coucy, seigneur of
Vervins and of Marie, and mareschal Oudart de Biez, his father-inlaw, for having surrendered the port of Boulogne to the English
without sufficient military cause.^

The real basis for the charges

seems to have been the hatred that Henry II felt for the pair,
possibly arising out of the fact that as the Dauphin he had commanded
another military force in the vicinity of Boulonge at the time of
the siege and had suffered embarrassment by its fall.

The Charges

were examined in the Cb»Tnhre de la Reine, an ad hoc body composed
of several magistrates presided over by the chancellor.

The

examination of the charges was lengthy and many witnesses were
heard on both sides.

A verdict of guilty was returned against Vervins

on June 21, 1549, which resulted in his execution.

A decision against

Du Biez on charges of lfese-majest£, peculation, and other charges
in August, 1551, condemned the unfortunate mareschal to the depri
vation of estates and honors, a 100,000 livre fine, confiscation of
property, and decapitation.

The death penalty was commuted into

57In 1544 Vervins had been placed in command of the garrison of
Boulonge by Du Biez, his father-in-law. Both men were distinguished
soldiers and held several honors and titles from Francis I. The
English beseiged the port with a large army and sixty pieces of
artillery for seven weeks. The general assault came on September 11,
when in an attack of seven hours, four breaches were made in the
walls. Vervins held for surrender upon the advice of his captains,
who unanimously declared the place could no longer be held. The
general consensus at the time held that Vervins had done everything
possible, a view which Francis I also maintained.
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perpetual detention at Loches.

After serving two years, Du Biez

was released, and in 1575 Henry III exhonerated both men posthu
mously. 58
At the middle of the sixteenth century, the history of the
monarchy clearly demonstrated that the administration of commissioned
justice represented one of the gravest defects in the French
judicial system.

The Parlement had reminded Charles VIII of this

fact in the remonstrances of 1489, and it had returned to the point
in its remonstrances of 1526.^9

French Kings continued the practice,

however, for two very sound reasons:

it was legally unassailable

as a manifestation of justice retenue, and it was politically
useful.

French kings understood both points very well and had

frequently and brutally wielded extraordinary justice out of
jealousy, expediency, legitimate suspicion, or for reasoned political
purposes.

Louis XI had found commissioned justice useful in breaking

5^A complete account of the events leading up to the trial and
the investigation itself can be found in "Prods d'Oudart du Biez,
marSschal de France, et de Jacques de Coucy, seigneur de Vervins,"
in Cimber and Danjou, Archives curieuses, 1st series, III, 103-116.
A note on page 101 indicates that this account is extracted from
the Pierre Dupuy's Traitfe concernant l'histoire de France. The
decrees pertaining to the affair can be f'ound inTsambert, Aneiennes
lois frangaises, XIV, 88, 186, and XV, 276. Brief descriptions are
presented in Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 749-50, and in
Fayard, Apergu historlque, I, 331-33*
59Maugis, Histoire du Parlement, I, 374-76, 561-63. Article 8 of
the remonstrances of 152&”attacked the establishment of individual
judges for certain crimes, condemnations for the purpose of confis
cating property, and the violation of the jurisdiction of ordinary
courts in such cases. Article 12 returned to the same them, asking
that the scandalous and inconvenient practice of commissaires extraordinaires be abolished in favor of ordinary judges.
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down the opposition of his feudality; Louis XII had resorted to it
in the preservation of his unification policy; Francis I had had
recourse to commissaires for multiple reasons, some of them perhaps
less honorable than any of his predecessors.

Thus as an instrument

of government, legitimate or illegitimate, irregular criminal
procedures were entrenched in customary public law by the 1550*s.
The problems of judicial reform, institutional relations, and
the regulation of justice did not go unrecognized in the legal world
of the sixteenth century.

On the contrary, Estates Generals,

jurisconsuls, and the courts had from time to time exposed procedural
abuses within the system and the Crown had sought to remedy them.
The Estates-Generals of 1355, 1357, 1413, and 1484 complained of
confusion in judicial matters, of hardships wrought on litigants
because of the drawn-out processes of appeal, and of the inequity
of evocations. Especially after the creation of the Grand Conseil,
the sovereign courts chimed in with disgruntled remonstrances that
their jurisdictions were being nibbled away at the expense of legal
usages as well as litigant's time and pocketbooks.

The clamor for

reform of judicial procedures was further sharpened among the public
at large during the sixteenth century by the infiltration of venality
and fiscal abuses into the court system.60
From time to time the Crown sought to treat the ills in its
judicial body politic by issuing great ordinances of reform.

Kings

60Doucet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 205-06; ChSreul,
Histoire de 11administration monarchlque en France, I, 188-92.
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had sporadically resorted to this measure during the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, but after 1560 there began one of the
greatest periods of legal reform in the history of the Old Regime.
It is one of the curious paradoxes of the monarchy that worthy
efforts at judicial reform and lawful government should have taken
place in the climate of general tension, lawlessness, and disorder
that prevailed after 1560, but such was the case with the great
ordinances of Orleans (1560), Roussillon (15640, Moulins (1566),
and Blois (1579).

The weaknesses of a regency and the riptides

of religious strife which enfeebled the Crown after Henry II's
death led to demands for reform which found expression in the
Estates General of 1560.

Quite possibly, though, the cahiers of

the Estates would have been cast aside had it not been for the
intervention of the talented politique Chancellor Michel de 1'
Hospital, who saw in the plaints of the Estates an opportunity to
create a lasting revision of French law while attempting at the
same time an amelioration of the gnawing antagonisms in French
society.

De 1'Hospital's attention to the material contained in

the cahiers produced the Ordinance of Orleans in 1561.

This was

revised with the Ordinance of Roussillon in 1564, followed by the
comprehensive Ordinance de Moulins in 1566.

With the exception of

the Ordinance of Roussillon, each of these codifications represented
an omnibus revision of the entire corpus of French public law
concerning justice, ecclesiastical affairs, social problems, royal
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finances, and military matters.

Each code attempted to come to grips

with the fundamental problems besetting royal courts, institutional
relationships, judicial procedures, and litigant's rights.^1
These ordinances are of particular importance to the institutional
and legal history of Richelieu's ministry because they represented
the most binding form of written law found in his time.

Parlementaires

cited them in defense of legality throughout the first half of the
seventeenth century, and the Frondeurs of I648 demanded a return to
the Ordinances of 1560, 1566, and 1579.

With the failure of the

Code Michaud of 1629, the sixteenth century codes remained the most
comprehensive collections of French law until the appearance of the
Code Louis during the 1660*s.
Among the 150 articles of the Ordinance of Orleans, three
deserve special attention because they bore on the administration of
sovereign justice.

Articles 37 and 38 show that De I 1Hospital

understood the confusion caused by the overlapping and competitive
ressorts of the Conseil des parties, the Grand Conseil, and the
Parlement.

The problem was attacked in direct fashion.

As a

parlementaire with six years of service in the court, he was naturally
inclined to sympathize with the traditional claims of the Parlement.
Undoubtedly, too, he perceived that the Grand Conseil was now some
thing of an anachronism, its former raison d'etre having been

1
^The role of Michel de 1'Hospital is the subject of a commentary
in Albert Buisson's Michel de lfHospital (Paris: 1950). The texts of
the ordinances of 15^0, 1564, T566, and 1579 are published in their
entirety in Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XIV, 62-98, 160-69,
189-212, 381-463. On the drafting of the ordinances see Chiruel,
Hlstolre de 1'administration monarehique en France, I, 188-96.
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rendered obsolete by the activities of the Conseil des parties.
For whatever reasons, Article 37 of the Ordinance of Orleans
drastically pruned the competence of the Grand Conseil by declaring

The men holding our grand conseil cannot and should not
hereafter entertain causes and matters other than those
attributed to them by their creation and institution, save
that the suits pending at present in the said council will
be judged and terminated.^
The implicit intention was apparently to limit the Grand Conseil
to ecclesiastical matters.

Article 38 extended and clarified the

effects of this provision by establishing that
requests for appeals against the decisions of our sovereign
courts and parlements will be sent to our mattres des requites
the report and to judge them in our
Evidently De 1'Hospital intended that the Conseil prlvl (or Conseil
des parties) should represent the highest court of appeal in cases
coming out of the sovereign courts, and in fact this regulation
seems to have taken hold.

It was, of course, perfectly in keeping

with the natural tendency of the past three decades.

Conversely,

the authority of the Grand Conseil underwent serious decline after
the 1560's, with many of its former jurisdictions being reclaimed
by the Parlement or passing to the Conseil des parties. The Grand
Conseil remained a sovereign court, but its jurisdictions were

^Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XIV, 7463Ibid,
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effectively reduced to miscellaneous ecclesiastical affairs and to the
hearing of cases committed to it hy the king.

In contrast with the

early part of the century, the latter category diminished considerably
in favor of the Conseil des parties.
The Ordinance of Orleans lacked a definitive and vigorous
statement on royal abuses of extraordinary justice.^

The defect

was left untouched by Article 30 of the Ordinance of Roussillon, a
collection of amendments and modifications registered by the
Parlement in December, 1564.

Article 30 seemed to leave no question

regarding the matter of commissaires:
We wish and order that all trials should hereafter be judged
ordinarily, in our parlements, Grand Conseil, and other
sovereign courts as in our prgsidiaux, and prohibit them
from judging any extraordinarily by c o m m i s s a i r e s .
In fact, though, the reference was to commissaires named by the courts,
not those named by the king.
Six years after the publication of the Ordinance of Orleans, the
Ordinance of Ifoulins sought to regulate the right of committimus, the
privilege of appearing immediately before the Grand Conseil, the
mnft.iv>a des requites, or the Grand*Chambre of the Parlement without
going through the judicial maze of lower courts.

Without suppressing

^Article 34 had touched on the subject of commissaires by
permitting their use in five instances of private law. These
commissaires were judges named by the court to summarily handle
minor cases and should not be confused with royal appointees.
Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XIV, 73.
65Ibid., 167.
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the privilege, Article 56 specifically ennumerated the categories
of persons entitled to the right.66 Article 70 was another in a
long

series of attempts to limit evocations which took litigants

away from their "natural judges."

It declared that evocations in

either criminal or civil matters "should not take place outside
the cases permitted hy the edicts and ordinances" and in such cases
were to be made only by means of letters sent by royal command and
signed by one of four secretaires d'Etat. ^

The parlements were

permitted to make remonstrances on these evocations, and the party
obtaining the evocation in a criminal matter first had to be made
prisoner in his locality.68
After De 1'Hospital's death in 1573> further reforms were asked
by the Estates General of 1576.

The cahiers of this meeting were

eventually incorporated into the Ordinance of Blois of 1579, a
cumulative code of 363 articles which, along with the Ordinances
of Orleans and Ifoulins, would serve as the basis of written French

66Ibid., 203-04* These categories were the great officers of
the Crown, members of the Conseil priyg, mattres des requgtes, royal
notaries and secretaries, domestic officers of the royal household,
princes of the blood and the officers of the sovereign courts.
Additionally, the twelve ranking proeureurs and avocats in the
Parlement, the six ranking lawyers in other parlements, and the
members of several churches, religious chapters, and religious
communities "which have the privilege, for communal affairs of the
said churches only."
6^isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XTV, 208.
6®Ibid.; ChSreul, Histoire de 1*administration monarchique,
I, 201-02.
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public law for nearly 100 years.

The most important provisions of

the Ordinance in regard to sovereign justice were contained in
Articles 91, 92, and 97-99 which clarified the relationship between
the royal council and the sovereign courts and regulated the use
of commissaires. The lasting importance of these articles mandates
quoting them at some length.

Article 91 declared in principle that

our Conseil priv£ . . . hereafter should not be occupied with
causes which lie in contentious jurisdiction; to preserve the
jurisdiction which belongs to our sovereign courts and ordinary
justices [we] bave returned suits introduced into our council
and pending undecided . . . to be heard before the judges
who should have natural cognizance of them. In the future our
council will not take cognizance of such and similar matters,
which we wish to be treated before our ordinary judges and by
appeal to our sovereign courts following our edicts and
ordinances. '
Article 92 continued the theme of the superiority of the regular
courts by declaring that
the decisions of our sovereign courts cannot be nullified or
retracted except by the paths prescribed at law . . . and
through the form born by our ordinances. Nor shall the
execution of these decisions [of the sovereign courts] be
suspended or deferred by simple request presented to us in
our Conseil priv6.
The long-standing issue of evocations was further treated in Article
97, which piously declared royal intentions that "hereafter we do
not intend to issue any letters of evocation, be they general or
individual, of our own initiative."

71

This provision, in theory,

^Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XV, 404.
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restricted the possibility of using the council as an instrument of
royal authority by having cases evoked to it.

The possibility of

granting evocations on the initiative of private parties, however,
was continued:
The requests of those seeking such evocations should be reported
in our Conseil privl by maftres des requites . . . to be there
judged following the edicts of Bourdaisi^reand Chanteloup and
other edicts since made by preceding kings and by us. If
such requests for evocations should be found reasonable, the
parties heard, and with knowledge of cause, then letters will
be sent and not otherwise. All evocations will be signed by
the secretaire d'Etat or of finances who received the expedition
when the evocation was deliberated. Evocations obtained
hereafter contrary to these forms will be of no effect or value,
and notwithstanding them we wish that the judges from whom they
would have been evoked continue with the investigation and
judgment.7^
The struggle to regulate comnrissaires extraordinaires continued with
yet another prohibition against them in Article 98:
In order to terminate the complaints made to us by our subjects
on the occasions of extraordinary commissions previously issued,
[wej have revoked and revoke all the said extraordinary
commissions, desiring that prosecution of each matter be made
before the judges to whom competence of it belonged. ^
Finally, Article 99 limited the maitres des requites to hearing
only those matters permitted them by the ordinances.

They were not

to judge sovereignly or in last resort any cases regardless of letters
attributing this power to them.7^
The great ordinances cited above testify that throughout the
last half of the sixteenth century the Crown made an exceptional
effort to put its judicial house in order by imposing paper

72Ibid., 405.
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regulations on the processes and procedures of justice.

The great

ordinances touched on most aspects of appeal and attempted to guarantee
the integrity of decisions coming out of the sovereign courts.
Abuses were decried, jurisdictions were defined, and the rights of
litigants cared for; in these ways the ordinances of the sixteenth
century provided impressive legal standards pertaining to sovereign
justice.

But as with the questions of venality and qualifications

for magisterial office, these ordinances failed to settle the
questions of public law treated in them.

Centuries of monarchial

behavior regaled against the strictures of written law, and tradition
certainly had as much validity as legal codes in French public law.
Further, given the ne plus ultra quality of royal authority and the
real or imagined need to exercise it in favored cases, there were
no effective means to ensure that the ordinances would be obeyed.
In the decades after their preparation, the provisions of the
ordinances seem to have been violated as often as they were fol
lowed; their only lasting accomplishment in the administration of
justice was to assign a kind of legal,opprobrium to certain
judicial procedures.
The chaotic state of royal government and the passions that
inflamed the country during the Wars of Religion undoubtedly
contributed to a continued degradation of French judicial procedures.
^One might cite, for example, the procedures followed in the
case of the prince de condS, accused of lgse-majestg in 1560 and
tried in council; that of Mole and De Coconas, executed April 30,
1574; the proceedings initiated against Admiral Coligny after his
death; and those against Briquemaut and Cavagnes in October of 1572.
Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 750; B.N. Ms. Fr. 7549, fols.
232-40.
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Thus First President Achille III de Harlay could complain to
Henry III that
"the council is reduced to the status of the Ch&telet of
Paris. Issues are adjourned there from distant areas such as
Languedoc or Guyenne for very small things, and in first
instance, even for a quibble over nine feus."76
A certain restoration of orderliness accompanied Henry IV1s rule
after 1594, but even Henry's judicious tolerance and pacification
sometimes relied on irregular methods such as intendants. Henry's
respect for equitable justice probably showed most clearly in the
administration of high criminal justice where the Parlement’s
jurisdiction was usually honored in regard to lSse-majest§. In
1602 the Parlement was ordered to deal with the. accusations of
lese-majeste made against margschal Biron, a prosecution resulting
in the condemnation and execution of Henry's former companion-inarms.

After Jean Chastel attempted to assassinate the King in 1594,

the Parlement was charged with investigation and prosecution of this
sensitive case.

The court passed sentence on December 29, after a

trial of one day, and declared Chastel guilty of 15se-majest§ in
the form of attempted assassination.

Yet as circumspect as Henry

was in such matters, irregular methods of justice continued to be
employed on occasion.

A commission of six eonseillers d'Etat

carried out the trial of would-be regecide Pierre Barriere and
condemned him to death on August 31, 1593.

Except for the fact

7^D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue, I, 54source and date of the quotation are not given.

The
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that the Parlement of Paris and of Tours had not yet been reunited,
the circumstances surrounding Barriere's case appear to have been
no different than several other attempts on the King's life which
were handled by the Parlement.

The last such incident, that of

Ravaillac in 1610, was dealt with by the Parlement in an investigation
beginning shortly after Henry's death on May 14 and terminating with
execution of the condemned on May 27.77
That past regulations and ordinances had neither permanently
improved the administration of justice nor clarified the functions
of public bodies was evident at the beginning of Louis XIII's reign
when the Parlement presented its famous remonstrances of 1615.

These

remonstrances were an outgrowth of the failure of the Estates General
to treat positively the troubles besetting the monarchy, some of
which, like venality and judicial reform, had a long history and
others, such as fiscal extravagance and Concini's presence in
council, could be ascribed to Marie's bumbling government.

Four days

after the Estates were adjourned without solution to these problems,
the Parlement seized the initiative for State reform.

On March 28,

the court, with all chambers assembled, returned a historic decision
to convoke the princes and peers and to formulate propositions
which would be made "for the service of the King and the relief
of his subjects."7® The judges justified their arrgt by citing
77B.N. M s . fr. 7549, fols. 239-41; Mousnier, The Assassination
of Henry IV, pp. 27-51, 215-24.
7®Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XVI, 61.
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the King’s prior promise not to respond to the cahiers of the
Estates without hearing the Parlement’s views.^
The decision of March 28 was not well received in royal circles.
First the gens du roi, then the entire Parlement, were summoned to
the Louvre to account for their actions and to hear the Queen
Mother denounce the unprecedented daring of the court.

Despite

this unmistakable manifestation of opposition, however, the Parle
ment persisted in its determination to expose what it considered to
be blatant abuses in the regency government.

On April 9 the court

began the drafting of lengthy and pungently worded remonstrances
containing nearly twenty major criticisms or suggestions.^

The

corpus of the articles was prefaced by the assertion that the
decision of March 28 and the remonstrances had been made "under
the King’s good pleasure", but the pithy comments which followed
made this phrase seem facetious indeed.

The Parlement condemned

Marie's dalliance with foreigners and foreign powers (a veiled
reference to Concini and Eleonora Galigai) reproofed the dissipation
of State finances, and urged respect for the Gallican liberties.
The regent was urged to place only capable men in ecclesiastical
positions, to abolish the venality of military offices, to reform
the finances, to cut back pensions and gifts, and to reduce the
^^Fayard, Apergu historique, II, 35; Glasson, Le Parlement de
Paris, I, 123.
^The remonstrances can be found in Mol£, Mlmoires, I, 28-51.
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numbers of financial officers.

"In a word," says Glasson, "these

remonstrances touched on everything, they were the true cahiers
of the Estates General."81
The manoeuvers of the spring of 1615 were most indicative of
the Parlement's enlarged political role, but the remonstrances were
also enlightening in their judicial articles.

These show that at the

beginning of Louis XIII1s reign the judges in the Parlement believed
that the time-honored defects in French justice persisted as in
centuries past.

Justice, the judges maintained, was one of the

principal columns of the State, lending both honor and affection to
Louis' rule.

With this attitude in mind, the officers of the

Parlement, the trustees of royal justice, "were obliged to represent
to you that for some years it

justice had been greatly violated and

its ornaments treated unworthily."

82

Decisions of the courts had

been flaunted in the streets of the capital, and crimes had gone
unpunished at the expense of the honor of the Crown and the
authority of the officers.
this situation.

Marie was humbly entreated to remedy

The edict on duels should be observed, as should

legal decisions emanating from the council, which were "too often
changed, so that those who had won their suit often found a short
time later that they had lost it."

83

8lGlasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 125.
82Mbl£, M&noires, I, 40.

8W
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Byond this, the Parlementaires asked for a redress of grievances
concerning sovereign justice:
The hearing of affairs treated in council should he regulated
following your ordinances, and contentious justice reduced
according to its form, at penalty of invalidity for that which
had been done. The decisions of your parlements should not
be nullified or suspended upon request as is ordinarily done.
Those who want to petition against decisions should do it
only through means of law and according to your ordinances;
likewise, too frequent evocations, of which complaint is noto
rious, should be cut back to the cases allowed in the same
ordinances.
The same lawful process, the judges held, should be applied to royal
letters of pardon for those indicted for assassination and other
violent crimes.Similarly, the Crown should not "send any
commissions, be they for sovereign judgment or in dernier ressort,
be they for the trial of any accused, that cannot be verified in your
Parlement."^

Thus the Parlement indiscriminately condemned all

forms of comnrissaires, either individual or empanelled.

The request,

as with others touching on the administration of justice, bore a
singular resemblance to those issued in the past.
The Crown’s reaction was immediate, emphatic, and negative.
In an audience of May 22, 1615, the Queen Mother listened attentively
to the remonstrances of the court and then in the presence of young
Louis totally rejected them as indicative of Parlementaire meddling
in affairs of State.

The next day a vigorously worded arr|t du

34ibid., 39-40.
^5See Infra, p.
^^Mole, Mamoires, I, 40.
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Conseil nullified the court's decision to unite the peers and present
remonstrances.

The arrgt cited decisions made in the reigns of

Francis I, Charles IX, and Charles VIII "barring the court from
affairs of State, reiterated previous royal injunctions made against
the Parlement's intentions to assemble the peers, and hluntly
declared that
inserted in these remonstrances [are] several articles whose
falsity is apparent, and others which are notoriously slanderous
in that they try to throw a general blame and cast a bad odor
about all those who have a part in the administration of
financial affairs. This is sufficient to judge that the intent
was to give pretext to those seeking to disturb the public
tranquillity, rather than to present the means for ending
abuses and disorders that they exaggerate to swell individual
discontent and commensurately diminish the authority of His
Majesty.
The arr§t then nullified and revoked the court's decision of March
28, "making proscription and prohibition to the said Parlement of
mixing in affairs of State (in the future) except when so ordered."®®
To ensure that the court followed at least the forms of submission,
the council's order required that "the said arrgt [of March 28]
together with the remonstrances should be struck out and removed
from the registers," for which duty the greffler was held responsible
at the cost of his office.

The document concluded with the all

important formulary "done in the Council of State, His Majesty there
sitting, at Paris, May 23, 1615," which signified that the decision
had actually been rendered in the King's presence and communicated
his immediate and sovereign authority.^
®7Ibld., 55.
%bid.
39lbid., 56.
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Forceful and ultimate as it was, the arrit du Conseil had no
effect on the Parlement except to elicit another decision to make
new remonstrances.

Marie countered with .a lettre de jussion

commanding registration of the councilliar arrgt. This was ignored,
and the court pursued its wayward deliberations for the next two
weeks.

During the fortnight, however, another and more ominous

note was sounded in the controversy.

The prince de Conde and the

due de Bouillion, chafing at exclusion from the government and
nearly in outright rebellion, began sub rosa overtures for an
alliance with the Parlement.

The court had been perfectly willing

to defy the Crown on legal grounds, but most of the magistrates
could not bring themselves to become openly committed to conspiracy,
an association with illegality contrary to all the traditions of
the court and the law it upheld.

Conversely Marie and her advisers

were now inclined towards a rapprochment with the Parlement to have
its support against the princely cabal.

Accordingly, towards the

end of June a working agreement was reached which veiled the dispute.
On the 23rd of the month, the Parlement issued an arr€t by which it
enjoined the prince de Conde- to discontinue mustering troops, and
it declared that in its remonstrances it had not intended to
discredit the government.

The assembly of peers did not take place,

but the Crown's arr£t du Conseil was never registered by the
Parlement. 9°

9°Ibid., 57; Richelieu, Mgmoires, I, 250; Fayard, Apercu
historique, I, 39; Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 125-2b.
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Conventional opinion holds that the events of May-June 1615 were
a victory for the Parlement and the forces tending towards a
balanced, harmonious, and traditional monarchy.

Fayard, in parti

cular, maintains that
the initiative of the Parlement had no other consequences ([in
politics or reform], but that sovereign court had expressed
its opinion on the direction of the government, and had
sustained an act of authority in maintaining its arrgt which
would serve it as a stepping-stone for future occasions. It
was a complete victory of a nature to augment its pretensions
and more and more to win for it the sympathies and the confi
dence of the Third Estate.91
Patteming his account after Fayard, Glasson concurs in concluding
that "the Parlement came out victorious in this crisis."92 Yet
in fact the affair of the remonstrances of 1615 and the use of
councilliar authority to nullify them never reached a definitive
conclusion because of the intrusion of external events.

The

interpretation that the Parlement was victorious in the encounter
must be tempered in the light of the regency's anemic authority
and its concurrent domestic crisis, factors which, together with
the popular disrepute brought to the council by Concini's presence,
subverted the royal position in the court's favor.
Nevertheless, the events of 1615 were in several ways meaningful
to the conflict that was to characterize the growth of absolutism
later in Louis' reign.

In terms of the scope of its political role,

the Parlement had aggrandized its place in the State by assuming the

^Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 39.
92Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 126.
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advisory functions of the defunct Estates General and voicing its
complaints without prior solicitation from the Crown.

The nature of

the widened political role thus generated had nothing novel about it,
for the Parlement had always thought of itself as an advisory agency,
but it did represent a significant heightening of the court's
responsibilities to act as a brake on monarchial power.

This thought

has been well summarized by Shennan when he writes that
Of course these remonstrances were extraordinary, both in their
scope and in the manner of their appearance, prompted by no
prior royal legislation and lacking royal consent. They were
much more reminiscent in style and content of petitions
emanating from the Estates-General, and this was in fact the
fact the first occasion on which the Parlement's role clearly
comprehended that of the Estates as well. . . . Yet there is
nothing even in this to suggest that the Parlement's intention
was innovatory. Its own obligation was to defend the multi
farious rights of the French nation, to preserve, in other
words, the traditional concept of kingship, limited by law. . . .
The Estates was concerned with the Parlement in enforcing
another ancient limitation upon the monarchy, that involving
the right to offer counsel. By the early seventeenth century,
however, only the Parlement remained powerful enough to assert
these customary values and in seeking to maintain them it
added to its own essentially judicial role the political
functions of an obsolescent institution.93
Apart from signifying a new and fortified political inspiration
for the Parlement, the events of 1615 also suggest a prelude to the
severe institutional antagonism between the Parlement and the
council that accompanied Richelieu's ministry.

As the history of

the monarchy's judicial organs shows, there was really nothing novel
about this discord, which was inevitable if the court was to fulfill
its advisory function.

As early as the fourteenth century, the

93shennan, The Parlement of Paris, pp. 24.5-4-6.
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council had exhibited a propensity to encroach on the legal
jurisdiction of the Parlement, and the tendency for the council to
establish itself as an ordinary, rather than extraordinary, ressort
superior to the Parlement had continued since that time.

In the

reign of Louis XI, the Parlement and the council had frequently
been at loggerheads over this usurpation; at about the same time
the Grand Conseil had appeared out of royal needs to administer
prerogative justice in matters of political sensitivity.
During the sixteenth century the arrogation of councilliar
justice began to repeat itself as the Conseil priv£ or Conseil des
parties replaced the Grand Conseil as dernier ressort in most legal
and administrative matters.

This usage was present in numerous

appeals and evocations in private law, but the same judicial authority
of the k in g in council could also be utilized in matters of public
law, legislation, and ad m in is t r a t i o n to nullify or bypass any kind
of decision by the sovereign courts.

Precisely this course had been

chosen in 1615 when Marie had issued an arr€t du Conseil to suppress
the Parlement's decision to present remonstrances (the decision
of March 28).

In so doing Marie had resorted to an ultimate expres

sion of arbitraire, that of the king sitting in the Conseil d'Etat,
tactlessly preferring this very blunt juridical means over more
diplomatic and more customary means of negotiation through the gens
du roi, lettres de jussion, or even a lit de justice.
The judges rightly feared the implications of such tactics
which menaced almost everything the Parlement stood for.

Most

immediately, growth of councilliar justice in the Conseil prive
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meant a diminution of the jurisdiction of their corps which in turn
threatened their prestige, their individual and collective social
standing, and their income in cases lost to the council.

There was

no danger that the Parlement would disappear— that was unthinkable
for many reasons— but the magistrates had good reason to fear that
their benches would become a mockery of the past, an honorary
anachronism of government consigned to the same institutional
scrapheap that had claimed the Grand Conseil. If this came to pass,
the judges' investment in the honor and dignity of office would
proportionately be robbed of much of its value.
For those who looked beyond material concerns into the realm
of public law, the imposition of councilliar authority meant an
increased increment of royal power and a corresponding imbalance in
the traditional constitution.

The question was not per se one of

the essential quality of sovereignty.

All the magistrates recog

nized, and venerated, the fact that the king's person was the primal
source of all legislation and all justice.

Instead of a corruption

of the monarchial principle, the judges feared for the exercise of
power, particularly the erosion of the time-honored mechanism of
counsel which in their eyes conferred justice and legality on the
translation of royal will into royal law.

According to feudal

tradition, this translation was binding only under conditions of
wide counsel, more or less representative of law and the common
good.

Strengthening of councilliar authority sapped the fundamental

principle of tr£s grand conseil in several ways.

The physical size

of the royal council, and therefore the breadth of opinion offered,
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was much smaller than the Estates General or the Parlement.

Much

more significantly, the king's councillors, when acting as conseillers
d'Etat, were simple commis whose appointment, career, and dismissal
lay wholly in the king's hands.

Though the council was amply educated

in the law, its principal orientation lay towards fulfilling adminis
trative functions.

In most cases this meant doing the king's will.

For these reasons the potential for ad hoc arbitrary decisions con
forming purely to the king's will or to administrative necessity was
substantially increased.

The magistrates, therefore, could legiti

mately argue that violation of their historic jurisdiction diminished
both respect for their rights in property and respect for the law of
the land.

The Parlement was historically bound to advise the Crown

of such illegality through its remonstrances.

Marie's nullification

of the court's remonstrances through the arrSt du Conseil thus posed
a dual danger to the parlementaires and the maintenance of a balanced
and constitutional monarchy.
Nearly a decade elapsed, however, before the possibilities
inherent in councilliar government began to manifest themselves in
a systematic way.

Until 1617, at least, Marie's council reflected

the effeminate and diffuse nature of the regency.

In structure

Marie's council was scarcely different from that of the sixteenth
century.

She inspired no progressive changes and for personnel

could do no better than to rely on Concini, expell the careful
Protestant Sully, and retain those professional ''graybeards"
who exhibited little ability and less will power.

Alert to this

vacuity at the center of things, great princes such as Conde,
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Soissons, and Bouillon flocked into the council to assert their
opinions.

This caeaphony of private interests would prevail until

Louis' coup d'etat of 1617 destroyed the Concini faction and
inaugurated the influence of Luynes.

Not until 1624 was the council

filled with men of substance and character like Richelieu and
Marillac.
At the beginning of 1624 there began the first in a series of
events which would eventually transform the royal council into an
efficient instru-ent of the king's will.

Between January and April

of 1624 Louis was persuaded to reform the membership of the council.
In January and February Chancellor Brulart de Sillery and his son
Puisieux de Sillery, a secretaire d'Etat for foreign affairs, were
disgraced.

On April 29> Louis, primarily under the influence of

Marie de Medicis and her party, introduced Richelieu into the
council and with his arrival came recommendations for further
changes.

The worthless surintendant des finances La Vieuville

was dismissed and replaced jointly by Michel de Marillac and
Bochart de Champigny.

By 1626 further changes in personnel had

taken place: Marillac became garde des sceaux and actual head of
the chancellery while margschal d'Effiat received control of the
finances.

At about the same time Constable Lesdiguieres and

Cardinal La Rochefoucauld died.

With their passing the last

prominent councillors of Henry IV1s era disappeared from the public
scene.
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The councilliar housecleaning of 1624-26 also marks the begin
ning of two decades of very rapid institutional development during
which the council virtually assumed the form and power it would have
for the remainder of the Old

R e g i m e . ^4

Several factors undoubtedly

contributed to this accelerated progress of the 1620's and 1630's,
but it is difficult to separate councilliar developments from the
arrival and subsequent influences of the garde des sceaux and chief
minister.

Different in method, philosophy, and in many ends, yet

mutually inspired by a fundamental impetus to enhance royal authority,
both men were interested in councilliar reform as a requisite to a
restoration of the Crown's power and prestige.
Possessed of a legal background and a highly moralistic,
pietistic, and methodical personality, as well as great administrative
talent, Marillac was particularly drawn to reform through regulation
in much the same way as his predecessor De 1'Hospital.

The Code

Michaud reflects his modus operand!, and between 1626 and 1630 he was
probably chiefly responsible for several r&glements du Conseil which
detailed the personnel, schedule, agenda, and competences of the
Conseil d'Etat. The net effect of these rlglements can be seen in
two parallel tendencies largely achieved before 1630.

The first

consequence of these efforts was an increase in specialization
among different branches and refined methods of preparing materials
for consideration in meetings.

A second trend was the growing

^Mousnier would have the transformation begin after Luynes'
death in 1622 on the evidence of reformation reglements of that
year. Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 148.
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preponderance of gens de robe over the noblesse d’epee and ecclesi
astics.

This shift was inseparable from the effort to constitute a

nucleus of career councillors who weuld receive preference over
those who sought retirement or a second career in the council
after leaving a sovereign court.

This proclivity worked to the

exclusion of ambitious parlementaires and exacerbated discord
between the two b o d i e s . T h e last councilliar r^glement of
Richelieu’s ministry, that of January IS, 1630, was particularly
important for its comprehensiveness.

It systematized former rules

and would serve to formally delineate the organization and activities
of the council for the next dozen years, being superceded only in
1643 by another set of regulations constituting the regency council
of Anne of Austria.
Like Marillac Richelieu gave the appearance of interest in
administrative reform.

In 1620 he had drafted a proposal for the

creation of four functional councils to supervise ecclesiastical
affairs, military activities, finances, and justice.^

This

project remained a dream as did another plan of 1625.97 As Orest
Ranum has shown, however, it was really Richelieu’s superlative
ability to work through personal relations rather than formal
regulation that fulfilled the possibilities opened up before the Day
^Mousnier, "Les F&glements du Conseil," p. 126; Mounier, "Le
Conseil du Roi," pp. 145-47, 166-71.
^D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue, I, 4397Riehelieu, Lettres, II, 169.
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of Dupes.9^ The chief minister knew very well how to manage Louis'
mercurial temperament as well as how to coordinate and direct the
client creatures he placed in the offices of surintendants des
finances and secretaires d'Etat. Only those men— Bullion, the le
Bouthilliers, Sublet de Noyers— together with one or two others
having Richelieu's full confidence were admitted to the inner
c o u n c i l . 99

The princes of the blood and other grands, consumed by

their own interests, were systematically excluded.

Richelieu's

creatures in turn informally reorganized their duties into more
efficient pattersn, transforming, for instance, the former geographic
division of correspondence into a functional one along the lines of
war, finances, and foreign affairs.

The net result of these changes

was the transmutation of the council into what after 1631 could
fairly be called a ministerial government.-^®®
Regulation and strengthening of the council crystallized, but
really did not greatly alter, its formal organization which, as in
times past, remained essentially divided into two parts, an inner
and outer or narrower and wider council.

The inner council,

judicially superior to its larger but subordinate relatives, bore
various contemporary titles such as Conseil secret or Conseil des
9^ln Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII. See also
Pagis, Les Institutions monarchiques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV.
99^0 one has ever been able to discover or prepare a list of
those admitted to the Conseil d'en haut after 1630. An acceptable
estimate would include Richelieu, PSre Joseph, Marshal Sehomberg,
Claude Bullion, Sublet de Noyers (secretaire d'Etat for foreign
affairs), Claude Bouthillier and Leon Bouthillier.
lOORanum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII, pp. 3-15;
PagSs, Les Institutions monarchiques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV, p. 31.
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affaires depending on what regulation or person made the commentary.
For convenience sake it will here be uniformly referred to as the
Conseil d'en haut, a title actually assumed only some time after
1643.

The Conseil d'en haut was the most direct linear descendant

of the ancient curia regis; in the absolute monarchy as in the
medieval or Renaissance Monarchy it denoted the king or regent
personally consulting with a few trusted advisors on policy.

Its

competence included, as a rSglement of 1615 put it, "generally
affairs of the greatest importance, as it will please his Majesty
to o r d e r . T h e rSglement of 1615 was the first to regulate this
council, and it proceeded to outline its activities, agenda, schedule,
and competences along with the rest of the council.

Such committment

to paper scarcely affected the operations of the Conseil d'en haut
which in the era of Louis XIII continued to exhibit all of its past
spontaneity, superiority, and flexibility.

The nature of this

council1s makeup and business naturally stamped its workings as
informal, secret, and expeditious.

Because of the king's presence,

it was unquestionably the dernier ressort in the kingdom.

Mousnier

has perfectly captured its functions and relationship to other parts
of the council under Louis XIII in this way:
Politics properly said, high administration, finances, justice,
it does them all. It appears as the Conseil du Roi par excel
lence with loosely determined functions, whose members sit one
day in finances, another for [contentious]) parties, another for
politics. The other sections [of the council] are subordinated
-*-0-'-Mousnier, "Les R&glements du Conseil," p. 148.
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to it like little sovereign courts. The Conseil d'en haut
seems on its own to begin anew the preceding evolution of
the £ medieval] Cour du Roi and the [Renaissance] Conseil royal.
The Cour du Roi assimilated unto itself practically all power
and all functions, then specialized sections slowly appeared.
One of them, the Conseil du Roi, acquired a wider and wider
competence and, in consequence, in its turn, painfully divided
and its fragments specialized themselves.
Beneath the Conseil d’en haut were three administrative councils
which, for simplicity's sake, can be thought of as sub-sections of the
Conseil d'Etat. Each was broader than the Conseil d'en haut and
shepherded day to day administrative policy formulated by the king's
ministers.

At various times during the week, the members of the

Conseil d'Etat assumed the name of Conseil d'Etat et finances to
study cases of financial litigation.

Most of the same personnel sat

in the Conseil de la direction des finances as a steering committee
an financial policy.

At other times most of the councillors

assembled as the Conseil prive or Conseil des parties to treat
judicial suits finding their way to the council by one means or
another.

These various sections of the Conseil d'Etat represented

the administrative arms of the Conseil d'en haut, interlocking them
selves with that body through the surlntendants des finances, the
secretaires d'Etat, and the Chancellor who had the right to attend
all councils.

In addition to these six or seven men, about two

dozen eonseillers d'Etat ordinaires had deliberative rights in the
Conseil d'Etat only.

These men received and discussed reports

102Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 153.
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compiled and presented by maitres des requites, four of whom also
enjoyed deliberative rights after 1629.

As Mousnier has said,

these specialized fragments of the council stood in relationship
to the Conseil d'en haut as the sovereign courts did to the council
as a whole.

The Conseil d'Etat was guided by its superior and its

decisions could always be nullified by it.

Unlike its superior, the

Conseil d'Etat was almost always chaired by the Chancellor or
garde des sceaux, a situation which led to a dichotomy between the
theoretical sovereignty of the Conseil d'Etat and the patent reality
of the king's absence..
All sections of the council possessed enormous judicial powers,
but the adjudications of the Conseil d'en haut were limited in number
and virtually unimpeachable at law, while the hearings of the
financial councils were oriented towards financial cases.

Conse

quently the operations of the Conseil privl, the specialized judicial
section of the council, were of primary concern to the Parlement of
Paris.

This portion of the council more than any other had demon

strated the historical potential to become a true sovereign court
superior to the Parlement.

Its attributions had grown steadily

during the sixteenth century, and by the early 1600's the Conseil
privg was acting as a more or less regular court of high justice.
The Parlement had complained of this encroachment in its remonstrances
of 1615 and the deputies of the sovereign courts to the Assembly of
Notables had renewed them in 1626, but to no avail.

The monarchy
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showed itself unable and unwilling to reform, the jurisdiction of
the Conseil privl continued to swell throughout the first half of the
seventeenth century, and one of the chief issues in the establishment
of absolute government remained unresolved.
The inability to restrain the ressort of the Conseil privg
certainly did not lay in ignorance of the problem, for after 1615
there were repeated efforts to limit the jurisdiction of the
Conseil privg through rgglements du conseil. Sometimes the Crown
even presented statements confessing the origin and nature of the
abuses, as it did in Article 3 of the reglement of May 21, 1615:
The multitude of causes which have been and are [now} in
the Conseil du Roy stem from diverse motives which can be
outlined in a few words.
Firstly, because of troubles and articles which have been
accorded by the late King [Henry iv} to many princes, seigneurs,
governors of places, cities, and communities, the knowledge of
which and of all disputes which might come out of them has been
reserved to the council of His Majesty as it was then necessary
to thus employ it.
Edicts and declarations made by those of the reformed
religion have brought the retention and judgment of many suits
and disputes in the council of the king.
In all [taxj farm leases which were made in the time of the
late king for gabelles, aides, and generally in all contracts
made for the affairs and finances of His Majesty, there was
always a reserve that all disputes which came out of the execution
of the said leases should be judged in the council of the king. ^
This article was really a catalogue of political necessity.

Under the

uneasy conditions of pacification during the 1590's, Henry had
found it necessary to protect the public peace by granting the right
of comnittimus, or the exclusive right of immediate appeal to
^%ousnier, "Les RSglements du Conseil," p. 14-7.
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councilliar justice, to various individuals and groups within the
kingdom.

The religious problem was perhaps Henry's gravest matter

of State, and it, too, seemed to demand councilliar consideration.
In the same way, financial agreements with tax farmers were often
delicate arrangements which could not bear the light of examination
in regular courts. To shield the confidence and credit of his
financiers and to the Crown were easily arranged.
Following this very accurate assessment, Article 4.went on to
declare that
Nevertheless, the King wishes and intends that competence over
all disputes that might come out of the execution of the edicts
and declarations of His Majesty which hitherto have been treated
in his council should be returned to the court of Parlement or
other courts where the edicts were verified to be there judged
and terminated in compliance with that which is ordered by
the said edicts.10^
The same principle was to apply to tax cases, which were to be taken
away from the Conseil d'Etat et des finances and returned to the Cour
des aides. The result, Article 6 confidently asserted, would be
that "there will be no need to hold so many councils.
This sanguine expectation proved illusory.

The business of the

Conseil prive was not permanently diminished, as continued rSglements
and the articles of the sovereign courts in 1626 testify.

Nevertheless,

until Marillac's fall, the Crown continued to try, at least on paper,
to order the activities of its judicial council.

The r&glement of

105Ibid., p. 148.
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January 18, 1630, prepared under the conscientious direction of
Marillac, meticuously detailed the workings of the Conseil prive
and once again attacked the abuses of justice administered in
council.

For the most part specific paragraphs reiterated past

admonitions to proceed under the law.

The first section piously

reaffirmed the ancient principle that "all affairs which lie in
contentious jurisdiction should be returned to the parlements,
Grand Conseil, Cour des Aides, and other ordinary judges."1^ >
No one in the council was to vote or remain seated when issues
involving relatives or "special friends" were d i s c u s s e d . L i k e 
wise no one was to attend if his impartiality had been challenged
by colleagues.

Several paragraphs established procedures to be

used by the maitres des requites for reporting evocations, appeals,
and contested cases in c o u n c i l . M b st importantly for the
Parlement of Paris, Article 18 declared that "decisions given in the
sovereign courts cannot be stopped or stayed [ cessls ni surcisl
save by means at law provided by the ordinances.
Section IV of the 1630 regulation defined "that business

which

His Majesty wishes and orders for the Conseil privi." Seven of the
eight articles contained nothing beyond ordinary and legally
sanctioned provision for requests, evocations, and the work of the
106Ibid., p. 184.
1Q7Ibid., p. 187.
108Ibid., pp. 186-87, Articles 9 and 12.
1Q9lbld., p. 187.
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the mitres des requites, but Innocuously buried in the middle of
the section was an extremely important new provision.

Article 26

declared that the Conseil privl would be charged with receiving
"the remonstrances of the parlements and other courts and affairs
concerning justice and the functions.of their charges."110 This
principle was not new, having previously been confided to the
Conseil d'Etat et des finances, but now the Conseil privl was handed
the right to hear and evaluate the remonstrances of the sovereign
courts, even though the king were not present.

This meant, in

effect, that the Conseil privl could judge conflicts between the
sovereign courts and the council.111
Despite the lack of written rSglements after 1630, the power
and importance of the conseil privl continued to grow.

By 1645 it

had acquired the right to hear cases of violations, excesses,
imprisonments, and rebellion originating out of the exercise of
councilliar authority:

the ordinances, arrlts du Conseil, judgments

of intendants, decisions of the trlsoriers de France, and other
conmrtssaires. This authority gave the Conseil privl the duty of
enforcing obedience to the council and the direct agents of the
king in the provinces, thus completing a structure of extraordinary
justice from intendant to council.

This structure was parallel to,

and outside of, the ordinary system of courts.

By the end of

11QIbid., p. 188.
111Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 161.
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Richelieu's ministry, the Conseil privg had become, in Mousnier's
phraseology, "an essential instrument of the realization of
absolute power.
The Parlement and other sovereign courts firmly resisted the
growth of councilliar justice and, in particular, that exercised
by the Conseil privg. The legal position assumed by the parlementaires at this time was no different than it had been at other
times of confrontation with the council.

The courts in general

subscribed to the broad relationship expressed by conseiller d'Etat
and jurisconsul Cardin Le Bret in 1632:
The parlements have over them the king, assisted by his
chancellor and his Conseil d'Etat in its broad sense from
them to receive correction Tf in something they exceed the
power given them, or if they come to do something contrary to
the good, of His Majesty's service and to the utility of the
kingdom.
The courts could not quibble with the superior authority of the king,
who indubitably possessed the "supreme power bestowed on one alone"
and who held the "right to command ab s o l u t e l y . H e n c e , when the
Ving was personally present in his council, the Parlement and other
sovereign courts acknowledged the validity of its decisions.

This

authority, however, did not extend to the council as an independent
body which, without the king's essential presence, had no powers
above those of the regular courts.

In the mid-1640's, for example,

when the chancellor asked Advocat General Omer Talon if he denied

112Ibid.
^•^Le Brat, De la souverain§tg du Roi, Bk. II, Ch. II, p. 157.
^Ibid., Bk. I, Ch. I, p. 1.
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the power and authority of the king's council, he replied "that he
acknowledged the authority of the King in his council and in his
ministry, while he was present t h e r e . W i t h o u t the mystical
presence of the king, the council remained on an equal footing with
the Parlement; both were sprung from common origins, the curia regis,
and neither could claim legal superiority.11^
To be sure, the sovereign courts never challenged the power of
the Conseil prive or the Conseil d'Etat et des finances in certain
cases of private law tendered in the ordinances.

The councils could

suspend decisions of the sovereign courts upon an appeal from one
of the parties based on the error of fact (proposition d'erreur) or
other recognized legal technicalities.

In these cases the maftre

de requites were expected to examine the appeal and, if found worthy,
to report it in the proper section of the council for examination.
The council, however, was not supposed to judge the matter itself,
but was to annul the decision and return it to the original judges
with instructions for retrial as the ordinances provided.

117

The

Council could also evoke an affair upon a request based on the
grounds of parente, that is, if the adversaries had relatives or
kin among the original judges, if the judges had other interests in
the case, or if they had been consulted or sollicited by either
party.

In these instances of inequity or ambiguity, the Council had

115Talon, M&noires, p. 152.
11^Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," pp. 145, 171.
92.

lir^By the Ordinance of Orleans, Art. 45, and that of Blois, Art.
Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XV, 76 and 404.
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the recognized right to regulate subordinate judges.
the case itself or commit it to another court.

It might judge

Finally, since only

the king could chose and invest his officers with their public
powers, only the Council could hear cases concerning provision to
office.
Certainly the Parlement and other sovereign courts had frequent
cause to complain of abuses in these categories of cases.

The

councillors often preferred to retain a case in the council and
judge it themselves, rather than return it to a lower court.

Fre

quently, too, the king granted blanket evocation privileges for
various political reasons to tax farmers, courtiers, rebels, the
Huguenots, communities, and diverse individuals.

These abuses

were numerous, notorious, and often provoked the courts to remon
strances, but they never carried the constitutional implications
surrounding the superiority of the Council in questions of public
law, matters of State, and bursal edicts.

In these matters there

existed a profound question of how royal arbitraire was to be
exercised.

If the superiority of the Council were upheld, a limited

number of the king's appointees could disrupt the traditional
balance between royal authority and the principle of wide counsel.
The question was basic and essential to the struggle to establish
absolutism in France, and it found both legal and institutional
l-^Mbusnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," pp. 175-76; Le Bret, De la
souverain£tl du roi, Bk. IV, Ch. II, pp. 490-91.
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expression when the Parlement was excluded from public affairs through
the use of councilliar arrgts.
The origin of the struggle over public matters, of course, was
grounded in the absolutistic policies of Richelieu and Louis,
policies which had as their basic premise "that the Parlement had been
established only to render justice to the subjects of the King, and
not to involve itself in affairs of State except when they had been
so commanded by the chief ordained of God."^^

This objective was

implicit in Richelieu's philosophy of government and was repeatedly
reiterated by Louis and Richelieu in official documents and oral
warnings to the court.

Neither King nor Cardinal ever envisioned a

substitution of the Council for the Parlement, or even a systematized
interference in the Parlement's legal jurisdiction.

Indeed, there

is no recorded evidence to suggest a radical modification of the
Parlement's historical legislative functions. Besides the necessity
of registering edicts, ordinances, and declarations, the Parlement
could be called on to lend its prestige to declarations against those
in revolt, the grands of the kingdom and their accomplices, and even
members of the royal family.

On occasion the court might be

commissioned to deal with some sensitive matters of State, such as
the annullment of Gaston's marriage to Marguerite of Lorraine in
1633f the conduct of an important criminal trial, legal or monetary
119ifol£, Memoires, I, 50.
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reform, or consultation over a treaty.

But at all times Louis,

like his predecessors, maintained that the Parlement should act
only on his order.120
In 1632, just at the height of the struggle between the council
and the Parlement, Cardin Le Bret sought to justify the use of the
arret du Conseil in public matters by propounding soundly reasoned
doctrines of councilliar superiority.

These were expressed in

fie la souverainete du roi, a treatise dedicated to Richelieu and
now recognized as the essential judicial expression of absolutism.
His argument was based on two points.

Conventionally enough, Le

Bret thought that the king unquestionably possessed the dernier
ressort in matters of justice:
Since only God can redress deficiencies and remedy disorders
which come into second causes. . . , it is only the king, who
represents this divine majesty on earth, who has the right
to correct the faults of officers and of magistrates that he
has commissioned in his place to render justice to his subjects.
The ancients called this sovereign right extremum judicium,
or dernier ressort.-*-21
What was the nature and quality of this ultimate jurisdiction?

For

Le Bret, the answer was quite conventional and in compliance with
current usages in councilliar cases:
It consists of the judgment of appeals, civil requests, proposi
tions of error [at lawj, illegality of decisions, evocations,
interdictions, and of regulation of judges.122
120lfousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 173.
121Le Bret, De la souverainit£ du roi, Bk. IV, Ch. II, pp.
490-91.

^Ibid.
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Le Bret then went Into alengthy dissertation on the application of
each of these questions, and in all cases concluded that the king
in council possessed sovereign authority over all the parlements.
Even in the nullification of sovereign court decisions, evocations,
and regulation of judges, which Le Bret termed "of the greatest
importance," there was no question of eouneilliar superiority.

He

firmly declared that
We see that the king has reserved the hearing of them in his
council, principally when he has been asked to nullify an
arrgt which, it is maintained, has been given contrary to his
ordinances, against the public utility, and against the rights
of the Crown. . . . When this comes about, there is no doubt
that the king can declare it null and override it, thus
imitating the example of Roman emperors.123
Le Bret also wrestled with the dilemman of the real presence of
the king in council.

In so doing he acknowledged that the Parlement

of Paris enjoyed a distinctly different status than that of the
other sovereign courts of France.

The presence of the king was

expected, but not required, to override its decisions:
I observe that on these occasions a difference is set between
the Parlement of Paris and other parlements and the sovereign
courts. When it is a question of nullifying an arrgt of the
Parlement of Paris, and when the presidents and conseillers
making the decision have to be heard to give an account of
their arret, this ought to be done in the presence of the king
Lcela se doit faire en la presence du Roy] . . . . But as to
the arrets which have been given in other parlements and other
companies, they are treated in the Conseil d'Estat or priv£,
although the king might not be present there.^

123lbid., pp. 497-98.
12^Ibid., pp. 496-97.
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The basis for this traditional observation was "that it is principally
in this court that he jthe king] has established the bed of his
justice with so much renown. "^5
The context of Le Bret's remarks in this chapter indicate that
his conclusions were generally oriented towards matters of private
law and administrative decisions.

Yet it is clear that he intended

that they were applicable to questions of public law as well, for he
drew no distinction between private cases, administrative decisions,
and questions of public law.

In all cases, regardless of subject or

consequence, the arrfets of the council were uniformly superior to
those of any sovereign court, and only the Parlement of Paris could
expect to be heard by the king in person.

Even in these circumstances

Le Bret was cautious, employing a conditional "ought to be done"
rather than a positive "must be done" in the royal presence.
The Parlement saw this limitation in a different way.

The judges

were aware that their duty lay in reminding the Crown of the law and
the rights of subjects and its obligation to respect both.

The court

maintained that this function was integral with an independent
advisory capacity.

In 1615 it had pretended to fulfill this role by

convoking on its own authority the princes of the blood, the dukes
and peers, and great Crown officers to deliberate on the conduct of
the State.

In this case the judges had even darkly hinted at the

removal of Concini, the Queen's favorite.

The same sort of independent

l^Ibid.
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capacity for reform inspired the activities of the Chamh-re de St. Louis
during the summer of 1648.

Though opportunities for extremes of

independent action were rare during Richelieu's ministry, the Parle
ment found many occasions to interfer with governmental policy, to
frustrate, obstruct, and to negate inportant legal reform, the trial
of a mar§sehal, prosecution of Richelieu's political enemies,
fiscal edicts, and other aspects of the Cardinal's program.
Finding opportunities for spontaneous advice extremely limited,
the Parlement usually found it had to offer its counsel through the
mechanism of remonstrances on a given issue.

The decision to present

remonstrances took the form of a juridical arr£t made after deli
beration en conseil, that is to say, with all chambers of the court
assembled "in council."

These deliberations were secret, limited to

sworn members of the court, and the decision taken therein represented
the will of the whole body.

Obviously such deliberations were often

contrary to royal wishes, and across the centuries a clumsy and
protracted, but rather pragmatic, system of negotiation had arisen
to mediate differences between the Parlement and the king.
The first move by the Parlement was usually moderate.

The gens

du roi communicated the court's opinion to the king, who then had
the option of perseverance, moderation, or total concession in his
original purpose.

In case of perseverance, the king conventionally

communicated his insistence through lettres de jussion, a form of the
sealed lettre de cachet enjoining the court to obey and outlining
reasons for it.

Lettres de jussion always originated in the
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chancellery, not in council, though the king might have their
dispatch debated there.

Hence the lettre de jussion was essentially

a personal communication of royal will, not a higher judicial
decision.
The first known lettre de jussion was issued in 1392, and by
the sixteenth century this instrument had lost most of its cutting
edge.

The Parlement felt free to ignore the letters until the

threat of other action presented itself.

If the jussion failed

to carry the point, the Crown had a variety of choices.

Prudent

and diplomatic rulers like Henry IV usually attempted to negotiate
with the Parlement by summoning a deputation, or by sending a
representative to the court to explain the royal position.

If the

court persisted in its resistance, the Crown was reduced to two
alternatives.

In rare instances of great need, kings traditionally

went to force registration of legislation or to annul the court's
action in a lit de justice. This ceremony was rich in legal,
symbolic, and psychological meaning.

In form the lit de justice

was a curious parody of the ancient curia regis.

The king entered

the court which had been prepared for his coming and, after exten
sive ceremonials, spoke the royal will through the chancellor or
garde des sceaux.

The opinions of the assembled judges were then

taken following a strict protocol.

Since their magisterial functions

ceased with the entry of the king, the status of the judges was
transubstantiated into the ancient status of councillors entitled to
express an independent formal opinion but ultimately required to
bow before that of the king as primus inter pares.
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Even while expressing royal will, the lit de justice was
clothed in dignity and public ceremonial.

The King had symboli

cally taken council, appearing personally before the judges to
let his will be known among his advisors.

During Louis XIII's

reign, however, the lit de justice began to suffer indignities which
eroded its meaning.

Responsibility for the degradation must be laid

at the door of both Crown and court.

After the lit of January 15,

1629, registering the Code Michaud, the judges found excuses to
continue their deliberations through the ensuing months.

Distracted

by military campaigning far from Paris, Louis was unable to force
the court to acknowledge his will until eight months later.

These

prolonged discussions tended to subvert the finality of royal
authority in the lit de justice. On the other hand, after Richelieu's
victory on the Day of Dupes, the Crown resorted to lits de justice
so frequently that the measure was converted into a relatively
common method of forcing the Parlement's hand.

Between November,

1630, and the Cardinal1s death in December, 1642, there were no
less than six lits de justice, or an average of one every two years.
During the period 1631-35 when the bickering between the Crown and
the Parlement waxed warmest, Louis held a lit de justice each year.12^
In addition, in 1637 Louis went to the Palais on a disciplinary
mission to enjoin the acceptance of new conseillers.
•^These lits de justice were: on August 13, 1631, to register a
decree against followers of Gaston d'Orleans; August 12, 1632, to
register a second edict against Gaston d'Orleans; April 12, 1633, to
register decrees concerning followers of Gaston; January 18, 1634, to
announce governmental policies before the court; December 20, 1635,
to register a large quantity of fiscal edicts.
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By way of contrast to these techniques, there were two lits de
justice during Henry IV's rule. One of these had come in 1597 when
the government was desperate for funds, the other was held in 1600
when Henry came to the court with the Duke of Savoy to show him the
majesty of his Parlement.

What is even more striking, Henry had not

had to resort to a lit de justice to compel registration of the
Edict of Nantes, even though the articles were an anathema to the
strongly Catholic court.

On this occasion, as on others, Henry

had been victorious by summoning the court to come to him at the
Louvre rather than going himself to force the royal will on the
court.
At best, however, the lit de justice had limitations as an
instrument of compulsion.

In abstract terms it satisfied the

court's pretensions to the expression of council, but in reality
lits often did nothing more than offend the judges and stiffen their
resistance.

Moreover, the king had to be present in person, and

many times this was impossible or impractical.

In these instances,

the arrSt du conseil offered a potent second alternative. Assuming
that the Parlement had already issued an arrgt of its own, an
arrit du Conseil could judicially quash the Parlement1s ruling and
substitute that of the council.

The councilliar arret was legally

unimpeachable if made in the king's presence, wherever he might be;
absolutistic doctrine such as that of Le Bret went further and
held that the council as a body held precedent over the court
whether the king were present or not.
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Only after all legal maneuvres had been exhausted did relations
between the Parlement and the Crown degenerate into an exercise in
the application of force majeure. If a lit de justice or an arrlt
du Conseil failed, the Crown was reduced to a single dramatic but
unpalatable and rather ineffectual gesture: it could order the arrest
or exile of those spearheading opposition in the court.

A move like

this, however, was a touchy operation fraught with hazardous
consequences, for if matters were pressed to this point, the Parle
ment actually had the upper hand.

It usually had public opinion on

its side, especially in financial controversies, and it could easily
retaliate by calling a judicial strike and throwing a monkey wrench
into the business of high justice.

For any chance of success, the

number of judges punished and their selection was a matter of
considerable discretion.

The group had to be large enough to

symbollize royal intentions but small enough to minimize the
antagonistic reaction within and without the court.

The court could

not be put out of business by a suspension en masse. Moreover, it
was imperative to strike at the genuine ringleaders within the
Parlement, and this was not always easy to do, since a rule of
secrecy was presumed to prevail for discussions en conseil.

In stun,

the efficacy of force, however judicious, was always dubious.
It is significant that while Richelieu was willing to underline
his determination by employing these kinds of measures, he was also
aware of their limitations.

The timing, extent, and severity of

arbitrary measures was always characterized by moderation, selectivity,
and a willingness to negotiate.

No more than six judges were ever
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ordered out of Paris at any one time.

No judge was ever humiliated—

or given the chance to "become a martyr— by confinement in the
Bastille or Vincennes.

The usual circumstances of exile corresponded

with those of house arrest today, since the magistrates were ordered
to remove themselves to their country houses.
That the extreme of exile was reached six times during the
decade 1631-1641 is a revealing indicator of the tensions playing
between the Crown and its high court.

Until Richelieu's ministry,

any kind of coercion beyond the lit de justice or arrSt du Conseil
had been extremely rare.

Francis I had succeeded in breaking the

Parlement's resistance to the Concordat of 1516 without carrying out
threats to establish another parlement or to have the Parisian
judges "scamper after him like the Grand Conseil." After Francis
returned from captivity in 1526, he had disciplined the proeureur
general and three other judges by suspending them from their
official duties for six months, but the judges apparently suffered
no other indignities.

In any case, on this occasion the King's

objective was a chastisement for past actions rather than an attempt
to coerce the passage of legislation or to slam the door on a
decision of the court.

Other examples of interdiction could be

found during the sixteenth century, notably in 1561 when First Presi
dent Gilles le Maistre had been relieved of his duties.

The first

recorded example of the exile of a judge came in 1597 when Henry IV
ordered Jacques Riviere outside the vicomte of Paris for six months
for his opposition to the registration of fiscal edicts.127

Thus,

127See supra, Chapter II, p. 92.
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as with councilliar justice and the lit de justice, the repeated employ
ment of purely arbitrary measures to control the Parlement indicates
not a new technique of government but a new determination to limit the
role of the Parlement in formulating public policy.

The Parlement,

on its side, showed itself willing to go to greater extremes of
obstinacy than ever before to block the growth of royal power.
Richelieu's employment of commissaires and other forms of
extraordinary justice also reflect a conventional and traditional
solution to immediate administrative needs.

As seen in Chapter IV,

Richelieu saw in the charge of lSse-majeste an effective legal
weapon against all kinds of real or suspected resistance to royal
authority.

The accusation was flexible.

It would serve equally well

against the conspiracies of les grands, religious rebels, pamphleteers,
and, in general, all those deemed in opposition to the king.

For

prosecution and trial, however, the accusation required at least the
formalities of judicial proceeding, and given the usual prerequisites
in such cases— haste, surety, and political reliability— the simplest
and most effective alternative to regular courts was to deliver them
into the hands of commissioned judges.

The magistrates were quick to

see the implications in the extended use of commissaires, and
after the Day of Dupes this quickly became one of the focal points
of parlementaire politics.
The nuclear issue at stake in the creation of eornmissaires
was closely related to the extension of the council's powers.

Like

the various forms of councilliar justice, the powers granted through
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a royal commission were an expression of justice retenue, the quality
of sovereign justice retained in the king's hands.

The exercise of

justice retenue in this way had troubled the monarchy for centuries,
and, in form, the problem under Richelieu was no different from the
past.

Expressed most simply, the Crown maintained the untrammeled

right to institute or commission agents of justice as it pleased, and
to invest them with the absolute authority of the king over regular
officers.
The most articulate spokesman for the employment of commissaires
in absolute government was Cardin Le Bret.

In Book II of De la

souverainetl du Roy, Le Bret developed a justification for their use
which brought together several essential, perhaps one should say cru
cial, arguments concerning this expression of royal authority.

In

Chapter I, Le Bret addressed himself to the question of the delegation
or retention of judicial powers and the appointment of royal officers.
In concert with his contemporaries, Le Bret acknowledged that
there are principally three kinds of officers which the king
employs in the administration of his kingdom, to wit, those
of judicature, of war, and of finances. I will treat separately
their functions to show that they depend absolutely on his
sovereign authority. But before going on, it seems to me that
following this discourse I am obliged also to
of
commissions extraordinaires, because it is a
of
sovereignty, which takes its source from it, which gives kings
the power to institute such officers as seems proper to them.128

63<ÿ

In short, the right to create officers found expression in two ways,
through the creation of ordinary officers such as the magistrates of
128-Le Bret, De la souverainltl du Roy, Bk. II, Ch. I, pp. 148-49.
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the Parlement and through the granting of commissions.

There was no

difference in the origin of the two types of agents; hoth had their
wellspring in the sovereign power of the king to appoint officials.
Up to this point Le Bret’s argument remained more or less
conventional and within recognized bounds of public law.

When

defining the qualities, authority, institution, legality, and
relationship of commissaires to other officers, however, Le Bret
expounded an exceptionally absolutistic doctrine.

A conseiller

d’Etat himself, Le Bret tied the question of independent eommissaires
to the authority of members of the council.

There were, he maintained,

two sorts of commissions: one is perpetual and attributes to
commissaires to rank and dignity for all time. One sees it in
the governors of provinces, conseillers, and secretaires d'Etat,
who even have the right to qualify themselves as chevaliers.
The other is only temporary and for the expedition of certain
affairs.129
Even if the commission were only a temporary one, however, perhaps
as an intendant or as a trial judge, it "gives to commissaires a
rank more elevated than that of the officers whose charges they
exercise during their interdiction."1^0 According to Le Bret’s
reasoning, this is "because they represent more particularly the
person of the prince, in whose name they act, and because it is a
maxim of canon law that Qmnis delegatus major est ordinario in re
delegata.
129Ibid., pp. 150-51.
13°Ibid., p. 151.
131Ibid., p. 151.
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What were the parameters for the delegation of power through
the commission?

For Le Bret the process was quite simple:

It is necessary that they [any commissions] specifically
delineate the power that the king gives to the commissaires,
and no person of whatever quality that he might he can
obstruct their execution, revoke them, or restrain them
without injurying the royal authority. It is sufficient
that they be published and signified.-*-32
Publication in a sovereign court was not required; the fact of
documentation and royal seals alone was adequate to authenticate
transmission of power.

In brief, the delegation process was

virtually unrestricted, and such commissions enjoyed sure superiority
over any regular officers superceded (in Le Bret's words, "inter
dicted") by the commission.
And what of the legal prohibitions against commissions and
commissaires found in the royal ordinances?

Le Bret acknowledged

that the ordinances superficially prohibited the issuance of
commissions.

But most significantly, he argued that there was a

difference between the provisions of the ordinances in cases of
private law involving only individuals and the application of the
law to public affairs.

Once again Le Bret interpreted the legal

limits to royal authority in a broad and absolutistic fashion:
I know that by the Edict of Blois, Article 98, that one
could infer that the king tied his hands not to give such
commissions, desiring that each case be returned to the
officers who should naturally have eomptence over it. But
he intended to prohibit them only for private affairs which
go no further than the interest of individuals, because on

132jbid., p. i5o.
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these occasions it is unreasonable to change anything in the
order which has been established by usage and the ordinances,
and not when it is a question of public affairs which concern
the State. There is no doubt that since he has reserved the
hearing of these for himself, following the edict of Charles
VIII, that he can. commission such persons as seems proper to
him to hear them.-1-”
The legal basis for Le Bret's argument was grounded in the principles
of Roman law which since the medieval period had been utilized to
strengthen the sovereign principle.

In this instance the seven

teenth century jurisconsul argued that the difference between private
and public affairs, and thus the difference between officers and
commissaires,
had been introduced after the example of Roman law, which set
up a difference between affairs which fall into ordinary
jurisdiction and those which affect the public. The hearing
of the former should belong to the officers, jure Magistratus,
and the hearing of the latter, a lege tantum, vel a Principe""
dabatur, that is to say, by c o m m i s s i o n . 1 ^
The argument was a perfect legal complement to Richelieu's philo
sophy of reason of State.

like the minister he served in the council,

Le Bret posited the status of the State as distinct from, and superior
to, the individual's place.

The State's powers were embodied in the

king's person, and he alone could determine the delegation of those
powers.
Le Bret spoke in terms of royal authority and the prerogatives
of that authority.

The Parlement's business, on the other hand,

was the rendering of justice.

Limited in their arguments at law

133Ibid., p. 149.
134Ibid., pp. 149-50.
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by the ultimate sovereignty of the king, the judges preferred to
base their remonstrances about commissaires on the fundamental
principles of moral justice and good kingship.

Its major sentiments

on the issue had been made known in the well-known remonstrances of
1615, but surviving examples from the heated exchanges of the 1630's
are rare, largely because remonstrances, while expressing the
court's official stand, were not normally committed to the registers.
Survival of the text of remonstrances was thus left to chance
and became problematical.

Nevertheless, some of the Parlement's

chief premises emerge from a manuscript preserved in the private
papers of Nicolas de Bellievre, son of Chancellor Pomponne de
Belli&vre and a prgsident & mortier between 1614 and 1 6 4 2 . The
piece is almost certainly the first remonstrance against the
commissaires of the Chambre de 1 'Arsenal, established by edict on
June 14, 1631.

Evidence in the form of Bellievre's letters to and

from garde des sceaux Chateauneuf indicates that the judge prepared
•^Untitled piece in B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, "Memoires, discours,
correspondence et papiers divers de Nicolas de Bellievre," fols.
24-31v . While the exact date of preparation is uncertain, internal
evidence in the piece and in following letters places its com
position during the latter part of September or early October of
1631. The official standing of the essay is somewhat difficult to
describe. It represents the opinion of Bellievre and the Chambre
des vacations, but neither the president A mortier nor the Chambre
des vacations' could represent the entire Parlement on an issue of
this importance. On the other hand, the ensuing action of the
Parlement after November 11 certainly shows that Bellievre1s memoir
accurately represents the sentiments of the whole court towards
the Chambre de I1Arsenal.
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the memoir on behalf of the Chambre des vacations which was sitting
when the Chambre de 1*Arsenal became active.
Bellievre1s theme, couched in customary Baroque flourishes,
pursued a philosophical rather than strictly legal course.

The

principles of justice and good kingship required an end to the
practice of commissaires, which was injurious to the Parlement and
to the monarchy.

"Petty princes and conquerors are somewhat

excusable if they use them for a certain time, " Bellievre began,
but great king's, established by God, cherished and revered
by the people, possessing their scepters in all assurance
through a long contiguous series of successions, resembling
the sun in its summer solstice . . . gladly leave their
subjects the liberty and security which is most commonly
found before ordinary justices. If this abuse [of commissaires]
began to appear within their States, there is no doubt that
they would immediately have it pulled out by the roots, since
there is nothing which could more quickly destroy credit before
their people . . . and which would most powerfully alienate
the hearts of their subjects. 37
Henry III had acknowledged this principle in establishing the
Ordinance of Blois which had wiped out the "new abuse" of commissioned
justice and restored "the former law of the kingdom."

Justice was

essential to the well-being of the State, but it was also necessary
that the justice be meted out by respected judges:
It is highly important to the reputation of Your Majesty that
evildoers be punished. There is nothing more necessary in a
State, but the intention [of justice] is not to eliminate their
persons. Rather it is the example that the public receives
from it. If judgment is rendered by commissaires, even should
136gee the five pieces of correspondence dated September 23 to
October 4 at B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fols. 32 through 40.
137B.N. M s . fr. 18415, fol. 24v°.
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it be the most just in the world, the result would be entirelylost because no one would be convinced that justice had been
done.1?8
Commissioned justice could not possibly encourage the credit and
credence that justice required from the king's subjects.

"How

could this credence of subjects be universally received by everyone,"
the remonstrance asked, "when an accused is given certain pliant
judges?" Not only was he deprived of his "natural judges and not
sent sent before another regular company," but "these commissaires
might even be chosen from different places, to judge without appeal
in a place where they had never assembled before and would never
be seen again."^39
The remonstrance terminated with a standard article of
parlementaire doctrine: no court or commissaires could serve the
purposes of justice better than the Parlement.

Moreover, the usage

of "chosen judges" had sometimes been tolerated, "but it must be
recognized that to soften the rigor in the eyes of the people,
their commissions were addressed to the parlements, to be there
verified."1^0 Verification in the Parlement satisfied two require
ments.

By making the commission known to the court, regular judges

could ensure that it was used according to its intended purpose.

It

also served as an opportunity to examine the qualifications of the
commissaire:

138b .n . Ms.

fr.18415, fol. 24v°.

139B.N. Ms .

f r . 18415, f o l . 25.

U °B.N. Ms.

fr. 18415, fol. 26v°.
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Inasmuch as to honor an officer with a commission is to give him
a new title and an approbation of his conduct, it is highly
important that he pass this examination in his company, the
which, seeing him named in the letters of the commission, can
make known the difficulties which might be imported for His
Majesty service and for the honor that should proceed out
The checks proposed by Bellievre would have in effect given the
Parlement power to review and to delay the exhcution of royal
commissions.

The judges might also insist that members of their

own body be entrusted with important commissions, particularly those
of criminal trials.

Medieval and Renaissance monarchs had sometimes

agreed to this policy, yet often they had preferred to avoid selecting
parlementaire judges.

The latter tendency was firmly established as

the Parlement more and more came to show itself independent of
Crown policy under Richelieu's ministry.
The problem of commissioned justice was but one aspect of the
complex problem of the institutional establishment of absolutism in
the French monarchy.

Closely, perhaps inseparably, associated with

it were other manifestations of absolutism such as councilliar
government, the intendants, extraordinary fiscal expedients, and
vigorous measures to contain the independence of the Crown's high
officials.

Varied the techniques of absolute government were, and

equally varied were the responses evoked by than from the diverse
orders of seventeenth century society.

No group, however, was

more directly affected than the bureaucracy, and no group within

U 1 B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fol. 26v°.
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the bureaucracy was more affected than the Parlement of Paris.

For

the judges, absolutistic government meant a gross distortion of the
fundamental qualities of justice, good kingship, the rule of law,
and respect for individual and corporate privilege; evocations,
interdictions, arrgts du Conseil, lits de justice, arbitrary arrests
and exile, commissaires, and finagling of the paulette represented
particularly intolerable abuses of sovereignty.
took a different view.

The Crown, conversely,

Richelieu’s philosophy of reason of State

held the same practices to be justifiable, necessary, and legally
defensible procedures to compell obedience, and thus to bring
glory and grandeur to king and kingdom.
Since the principles of precedence dominated French public
law, Crown and court were well aware of the roles each had played in
the past, but neither could possibly see their struggle in the 1600’s
as institutional historians can today.

That view, longer by several

centuries, properly puts the clash in the continuum of persistent
historical dilemmas confounding the administration of justice in the
monarchy since the fourteenth century.

It is an intensification of

this continuing dichotomy between the attractions of administrative
justice and customary legality, rather than any ”administrative
revolution” during the ministry of Richelieu, which perhaps best
characterizes the play of constitutional tensions during the period
1624-42.
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POLITICS AND THE PARLEMENT: I

On April 29, 1624, Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu,
was introduced into a meeting of the royal council, then attending
the King at the ancient chateau of Compiegne.

Richelieu's entry

was an unpleasant surprise for at least some of the councillors
present, it being widely thought in court circles that the King was
indifferent, even antagonistic, towards the Cardinal.
recently this had been true.

In fact until

Louis had changed his mind in deepest

secrecy, and the decision had only been made known to Richelieu
during the preceding evening.

Louis' reluctancy had been overcome

primarily through the maternal influence of Marie de Medicis and in
spite of the best efforts of La Vieuville, then directing the
finances, and old Marshal Lesdiguieres, former favorite of Henry IV.
The councilliar nomination was the culmination of a long and
assiduous cultivation of the Queen Mother, who alone could persuade
Louis that his initial distrust of Richelieu was without foundation.
The most immediate reward for the Cardinal's diligence, ambition,
and artful manipulation, however, was anticlimatical.

This first

council meeting was distinguished by nothing other than a squabble
over precedence that would have been totally insignificant had it
not resulted in Richelieu's assumption of the second place at the
council table, next to that of Cardinal La Rochefoucauld.
La Rochefoucauld, afflicted with the burdens of old age, soon

355
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retired from the council and left the unofficial, but meaningful,
place of first minister to Richelieu.

With the disgrace and arrest

of La Vieuville in August, Richelieu's primacy was virtually un
challenged.*^
Richelieu's introduction into the ministry caused hardly a
ripple on the then tranquil waters of parlementaire politics.
During the spring and simmer of 1624> the Parlement, then under the
leadership of the placid and scholarly Nicolas de Verdun, was
occupied with routine business, and it would be several years before
the stirrings of royal power began to disturb the court's relations
with the Crown.

The domestic politics of the era were complex in

the extreme, yet the initial serenity of the new ministry is fairly
easy to account for.

While Louis' authority was at a low ebb, and

the government in serious financial need, Richelieu's alternatives
in regard to the Parlement were really quite limited.

His

immediate concern was to protect and enlarge his foothold in
Louis' confidence, an undertaking ineampatable with an aggressive,
risfcy policy towards those in the Palais de Justice.

Additionally

the circumstances of 1624 and 1625 drew Richelieu's attention
towards foreign affairs, notably the area of the Valtelline passes
and the arrangement of an English marriage for Louis' sister
Henrietta.

Even if Richelieu had been willing to confront the

court with controversial legislation, the state of the council
would have made a coordinated policy difficult.

The chancellors of

1Burckhardt, Richelieu, His Rise to Power, p. 158-60.
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the 1620's— Sillery until June, 1624, then D'Aligre— were not men of
Richelieu's confidence.

D'Aligre, a cipher, was inclined to avoid

confrontation with the Parlement.

Michel de Marillac, who could

hold a tough line with the magistrates, was not made garde des
sceaux with custody of the seals until in the summer of 1626.

Lastly,

the council as a whole favored a conservative, careful financial
policy made possible by a lull in religious and noble civil war.
Until 1627 a line was held on taxes, the Parties casuelles, and
extraordinary revenues, and instead of these measures a chambre de
justice was instituted in October, 1624, to fill the royal coffers.2
The formation of the Chambre de justice and the Parlement's
reaction to it were characteristic of the first two years of
Richelieu's ministry.

The Cardinal's MSmoires indicate that he

conceived the notion of a proceeding against the Crown's creditors
during the summer of 1624.^ An investigation of this nature was
almost perfectly tailored to the needs of the moment.

The

financiers were uniformly disliked and distrusted throughout society,
and any move against them would likely have popular approval.

From

the government's standpoint, too, the opportunity could not have
been better.

The Crown was in desperate need of money, yet its

most pressing needs, those of the military, were temporarily in
2Ibid., pp. 160-91; Lublinskaya, French Absolutism, 1620-29, pp.

272-325:
^Richelieu, Memolres, II, 345; Lettres, II, 178. The Memolres
indicate that the decision was taken soon after La Vieuville's removal
as surintendant des finances on August 12, 1624. The establishment
was debated for several days in council, during which time
Richelieu actively argued in favor of it. His views are exposed at
length in the Mgmoires, II, 345-48.
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abeyance after the peace of Montpellier, signed with the Huguenots
in 1622.

At the same time, however, Richelieu's future plans for

an excursion into the Valtelline area in 1625 hinged on finding
new funds.

The sources were limited.

It was impossible to raise

taxes, already at the breaking point, and additional extraordinary
revenues were a delicate proposition, as was any tinkering with the
paulette. The natural solution was a chambre de justice, an
investigation into the business dealings of the Crown's chief
financiers which amounted to a government-sponsored blackmail
operation in the King's interest.

From the beginning the Crown

never intended to delve into the financier's bookkeeping but to
threaten them with fines and exposure before the public eye.

Rather

than have their books audited and their personal reputations
besmirched, most of the financiers would prefer to compound their
obligations in secret negotiations which would net substantial sums
for the royal treasury.

In one expeditious operation the people

would be pleased, a good moral example set, the treasury filled, and
the rapaciousness of the financiers discouraged.

So ran reasoning

within the council in the summer and fall of 1625.^
^Richelieu, M&noires, II, 345-48, has a long and detailed exposi
tion on the advantages to be gained from the Chambre. Glasson main
tained that Richelieu hoped to make the Chambre permanent and that the
Parlement objected. Le Parlement de Paris, I, 13J! This thesis is
not substantiated by tEe Mgmolres,~The Testament politique, Richelieu's
papers, or by the registers of the Parlement. Glasson undoubtedly
drew his conclusion from Richelieu's similar proposal to establish a
Chambre de justice which would tour the provinces and receive complaints
about abuses In the regular courts and parlements. See Lettres, II,
178, and supra, p. 160.
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Although it was a financial "bench, the Chambre de justice
required the approval of the Parlement because it would make an
important judicial inquiry in Paris with the King's sovereign
authorization.

For several reasons, however, the court was quite

willing to accept the establishment.

The judges loathed the

financiers as leeches living off the King's tax farms, enjoying
immunity from prosecution behind the council's skirts, and
acquiring great wealth which they used to advance themselves
socially.^ For these reasons and others, in the great remonstrance
of 1615 the judges had asked Louis for "an exact and serious investi
gation of malversations committed in his finances by those who have
the management and disposition of them."6 This investigation had
never taken place, and the thieving went on.

Hence, in 1624 the

magistrates regarded such an examination, even one undertaken by a
specially constituted court, with favor.

The judges, too, could

console their legal consciences with the thought that the Chambre,
while prostituting justice in a most inequitous way, did have
several precedents. Similar ehambres de justice had been constituted
several times in the sixteenth century and under Henry IV in 1597,
1601, and 1607.7
5See Dent, Crisis in Finance, pp. 113-231, for the truth and
the fiction surrounding the financiers in society.
^Mole, Mgmoires, I, 49.
7Richou, Histoire des conmissions extraordinaires, pp. 98-99.
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Thus when the judges received two royal declarations dated
October 21, 1624, "erecting and establishing . . . a chambre de
justice composed of the officers of our sovereign courts," the magis
trates were favorably disposed towards the letters.®

The Crown's

method of approach to the Parlement, the explicitness of its
legislation, and its selection of the membership of the Chambre
further insured that no objections would be forthcoming.

The

declarations meticulously detailed the purposes and objectives of the
new bench in a way that made the King's intentions crystal clear,
thereby soothing fears that the chamber might be perverted to other
ends.

The first edict set out that the chamber was to prosecute

the officers to finance, their staffs, and those in charge of
extraordinary levies made since 1607.

This was extremely important,

because the King wished "that the judgments which will be given by
the said number a quorum of at least seven judges

should be of

parallel force and virtue as the decisions of our sovereign courts."*
The Chambre de justice, in other words, would temporarily act as a
sovereign court with the same binding quality as the ancient
sovereign courts.
Perennial jealousies and anxieties could easily have been
aroused by a jurisdiction like this had not the Crown further

®The declarations are Actes rpyaux, F.46949, nos. 23 and 24.
Lettres de cachet and correspondence relating to the establishment
of the chamber are in Mole, Memoires, I, 334-38.
^Aetes royaux, F.46949, no. 23, p. 7.
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allayed fears by sending the Chambre!s commission to be verified
in the Parlement.

This second edict indicated that the commissaires

would uinvestigate civilly or criminally in first instance . . . all
causes . . . concerning the said faults and malversations b o m by
our [accompanying] letters."10 The judges were to work at the
chamber and not their regular duties; they were to pursue abuses
and malversations wherever found in the kingdom; they had permission
to travel as need be; they could sub-delegate their authority.
Cases of over 1500 livres could be appealed to the full chamber;
those under 1500 livres could be judged with an appeal to six of the
officers of the chamber.

Full power was given over other

sovereign courts:
To do this we have given and give you full power, authority,
commission, and special mandate: informing and ordering the
staff of our courts of Parlement, Grand Conseil, Chambre
de nos comptes, Cour de nos aydes . . . (and all other
courts^] to which it appertains, that you should be obeyed
in this; and to all their prevots, their lieutenants and
archers . . . to execute your decrees, ordinances’!
judgments, and decisions.11
The commission listed twenty commissaires by name, fifteen of whom
came from the sovereign courts of the kingdom and five from the
maitres des requites. The Parlement would send two deputies:

Henri

de Mesines, seventh president a mortier, and Pierre Gayant,

10Actes Royaux, F.46949, no. 24, p. 5.
11Ibid., p. 6.
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conseiller and president aux Enqu£tes.

Presidency was entrusted to

Chancellor D'Aligre with Rene de Maupeou, conseiller d'Etat,
directing prosecution in the King's name.1^
Presentation of the Chambre1s creation and commission fully
satisfied the Parlement.

On October 23 the court ordered unrestricted

registration of both letters "according to their form and tenor."
As a reference and precaution for the future, though, the judges wrote
a complete summary of the legislation into their registers.13
The chamber opened its meetings on October 30 and sat for more than
six months, during which it judged numerous financiers.

The

court's registers and Moll's Memolres maintain a total silence
on these operations, indicating that the commission maintained good
relations with the Parlement.

This held true even though the

original membership of the commission was modified during the course
of its investigations.-1^

These probes were successfully completed

by the middle of April, 1625.

On the 25th of that month Robert

Aroauld d'Andilly, a former conseiller d'Etat with reliable
governmental contacts, recorded the extent of the chamber's
success in his journal:
12Ibid.
13B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 24-25, October 23, 1624.
1^The seven judges from the provincial sovereign courts never
attended, and their place was taken by Marillac and De Roissy,
conseillers d'Etat, and Champigny, surlntendant des finances. Richou,
Histoire des commissions extraordinaires, p. 102.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

363

The composition with the financiers comes to VII million IIII
rsicl thousand livres, Mr De Beaumarchais, La Barre, D'Onon
and Aubret (condemned) excepted. — Since [this time) IF
Beaumarchais has made his agreement at 2 millions of livres,
in payment of which sum he gave up his office of tresorier
de l'espargne which the King in turn sold to IF IPaven for
1 million livres.15
Having thus squeezed the King's creditors, the Chambre was dissolved
in May, 1625.

The Parlement was notified by means of a lettre de

cachet on May 16, but it delayed registration of the lettre and
accompanying declaration until June 2.^
The court had been receptive to the Cbamh-pp de justice because
of its timeliness and public popularity, because it had been duly
submitted for examination, and because it increased revenues
without increasing taxes.

The same receptivity, however, did not

always apply to other financial expedients such as rentes and
creations of office.

In times of need the Crown leaned heavily on

these measures for extra income, but because of their wasteful and
burdensome nature, the Parlement usually subjected them to through
scrutiny.

As a general rule, unless the legislation was

exceptionally controversial, the court eventually gave its approval.
Sometimes, however, the verification process was rather leisurely,
either because of the pressure of other business or through
fault-finding of the judges.

■^Robert Amauld d'Andilly, Journal inedit, 1620-1632, ed.
Eugene and Jules Halphen (10 vols.j fcaris, 1888-1909), V, 17.
Lublinskaya confirms the settlement of 10,000,000 livres in
French Absolutism, 1620-29, p. 274^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 56, 58-61, May 16 and
June 2, 1625; Actes royaux, F. 46952, no. 10.
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The court's hesitancy to approve additional rentes was evident
in November, 1624, when the Crown presented an edict creating
500,000 livres of rentes to be issued by the Hotel de Ville of
Paris on the revenues of the gabelles.

The Parlement delayed

consideration until December 20, when it decided it would not
proceed to the verification.
court had changed its mind.

By the 10th of January, though, the
Then it decided to register, but

only with the formula "at the very express commandment of the
said seigneur King and after the said commandment was

several

times repeated," and under the condition that revenues coming from
the sale would actually be used to defray expenses of war,
government, and aimies, and none others.

Trfes humbles remonstrances

were also to be sent stating the reasons for these actions.

These

gestures were more or less standard procedure for the court,
indicating that while displeased it was willing to concede to the
Crown with a statement of its opinions.
The Parlement was more reluctant than usual to approve a
creation of offices proposed during the spring of 1627, even though
at this time a fresh Huguenot uprising centering on La Rochelle had
been gathering headway for months.

At this date, of course, no one

could have envisioned the lengthy siege operations which were to
come during the fall and winter of 1627, yet everyone knew that the
King would need money for suppression of the rebellion.

Accordingly,

17B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9775, fol. 298; Mole, Memoires, I,
33?, n. 1.
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In April, 1627, the Parlement was presented with a fat package of
edicts creating a multitude of new offices.

Among them was a

scheme to double the staff of the presidiaux and private courts
in the ressort of the parlement by putting them on a semestrial basis.
Half of the officials in these courts would serve from January to
June, the other half July through December.

Another edict

multiplied the staffs of the tresoriers de France and the g^neraux
des finances;

a third added a clerk to the clerical staff of al1

courts and jurisdictions in the kingdom.1** Without explaining
itself, the Parlement ordered on May 14 "that it should not and
could not proceed to the verification of the said edicts."19

Two

lettres de juasion in close succession failed to move the judges, who
on June 7 decided once again to persist in their deliberations.
Two of the edicts, those concerning the financial bureaus and the
clerks, were finally registered on June 28.^0 A final decision on
the edict concerning the semestrial system in the lower courts
cannot be found, and it was probably withdrawn at a later date.

1{*B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 212-13, June 7, 1627. The
registers for this date contain a synopsis of the April edicts, two
of which can be found in printed form as Actes royaux, F.46959,
no. 2, and F.46960, no. 2.
19B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 213, June 7, 1627.
20b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 213, June 7, 1627; Actes
royaux, F.46950, no.2, and F.46960, no. 2.
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While primarily occupied with foreign affairs for the first
two years of his ministry, Richelieu began to turn his attention to
domestic affairs in earnest during 1626.

Upon entering the ministry

he had promised Louis, in the words of the Testament politique,
to "humble the great nobility.11 The opening moves in the campaign to
fulfill this promise were meant to instill respect for the King's
law among those of the Second Estate by strengthening dueling
laws and by ordering the leveling of strongpoints from which nobles
could defy the government.

The Parlement*s registration and

enforcement would be necessary to put teeth into these laws, but
since they would strengthen the efficacy of royal law and the king's
authority without challenging any prerogatives of the magistrates,
the judges were inclined to support them.

Hence, in seeking the

court's approval, the risks of a collision were low and the rewards
of success high.

Louis, especially sensitive to public violation of

his authority and ever determined to have himself obeyed, was in
full agreement with his chief minister.
Richelieu's impulse to combat the practice of duels was
fundamental if the nobility were to be subjected to the king's will,
for the problem was at the same time both symbolic and a very real
manifestation of the nobility's insubordination.

Antique custom

permitted gentlemen to carry swords, and manners just as ancient
encouraged their use in affairs of honor.

In feudal times the

sword had been essential to the feudal code of honor as well as the
battlefield, but by the seventeenth century it had become largely
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symbolic of the past and thus of the honorable lineage of the
bearer.

Nevertheless, gentlemen continued to consider it their

privilege to wield their weapons in the settlement of private
quarrels, and thousands of noblemen so destroyed themselves each
year.

The net result was more than a senseless slaughter.

The

practice of dueling set nobleman above the law by allowing him the
privilege of personal justice, which Inevitably became the right
to murder on certain occasions.

Cardinal Richelieu was aware of

the problem in a painfully personal way, for his older brother had
died at the hands of an unscrupulous duelist in 1619•21 As
churchman, too, Richelieu was obliged to take an active stand against
the custom, and he encouraged Louis to do the same.

As he advised

the King in 1629, "One could truthfully say that His Majesty and
his council will answer for all the souls lost in this diabolical
way if they do not prevent them by the rigor of the penalties due
such a crime.1,22
Under these circumstances one of the Cardinal's first acts
upon assuming office was to renew past injunctions against dueling.
By a declaration of June 25, 1624, Henry IV's law of 1609 against
dueling was

c o n f i r m e d . ^3

The declaration, however, went unheeded.

21The death.of Richelieu's brother is described in Burckhardt,
Richelieu, His Rise to Power, pp. 130-31.
22Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," 192-93; Richard Herr,
"Honor Versus Absolutism: Richelieu's Fight against Dueling,"
Journal of Modem History, XXVII (1955), 281-85.
2^Isambert, Anciermes lois franeaises, XVI, 146. This edict
was registered in the Parlement on July 1, 1624. The edict of 1609
is given in Isambert, anciennes lots franqaises, XV, 351-58.
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Affairs of honor continued unabated, and by 1626 the failure of
past policy became evident.

"Duels had become so common, so

ordinary," Richelieu wrote of the period, "that the streets began
to serve as fields of combat, and as if the day were not long
enough to exercise their fury, they fought under the stars or by
the light of torches which served them as a fatal sun.
Recognizing the failure of past legislation, Richelieu determined
on a modified approach.

Until this time the king1s law had

automatically branded all duelists as criminals of lese-majest£ and
uniformly required the death penalty for all participants, including
seconds, even in engagements not resulting in a death.

Richelieu

reasoned that this severity was too rigorous because its inflexibility
made enforcement difficult in cases where no loss of life had
occurred, or where guilt was not clearly established.

In these

cases forfeiture of liberty, honors, charges, and social position
would be much more e f f e c tive.^
The declaration presented to the Parlement in March, 1626,
closely conformed to these thoughts.

The simplistic uniform death

penalty was abandoned and all former offenders pardoned in virtue
of the marriage of the King's sister.

Having wiped the slate clean,

the edict substituted a graduated scale of punishments which
acknowledged the complexity of the offense; Henceforth, all duelists
would be subject to loss of public office, royal pensions, and

^Richelieu, Memoires, III, 40.
^Ibid., 40-43; Herr, "Richelieu's Fight Against Dueling,"
p. 283.
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confiscation of a third of their property.

"Principal authors of

the crime" stood to lose more: confiscation of half of their
property and a banishment from the kingdom for three years.

Repeat

offenders, those who killed an opponent, or those who "cowardly"
urged their seconds to join the combat were liable to "irremissible"
derogation and execution since they fought by intention.

Judgment

of dueling crimes was specifically confided to the parlements,
which were solemnly promised that the Crown would refrain from
issuing letters of grace nullifying their decisions.

In the future

all gentlemen were expected to peaceably submit insults and questions
of honor to ad hoc courts of peers which would hear the issue
and exact such satisfaction as they deemed appropriate.

Those

who refused amicable arbitration were to suffer imprisonment and the
loss of the privileges of nobility.

In these ways Louis made it

clear that violation of his law would certainly result in the loss
of dignity, honor, and office, and, in more extreme cases, one's
life.26
The Parlement's reaction to these propositions was rather
interesting.

Historically the court was well aware of the problem

of dueling and its prohibitions.

In the remonstrance of 1615

the judges had asked that
26Isambert, aneiennes lois franqaises, XVI, 175-83; Herr,
Richelieu's Fight Against Dueling," p. 283.
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the edicts and decisions imposed against dueling should be
observed and upheld, under which the guilty should have
no grace and abolition jjfrom the kingj, [itj being a
regrettable thing that so many edicts and declarations
verified in your Parlement remain without execution and
that the blood of your nobility, which should be
conserved for your Majesty, is so often spilled for light
and frivolous occasions.27
The court was particularly concerned about the frequency of royal
pardons for such serious crimes, and modem research in the criminal
registers of the Parlement seems to substantiate the judges'
argument that all too often royal pardons undermined the efficacy
of Henry's laws.^

Yet when the declaration of 1626 was presented

to the court, the magistrates balked at verification on the grounds
that the more
mild.

realistic and enforceable penalties in it

weretoo

The judges were quite willing to accept the categorical
27lfole, M&aoires, I, 40.

^According to research recently published by Francois
Billacois, the Parlement was fully justified in complaining about
the frequency of royal letters of grace pardoning dueling offenders.
After the edicts of 1602 and 1609, the duel was officially a
crime liable to prosecution and carrying a capital penalty for
guilty parties. Billacois surveyed the criminal registers of the
Parlement between 1600 and 1624, finding fifteen trials for
duels or similar crimes in which a man had been killed. Decisions
could be found in nine of the cases. Two of the nine were
condemnations. One cleared two brothers previously adjudged guilty
in exchange for 80 livres "charity for the prisonner's bread"
and court costs. The other, more severe, confirmed an earlier
sentence of a six year banishment. The other seven decisions all
confirm royal letters of remission accorded by the sovereign.
"Thus," says Billacois, "the dominant note of these verdicts for
mortal duels is indulgence and even pardon." "Le Parlement de
Paris et les duels au XVTIe siecle," in
Crimes et criminalite en France sous l'ancien regime: 17e et
I8f silcles, Cahiers des annales, no. 33 (Paris, 197*1), pp. 33-47.
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pardon for past offenses, but remonstrated that His Majesty should
not modify the rigor of preceding edicts.

In short the court

preferred the austere inflexibility of tradition, however unworkable
that might have been, to any softening of sentences according to
circumstances.

Upon hearing the magistrate's views, Richelieu

urged Louis to persist, saying
that the councils of prudence should come from few men, and
that the great companies were only good for compelling
the observation of a written rule. The reason was that
since good spirits are much less in number than the mediocre
or the poor, the multitude of those in the last two categories
smothered the sentiments of the first in a great company.29
Louis followed Richelieu's advice and sent the Parlement a jussion,
in virtue of which the edict was verified without further debate
on March 24.30
The new edict, as well as the King's will in enforcing it,
were put to an important test a year later.

On May 12, 1627,

Mbntmorency-Bouteville, young scion of one of the most notable
houses in France who had already killed twenty-two men in duels,
publicly fought in broad daylight an the Place Royale in the
center of Paris.

The affair was a flagrant contradiction of the new

edict and an open defiance of Louis1 past warnings to Bouteville.
Bouteville's youth and lineage provided a harsh test for the
constancy of the King, who was petitioned from all sides to show
leniency.

Louis turned a deaf ear, and the case was duly dispatched

to the Parlement, it being publicly whispered about in the antichamber
29Richelieu, Mtmoires, III, 46-47.
3°Ibid., 47.
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of the Queen "that the Parlement had made the King
that if the execution of Bouteville

in 1610 , and

took place the King would

make the Parlement."^ Louis had little need for concern.

The

Parlement, which began its hearing on June 16, soon returned a
capital condemnation.32

Bouteville and his companion Des Chapelles

were beheaded before the H6tel de Ville at five o 'clock in the
afternoon of June 22, 1627.

The decision helped discourage dueling,

at least for the next few years, and dramatically demonstrated that
none of the nobility, whatever their stature, were beyond the reach
of the King's law.33
Curiously enough the Parlement's decision was not wholly
pleasing to Richelieu, who sourly commented in his Memoires that
it is necessary to point out that in the decision that the
court gave against them, there were three unjust things
which offended the king: one is that while condeming the two
prisoners they dared acquit the dead man Baron Bussy
d'Amboise, killed by Des Chapelles because his mother was
the wife of president de Mesmesj another is that they
confiscated only one-third of the property of the executed
men instead of their whole fortune as required by law.
31Ibid., 303
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 216, June 16, 1627, notes
the beginning of the hearing only.
3%err, "Richelieu's Fight Against Dueling,” pp. 28-4-85;
Tapie, La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, pp. 157-59; Burckhardt,
Richelieu, Assertion of Power and Cold War, pp. 62-70. Herr
concludes that the edict of 1626 was not a success: "Despite the
cardinal's memoirs," he says, "one should not fall into the error of
classifying the edict of 1626 among his successful measures to
establish royal authority over a turbulent aristocraev." The
conclusion is based on the observation that dueling resumed during
the 1630's and 1640's much as it had before the edict was issued.
The conventional view, assumed here, is that the edict served purposes
as much symbolic as functional in reasserting royal authority over
the Second Estate during the 1620's, and in the short run, at least,
it was successful in exemplifying the resurgence of that authority.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

373

In so doing they let it he known that they did justice to
them only gmdingly. In the third place, having given the
decision for death, they delayed the execution until the
next day, either to subject him [Louis] to hearing last
minute supplications against his will, or to cast on him
the nuisance and the hatred for their deaths.34
Richelieu went on to assert that the verdict was nothing other
than an arrogant expression of the court's independence and not
the processes of justice.

By choosing to condemn the living and

not the dead, and by moderating the confiscation of property, the
Parlement was trying to usurp the King's authority.

"They want,"

he said, "not only to have the execution of laws but the power
which alone belongs to the King of making and changing them as
he sees fit. "3^ Suspension of the sentence showed the same thing,
"that they wanted to share pardons with those who should give
them, or to libel him with hate if he did not do it."36
Those considering the reason, equity, and the good intentions of the
Parlement should also consider that the court had been faithless
to its own principle of severity.

Richelieu reminded readers

that at first the court had made verification difficulties because
the edict had been too moderate.

Later, when the time for

implementation came, the judges had not only moderated the penalties
but did what they could to annul -them. 37

34Richelieu,

Memoires, III, 302.

35Ibid.
36ibid.

37Ibld., 303.
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A few months after enacting the prohibition on duels, the
Parlement received another royal measure aimed at limiting the
potential for rebellion in the kingdom.

A declaration drafted at

Nantes, dated July 31> 1626, ordered razing of all walls, fortresses,
and chateaux that were not essential to the border defenses of
the kingdom.

In the seventeenth century there were many such

places remaining from the medieval and Renaissance periods capable
of defying any force short of a royal army; to level these
would make contempt for the king's authority considerably more
difficult.

The Parlement agreed, and the edict was registered

without trouble on September 7, 1626.3®
The decision to destroy the nobility's bases of operation was
perhaps influenced by revelation of the Chalais Conspiracy during
the summer of 1626.

Since details of the plot are well know, only

the outlines will be given here.

Early in 1626 Richelieu had

decided that for dynastic reasons Gaston d'Orleans, the King's
younger brother and heir apparent, should marry the duchesse de
Montpensier.

Gaston had other ideas, and the decision sparked

off a web of intrigue which eventually entangled Gaston; his
tutor and confident, mar£schal d'Omano; Cesar and Alexandre
Vendome, Louis' illegitimate half-brothers; the duchesse de
Chevreuse; the prince de Conde and the comte de Soissons; and
38isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, XVI, 192-94.
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Henri de Talleyrand, comte de Chalais, a young, immature, and
irresponsible associate of Gaston's who believed himself in love with
the duchesse de Ghevreuse.

The plans of the conspirators were

muddled and often changed but involved liaisons with England, Spain,
and Savoy through the Duke of Buckingham, thoughts of putting Gaston
on the throne, and the assassination of Richelieu.

Whispers of these

schemes began to reach the royal ears in the spring of 1626, and on
May 4 Louis ordered D'Omano incarcerated in

Vincennes.

39 Six

days later, on May 10, the plot became much clearer when Chalais was
prompted to confess its existence to Richelieu and the King.

For the

time being though, Chalais was allowed to go his way while the Crown
sought out and bought off or arrested the genuinely dangerous
plotters such as Conde and the Vendomes.

Dealing with them took up

the rest of June.
In the meanwhile Chalais, actually one of the smaller fish in
the conspiracy, had been unable to avoid further compromise after
his confession.

Louis, then at Nantes for an assembly of the Breton

estates, had Chalais watched for some days, then ordered his arrest.
On July 8 a royal commission was delivered to garde des sceaux
Marillac, his brother Louis, and conseiller d'Etat Le Beauclerc
^Louis was careful to notify- the Parlement of the reasons
for this singular move. See B.N. Inprimes Lb36.2469, Deux lettres
escrites par le Roy au Parlement de Paris, & aux Gouvemeurs des
j>rovinces sur 1'arrest falct du Mareschal dT0mano (n.p., n.d ).
This is a printed panphlet of six pages containing two4letters of
the King.
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"to secretly investigate all the facts and the above mentioned
case, and to issue writs against all persons that needs be.
The proceedings that followed were the first of Richelieu’s infamous
commissions so often employed during the 1630's against an sorts of
political offenses.
held at Nantes.

On July 9 Chalais was taken into custody and

Questioning began immediately and revealed several

accomplices, including Gaston's friends Puylaurens, the comte de
Soissons, the marquis de la Valette, and others.

Depositions taken

on the 10th and 29th of July connected Chalais with Gaston and
marshal D'Omano; on the 17th one Sieur Lamont and several soldiers
testified that Chalais had used blasphemy against God and King in
their presence/1
By virtue of a royal commission dated August 10, Chalais' trial
was confided to a chambre de justice to be held at Nantes.

The

commission bared the reasons for this location but played down the
fact that the King's proximity was the primary consideration:
We have decided to conduct and complete the trial and to
proceed to its judgment in this city of Nantes because of
our visit, and because of the detention at the chateau here
of many persons close to us, of our court and following,
necessary to the investigation and testimony of the said
trial, together with the diligence and secrecy requisite to a
trial of this quality and punishment for crimes of lese-majeste
. . . in cansequnce of which is b o m by our letters in the
month . . . the creation of

^Ojean-Benjamin de Laborde, Recuell de pieces interessantes pour
servir a l'histoire des regnes de Louis XTTl et de Louis XIV (London,
1781, pT 18; Richelieu, Memoires, lit, 90-91.
^Laborde, Recuell des pieces interessantes, pp. 26-100.
42Aetes royaux, F.46957, no. 6, pp. 11-12.
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The bench named In the commission was comprised of two presidents
and nine conseillers of the Parlement of Rennes and three ma^tres
des requites chosen, according to Richelieu, "for their great
reputation of probity," but more probably because the Crown could
rely on their opinions.43 Michel de Marillac presided, assisted
by the proeureur general of the Rennes parlement.
Whatever their political tendencies, the judges had little
problem with their consciences in the case, for the evidence
presented against Chalais by his own confessions, his letters, and
the testimony of witnesses was overwhelmingly damning.

The

hearings opened August 11 and closed on August 19 with the pro
nouncement of a dishonorable death sentence.

The execution,

horribly botched because neither the executioner nor a proper
sword could be found, took place in the Place de Bouffay of Nantes
on the same day that the verdict was handed down.44
4%ichelieu, Memoires, III, 91. The complete commission is in
Actes royaux, F.46957, no. 6. According to this printed version
of the commission, the comnissaires were: Jean de Boumeuf, Sieur
de Cusse, First President at Rennes; Isaac Loisel, Sieur de Brice,
second president in the court; Joachin de Scartes (Descartes),
Simon Hay, Gilles du Lys, Laurent Pichart, Jean du Halgouet,
De Martigues, Audart, Huet, and Frangois D'Audiquier, conseillers;
Christophe Fouquet, conseiller en conseil; unnamed procureurgeneral at Rennes; Francois Fouquet, Charles de Machault, and
Criqueville, maitres des requites. The list was distinguished by
the presence of Joachin Descartes, father of Rene Descartes, and
Francois Fouquet, father of future surintendant des finances
Nicolas Fouquet who faced a similar inquest in 16&1.
44Laborde, Recuell des pieces interessantes, pp. 181-34; Tapie,
La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, pp. 155-56; Burckhardt,
Richelieu, His Rise to Power, pp. 203-07.
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Most of the other conspirators escaped such severity.

The

Vendome brothers remained in prison; the duchesse de Chevreuse,
whose part had remained shodowy and who was perhaps viewed with
some affection by the Cardinal, escaped unpunished; mm»^achai
D'Oroano died in prison on September 4> 1626, a few days after
Chalais* demise.

The chief instigator of the plot, Gaston

d*Orleans, suffered only the indignity of an unwilling marriage
to the duchesse de Montpensier.

The ignominious trial and death

of his friend, for which he was largely responsible, left him
unmoved, unrepentant, and as unruly as ever.
Chalais* execution produced no notable reaction among the
nobility, who quietly pondered the sobering lessons to be learned
from the Comte’s example.

In the government, however, the course

of events brought one important change bearing on the Parlement.
Chancellor D'Aligre, demonstrating a lack of resolution during the
conspiracy, had been disgraced on June 1.45

Urged on by his

mother, Louis handed the seals over to surintendant des finances
Michel de Marillac.

Richelieu, whose political objectives and

philosophy clashed with Marillac*s in a number of ways, could not
have welcomed the change but could do nothing about it.46
Marillac*s appointment did not bode well for the Crown's
relationship with the Parlement.

The judges knew him as sincerely

pious, honest, intelligent, and a capable legist.

They were aware,

45Griffet, Histolre de Louis XIII, I, 493; Everat, Michel de
Marillac, p. 44.
46gverat, Michel de Marillac, p. 45.

See supra, pp. 228-35.
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too, that his religious opinions leaned to Ultramontanism, and they
soon came to find that he was also a determined advocate of royal
rights, a stickler for the letter of the law, and that he frequently
defended his convictions with a forthrightness that slid into
tactless insensitivity.

Something of these attitudes are suggested

in letters to procureur general Mathieu Mole even as Marillac
became garde des sceaux.

One of his first acts was to write to

Mole on behalf of his right to preside over the Parlement.

This

prerogative was customarily vested in the chancellor as the head of
the kingdom’s justice, but Marillac insisted that tradition gave
the right to gardes des sceaux as well.

Mole responded that

Marillac's letters of provision were modelled after those of
Guillaume du Vair (garde des sceaux 1616-17) and warned that in
Du Vair’s case the Parlement had delayed approving his rights to
preside for some time.

Mole also researched Marillac's claims

in the archives of the Tresor des ehartes, and later wrote to him
saying that he would "contribute all my care to try to see that
you should receive the honor due your merit."47 The latent issue
apparently never came to a head, however, for neither the court’s
registers nor Mole's M^noires make any further mention of the
registration of Marillac’s letters.
Among the judges of the Parlement the Chalais Affair came and
went without contention.

While the magistrates might have felt

that the significance of the trial warranted its hearing before

47Mole, Mfiaolres, I, 366.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

380

the Parlement, they also had to acknowledge that Chalais was neither
duke nor peer and thus had no inalienable claim to a trial by the
court.

Nor had Chalais1 friends or relatives made any effort to

present an appeal to the Parlement during the course of the trial,
choosing instead to direct their pleas to Louis and Richelieu.
Finally, the trial had been conducted by judges from a sovereign
court and ample proofs had been presented that the Comte was
guilty as charged.

These factors, together with past precedents

for such trials, probably tended to minimize grumbling from the
Parisian judges.
This situation began to change when the trial of the due de
Rohan was committed to the Parlement of Toulouse by a royal edict
of October 14, 1627.4® Henri de Rohan, a duke and peer of the realm,
had taken up leadership of the Huguenot cause during 1625 and raised
the south up in arms against the King.

Though Rohan was still at

large, the Parlement of Toulouse had him tried in absentia and
declared guilty of rebellion and lfese-majeste by decrees of
January 22 and 29, 1628.49

irregular custom dictated that Rohan

was entitled to a hearing before his peers in the Parlement of
Paris.

The royal administration, however, had found the needs of

State more pressing and had ignored tradition in the interest of
making an example of Rohan among the people he had led into rebellion.
4®Le Mercure frangois, XIV, 319-2349pbid., second pagination, 45-57.
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Lengthy arguments justifying this course can he found in
Richelieu’s Memoires, where the Cardinal maintained that Rohan had
lost his privilege by his ’’notorious rebellion," and therefore
should not be considered as a peer but as a private person who
should be judged and punished in the place where his crime had been
committed.

There was no privilege, Richelieu argued, that could

not be revoked, and everyone agreed that those who abused their
privileges should lose them.
the king alone.

Judgment of this lay in the hands of

It applied to royal officers and clerics, and it

certainly applied in cases concerning the authority of the State:
Kings, by the confession of all doctors of law . . . can
never give a privilege contrary to themselves, so that no
privilege can deny to kings the entire liberty of using
their authority to punish the guilty, even of such crimes
[of lese-majestel, and to have them judged in such place
and by whatever judges it pleases them.50
Moreover, there were ample legal precedents, based on good usage, for
removing cases from the Parlement of Paris.

In 1458 Charles VII

had asked the Parlement about judgment of the peers and had been
told that neither by institution nor ordinance was there any
observation of cases concerning the peers of France, but that it
was spoken of through usage and this varied.

In 1463 the comte d'

Angouleme had been moved to ask for a confirmation of his privilege
by special letters from Louis XI.

This would not have been necessary,

Richelieu reasoned, had the observance been regarded as binding law.
In 1474 the case of Jean d'Alen^on bad been referred to sixteen

^Richelieu, Mgmoires, III, 447.
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judges of the Parlement without calling the peers because he was
accused of relapsing into lSse-majeste. As if these examples
were not enough, Richelieu cited others as far back as 1311.

For

these reasons and by these examples, the Cardinal concluded, the
King had been within his rights in sending a commission to the
Parlement of Toulouse to judge Rohan, who "being stripped of the
peerage, there is no reason to judge him other than in the province
in which he committed so many crimes of lese-majest€."51
At Paris the judges' reaction to the transference of Rohan's
trial went unrecorded in the official registers of the Parlement.
This silence suggests that the court did not deliberate the issue
en conseil as a matter of public concern.

In contrast with the

Chalais commission fourteen months before, however, there are some
hints that not all the magistrates were pleased with the move.
Mathieu Mold's Memoires make some very curious revelations about
the judges' discontent and why it never materialized into discussion
of Rohan's trial.

On the 20th of November, 1627, the procureur

general wrote to Michel de Marillac at La Rochelle concerning news
of the Rohan edict in Paris:
^Ibid., 4-51. Richelieu's exposition in the M&nolres should
be compared with the reasoning given in a "Recueil Sommaire des
Raisons de la Resolution prise par- le Roy d'envoyer au Parlement
de Toloze la Commission pour faire le Procez au Due de Rohan,
le declarant decheu du Privilege de Pairie," B.N. Ms. fr. 18429, fols.
47-52. The arguments given and precedents cited here are identical
to those in Richelieu's Memoires.
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Permit me, Ifanseigneur, to say to you that someone has
published in this city a declaration, said to be verified
at Toulouse, against the due de Rohan by which he is
declared deprived, of the privilege of peerage. Being a
printed copy [Etant imprimee sur une copie], I said that
it could not be true in order to stop the clamor that some
wanted to make about the insult that the Parlement had received,
since it has been the sole judge of the peeps.52
Mold’s letter indicates that the first news of the edict did not
arrive in Paris until about a month after the original was
dispatched from La Rochelle, and that the judges first learned
of it through printed copies circulated around the city.

Either

out of simple neglect, or anticipating resistance from the
Parlement, the royal administration had failed to notify the
Parisian court of its intention to shift Rohan's trial to Toulouse.
Mole, incredulous at this turn of events, had tried to reassure
the Parisian court by dismissing the printed declarations as
scurrilous fabrications.

What followed at Paris during the next

few weeks is unknown, but on December 1 the garde des sceaux
replied to Mole.

This letter, too, is significant.

The wording

confirms that the council had, in fact, predicted grumbling from
the court and had deliberately avoided notifying it in advance of
the Toulouse trial:
As to the declaration sent to Toulouse authorizing the trial of
M. de Rohan, it is authentic and was deliberated [elle est
veritable et a ete considereej. I trust that those who could
raise a racket about it will do nothing dishonorable nor
unreasonable.53

52ifoie, M&noires, I, 476. Mole's letter is undated, but
Marillac's reply shows that it was penned on November 20. See
Marillac to Moll, 486.
53ibid., 487.
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Marillac then proceeded to defend the Crown's action by using the
same reason of State justification that Richelieu later presented in
his Memoires:
It is founded on justice and ordinary practice. There are
in the State various conditions of privileged persons
who have their particular judges and bylaws because of their
privileges. Nevertheless, there are some crimes by which, in
committing them, they lose their privileges ipso facto, and
never was it said that they should be sent before their
customary judges for judgment of their crime, nor even
if they should be deprived of their privilege. But they are
sent by all right before the judge who is their natural
_
Lor localj judge, suspending the privilege [of peer judgmentj
as unworthy and forfeited, judging that they are deprived
ipso facto, evidentia sceleris, non indiget clamore accusatoris.
And the crime of which it is |here aj question is specially
designated by the law among those where it is necessary
[first] to punish and then to infoim Q..£-, crimes of state]
as duces faetionum.54”
The lesson that Marillac drew from Rohan's example could well have
been expressed by Richelieu in the Testament politique:
It is good that les grands realize that all that they have
of favor, of dignities and of prerogatives from kings, will
serve them nothing against kings, and will not render them
[any more] important when they offend kings by disobedience and
by rebellion.*5
From this exchange of letters, therefore, the following picture
emerges.

Louis, Richelieu, and Marillac, engaged in the trying

siege of La Rochelle, decided to have the due de Rohan condemned
for his rebellion.

Reasons of State demanded that this be done

before the Parlement of Toulouse in Languedoc where the Protestant
cause was strongest and where Rohan's condemnation would have the
greatest impact.

Legal precedent supported this transfer, but

^Ibid., 487-88.

55ibid., 488.
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grumbles from Paris might also be expected.

To obviate this

possibility, the Parisian judges were not notified when the original
commission was sent to Toulouse after October 14.

The manoeuvre,

was successful in as much as no discussion ensued, but the incident
sensitized the judges to the attitudes of Louis' advisors towards
their jurisdiction and customary rights and heightened their
suspicions of Louis' councillors.
Suspicion and doubt engendered by Rohan's trial were accentuated
by an ugly quarrel between the Parlement and the garde des sceaux
that raged from the last months of 1627 throughout 1628.

The

heart of the dispute was not a political issue but stemmed
directly from Marillac's insistence on the observance of the
letter of the ordinances regarding the degree of kinship permitted
within the chambers of the Parlement.

In the interests of equity

and justice, royal ordinances had long prohibited closely related
judges from holding offices within the court.

This principle of

parente, or kinship, had been maintained in the Ordinance of Orleans,
Article 32, and repeated in the Ordinance of Blois, Article 116,
which read:
fre, Henry Ilf] desire that Article 32 contained in the
Ordinance of Origans, bearing prohibition against receiving
in the same parlement, chambre des comptes, and other sovereign
courts, or in a similar seat, fathers, sons, brothers, uncles,
and nephews, should be invioably kept in the future.5°
56isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XIV, 410.
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As with so many of the other provisions of the same ordinances, though,
this law had never been observed.

Customary usage permitted free

entry to close kin, though usually the court attempted to restrict
them to separate chambers and prevent relatives from sitting together
in a trial situation.

Any attempt to enforce the letter of the law

would have limited the possibilities of survivan.ce and was certain
to provoke an indignant response from judges accustomed to bringing
heirs or other relatives into their institution.

Additionally

the judges might argue that while the law said one thing, another
legal principle, that of common usage, said quite another.
So matters stood in November, 1627, when Nicolas Meliand, a
conseiller in the Parlement, sought to introduce his brother-in-law,
Alexandre Petau, into the court.

Marillac apparently refused to

set the royal seal on the lettres de provision for Petau because
of parent!, whereupon Mole wrote in his behalf that
M. Meliand, conseiller in this court, was promised that
you would not make any difficulty about sealing the lettres
de provision for his brother-in-law, the son of the late
BT Petau. It is true that the law is not kept which prohibits
receiving relatives to the degree of the ordinances, and that
the clause inserted into the provisions "provided that
they have no relatives to the said degree" is by-passed. One
sees it observed for subordinate seats . . . but serving in
different chambers [of the Parlement] it seems that this
would be remedy to the evil that is feared, and that usage
being such before the ordinance and since continued, that this
would be an interpretation that has been introduced. It
would only remain to prescribe an order when the chambers
assemble in order that the spirit of the law should always
prevail, and to order that near kin should not be found there
together, and that the most recently received should retire.^
57lfcle, Memoires, I, 476-77.
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Marillac quickly conceded that the ordinances said nothing ahout
brothers-in-law in the same court but said he thought that in
another article, "where evocations are spoken of, one and the other
allied by blood or marriage are included; that is why I thought that
thaj; should be considered."58 He then consented to seal Petau's
letters without further objections, and the conseiller was received
on February 11, 1628.59
After acknowledging his mistaken notion in the Petau case,
however, Marillac staked out a legal position which would shortly
lead to further troubles with the Parlement.

In the course of

communicating with Mole during December, 1627, the garde des sceaux
set out his views on parent^ with an unbending rigidity which
became ever more salted with a pious righteousness.

On December 1

he wrote Mole that
in regard to the ordinance, I hold it to be in viridi
observantia at law, if not in fact, and that it can no longer
be held as abrogated by disuse. I avow that although the
ordinances can be abrogated by lack of obervation and by
contrary usage received and approved by the prince or by
universal consent, this cannot be applied to ordinances
which the prince has continuously proclaimed, the observation
of which all assemblies have always demanded, so that this could
be called nothing other than a pure lack of execution and
real disobedience, seen even in the present clause and
condition annuling the reception in all the propositions.80

58Ibid., 488-89.
59manchard, Catalogue de tous les conseillers du parlement,
p. 123.
80Mole, M&noires, I, 489.
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Marillac then dismissed Mol!1s earlier suggestion that internal
arrangements might he made within the court to alleviate the
difficulty as of "little efficacy and not bearing on the sense and
intention of the ordinance."61
Three weeks later Mole penned a warm rejoinder upholding the
principles of traditional practice and the abrogation of law
through disuse.

Concerning the Ordinance of Blois, Moll tartly

noted that
this law is from 1579, verified in the Parlement in 1580
and never observed since that time. And you wish, in 1627,
to have it rigorously kept? If that is the King's intention,
it would be better to draft new letters patent in the form
of a declaration, in order that this law being renewed and
its justice recognized his subjects would render it full
obedience in the future.62
In the past the clause "provided that there are no relatives to
the degree of the ordinances" had been ignored with the knowledge of
the prince and those charged with enforcing it.

Would it then be

just, Moll asked, "to now give such force to this particular clause
as to a new law verified in all the parlements and published for all
of France?"

To do so, the procureur glrieral thought, would be to

disrupt a workable and established practice preserving familial
continuity in the court:

6lIbld.
62Ibid., 496.
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In the future you will pity the condition of fathers who
will he constrained to put their children out of their homes
at their own risk, to send them into distant provinces,
consuming themselves by the outlay of expenses necessary to
maintain the dignity of the [provincial] office [of their
sons], without mentioning either the excessive cost of offices
or the infinite misfortunes which might follow. 63
Rather than bring such hardship into robe families, the procureur
general thought that when plaintiffs complained about parente, it
would be simple to grant them an evocation to another parlement and
thus avoid all together the problem of kin sitting on one
Marillac was not persuaded.

b e n c h . 64-

On January 15, 1628, his

insistence grew sharper in offering Mbl£ a pointed reiteration of
his views:
You propose to me that he [the King] should make a new
declaration on it, and that being thus renewed, no one will
have an excuse not to observe it.If thLs remedy had served,
there could be some consideration [of it] . . . . But it
has been made at Orleans and neglected, repeated at Mbulins
and neglected, renewed at Blois in very express terms and
nevertheless neglected once again; repeated and renewed
in each provision and always neglected. Are we to hope
that a new declaration would have more effect? I pray of
you, Monsieur, to consider what can the prince do in so
great hardness of continual resistance to the practice of a
law so useful to his subjects?65
Shortly after committing these lines to paper, the garde des
sceaux answered his own questions by refusing to permit Nicolas de
Bellievre, the third president a mortier, to install his son,
Pomponne II de Bellievre, in the Parlement as a conseiller outside
his own Grand 'Chanibre. This attempt conformed to customary usage in
63lbid., 497.
^Ibid.
65Ibid., 501.
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the court but violated the letter of the letter of the ordinances,
and Marillac refused to seal Bellievre's letters for the office.
Upon hearing of Marillac's refusal, Mole was nettled into composing
one of the sharpest letters extant in his correspondence.

Clothed

in Baroque formality, the letter nevertheless plainly shows the
procureur general's wrath:
Whatever incident there has been in the affair of M. le
president Bellievre, you will permit me to tell you that I
have received from it a very lively displeasure, seeing you
name and your actions (your name that it is particularly
necessary to cherish and respect, and your actions which
should serve as an example to each and should be without
reproach), give subject to a public deliberation in an
aggravated company, and all the more since your person alone has
found it necessary to maintain this stonn. I write you
nothing about it in particular, except that M. le president
has had the letter sent to the King. And permit me to tell
you that the more I consider the law and the reason for it,
the less I find cause to observe it now for all kinds of
public and individual considerations.66
Here the matter rested for some months while Bellievre took his
appeal to Louis.

Throughout the spring the King was silent, possibly

because he was engaged with the siege of La Rochelle, and on June 1
Bellievre wrote to Marillac once again.

This request for a dispen

sation was tartly rejected in Marillac*s response of June 26.^
Bellievre now sought the assistance of his colleagues, and on July 7
the question was discussed before the assembled chambers of the
Parlement.

The next day the magistrates decided to write to Louis

and to Marie on Bellievre*s behalf.88
66ibid., 510.
67bn Ms. fr. 16484, fols. 362-363v°, has copies of these letters.
68BN M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 261-62, July 7 and 8, 1628;
a copy of the letter, signed "les gens tenant votre cour de
Parlement," is in BN Ms. fr. 16484, fols. 358-60.
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A courier from the court was dispatched to La Rochelle, arriving
there on July 24.

Louis granted an immediate interview, and six

days later sent a lettre de cachet back to Paris.

His response,

read in the parlement on August 9, was a total reversal for the
judges:
We would like very much to he able to comply with your
desires . . . but considering that this observation has been
practiced many times in all our parlements, that it is of
very great consequence to all our subjects who are extremely
beset by evocations because of parenti, and that it is not
a question of hiding the lack of observation but of revoking
and abridging in effect an ordinance that many of our
ancestors have carefully made and that all the orders of our
kingdom have very incessantly and so wisely asked. We have
decided to change nothing for the present, and we deem that the
welfare of justice, the dignity of our sovereign courts,
and the relief of our subjects requires that we do it thusly. 9
The magistrates, however, detected a certain temporizing in
Louis1 words and decided on September 1 to make oral remonstrances
with the King returned from La Rochelle.

Louis did not come back

until late in December, but on the 30th of that month the court
elected to send a delegation to see him about the Bellievre case.
The registers of the Parlement do not mention the date of the
meeting, but the deputies must have reached some accommodation,
for on January 14, 1629, Louis issued lettres patente giving sons
and brothers the right to sit in the same seat, the Ordinance
of Blois not withstanding.

Uncles and nephews were still excluded.70

These letters were evidently remitted to Marillac, who
69b .N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 271-72, August 9, 1628.
70B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 282-83, 306-07,
December 30, 1628, and February 9, 1929.
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chose to retain them until the first week in February.

The Parlement

registered them on February 9, Pomponne de Bellievre was duly
sworn in as a conseiller on February 22, and the issue of parent^
did not arise again during Louis' reign.?1
The magistrates of the Parlement had due cause to rejoice over
the outcome of the parente question.

For them the victory meant

a happy confirmation of past practices associated with office
holding and survivance as it was then known.

Sons, brothers,

nephews, and other kin could continue to enter the court under the
tutelage of relatives with all of the advantages of friendly personal
contacts that established family ties could provide.

For Michel de

Marillac, however, the wrangle with the Parlement was the beginning
of a disaster that steadily worsened until his fall in 1630.

From

the time the seals had been conferred on him, Marillac's religious
views, personal history, and personality had made him suspect to
the Parlement.

The Crown's handling of Rohan's trial probably deepened

this mistrust, and Marillac's stand on the parent^ issue discredited
him even more thoroughly.

The parlementaires would have liked

nothing better than a chance to revenge themselves on the garde
des sceaux, and as 1629 began, verification of the Code Michaud
presented the judges with just such an opportunity.
Since the adjournment of the Notables in 1627, Marillac had been
at work directing a comprehensive revision of French law based on

^Blanchard, Catalogue des tous les conseillers du Parlement,
p. 123.
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the cahiers of the Estates General of 1614, the Assembly of
Notables held at Rouen in 1617, and those of the Assembly of 1626-27.
The project was completed by January, 1629, as a massive code
embodying fifty years of progress in French law in 461 articles
touching on ecclesiastical, educational, judicial, legislative,
social, military, financial, commercial, and maritime affairs.

The

net result was, in the words of Marillac's biographer Edouard
Everat, "more than an edict: never had the nation seen appear an
ordinance as extensive, as complete, as thought out."72
Marillac, justly proud of his endeavors and those of his
colleagues, determined to present the Code for presentation in a
lit de justice planned to celebrate the fall of La Rochelle.
Verification of the ordinance with such pomp and circumstance was
motivated less out of egotism than anxiety for the future of his
great work, for Marillac knew of his reputation in the Parlement.
He sensed that the court would object to certain articles,
particularly to 1 and 53 which limited remonstrances; he was well
aware, too, that the magistrates would subject the Code to a
protracted and searching scrutiny which might run into years.

The

solution, it seemed, was to force the Parlement's hand in a lit de
justice. The counter was clever, perhaps too clever, since one
of the Parlement's greatest sacred cows was its right to remonstrance,
a right jealously exercised in verifying the most recent ordinances

72jfjchel de Marillac, p. 68. A thorough section-by-section
analysis of the Code Michaud can be found on pp. 68-89; a less
complete examination is in Amauld-Menardiere, Essai sur Michel
de Marillac, pp. 24-44*
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of Orleans, Moulins, Roussillon, and Blois.

Thus b o m with the

consent of the magistrature in 1626, by the time of its presentation
in 1629 the Code Michaud was a suspicious document, tarred with
Marillacfs reputation, questionable because of its reforms, and
overshadowed by the look of timorous belligerence cast by presentation
in a lit de justice advertised for another purpose.
The ceremony that was held in the Grand'Chambre on January 15,
1629, with the King, Richelieu, Marillac, seven dukes, and four
marshals in attendance followed traditional forms in every way.^3
Louis opened the session with a short speech, followed by Nicolas
Le Jay acting in the capacity of temporary First President.

These

were followed by the garde des sceaux, who delivered a long and
elaborate discourse lauding Louis' accomplishments in subduing the
Rochellois and glorifying his graciousness in extending a generous
settlement to his rebellious subjects.

Confident that the mechanism

of the lit would successfully see the Code through any difficulty,
Marillac then delivered a galling speech extolling the royal authority
and disparaging the role of the Parlement in affairs of State.

His

words, reproduced for all to read in the Mercure franaois, drew
heavily on principles expressed more fully in the "MSmoire contre le
Parlement":
We are all in agreement that the King should do nothing unjust j
he knows it and believes it himself, and no matter how much he

^The official account is in B.N. Ms. fr. 9890, fols. 285-97,
January 15, 1629. See also the less complete accounts in Le Mercure
frangois, XV, second pagination, 1-28; Isambert, Aneiennes lois
frangaises, XVI, 342-43; Everat, Michel de Marillac, pp. 90-96.
74lhe chair of the First President was vacant following the
death of Jerome de Hacqueville on November 4, 1628.
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may be above the laws, he is nevertheless willing to subject
himself to reason. But the core of the question is, who will
be the judge of the King's actions, to say whether they be
just or not? If we make the King's subjects or officers his
judges, if it is up to them to qualify the King's actions and to
declare them just or unjust, the King is no longer King but
under the tutelage of his officers, and sovereignty is
dependent on them. That would be to open the door to factions
in the State, to give means to proponents of change who
constantly criticize the King's actions, and to compromise his
authority. It is therefore true that the King alone is the
judge of justice and his actions. He renders account for them to
God alone, and as each of us loves the State and the public
peace, so too should he hold firm in this resolution.'5
The absolute authority of the King thus ruled out any possibility
that the Parlement might pursue an independent role in matters of
State and confined it to the administration of justice.

Marillac

underscored this last point in unmistakable terms:
I know very well that on many occasions our Kings have wanted
to take advice from this company, be it as an entire body, be
it from some of it, in affairs very important to their State,
when they have found it well to do so. They would still do it
often were it not that some misgivings of these recent times
have rendered communication more difficult. But as it is in
the power and conduct of the Prince to take advice as he
pleases from those that he wishes to call, so this in no way
changes the condition of those he calls, and gives them no new
right or new quality. The function of this company has always
remained this first and principle part of all royal actions,
nnd the most important in a State, which is the administration
of justice.76
Thp garde des sceaux concluded that since the reign of justice was the
most illustrious duty of kings, and since the parlementaires were
the most worthy judges in the kingdom, the Parlement should pay the
strictest attention to its judicial duties.
7^Le Mercure frangois, XV, second pagination, 19-20.
76Ibid., 25-26.
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All formal preliminaires done, the articles of the Code were
brought forward for registration.

In keeping with ancient custom,

a rigidly prescribed ritual was followed.

The greffier read a

representative sample of the edict, then avocat general Qmer Talon,
speaking for Mole, gave his conclusions and required that it be
registered according to form and tenor.

The garde des sceaux then in

turn consulted the presidents a mortier, the cardinals, dukes and
peers, eonseillers d'Etat, maitres des requites, and conseillers for
opinions and returned them to the King.

This done, Marillac

pronounced the official registration:
The King, seated in his lit de justice, has ordered and orders
that on the back of the said letters in the form of a
declaration of the month of November and December last, and
the said cahiers and articles of the present month of January,
will be put: read, published, and registered, heard and
this requiring his procureur general, and that copies collated
after the original will be sent into all the bailliages and
seneehausees of this ressort to be there read, published and
registered, kept and observed, according to their form and
tenor. ^
He then added a postscript which would shortly become the focal
point of a bitter dispute between the Crown and its court.

The

presidents, he said, had requested in their opinions that the King
suspend sending the articles into the provinces until the court had
had time to examine them in detail.

The King had granted the

request, with the proviso that registration would not be delayed and
that the new law would immediately go into effect.

No more than

two months were to be spent in such discussions.*^ With verification

77B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 296, January 15, 1629.
*^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 296-97; Everat, Michel de
Marillac, p. 96. The registers do not mention the two month limit
on discussions.
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completed, the lit de justice was adjourned.

Having suitably

publicized his victory at La Rochelle and lent his presence to the
verification of Marillac*s ordinance, Louis departed Paris the next
day for Montferrat and a resumption of campaigning in the south of
France, leaving the royal government north of the Loire in the
hands of Marie de Medicis.

Richelieu accompanied the King,, but

Marillac remained behind in Paris.
The absence of the King offered an excellent opportunity for the
judges to create trouble for the ordinance, and this they quickly
proceeded to do.

The struggle began with the judges' refusal to

inscribe the formula of registration on the edict, in spite of the
fact that the King had ordered them to do so in the lit de justice.
On January 19 acting First President Le Jay, a partisan of Richelieu
and no friend of Marillac, reported to the assembled chambers that
the day before the garde des sceaux had asked for the signed and
verified copy of the ordinance.

Le Jay urged the court to decide

what course it wanted to take:

to verify and surrender the edict

before discussing it, or to withhold the document from the garde des
sceaux.

It was decided with "all chambers assembled, that the said

cahiers would be read, and that in the meantime their delivery
would be suspended. "79 Reading of the articles began the same day.

79b .N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 297-98, 19 January, 1629;
Richelieu, M&noires, IV, 286; Everat, Michel de Marillac, pp. 106-07.
Everat stresses the influence of Le Jay in fomenting resistance to
the Code Michaud in this way: "Unfortunately for the edict, the
Parlement was then directed by president Le Jay, a cunning man,
violent, full of spite, the personal enemy of Marillac, a great
adversary of judicial reforms. His past had necessitated lettres
d*abolition and his advancement in the magistrature had only been due
to the high protection of Richelieu. Resistance to the ordinance was
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Marillac, nervous about the discussions in the Palais and
believing that an early assertion of the King's authority might quash
the matter in the bud, resolved to write to Louis at once.

By a

letter of January 23, he reminded the King of the circumstances
surrounding the ordinance in the lit de justice and asked that he
command La Ville-aux-Cleres, one of the secretaires d'Etat, to put
the decision [of registration} on the ordinance, it being a thing
appropriate to his charge and to the presence of His Majesty, by
which means the publication of the ordinance, highly useful to his
people, should no longer be deferred, and His Majesty's authority
would neither remain impaired nor dependent on others.®0
Louis' response, a lettre de cachet enjoining obedience, was not sent
from Grenoble until February 15.81 While awaiting the royal response,
was for him a means of impeding the application of projected measures
and at the same time of satisfying his hatred of the garde des sceaux.
Endowed with a rare perspicacy, he had miraculously detected the stilllatent conflict which already existed between him Marillac and the
Cardinal. He thus thought it not displeasing to the minister in
entering the struggle with Marillac. Then his relations with Richelieu
permitted him to surmise that the Cardinal would not vigorously support
the execution of the edict. Opposition then became not only possible,
but even more, had some chance of success. It is this which he very
perfidiously insinuated to his colleagues. These allowed themselves to
be easily convinced." Everat's comments undoubtedly are plausible and
have some merit. Le Jay did apparently maintain close contacts with
Richelieu, but hard evidence of their exact relationship is lacking.
Le Jay left no papers, and those of Richelieu scarcely ever mention
the First President in a revealing manner. In any case, as First
President the opportunities for stirring up the court would have been
fairly limited without a widespread animousity towards Marillac.
80Richelieu, Meinoires, IV, 288.
81B.N. M s . fr. 3826, fol. 12. Everat ascribed the unusual delay
in the dispatch to the influence of Richelieu on Louis:."Richelieu, one
may see by the tone of his M&noires, was not perturbed by the diffi
culties instigated against the garde des sceaux.. On the one hand, he
thereby satisfied his resentment for him; on the other, he regarded
with indifference . . . the obstacles brought to the execution of the
code. He did not then hurry to answer. It was, after Pere Griffet,
only on February 16 fsicl that the King sent to the Parlement the
letter patent requested by Marillac." Michel de Marillac, 108.
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the garde des sceaux also approached the Queen Mather, asking her to
summon Le Jay and stop the Parlement's debates.

Marie acceded,

telling the president on January 25 that
she found it strange that the Parlement should assemble and
refuse to make the verification and deliver the cahiers; that
the King would be offended, since they had been verified in
his presence, and that it went contrary tothe honor due the
seigneur King and his authority, the act of his entry having
been published and the pronounciation made in his presence.®2
Le Jay answered simply that he would inform the court and withdrew.
hearing his version of the interview on thenext day, the Parlement
decided on remonstrances.

After hearing these on January 27, Marie,

thoroughly irritated, once again told the magistrates that
the King wished it, and that if the Parlement continued to
insist, that would give him dissatisfaction; that since they
had put the registration on paper they could put it on parch
ment, and that would not hinder the Parlement from doing all
that the King allowed.^3
These prohibitions, like the earlier ones, were shrugged off.

On

the last day of January the court decided to persist in its actions.
Pending the arrival of orders from the King himself, Marillac
and Marie could only look on with helpless frustration and repeat
their injunctions to a Parlement growing increasingly insolent.

Just

before the King's departure, Marie had been endowed with full royal
powers north of the Loire, and on February 2 she used these powers,
addressing a lettre de cachet to the court enjoining publication of
the ordinance as her son had ordered.^

This document was no more

82B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 299,

January 26, 1629.

^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 304,

January 31, 1629-

8i4B.N. Ms . Dupuy 94, fol. 123-
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persuasive than previous warnings.

When the Queen Mother’s letter

arrived in the Grand1Chambre, Le Jay refused to open and read it.
After the message was delivered orally, a tumult of jeers and cat-calls
erupted within the court.

One of the procurers openly labeled

Marillac as being "of Spain, of the Inquisition, of intrigues,"
saying "that he would not live forever, that he had two children
who might come into the Parlement, and that they would be reminded
of it."

Others muttered that under Henry IV things had been different

but "at present one had to do what pleased the cardinal and the garde
des sceaux." Here and there were murmurs that the Crown had been
sold out, and that the princes and les grands should be assembled to
hear about it.

The row turned on Le Jay when some of the other

presidents discovered that he had presumed to write "Le Jay, acting
First President" on the court's decisions.

Potier de Novion in

particular had words with him "about their qualities and birth” and,
among other insults, said "that the graft of the century had been put
in the Parlement, and it would be justice to oust it."®^
When tempers had cooled and calm returned, the judges shifted
their tactics'from active to passive procrastination.

All

discussions were stopped in deference to royal orders, but the
registration was not made, the court awaiting, in Richelieu's words,
the moment "to resume this affair when it could have it at its
liking."^ Marillac, on the other hand, having failed with the
^Richelieu, Mgmoires, IV, 289-90; Everat, Michel de Marillac,
p. 109.
®%ichelieu, Mgmoires, IV, 291.
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stick, now turned to the carrot.

Swallowing his pride, he remitted

to the court the King's permission to allow sons, fathers, and
brothers in the court.

The letters were promptly registered on

February 9.®7 Confident that the Parlement had been won over at
last, the garde des sceaux wrote to Richelieu on the 7th that
all that remained for the registration was the office of the
greffier, who could not say that he had been prohibited, and
thus could be forced to put it there. If there was need, the
Queen could require him to put it on in her presence, or treat
him as he deserved if he refused, there being an example that
the chancellor, even in the Parlement, had made the greffier
register without taking the opinion of the Parlement, and even
contrary to the Parlement which resisted it.°°
Marillac's sanguine hopes were soon dashed.

On February 8

deliberation on the ordinance resumed at the insistance of the
Enqultes and continued on the 9th.

Once again the garde des sceaux

had no recourse but to have the Queen Mother summon deputies to
account for themselves.

These representatives, headed by Le Jay,

appeared before the Queen at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 9th.
The Queen Mother, in company with Marillac and several attendants,
demanded to know why they planned to assemble the Parlement on the
morrow.

Le Jay replied that it was to continue the deliberation at

the request of the EnquStes.

Marie then told the delegation that she

had written them on February 2 so that they would not continue the
discussion, but they had not wanted to see her letters; that she
had sent for them in order to tell them personally that she had
written to them; that there should be no doubt about it, and that
^7B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 306-07, February 9, 1629.
^Richelieu, M&aoires, IV, 291.

\
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she prohibited them absolutely from discussing the affair any further,
since the King was gravely offended.

Le Jay answered that he would

tell the court, then, relieved of the decorum required before Louis,
launched into a vindication of himself and the authority of the
Parlement, insinuating to Marillac that the court had at various times
tried chancellors, constables, and even princes of the blood.
Marillac, he asserted, had violated the agreement made in the lit
de justice by having the Code printed and sent to the provinces.
Marillac, temper inflamed, retorted that he had no reason to
fear the Parlement because, unlike Le Jay, he had lived a life
without need of lettres d1abolition.8^

Furthermore, he added, the

bitigain struck in the lit de justice had included immediate verifi
cation, then the presentation of remonstrances within a limited time.
It had said nothing about printing the ordinances.
Le Jay upheld the contrary view and demanded to see what the
register had to say on the point.

Marillac happened to have the leaf

in his possession at the time and read it before the group, finding
no evidence for what Le Jay had said.
say no more.

Abashed, the president could

The interview concluded with a compromise agreement

that for four months the edict would not be sent out, during which

^The reference is obscure. Griffet believed that it referred
to Le Jay's arrest during the regency for consorting with the
prince de Conde and attempting to stir up the Parlement on his
behalf. Histoire de Louis XIII, I, 656. For the events of the
incident in 1615 see dasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 128-29,
and Mole, Mgmoires, I, 72-86.
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time the court would work on its remonstrances.90

In the meanwhile

the ordinance was to have full effect and force.91
During the next few months both sides respected the agreement of
February 9, but this was not necessarily out of good faith nor did
it insure a quick resolution of the verification question.

Marillac,

content to let matters rest for the moment, departed Paris during the
spring to join the King in Langued'oc.

Now weighing heavily on his

mind were considerations other than the ordinance: thoughts of the
internal state of the kingdom, the possibility of a new war with
Spain, and, inseparably from these, the problem Richelieu's growing
influence over Louis at the expense of his own devot faction.

In

fact, the "Grand Orage" of the Day of Dupes was already beginning to
gather.92
The Parlement, for its part, soon began the immense task of
sorting through the ordinance.

During March, April, and May the

first ten articles were examined> discussed, and modified according
to the judges' lights.9^ Of these ten paragraphs, only the
remonstrance on the first is of any significance here.

According to

9°There is no agreement on the length of time granted for
remonstrances. The registers of the court give four months; Griffet
indicates six months; Richelieu's Memoires say two months. B.N. Ms.
fr. 9890, fol. 311, February 10, 1629; Histoire de Louis XIII, I,
656; Memoires, IV, 294.
91B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 307-311, February 10, 1629;
Richelieu, Memoires, IV, 292-94; Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, I,
656; Everat, Michel de Marillac, pp. 110-12.
92Pages, "Richelieu et Marillac:

deux politiques." pp. 63-79.

93B.N. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 311-21, March 6-May 12, 1629;
Isanibert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XVI, 342-44.
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Article 1, all laws from past reigns and Louis' rule that had not been
abridged, discarded, or modified, whether registered in sovereign
courts or not, would be considered valid and in force.

The judges were

given six months to present their remontranees about any of these
laws.

Such restrictions were intolerable to the court, and on March 6

it opted for remonstrances favoring a continuation of past practices. 94
The Parlement made its usual criticisms of nine more articles by
Miay 12, but after this date enthusiasm lagged and no more provisions
were taken up.
This situation still prevailed in August when Louis, having
completed the pacification of Langued'oc, retraced his steps
towards the capital with Marillac accompanying him.

Richelieu stayed

in the south to supervise the destruction of fortifications.

With

the King approaching Paris, Mol£ warned the Parlement on August 11
that "on his return he wanted to have his ordinances with the
registrata just as he had pronounced in his presence."
did nothing.

The judges

Exactly a week later, with Louis now in the irmediate

vicinty of Paris, Mole again said that
the said seigneur King had told him to make known to my
Parlement that I want the registrata to be put on my ordinances,
and intend that they deliberate only as to whether they will
do it or not, because it is a thing done. I intend that they
should be brought to me if I am nearby, or if not, to the
Queen Mother. When I or she has them, then I will return them
at once to my Parlement to be deliberated.95

94b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 311, March 6, 1629.
95fi.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 335-36, August 18, 1629.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

405

Mole then added that Louis would not receive any deputies from the
court until the ordinances had been presented to him.

This meant the

judges could not see the King about any official business, could
not discuss other affairs, among them the paulette which would expire
at the end of the year.

The Enquites, especially, were already

pressing for renewal of that cherished right.96

Even with the

pressure of these considerations, the Parlement still took no action.
In the meanwhile Louis took the road for Fountainbleau, and Marillac,
growing impatient, urged Marie to get authorization to force the
greffier into registration.

On August 24 Louis did just that,

writing his mother from Ferte-Alais that
seeing the slowness of my court of Parlement to render me the
act of obedience that they owe me concerning my ordinances,
I have deemed it most appropriate to command the greffier
Du Tillet to do his duty and put on the edict containing the
said ordinances the act customarily put in similar cases. For
this I am writing Monsieur Des Landes to bring you the said
edict that he has in his hands, and to the greffier to inscribe
the act. I entreat you to have them do this, to command them
and all others that need be as much as you will judge necessary,
at which I desire that they obey.97
The arrival of these injunctions at last prompted the court to order
the Code Michaud registered on August 29, seven months after the
January lit de justice. Louis received the registered ordinance
on September 4 and promptly handed it back to Mole with permission
to present remonstrances. 9®

96b .N. Ms. fr- nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 33-34, July 6, 1629.
^B.N. Ms. fr. 3829, fol. 224, Louis to Marie de Medicis,
August 24, 1629.
9%.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 336, August 29, 1629.
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These remonstrances were never presented.

Instead the Parlement

turned to quite different tactics to disable the ordinance.

Having

been compelled to register what they were now derisively calling
the "Code Michaud,” the judges could not be forced to put it into
practice as they were sworn to do.

During the remainder of 1629 and

1630, lawyers who chose to argue from its principles were hooted
down before the bar and faced the certain loss of their cases if
they persisted.

At best the Crown had few alternatives to counter

such behavior, even had the will existed to force the issue, and a
combination of circumstances conspired to insure that Louis did
nothing to enforce his new law.
royal presence.

One of these circumstances was the

During most of 1629 and 1630 Louis was busily

engaged asserting the French presence in the Duchy of Mantua and
had little time for judicial affairs in Paris.

Just as these

campaigns drew to a close, Louis suffered a nearly fatal breakdown of
his health, and upon his recovery the Day of Dupes produced Marillac's
disgrace, arrest, and imprisonment.

After this time Richelieu had

little interest in resuscitating a measure widely credited to his
erstwhile rival, however worthy it may have been, and the Ordinance
of 1629 remained in limbo, a monument to the high hopes, hard work,
and poor political judgment of the foimer garde des sceaux.
Some of the same factors that spelled the doom of the Code
Michaud also dampened Parlementaire politics during 1630.
far from his capital for most of the year.

Louis was

Richelieu and Marillac

were too pre-oecupied with the King's affairs in Mantua, the possi
bility of European war, with Louis' failing health, or with fending
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off their rival's claims on the royal affections to chance a dis
tracting encounter with those wearing the black robes of justice in
the

P a l a i s . 99

For their part the magistrates were also content

to let sleeping dogs lie.

The paulette agreement concluded in

1621 expired at the end of 1629* and the Crown made no immediate
effort to open negotiations with its magistrature. The King's
initial offer came from Iyons only on June 21, 1630, in a declaration
which included the outrageous demand that the judges pay an immediate
loan of twenty-five percent.1^

As soon as these terms became

known in Paris, the Parlement declined to pay them and forbade any
member of the court from acceding to the June edict until better
conditions were forthcoming.101 Nothing better, though, was
offered until the very end of the year.

In the meanwhile, the

judges had to bide their time and hope for the royal grace.

For

these reasons the Parlement's record during 1630 was very routine.

It

was a year of suspense for both Crown and court, a hush before the
storm that broke in the Palais Luxembourg on November 10, 1630.
99

7 For tensions in the innermost circles of government during
1630 see the important article by Georges Pages, "Autour du 'Grand
orage.'"
100B.N. Imprimes, Actes royaux, F.46968, no. 17.
101B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 34-35, July 1 and 5,

1630.
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CHAPTER VII
THE PARLEMENT AND THE DAY OF DUPES
Sometime during the mid-morning hours of November 10, 1630, a
dramatic confrontation took place within the luxurious confines of
Marie de Medieis1 Palais de Luxembourg in the faubourg St. Germain.
Two of the principals in the tempestuous scene— Louis XIII and his
mother— had come together to discuss a matter of the highest
importance, the rendition of a royal promise to remove Richelieu
from the government.

Marie, now estranged from her one-time favorite

and fiercely jealous of his influence over her son, had extracted,
the promise from Louis as he lay recovering from a nearly fatal
illness contracted during the Mantuan campaign.
October.

That had been in

Now miraculously recovered, Louis had done nothing about

his pledge, and that November morning Marie meant to persuade him.
Just as their conversation waxed warmest, however, Richelieu had
appeared as if by occult summons through an unlocked door, inter
rupting this most private of meetings and bringing Marie to a fit
of outrage which, in her son’s eyes, finally crystallized a long
postponed decision.

The details of what followed vary, but none of

the results are open to speculation.

During the afternoon and

evening of the 10th, Richelieu's primacy in Louis' councils and
confidence was solidly confirmed by long, intimate exchanges at the
then secluded hunting lodge of Versailles.

Never again would that

primacy be seriously challenged.
408
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The dupes of the day, those who had wagered their all on the
mother rather than the son, soon found themselves disappointed or,
worse yet, disgraced.

Michel de Marillac, center of the Queen

Mother's faction, was stripped of the seals on November 11 and
packed off to confinement at Chateaudun where he dies two years later.
Orders for the arrest of his brother, mareschal Louis de Marillac,
governor of the fortress of verdun, commander in Italy with La Force
and Schomberg, went out on November 13.

The margschal offered no

resistance and was conducted under close guard to Ste. Menehould to
undergo an investigation which would shortly involve the Parlement
of Paris.

Marischal Bassompierre, compromised by letters to Louis

de Marillac, was assigned a cell in the Bastille where he spent the
next twelve years.

Marie and Gaston d'Orllans, obstinate and

unforgiving in their hatred of Richelieu, were beyond direct
chastisement; Louis, indeed, would have preferred a peaceful
reconciliation with them.

This, as ensuing events would show,

ultimately proved impossible.1
Reverberations from the Day of Dupes were felt almost immediately
in the halls and chambers of the Palais de Justice as Richelieu moved
to consolidate his victory.

While the politics of the Parlement

would be dominated by the consequences of the Day of Dupes for the
next three years, the new order manifested itself first in two
crucial appointments made shortly after November 10.

With the

1Mongredien, La Joumee des dupes, passim; Tapie, la France de
Louis XIII et de Richelieu, pp. 215-26; Burckhardt, Richelieu, His
Rise to Power, pp. 370-4-02; Pag&s, "Autour du 'Grand Orage,'" passim.
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displacement of Michel de Marillac as garde des sceaux, the seals hud
reverted to Louis' custody; Richelieu determined to entrust them to
a reliable creature, some suitably qualified figure of dignity but,
above all, one of straw.

In Charles de l'Aubespine, marquis de

Chateauneuf, Richelieu found such a m a n Chateauneuf, of one
of the best Parisian families, son of a long-time ambassador to
England and himself experienced in government, brought sufficient
stature but little of Marillac1s native interest, ability, or
independent obtrusiveness to the office.

His role vis-2L-vis the

Parlement during the next two years might best be described as that
of the Crown's mouthpiece, personally inoffensive, except for an
exasperating habit of whispering his speeches, and officially
complaint with instructions from Louis and Richelieu.

There is

nothing to suggest that his relationship with the Parlement had any
connection with the intrigues that led to his fall in February of
1633.
Custody of the seals was not the only important judicial
disposition made after the Day of Dupes.

On November 18 Nicolas III

Le Jay was sworn in as First President of the Parlement, filling a

^Charles de l'Aubespine, marquis de Chateauneuf, seigneur de
PrSaux, was the son of Guillaume de l'Aubespine, dean of the king's
council and Chancellor of the Order of the Holy Spirit. Chateauneuf
became conseiller clere in the Parlement of Paris in 1603; ambassador
to Holland, 1609; to (jermany, 1620; to Venice and the Grisons, 1626;
to England, 1629; Chancellor of the Ordre du Saint Esprit in 1630.
Chateauneuf was handed the seals on November 14, 1630, and retained
them until February 25, 1633, when he was disgraced and exiled to
Angoulfene. He returned to the court after the death of Louis XIII
and played a significant role in council on several occasions
thereafter.
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vacancy open since the death of Jean V Bochart de Champigny in
April, 1630.

In actuality, however, Le Jay had been First President

in all hut name since the death of Jerome d'Hacqueville in November,
1628, since Champigny had never presided over the court.

The

appointment of a First President should have given Richelieu long
pause, for the charge was an important one and the selection of its
bearer a delicate proposition.3 While the First President did not
control his associates, he represented them on ceremonial occasions
and played a large part in shaping their deliberations.

These

considerations made it imperative that the First President be a
moderate or, if possible, a royalist.

Yet the potential candidates

for the position were limited, because to be reasonably acceptable to
his brother judges the First President had to be of the robe and
experienced in the Parlement.

In effect this meant that the office

had to be filled from among the presidents

mortier or gens du roi

and while there had been exceptions such as that of Champigny, there
was great pressure within the court to promote the ranking prSsident
to First President upon the death of his forebearer.
In November, 1630, a circumstances made Richelieu's decision
easier, for the ranking president a mortier, Nicolas Le Jay, was
^The First President's position was really a commission which
could be revoked, although removal was quite rare. Since it was a
dignity and not a purchaseable office, charge describes its nature
better than office.
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also known and acceptable to him.

As a First President, even as a

president & mortier, Le Jay was strangely stypical.

His family

background showed no association with the Parlement and was not
particularly distinguished in government service. 4 Nicolas Le Jay
had been a secretaire du roi and maftre des comptes under Francis I,
titled as gcuyer (squire) by virtue of his lands at La Fouche
Hersans.

Nicolas I's only son Jean, grandfather of the First

President, kept his father's office of secretaire, married Guillemette
Hotman, and died in 1556.

In October, 1559, Jean Le Jay was

posthumously qualified as noble, probably through his office of
secretaire. Noble homme Nicolas II inherited the family office of
secretaire by survivance in 1552 and became a correeteur des comptes
in 1571.

Through inheritance, purchase, or his marriage to Madelaine

Grotton de Gron, Nicolas II held the seigneuries of Bervilliers,
brief sketch of three other contemporary presidents A mortier
will illustrate more typical patterns among them. Nicolas de Bellievre,
received as president 5. mortier in 1614, was the eldest son of
Chancellor Pomponne I de BelliSvre, who, in addition to several
ambassadorships, had also been surintendant des finances and a
president A mortier (1579-80). In 1605 Nicolas de Belli&vre married
Claude BrGlart, the daughter of Nicolas BrGlart, Chancellor of France,
and member of a parlementaire dynasty. Andre I Potier, sieur de
Novion, became president A mortier in 1616 and remained in the office
until his death in ld>35. His father, Nicolas III Potier, had been a
president A mortier and his grandfather a conseiller in the court.
His mother was the daughter of a president 5 mortier and his wife was
the daughter of conseiller Michel de Lauzon. Finally, Henri de Mesmes,
received as president in 1621, was the eldest son of Jean-Jaeques de
Mesmes, conseiller in the Parlement and later conseiller d'Etat, and
grandson of a maftre des requites under Francis I. Henri de Mesmes
marital alliances were somewhat exceptional, for both of his wives
were of the noblesse d'gpge. See the entries in B.N. 7553-7555^i£,
"Receuil alphabetique” ie notices et amoires des presidents, conseillers,
etc., du Parlement de Paris," and B.N. Ms. fr. 11427, "Memoires
sur les families du Parlement."
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Quinquempoix, La Grange, Tilly, and La Maisonrouge, leaving these
to five sons in 1 5 8 6 .5
The eldest of these sons, Nicolas III Le Jay, pursued a
strikingly successful career in the judiciary, beginning as a
conseiller aux EnquStes in 1600 and moving to the Ch&telet as
procureur au Roi in 1602.

In 1609 he took a step up in the Parisian

world, becoming lieutenant civil "by means of 50,000 geus that he
paid to the son of M. [Francois] Miron, and 25,000 to Concini,
marlschal d'Encre [sic], to get permission for i t . A s lieutenant
civil, Le Jay had earned something of a reputation for maintaining
calm in the city after the assassination of Henry IV in 1610.

Three

years after this episode, Le Jay went back into the Parlement, se
curing a presidency 1 mortier by resignation from Jacques-Auguste de
Thou.
At the time of his appointment as First President, Le Jay had
seventeen years of experience in the court and was at the top of the
list of presidents. By this time, too, he had increased the extent
and stature of the family lands, having raised the selgneuries of
Tilly, La Maisonrouge, and Saint-Fargeau to baronies, and having added
the seigneuries of Villiers, Les Salles, Saint Y, Bretigny-sur-Mont,
Malabri, Paray, Conflans, and Les Carrieres.

His marriage to

Magdelaine Marehand, daughter of Charles Marchand, colonel of three
5b .N. M s . fr. 29913 (dossiers bleus 368), "Le Jay"; Ms. fr. 7553,
fol. 21; Ms. fr. 7555, fols. 505-06.
6b.N. Ms. fr. 29913 (dossiers bleus 368), "Le Jay," fol. 3.
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companies of soldiers attached to the HOtel de ville, was apparently
not as successful as his acquisition of lands, she bringing him neither
high connections nor children before her death in 1625.7
At the time of his appointment as First President in 1630,
Le Jay's public reputation was that of a "knowing fsavant!> honest
man, although a philanderer; also his charge cost him a great deal."®
In 1615 Le Jay had made a flirtation with the rebellous princes
Condi and Soissons and had been briefly imprisoned for it.^

This

escapade may have taught him a lesson, for by the late 1620's he had
become a royalist, as his behavior during the verification of the
Code Michaud testifies.

During 1630 Le Jay acted as First President

in the absence of Jean Bochart de Champigny.

Undoubtedly, too, by

this time he had developed some association with Richelieu, although
the extent and nature of this relationship is shrouded in conjecture
since Richelieu's papers, correspondence, and Mgmoires make only
infrequent and fleeting references to him before November, 1630.
Certainly if Le Jay was a creature of Richelieu in some way before
this time, he retained these ties of loyalty after becoming First
President, for within the rules of the court, he always diligently
worked to further the royal cause.
7B.N. Ms. fr. 7553, fol. 21; Ms. fr. 7555, fols. 505-06.
8B.N. Ms. fr. 29913 (dossiers bleus 368), "Le Jay," fol. 3.
The Historiettes of Tallemant des Reaux make no meaningful comment on
any aspect of Le Jay's life except his amorous adventures, from
which he received some notoriety and several illegitimate children.
?Mol6, Mgmoires, I, 72-86.
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The beginning of Le Jay's presidency found the Parlement in a
sullen mood brought on by the prolongation of the paulette renewal.
Since issuing its declaration of June 21, 1630, the Crown had held
fast in its determination to negotiate the paulette in exchange for
an extortionate loan of twenty-five percent from its judicial officers;
by the opening of the 1631 session in November, 1630, the judges in
the Parlement were anxious and angry at Louis' failure to come to
terms.

One of Le Jay's first tasks, therefore, was to lead a

delegation to see the King about the droit annuel. On November 22
Le Jay, BelliSvre, and Potier de Novion, in company with several
conseillers, rode out to Saint-Germain-en-Laye to meet with the
King.

Louis promised them his good intentions, but the new offer

that was issued on December 21 hardly pleased the magistrates.

It

called for the officers of all sovereign courts to pay a loan of
twelve and one-half percent; the trSsoriers de France and the
prSsidiaux, sixteen and two-thirds percent; and all others twenty
percent.-*-0 Thoroughly dissatisfied, the judges refused to pay on
these costly terms which took no account of their elite status by
comparison with that of the provincial sovereign courts.
Before a protest could be mounted against the paulette, however,
the magistrates' spirits were further irritated by an attempt to
create offices within the Parlement, the first such effort since
Henry IV's reign.

By an edict presented December 30, the judges were

asked to approve two new maitres des requites and a conseiller lalque

1®B.N. Imprimis, Actes royaux, F.46968, no. 20.
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in each of the five Chambres des enqufites and two of RequStes.

The

King regretted such means, but "the urgent necessity of our affairs"
made them imperative, and the Parlement was ordered to register without
delay, restriction, difficulty, or modification.

This the court

refused to do, opting instead to present remonstrances.
These remonstrances, together with the longstanding paulette
grievances, were the central topics on the morning of January 20
when a delegation headed by Le Jay met Louis and his advisors at the
Louvre.

From the standpoint of both parties, the session was fraught

with potentially important consequences.

For the Crown, desperately

in need of funds after the Mantuan campaign of the preceding year, the
most obvious considerations were financial:

sale of the big judicial

-offices plus a plump paillette settlement could substantially ease
the treasury's pains if the Parlement could be persuaded to accept
them.

Less perceptible, but at least as meaningful, were psychological

factors surrounding the solidarity and credibility of Richelieu's newly
confirmed ministry.

The wily judges could not be allowed to dictate

terms to the council; conversely, an impression of mutual trust and
open-minded compromise were also desirable.

Louis and Richelieu,

therefore, resolved to put on a grand show.

When the deputies from the

court arrived late in the morning, they were received by the King and
his entire council:

Richelieu, the garde des sceaux, the

surintendant des finances, four margschaux de France, several
■^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. aeq. 9891, fols. 59-60, December 30, 1630,
and January 2, 1631-
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secretaires d'Etat, conseillers d'Etat, mattres des requites, and
even the captain of the King's guards stood in reception.
For the judges, on the other hand, the dual issues of the
paulette and creations came to the same point:

the Parlement, the

oldest and most honorable sovereign court, should not be treated in
connnon with other institutions.
were at stake.

Both a principle and material interests

A distinction for the sovereign courts had been made

when the paulette had been assessed in 1620, a distinction which in
1630 the Parlement hoped to further improve into an exclusive privilege;
in the same way the Parlement, long exempted from creations of office,
should continue to enjoy its immunity.

Opposition on the latter point,

of course, could easily be defended in the name of legitimate public
concern, good government, and the welfare of the kingdom, because
everyone knew the sale of office was a notoriously wasteful and
injurious means of public finance.

This seemed to be especially

true at the beginning of 1631, since the military activities of the
past year had largely been concluded and the need for extraordinary
financing much diminished.
These basic aspirations, therefore, were foremost in Le Jay's
mind as he argued the court's case.

The First President began by

maintaining that just as the Crown's needs had slackened with the
coming of peace, so too should it relent in its demands:
While Your Majesty had war underway and armies within and
without the kingdom, it was impossible for him to order
anything for the relief of his subjects; that is why your

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

418

officers
it seems
of peace
that war

remained silen-b by reserve and modesty. But at present
that necessity lias had its day, and that the serenity
has moderated in several ways the rigor and calamities
customarily b r i n g s . ^

Le Jay then went on to develop the Parlement*s refusal to pay the
forced loan associated with the droit annuel, intimating that its
rank entitled to special considerations:
Allow us, Sire, that on this occasion we should say that your
Parlement, which is the first parlement of France and the
Court of Peers, should believe itself to have prerogatives anH
pre-eminences above the others. Nevertheless, we do not know
by what misfortune it finds itself mingled in confusion and
in rank with companies which are inferior to it.1^
The Parlement of Paris was especially deserving through its elite
standing, but all the sovereign courts were deserving because they
contributed by administering the King's justice at very low salaries,
drawing less than 500 livres a year for the conseillers lalques and
4-00 for the conseillers elercs. Furthermore, Le Jay continued, the
Parlement had never asked for any increase in these humble wages
and contributed 300 livres out of them for the privilege of the quarante jours. That left 200 livres remuneration, "a strange and
pitiable thing which merits consideration."1^
After offering these considerations, the First President
specified two deficiencies in the December declaration of the droit
annuel, neither of which, oddly enough, referred to the forced loan.
One was that there was no provision made for safeguarding and con
serving offices

for widows and

orphans of

those who had died during

^B.N. Ms.

fr. nouv. acq. 9891,

fol. 64, January 24, 1631.

^B.N. Ms.

fr. nouv. acq. 9891,

fol. 64, January 24, 1631.

^B.N. Ms.

fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 64, January 24, 1631.
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the rupture of the agreement.

Because of this, a conseiller who had

died six months before had lost his office, leaving behind ten
children to subsist on 100 livr-es of rentes. Secondly, the recent
edict had made a distinction among the prgsidiaux, royal judges, and
lesser jurisdictions "who are poor and miserable, the highest of
them having only fifty livres in salary."

As for the creation of

the maitres des requites and conseillers, the Parlement had
deliberated on them for three consecutive mornings and decided on
remonstrances.

Le Jay though that "to represent all the reasons which

were expressed against them [[the creations] would be to bore you,"
but the principal one was "that it had always been judged that the
multiplicity of officers in France is very injurious, that they will
be perpetual, and that in eight years we will be constrained to do
the same or the equivalent, and so on to infinity."

In summary, the

judges hoped and believed that Louis, out of bounty and consideration
for subjects, officers, and honor, would preserve the Parlement in
its rights and privileges.15
Louis' response, given by Chateauneuf, was conciliatory in tone
but made no compromise on the main issues. The garde des sceaux
told the deputies that the King greatly regretted having been driven
to such means in his hour of need; in the past he had been helped
by the clergy and the nobility which had given property, blood, and
lives in his service; the people, too, had b o m several new imposts,
l^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 65-66, January 24> 1631.
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but "the war, the necessity, and the sterility of the seasons having
saddled all alike, the King thought it possible only to draw
help from the zeal and affections of his officers."
several propositions to make.

He had, however,

In those eases where security of

investment was threatened, the King would see to the conservation of
office in the family; he had not wanted to augment the Parties
casuelles by his first asking of twenty-five percent in June, 1630,
and "not wanting to profit from his officers," had reduced it to
the very moderate former taxes; these things considered, the Crown
could find no other resource than the present and moderate one;
that having sent his edict to the Parlement, the King wanted it
verified, which the officers should do "by the zeal and affection
that they bear for his service."

With this not very promising

dismissal, the deputies had to be content and retired to reflect on
it.16
Even as Le Jay reported the interview of January 20 to his
colleagues, however, consequences of the Day of Dupes were taking
shape which would soon displace the paulette and December creation
in the judges' attentions.

These matters were never out of mind

during the spring and summer, but they came to be mingled with
issues of even greater importance surrounding the administration of
high justice by commissaires and the fundamental right of the
fundamental right of the Parlement to mingle in affairs of State.
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 67-68, January 24, 1631.
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Violent bickering over these matters would dominate the politics of
the Parlement until February, 1632, making 1631 a year of crisis
between the Crown and the court unequalled until the outbreak of the
Fronde in 164-8.

By February, 1632, Louis and Richelieu had secured

a wobbly victory on several major points, but only by the repeated
use of punitive measures which in themselves accentuated tensions
playing between the council and the sovereign court.
The Parlement was first sucked into the turbulent wake of
Richelieu’s ascendancy when, in the closing week of January, the
court received a plea for justice from Catherine de Marillac, wife
of the marlschal who had been arrested in Italy and returned to
France for trial.

Preparation of a case against him had been handed

over to conseiller d 1Etat Moricq and mattre des requgtes Isaac de
Laffemas, later notorious as "Richelieu’s hangman."

Laffemas

proceded according to his own methods, indiscriminately seizing
boxes of the mareschal's private papers without warning or explanation,
breaking them open, and forwarding the contents to Mbricq for
examination.

The first reaction of the mareschal*s wife was to

present a recusation against Laffemas; when this had no effect, she
protested to the Parlement of Paris, sending a request for justice
and an interdiction of Laffemas' activities.1^ Mole received the
17B.N. Imprimes Lb36.2839, Requestes presentees 1 la Cour de
Parlement de Paris par le mareschal de Manllac et sa femme (n.p.,
1631), pp. 3-5. This pamphlet of twenty-seven pages contains the
petitions of Marillac and his wife presented to the Parlement and
the arrSts issued in their favor between January and September, 1631.
Several of these documents are not to be found in other sources such
as the registers of the Parlement.
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appeal on January 23 and gave his approval for its consideration
before the Parlement, writing across the bottom of the original:

"In

consequence of preceding decisions of the court interposed on
eommissaires extraordinaires, I do not bar it from the King.1,18 The
reception of the Parlement encouraged Marillac to present a formal
appeal in his own name a few days later:
Louis de Marillac, mareschal de France, humbly pleas, saying that
he has seen himself suddenly struck as if by thunder, and by and
by closely imprisoned and carefully guarded as if he were a
criminal of llse-majesti and could bring some terror to the
State, without knowing why, at the request of whom, who the
prosecuting party is, nor why they wish it.
Actually, the Marshal strongly suspected the origin of his troubles
and intimated it, even though Richelieu was not mentioned by name:
He has since learned and is advised that in order to substan
tiate such unwonted extraordinary methods and to make M m out a
criminal in some way, they are examining all his life, imputing
unknown crimes to him which were b o m and came to light only
during the night and day following Saint-Martin's Day last
[November 11J, solely through malevolent intentions of those
who desire and procure his ruin.
Marillac maintained his innocence could easily be shown before
ordinary courts, but he had not had the chance because the investi
gation was being made

l8"En consequence des precedents arrests de la Cour intervenus
sur les eommissaires extraordinaires, je ne l'enrpesche pour le
Roy." Ibid., p. 5. From the beginning of the Marillac Affair, Moli
showed himself receptive to appeals from the mareschal, although
he must have known that the case was extremely sensitive to the
King and Richelieu. On the question of Mali's involvement in the
Marillac Affair, see the important footnote in his Memoires, II,
68, n.3, where the editors have provided a valuable annotation
to documents presented in the text.
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by way of eommissaires, chosen and named by deceit, am^ng
others sieur de Laffemas, maitre des requites that the court
knows well enough and how he came into the charge of mattre
that he has, in which he is still not recognized by the
court, and monsieur de Morieq, also a maftre des requites,
in truth a personnage of honor, against whom he has nothing
to say except that he could only be suspect, being chosen
and influenced by unknown parties adverse to him.
These judges had proceded against him in unheard-of ways,
beginning by imprisonment, by seizure of property, titles, and
papers of the plaintiff, then seeking out witnesses from all
sides to inform on his life and to have them deposit all the
wrongs that they imagine to have been committed, [in order]
to make a case of it.
Beyond these injustices, the mareschal thought the court should
recognize the fact "that the commissions of the said sieurs de
Laffemas and de Iforicq had never been verified by the court, and
that their procedure is completely novel and unprecedented."

Under

the extremity of these conditions, the mareschal hoped to receive
recourse and justice from the Parlement:
If it please your graces, receive the said plaintiff appellant
from incompetent and recused judges as well as from the complete
procedure done by them, holding him to be wholly relieved; order
that on the said appeals the parties will have audience on such
a day as it pleases the court to order; that until such day the
pretended investigation and other procedures carried out by
them against the said plaintiff, together with their commissions,
in virtue of which they have worked, will be brought to the
greffier of the court; that to do this the greffiers of the said
commtssaires will be constrained by all due and reasonable means,
even by imprisonment of their persons; permit the said plaintiff
on the said appeal to summon those that he believes to be his
secret parties and those it will seem proper to him, and until
then, to prohibit the said sieurs de Moricq and De Laffemas and
all other judges from proceding to the execution of the said
commissions.

^B.N. Imprimis Lb^^.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillac,
6-8.
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Mathieu Mole inscribed, favorable conclusions on the petition on
January 29, and it was taken up by the court some time within the next
three days, though the registers do not indicate the exact date.^
With the paulette pending, what provoked the court to take this action
contrary to the King's will and contrary to its feelings towards the
Marillac family?

The answer probably lies with the Parlement's

longstanding concern with eommissaires extraordinaires vested in
mattres des requites or conseillers d'Etat. The granting of such com
missions had persisted in spite of the court's repeated injunctions
and remonstrances against them, and just before Marillac's case
appeared the Parlement had recognized a similar appeal coming from
Antoine Brillet, lawyer in the presidial of Angers.21

The Parlement

had unanimously accepted his claim; having done so, it could hardly
do less with a much more spectacular appeal coming from a Marshal of
France.

As Pierre de Vaissi&re, historian of Marillac's trial put it,

this eagerness of the Parlement to welcome the Marshal's
complaint is explained by the uneasiness caused it for a long
time by commissions extraordinaires confided to mutt-res des
requites ordinaires de l'hfrtel du roi, and which threatened
to dispoil the highest Jurisdiction of the kingdom of a part
of its prerogatives.22

20j4oie wrote, "Je ne l'empesehe pour le Roy.'1 B.N. Imprimis
I2J36.2839, Requestes presentles par de Marillac," p. 8. See also
Mole, Memoires, II, 68, n. 3.
2lSee supra, p. 176.
22pierre de Vaissi^re, L 1Affaire du marlschal de Marillac (Paris,
1924), p. 109. This is a very substantial and thoroughly documented
work covering all aspects of Marillac's trial in detail.
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Additionally, of course, Marillac had the imponderable factors of
justice and popular opinion on his side; in this instance, these
also happened to coincide with the court’s interests of the moment.
The King's interests were diametrically opposed to those of his
Parlement, and on February 3 Le Jay and three conseillers were
summoned to the Louvre to account for their acceptance.

There Louis

told them in no uncertain terms that they had been called because
of the Miarillac petition and that he "did not intend for them to
consider the affair and that he wanted to be obeyed. "23 Le Jay said
that he would tell the court and the deputation retired.
Having been apprised of the royal will, the next day Le Jay’s
colleagues promptly decided to disregard it.

On February 4 the

Parlement gave a formal arr§t in Marillac‘s favor totally satisfying
his request.

The mareschal and his wife were held to be relieved of

obedience to the eommissaires, permitted to summon any witnesses
they chose in his defense, and granted a hearing before the
Parlement as soon as possible ("audience au premier jour").

The

investigations and papers of MDricq and Laffemas were to be deposited
with the greffier of the Parlement for the procureur general *s
examination. 24
An emphatic royal reply to this decision was soon forthcoming.
On February 6 an arr$t du Conseil quashed the Parlement’s decree and

23b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891> fols. 70-71, February 4> 1631.
^B.N. Imprimes Lb36.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillac,
p. 9, gives the text of this arr^t. It is not found in the
registers.
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and forbade the court to take any cognizance of eommissaires
extraordinaires. Those on Marillac's case continued their work,
Moricq leaving the next day, February 7, for Champagne with a new
commission. 25

The councilliar arrit set off a great commotion in

the Palais, deputations, discussions, and meetings with Louis and
thegarde des sceaux coming thick and fast during the next three days.
On the 9th Chateauneuf, in Louis* presence, laid down the final
royal stand:
[in regard to 3 the affair pending in the Grand ’Chamhre by reason
of the commission addressed to two mattres des requites con
cerning the sieur de Marillac, [he] did not intend that the
court should take cognizance of this affair; that the King was
going to CompiSgne for a few days and that he remanded the city
of Paris to them.26
These words and

the arrit du Conseil did not deter the Parlement,

which now knew that the King would soon leave.

On February 11 it

decided to make tr§s humble remonstrances on the arret du Conseil of
the 6th.

In the meantime the gens du roi were instructed to ask for

a suspension of matters until the remonstrances could be presented.2?
Matters rested here for a few days, but on the 14th the court
received a second request from Marillac pointing out that the
eomnissaires were going about their inquest, the decision of February 4
notwithstanding.

If the Parlement did not act quickly, the mareschal

25vaissi§re, L1Affaire du mareschal de Marillac, pp. 110-11;
Griffet, Histoire Te Louis xTTl, lit, 120; Richou, Histoire des
commissions extraordinaires, p. 53- The text of the arrgt is not
found in the registers or printed sources.
26B.N. Ms.

fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 74, February 10, 1631.

2?B.N. Ms.

fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 75, February 11, 1631.
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thought, "he will find himself guilty and will be judged, . . . [it]
being considered that commi ssaires are chosen not so much to condemn
the guilty as to see that the innocent perish."

To prevent this

Marillac asked for a renewal on enjoinders against Moricq
Laffemas,
conforming to your arr|tQof February 4] that the charges and
investigations and other procedures made by the said commissaires . . . will be brought to the registry of the court, . . .
and that the plaintiff will be led away and imprisoned in the
Coneiergerie of the Palais, to be under the jurisdiction of
the court."28
Once again the Parlement was receptive, issuing a second arrit
on February 22 which largely reiterated its earlier one of the 4th.29
The eommissaires were prohibited from continuing work on Marillac1s
trial; remonstrances were to be made on the case; the huissiers of the
Parlement were enjoined to deliver the arr£t when they were required
so to do.30 As before, howevery such efforts remained a dead letter,
2®B.N. Imprimis Lb36.2839, Requestes prisenties par de Marillac,
pp. 10-12.
^This time MolS inscribed more vigorous conclusions on the
bottom of the request: "Vu 1'arrSt du Conseil du 6 fivrier dernier,
avec la commission dudit jour, et autres pieces y attachles, je
requiers pour le Roi trSs-humbles remonstrances Stre faites audit
seigneur Roi, tant sur le sujet de l1interdiction que des termes
extraordinaires contenus audit arrit du Conseil, et cependant que,
conformement 8 l'arrit de la Cour conni, les Chambres assemblies, le
2 fevrier dernier, les eommissaires ne passeront outre 8 1'instruction
dudit proc8s, jusques 8 ce que les remonstrances ordonnees par ledit
arr&t aient ite faites audit seigneur Roi." B.N. Imprimis Lb36.2839,
Requestes presenties par de Marillac, p. 12.
30lhe text of the Parlement's arret is in Lb36.2839, Requestes
presentees par de Marillac, pp. 13-14- Neither the debate nor the
text of the ari^Tt is preserved in the registers.
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for an arr&t du Conseil nullified the Parlement1s decision on the
same day it was issued.^

Under these circumstances none of the

Parlement1s huissiers dared risk delivering the decision, and the
arrgt had to he carried to Moricq at the citadel of Verdun by an agent
of the Marshal's family.

The court’s huissiers had been right: upon

his arrival on the 28th, the messenger was aribtrarily thrown into
a fortress where he remained incommunicado and without trial for six
or seven months.32
Help from the Parlement frustrated, the mareschale de Marillac
appealed to Louis for an audience.

This was turned down.

She

then went to Richelieu, who told her that he would not see her
without Louis' permission.

Some time after this the mareschal1s

wife was conducted outside Paris; other members of his family were
exiled from Paris or expelled from their positions.33

At

the same

time the mareschal drafted writs of recusation against the garde des
sceaux,

Moricq, and several other royal agents; during March these

were summarily rejected by three arrgts du Conseil.
Having brushed aside the opposition of the Parlement and
Marillac's personal appeals, the Crown pressed on with its prosecution
of the hapless victim.

Letters from Paris dated May 13, 1631,

proclaimed the official version of charges against him, ordered

32Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 121; VaissiSre, L'Affaire
du mareschal de Marillac, pp. 112-13.
^VaissiSre, L1Affaire du mareschal de Marillac, pp. 112-13;
Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 122.
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Marillac moved from Ste. Menhould to Dijon, and commissioned a
chambre de justice to carry out his trial.

This bench was initially

composed of Noel Brulart, Claude de Paris, and Paul Hay de Chastelet,
maftres des requestes; Pierre des Barres and Jean Bouchu, presidents
of the Parlement of Dijon; and ten conseillers drawn from the same
court.

As the trial progressed the garde des sceaux and others came

to be added to the list.

Moricq and Laffemas acted as rapporteurs

with prosecution in the hands of Pierre Saintonge, procureur g£n£ral
at Dijon.

At least ten judges had to be present to return the

verdict.34
Why had the government chosen to locate the commission at Dijon?
Marillac*s partisans saw in this royal intentions to have him
judged by those whose lands and buildings had suffered in the passage
of the mareschal1s army from Champagne to Piedmont during the campaign
of 1630.

But VaissiSre, Marillac* s historian, suggests that the

Crown had other more important, considerations connected with the
influence of the Parlement of Paris:
I believe, however, that the preoccupation of the government was
especially to have the case judged outside the ressort of the
Parlement of Paris. That which tends to prove it is that an
epidemic having broken out in Burgundy, and another place of
assembly having to be designated for the commission, they
immediately accepted Laffemas and Moricq* s proposition to meet
at Verdun, "place, said they, sufficiently prescribed by the
investigation which is there continuing, and which is outside
the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Paris."35

34The text of the commission of May 13 is in B.N. Imprimes Lb36
.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillac, pp. 15-17. Additional
details-may be found in Vaissi^re, L*Affaire du mareschal de
Marillac, pp. 113-14^^Vaissi^re, L*Affaire du mareschal de Marillac, p. 115.
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The transfer to Verdun took place on July 2; evidently even at this
late date the eommissaires had enough respect for the influence of
the Parlement in Marillac1s cause to avoid operations within its
jurisdiction.

Finally, both Dijon and Verdun were close to the

Duchy of Lorraine where Gaston D 1Orleans had sought refuge after
fleeing the kingdom in pique and panic during March.

Making an

example of the mareschal nearby might serve to remind his followers
of the treatment meted out to rebels and conspirators.
According to the commission of May 13, the comwrissaires were
to try Marillac on the broad grounds that
he has very badly abused the authority that we {[Louis XIIl]
gave him, and that he availed himself of it only to oppress
our subjects and to impede the implementation of our good
intentions, so that on the complaints Tof our subjects] . . .
we have been constrained to assure ourselves of his person,
and to investigate his actions and behavior that we have
found so contrary to the expectations we had conceived in
him. After seeing in our council the charges, investigations,
and other procedures made against him by eommissaires we have
deputed for this purpose, we have deemed ourselves unable,
without wounding our conscience, to any longer conceal his
evil actions nor excuse him of them without punishment,
exemplary for the public interest rather than for our own. For
these reasons, completely assured of your integrity and wisdom,
we have commissioned, ordered, and deputed you . . . to
prosecute and extraordinarily try the said sieur de Marillac.3°
During the following months the Crown's prosecutors found that trans
lating these vague assertions into legal torts of l3se-majest€ was
impossible; unable to show that the mareschal had committed any crime
of State, the judges then concentrated on his handling of State

36fi.N. Imprimes Lb#*.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillac,
pp. 15-16.
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funds involved in construction of the citadel of Verdun and the
conduct of his troops, where, under accepted military practices of
the times, it was easy to dredge up some misconduct.

By mid-summer

the semblance of a case had been built around three general categories
of charges:

peculation of funds dedicated to the army in Champagne

during 1630; malversations committed in the course of construction
at Verdun, which Marillac commanded; and excessive requisitions
levied on civilians where the army had passed on its way from
Champagne to Piedmont.

Arraignment on these charges did not take

place before late in the year, however, and long before that time
the Parlement of Paris had become embroiled in a host of other
difficulties with the Crown which it is now necessary to examine.3?
The thorniest problem that Louis XIII faced after the Day of
Dupes was that of his immediate family, for despite large bribes,
tearful promises, and solemn reassurances, a peaceful and trust
worthy rapprochement between Louis, Richelieu, Gaston d'Orleans, and
Marie proved impossible.

At the end of January Gaston withdrew from

court in a huff and retired to Orleans, thereby raising the possi
bility of new cabals.

Long discussions between Louis and his

advisers then produced reluctant decisions:

mother and brother must

remain separated; the Queen Mother must be secretly deported to a
close and certain supervision secure from Gaston's machinations and
far from Paris.

The place chosen was an ancient royal residence

VaissiSre, L'Affaire du marSschal de Marillac, p. 115.
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deep in the forest of CompiSgne, where the King, Queen, and an
unsuspecting Queen Mother gathered in the middle of February.
Louis' stay, however, was short.

Before morning broke on the 23rd,

Louis and the court slipped silently into the dawn, leaving Marie
and her entourage behind, for all intents isolated in the care of
eight companies of royal guards.

With his mother thus restricted,

on March 11 Louis set out for Orleans to bring his younger brother
to reason.

Gaston, impetuous and foolish as ever, refused any

contact and fled to Lorraine, all the while papering the countryside
with vehement letters, tracts, and broadsides blaming his own and
the kingdom's misfortunes on the scheming, ambitious, and hard
hearted Cardinal.

Louis followed, stopping in Dijon on March 30 to

register a proclamation with the parlement in which his brother's
supporters were declared guilty of l£se-majestg.
These events of the early months of 1631 presented the monarchy
with a delicate situation, for Louis now had the embarrassing and
dangerous public image of having hounded both his mother and brother
into exile.

If Marie was temporarily in hand, Gaston was free and

quite capable of stirring up major troubles with the due de Lorraine
or even with the Spanish in nearby Franche Comte.

Within the kingdom,

where popular discontent was running high because of economic hard
ship and oppressive taxation, various elements could easily raise
the standard of revolt in the name of the heir apparent against
an unjust king and his tyrannical minister.

The possibilities of a

linkup between internal and external forces was thus very real and
readily apparent to both sides during the spring.
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At the same time a powder keg was developing in Louis' capital
where high elements of the royal administration were among those
Frenchmen most disturbed by royal policies.

To be sure, under

normal conditions Louis' familial estrangement would have left his
officials largely unmoved.

But in this uneasy spring of 1631, all of

Paris was depressed by unusually severe outbreaks of vagabondage,
crime, and epidemic sickness which were compounded by rumors of
royal intentions to impose an aide of twenty-five percent on the
retail sale of wine.

On February 3 these rumors brought a hundred and

fifty wine merchants and four or five hundred tavern keepers, porters,
lackeys, servants, and on-lookers to the front of the HStel de ville
for a demonstration against the tax.

The privSt des marchands was

unable to give them any satisfaction, and soon the crowd was crying
for blood.

When the city guard was called up, the colonel de

quartier in charge found that not a single one of his command would
bestir themselves in support of law and order.

The mob soon surged

through the city streets seeking Jean Bryois, the local aides
farmer, screaming that they would throw him into the Seine or flay
him and set his house on fire.

The rioters were finally dispersed

by two companies of guards brought over from the Louvre who shot
down several of the crowd and seized others; Bryois was personally
rescued from hiding by the due de Montbazon, governor of Paris,
and spirited off in his carriage for safekeeping.

38d <Avene1, Richelieu et la monarehie absolue, II, Appendix VII,
"Emeute provoquSe par un drortf"3e detail sur le vin," pp. 434-35.
For the conditions of the spring of 1631, see supra, p.
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Encouraged "by these hardship conditions, a particularly potent
combination of annoyances had been building steadily among the
Parisian courts since the beginning of the new year.

The interaction

of contemporary conditions with the politics of the sovereign courts
was noted by D'Andilly, who, with slight error in time frame,
observed that 'during the indecision of the CompiSgne joumey
[February 11-23] there transpired three things which proved very
unsettling."

The first of these was the departure of Gaston for

Orleans; the second, the emeute populaire in Paris over the new
imposition of aides; the third
was the protest of the soverign companies on edicts that the
King wanted passed because, seeing that they those in the
council did not want to give them the paulette, they would
not verify any edict, which frustrated the King's chances for
the revenues that he hoped to draw from the edicts.
Then, as a postscript, D'Andilly tellingly added, "the real cause was
the November stroke which continued the displeasure of Ms the brother
of the King with M8 the Cardinal."^9
D'Andilly was especially accurate in regard to the Parlement,
where dissatisfaction had been mounting since the Day of Dupes.

Three

major reasons for the court's inquietude, the seizure of Marillac,
the accusation of Brillet, and the problem of commissaires in general,
have already been seen.

Even in the midst of discussing these topics,

however, the Parlement could not forget that the paulette had been
suspended or that a creation of office was pending.

On

^^Biblio. de l'Inst., Ms. Godefroy 285, "Journal de la cour sous
Louis XIII," by Robert Amauld d'Andilly, fol. 28. This manuscript
includes material that is not found in the Journal inedit for the
years 1630-32.
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February 17 the judges in plenary session decided that thereafter
there would he no deliberation on the provisions to any office in the
court and that the droit annuel would not be paid.40

The Crown did

not act to relieve any of these grievances, and near the end of
February the Palais was seething with anger, as witnessed by an
interesting letter from conseiller Pierre Berger, one of Richelieu's
informants in the Parlement, to the Cardinal.

Berger very frankly

advised the minister on the 24th that
it appears that the spirits of the company are growing more and
more irritated, and beyond that the enemies of your power, who
are hardly more friendly to that of the King, are taking subject
to render you odious and are everywhere making malicious accounts
of you. I see by the gestures and by ways of acting and speaking
of several that I have always known [to be] the friends of
innovation, that they promise themselves a change soon . . . .
They are making an inventory of these ([complaints in] remon
strances: on the last Briois riot; . . . that several quarters
of rente on the city have not been paid; that the poor folk
of the country are dying of hunger, and that nevertheless
instead of discharging they surcharge them; that all the notable
people of the State are exposed by means of these extraordinary
commissions to the danger of suffering anything one wishes at
the court. . . . I make no judgment on all that . . . I will
only say that one sees by these and by an infinite number of
other circumstances . . . that public discontent grows from day
to day, and that the particular remedies of driving away or
putting in the Bastille those that it seems are accounted more
bad than good give the King and you a hundred adversaries for
[each] one so treated . . . .
It is thus necessary to find some
universal remedies to put an end to these discontents. Discharge
yourself of the spirit of all these little topical remedies which
are not even pallatives in the [present] ill-disposition of
spirits and which serve to sharpen and aggravate the evil rather
than to tone it down. I have no need to tell you, indeed, that
which you known better than I, that is more expedient to reign in
hearts than with stick in h a n d . 41

4°B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 77-78, February 17, 1631.
41yaissi5re, L 1Affaire du mareschal de Marillac, pp. 111-12,
quoting an uncited letter o f"~Eerger to kicFeiieu.
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Iouis, then at Compidgne, was well aware of the prevailing state
of affairs in his capital and kingdom.

Before setting off to deal

with Gaston, he composed a long lettre de cachet to the Parlement
explaining the woes of the kingdom, his reasons for the humiliating
treatment of his mother, and his enduring support for Richelieu.

The

letter was carefully timed to arrive in Paris just after the King
left Compi£gne, and between the lines the judges could read that it was
a subtle warning not to further complicate the royal dilemma at this
critical juncture.42
The judges of the Parlement understood the King's situation but
tacitly chose to ignore it as the most serious crisis of the spring
budded in the Palais de Justice during early March.

The fresh turmoil

had not originated with the Parlement, but with the Cour des aides
which, in early February, had been asked to register an increase in
the wine aides of Paris. There was great popular resistance to the
tax, as the Bryois riot showed; the Cour des aides had refused
registration, whereupon on February 27 the Crown ordered it inter
dicted and transferred its functions to a commission of maitres des
requites and conseillers from the Grand Conseil.43 The maftres

42b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 78-81, February 26, 1631.
The text is also printed in Mold's Mgmoires, II, 35-37. The letter was,
in effect, a press release to the public in the form of an open letter
to all the parlements. It was also printedin the Mereure frangois,
XVII, 130-33. The letter was dated from CompiSgne, February 23,
though it was certainly postdated, for the King departed before dawn
on the 23rd. It was presented in the Parlement on the 26th, by
which time news of the Queen Mother's exile and the King's departure
would have reached the capital.
43D'Avenel, Richelieu et la mcnarchie absolue, II, Appendix VIII,
"Refus d'enregistrement d'un £dit par la Cour des aides," pp. 435-42.
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were thrown into a quandry:

should they accept a commission ousting

an entire corps of their fellow magistrates, or should they resist
the King's orders?

Normally there would have been little difficulty

in deciding for the King whose councils they served, but the mnftres,
like the other judicial officials, had not yet been granted the
paulette; their corps, too, had been threatened with expansion in
the edict pending before the Parlement.

Therefore, in early March

the maftres assembled as a body, refused the Crown's commission,
and even made remonstrances to the garde des sceaux.

The council

retaliated with an arr&t of March 10 which annulled the decisions made
in the mattres' assemblies "as made by incompetent judges and without
power," ordered their acts stricken from the registers and replaced
by the arr6t du Conseil, and proscribed any such assemblies in the
future.

Finally and most remarkably, three of the mafrtres were

suspended from their duties and barred from participation in the
Conseil

p r i v e .44

On the same day the commissaires went to the Cour

des aides, took their places, registered their commission, and
promptly adjourned because the greffier, the registers, and necessary
instructions could not be f o u n d . A t this point the Crown was faced
with the possibility of a general revolt among the most elite members
of its magistrature, including those serving the council itself.
^MolS, Mgmoires, II, p. 38-39.
45d 'Avene1, Richelieu et la monarehie absolue, II, Appendix VIII,
p. 440.
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This rebellion threatened to infect the Parlement just as Louis
was departing for Orleans when some judges proposed to take up the
interdiction of the Cour des aides and the

1 commission.46

The prospect of parlementaire cooperation with the maitres and other
sovereign courts in the King’s absence presented a specter of the
first magnitude, and Louis hastened to avoid it.

Before leaving his

capital on the 11th of March, Louis forbade any assembly in the
Parlement touching on the Cour des aides. After the King had departed,
however, some judges again suggested discussions, and on March 13
royal couriers pounded up the road from Etampes with a bundle of
lettres de cachet: one each to the Grand Conseil, the gens du roi
in the Parlement, the court as a whole, and one each to the
presidents £ mortier. The general tenor of each copy was the same,
the most interesting one to the presidents 3 mortier reading:
Monsieur le President, yesterday I was informed that an assembly
of the chambers had been asked, there to put forward considerations
on the establishment that I have made of some commissaires to
attend to rendering justice to my subjects on the collection of
Aides. I avow to you that this affair is sensitive to me,
because those of my Parlement have no jurisdiction over matters
which others have competence, and that it seems that having
prohibited the undertaking of it on Monday [the lOtlj) that Wed
nesday it was pursued. Seeing the different directions which
that might take, learning the ones who injured my authority, and
not wanting to be obliged to make an assertion of all extremity
against my Parlement, I have resolved to prevent the evil,
using new prohibitions, not only writing to the court, to the
sieur Le Jay, First President, and to my attorneys as is
accustomed, but to each of you, presidents in the Parlement, in
order to explain to you my sentiment and to declare to you that
46The registers do not contain this initial consideration,
which must be inferred from later references. See B.N. Ms. fr. nouv.
acq. 9891, fols. 81-82, March H , 1631, and Ifoll, Mgmoires, II,
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I would be offended if, in the face of my intentions, it were to
continue. I am counting on your fidelity and affection in case
the affair is advanced so far that the dignity of your offices and
the weight of your reasons cannot stop them, nor the force of
my letter, nor that which will be said to them by our avocats
and Procureur Ggn&ral, ([so] that you, with your colleagues,
will adjourn yourselves at one time which will prevent the
continuation of this deliberation. I am writing in these same
terms to your colleagues, and have very precisely mandated my
will to the said sieur Le Jay, whom I entreat you to support and
follow. Relying on your fidelity and accustomed affection, I
pray God that he will have you, Monsieur le President in his holy
care. Written at Etampes the 13th day of March 1631.^
Despite these explicit instructions, the next day the Parlement
ordered tr8s humble remonstrances on the commissaires in the Aides'
seats as well as the interdiction of the three maftres. BelliSvre and
several conseillers were entrusted with the task of presenting them.48
At first glance these actions of the court appear to be daring
defiance of the royal wishes.

The Crown took them to be so, and

rightly feared the consequences.

Other pieces of evidence, however,

indicate that the court had proceded quite cautiously behind Louis'
back.

Noting the Parlement's actions of the week, D'Andilly wrote

Although the King in leaving Paris had made prohibitions to the
Parlement to assemble, it assembled nevertheless; but the
action passed with great respect [l'action se passa avec grand
respect] and only IF le_president de BelliSvre was deputed to go
to make remonstrances to the King on the unpleasant impressions
given to him by his Parlement.49
Assuming the veracity of D'Andilly's remarks, it seems likely that
the Parlement's involvement was intended more as a gesture of support
47Molg, M&noires, II, 41-42.
4%.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 84, March 14, 1631.
49D«Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 156-57.
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for the Com* des aides and the maftres than a determination to press
matters to a confrontation and possible co-operation amnng the
discontented magistrates.

If the judges had wished to underscore

deeply held feelings, a larger delegation would have been named under
the direction of the First President.

Finally, although the Crown

made no conciliatory move to the Parlement, the matter disappeared
from the court's registers after the entry of 15th.

Undoubtedly the

decision to drop the issue was encouraged by withdrawal of the
twenty-five percent aide on March 17 and by increasing evidence that
the commissaires would not be able to function, since they received
no pleas and lawyers refused to argue before them.50 Nevertheless,
for a time the ominous possibility of united action among the
sovereign courts of the capital had presented itself, and at least
partially because of pressure from officers, the Crown had been
forced to compromise with them by withdrawing the wine tax.

The

commissaires, too, proved an experience in burlesque and were
completely withdrawn on May 7.^
The affair of the Cour des aides had scarcely subsided when the
Parlement was drawn into consideration of a matter of State of the
utmost significance:

the rebellion and flight of Gaston d'Orleans.

This momentuous issue, like so many others, was grounded in the Day
of Dupes, but in gravity it far outstripped any the Parlement had
considered up to that time.

Indeed, this affair was not only the

5®D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchic absolue, II, Appendix VIII,

440-43.
51Ibid., 444.
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climax of the spring crisis hut potentially became one of the most
perilous periods of Louis' reign when, in the middle of April, Louis
and Richelieu had to contend with a public overture to the Parlement
submitted by Gaston.

The court went on to discuss royal policies

towards his followers, and the Crown's firm resolve had to be
underscored in the strongest terms to that date, including a summons
to meet the King en corps at the Louvre, public destruction of its
records, and the exile of several magistrates.
The Gaston d1Orleans Affair began innocuously enough.

On

March 30 Louis had had registered in the Parlement of Dijon a
declaration against his brother which outlined his contrary behavior,
ingratitude, and final flight from the kingdom.

The King's brother,

as Louis' heir-apparent, was invulnerable, but the edict declared his
followers the eomte de Moret, the dues d'Elbeuf, De Bellegarde, and
De Roannez, the president 5 mortier Jacques le Coigneux, the sieurs
de Puylaurens, Montsigot, and Chanteloube, "and all other persons of
whatever quality and condition that they should be" guilty and
convicted of lSse-majest€ on the primae facia evidence of having fled
the kingdom without

p e r m i s s i o n . 52

From Louis' view there was nothing

unusual in the pronouncement, which was soundly grounded in the
ordinances.

The Parlement of Dijon had been presented with the

document out of force of circumstance, because Louis had ended his
pursuit there and because the court was close to Gaston's refuge.
^2Le Mercure fran^ois, XVII, 1/+6-52.
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Likewise, as far as the Crown was concerned, Gaston's supporters had
convicted themselves by their treasonous behavior in assisting and
advising the King's brother against the known will of the King.
Their actions had included the raising of troops in Gaston's behalf,
an offense plainly defined as l§se-majestg in Article 183 of the
Ordinance of Blois.
Therefore when the Parlement of Paris received the declaration
on April 4, there was no readily apparent reason why registration
should not have followed immediately.

Nevertheless, it did not,

the court deciding "to deliberate on the said declaration and to see
the registers. "53

The reasons for this decision and the ensuing

hearings were never formally expressed, but they were probably an
amalgam of accumulated mistrust from earlier in the spring, institu
tional pride, and legal reasoning.

The Parlement received the

declaration in a low humor, which was not improved by the news that
it had first been presented in a provincial sovereign court and not
the first court of the land.

Upon examination the magistrates found

that one of their own number, the president £_ mortier Jacques le
Coigneux, had been condemned without being heard before the Parlement.
Lastly, the court may have believed that Gaston's other supporters
had been unfairly condemned because their offices required that they
remain near his person, thus having been declared guilty of lSsemajestg for merely having followed their master.^
53b .N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 85, April 4, 1631.

^Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 144-45. Griffet added a
fourth reason that is more difficult to substantiate, that the judges
acted out of concern for Gaston, "whose interests had always been
dear to the company."
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Unhappily for those who would know the court's actions at this
time, the registers contain no entries between April 4 and April 24.
If the court followed its usual procedure, and there is no reason to
suppose that it did not, a committee was appointed to examine the
declaration and report on it.

A few days later, perhaps on the 7th

or 8th, a report was presented and deliberations begun.

However,

according to D'Andilly,
When it came to UF Pinon [dean of the conseillers of the Grand1
Chanibre] he said that it seemed to him that they were going a
little quickly in an affair of so great a consequence, and that
he was of the opinion that they should see the registers as
they customarily did on similar occasions.55
The proclamation was probably still under examination on April 12,
when a new development cast the Parlement's consideration in a
radically different light.

On Saturday, the 12th, one sieur Michael

Roger, Gaston's procurer general, delivered a request for justice
from the prince to a conseiller of the Parlement.

The petition was

in two parts, the first a polemic against Richelieu, who "had under
taken open force upon his person," driven him from the kingdom, and
sent a declaration to the Parlement of Dijon "filled with various
facts that he imagines contrary to the honor and reputation of the
said seigneur due."

Gaston then enlisted the aid of the Parlement

through a legal appeal:

55D'Andilly, Journal inedit, X, 162-63- D'Andilly recorded this
entry for April 24, then noted: "This {opinion] of UF Pinon came more
than fifteen days before, the first time that they had deliberated on
the declaration, [and] upon which they re-deliberated from the begin
ning on the said day the 24th." This note would then place the
beginning of the deliberation around the 7th or 8th of April.
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This considered, Messieurs, [if] it please you [to] give writ to
the said Due on that which he declares, that the enterprise and
violent persecution of the said Cardinal against his person is
the cause of his sortie from the kingdom, and that there is not
one among those named in the said declaration, nor any other,
which by counsel or otherwise has there contributed; give him
writ as well as on the protestation which he makes so that the
said above mentioned declaration cannot damage or prejudice
those included in it, nor him, from that which he opposes;
that it oppose the execution of the said declaration and the
registration of all similar [ onesJ which might be presented
on the same subject; to arrest the course of the pernicious
designs of the said Jean Armand de Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu,
the said Due asks that it render itself a formal party against
him, his abettors and abherents, to have them tried on the
facts mentioned in the present request, circumstances, and
dependencies; requiring to this effect permission to investigate,
obtain monition, and the adjunction of the King's Procureur
ggngral; to do yourselves justice.56
This was nothing less than an attempt to rally the Parlement to Gaston's
cause, and the conseiller, well aware of the significance of what was
happening, passed the petition to Le Jay, who remitted it to the King. 57
Does this mean that the request was not debated in the Parlement?
question cannot be answered with certainty.

The

The court's registers

and the memoirs of Mol£, Talon, and Richelieu make no mention of any
deliberation en conseil between April 4 and 24.

That no debate on the

^Le Mercure francois, XVII, 178-82.
^According to Griffet's account, "The First President made
clear to him [the conseiller] the consequences of such a step, and
the request was sent to the court. Bernard [Charles Bernard, Histoire
de Louis XIII eomposee par Messire Charles Bernard (Paris, 1646),
258-59.] asserts that it was presented to the Parlement on April 12,
but in the preamble of the arrgt du conseil returned on May 12, 1731
[sic, 1631J, by which this request is suppressed as calumnious and
contrary to the repose and security of the State, it is said that
the conseiller comported himself in this affair according to his duty
[Griffet’s italics]; this signifies in the style of the cardinal that
the request had been remitted to the King." Griffet, Histoire de
Louis XIII, II, 145-46. The arret du Conseil of suppression of
May 12, 1631, may be found in iLe Mercure francois, XVII, 183-84.
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request took place, or that Le Jay attempted to stop it, is supported
by Gaston's later accusation that the First President had "prevented
f a empeschel that the said request should be presented to you."
Equally, Le Jay might only have impeded presentation of the request
by forwarding it to Louis.

This view is supported by the testimony of

Robert D'Andilly, which indicates that the Parlement did deliberate
the request:
The Parlement of Paris assembled all the chambers to deliberate
on the request presented to them by the procureur general of
Monsieur D'Orleans and was concluded by voice illegible were
of the advice to make tr&s humble remonstrances to the King and
convoke the peers and the others to make an investigation*9
Probably Le Jay first took the request to the King, then, its presen
tation being widely known, others demanded that it be deliberated en
conseil as a matter of public concern.

The appeal was, of course,

closely tied to the subject matter of the March 30 declaration and
could easily be insinuated into discussions on it.

Whatever the

nature of the discussions during the week of April 12-17, they
produced no decision, for on April 17 the Crown addressed a lettre
de cachet to the court requiring a prompt registration on the first
day of audiences after Easter (April 20).
comply.

The court refused to

Upon its return on April 24, it decided to continue its

deliberations on the next Saturday, the 26th.60

58Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 201. This accusation against Le Jay
is found in a second petition to the Parlement recusing Le Jay dated
May 30, 1631.
59fiiblio. de l'Inst., Ms. Godefroy 285, fol. 35.

6o B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 86-87, April 24, 1631.
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Happily for those who would understand the temper of the Parle
ment at this time, the deliberations that took place on April 26 are
known in some detail.

The final billet des opinions for this day

has survived in manuscript form; along with a detailed commentary in
D'Andilly1s journal and a few remarks in Mbit's Memoires, this permits
a reasonable accurate reconstruction of what transpired.

On this

notable Saturday there were only sixty-eight judges present because,
according to D'Andilly, many were still away at their country homes
after the Easter holidays.

Perhaps, too, some of these were wary

of returning to what the Crown could only regard as a contumacious
assembly.

Among those present, D'Andilly remarked, "some strange

things were said" (II se dit des choses estranges).^

Amid the

clamor of the day, a report on Gaston's request was not presented,
but there were rumors circulating about it.
cation.

No one spoke for verifi

After the report by rapporteur Boucher, debate organized

itself according to four opinions.

The first, moderate and temporizing,

was to turn the issue over to the procureur g$n£ral for investigation.
The second, presented by president des Enqugtes Jean-Jacques Barillon,
was to make remonstrances to the King, not only on the declaration
but also on the presentation of Gaston's request, for, as he said,
"if it were true, he was shocked that they [the judges} had not
spoken of it, and if it were not, its publication [in Paris} would
not have been allowed."^*2 President 5 mortier Nicolas le Bailleul
^D'Andilly, Journal inedit, X, 16362Ibid.
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offered a third course, that the King should he petitioned to send an
envoy to Gaston "to exhort his return and to enjoin all those who had
followed him and were for the King to return within the month."63
Finally and most radically, president des Enqugtes Pierre Gayant
recommended calling the peers.

Very few favored either of the last

two courses, and the opinions were reduced to the first two, an
investigation and report on the declaration by the procureur general
or, more drastically, to refuse verification and male remonstrances.
The court could not decide between these, and the day ended with a
split decision, thirty-four votes to thirty-four.^

Le Jay was

infuriated at this turn of events, telling his colleagues that "the
King will see to it."65

63Ibid.

^

64Ibid., 164. B.N. Ms. fr. 18413, fol. 127v°, "Act de delibera
tion de la Cour de Parlement de Paris L'an 1631 le xx6er avril sur la
declaration que dernier du mois de Mars," gives the votes on this
decision. Those for an investigation and report were: presidents a
mortier Le Jay, Bailleul, Siguier, and Bellievre; conseillers Bouehier,
Bauyn, Pastoureau, Crespin, Damours, Durant, C. le Clerc, Viole,
du Fautray, De la Barre, Le Ferron, Hatte, Ruelle, Rancher, Charlet,
Jabin, Fayet, Pinon, De Pleure, Saunier, L'Alemand, Le Coq, Portail,
Meliant, Magdelaine, Catinat, Sauarre, De Machaut, Halle, De Bretagne.
Those for remonstrances were: Batillon, Tudert, Laisne, De Longueil,
Lescalopier, De Coumont, Durant, De MontIon, Lefebvre, Amelot,
Du Tranehan, Saveuse, Bici, Ferrand, Viole, Broe, Parfait, Saumiere,
Berrochel, Doujat, Baton, Le Roy, Benoise, N. Le Clerc, Perrot, Gayant,
Du Tranchay, Luillier, Pithou, Brussel, Favier, Brisart, De Ligny,
Courtin. Spelling of names, still highly variable at this time, is
given as in the orginal.
^The original reads: '([After the decision was returned]
Quelques'uns dirent qu'il se fauldroit rassembler la semaine
prochaine, auquel temps tous Mrs seroient revenuz des champs. Mais
le premier president, tout pique, leur dit: 'Le Roy y pourvoyera.1"
D'Andilly, Journal inedit, X, 164-
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This Louis did, but with discretion and careful planning.

On

April 29 Mole was instructed to immediately send an account of the
April 26 deliberations, which he did, providing Chateauneuf with a
copy of the opinions, along with the advice that
I know very well that this is not satisfactory to the King’s
will, who has sent his letters to be published and registered,
and this difficulty in his view could have the same effect as a
refusal. In which case, it will be necessary to send lettres
de jussion in order to oblige the company to return a certain
resolution. °
But instead of sending a letter, Louis and Richelieu determined on
the toughest of measures to deal with the court.

Sometime before

May 12 the King and his chief minister hashed these measures out,
then their decision was presented in a pro forma meeting of the council
attended by all the princes, dukes, peers, officers of the Crown,
and eonseillers d'Etat. The first opinion was delivered by the
senior conseiller, De Roissi, who presented the Crown's argument that
there was no reason why the Parlement should not be excluded from
considering matters of State, Francis I and Charles IX having created
precedents for such a ruling.

This proposal carried easily because,

in Griffet's words,
the opinion of M. De Roissi was too much in conformity with the
maxims and interests of the Cardinal not to be followed by all
who voted in his presence. Everybody was of the opinion to tear
up the deliberation of April 26, and to put in its place in the
register an arret by which this act would be annulled as fool
hardy before the laws and usages of the kingdom. ^7
^Mble, MSmoires, II, 48.
6?Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 148; D'Andilly, Journal
inedit, X, 166.
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Two arrgts du Conseil were then drafted, the first quashing the
Parlement's deliberations and barring it from matters of State; the
second suppressing Gaston d'Orleans request of April 12 as "calumnious,
contrary to the wellbeing of his service, the repose of his subjects,
and the security of his State.
signified to the Parlement.

These arrtts were not immediately

Instead, lettres de cachet were sent

notifying it to appear at the Louvre en masse the next day at 4:00.
The greffier was specifically ordered to bring the official minutes
of the April 26 debate, but the reason was not

g i v e n . ^9

Mole presented the summons early on the morning of May 13, and
after having hurriedly sent the gens du roi on a reconnaisance
mission to the Louvre to try to find out what the King was up to, the
Parlement finally resolved to obey the royal order to appear.
At 3:30 in the afternoon 140 of the assembled magistrates departed
6**Le Mercure francois, XVII, 183. The arrgt against Gaston's
request was published in its entirety in the Mercure francois, XVII,
182-83.
---------- --S^Mole, Mgmoires, II, 49.
^Robert D'Andilly's journal makes some very revealing comments
about this expedition and the events of the morning of May 13. Upon
receiving the lettres de cachet of May 12, the court assembled and
called for the gens du Rol to ask their opinions. Avocat general
Omer Talon, new to the court and perhaps a little overawed, "said that
they had nothing to say." This riled the judges, who finally decided
that they should send procureur general Mole and not Talon to find the
King. Mole arrived at the Louvre at 11:30, just as the King was
getting up, and found Louis "so irritated against the Parlement that
he TMoleJ could never win anything, saying that he wanted to be
entirely obeyed and, during this time, having sent to Mr the Cardinal,
he received the following note: 'It is with kings as with gods who
never refuse to pardon and remit the faults of those who repent. If
Messieurs of the Parlement, coming to find the King upon the letters
C de cachetJ that His Majesty has sent to this effect, say to him that
they have come to recognize the wrong they have had in the procedure
that they followed [on April 26], the regret that they have for it,
and the resolution that they have taken to correct themselves
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the Palais on foot in black robes and square bonnets, Tna-rnhing two by
two, led by the huissiers, to one of the most memorable rendezvous in
the court's history.

The judges filed out through the Cour du mai

at the front of the Palais, turned left, transvered the few hundred
meters to the Pont au change, then turned left again at the Chatelet,
passing along the Seine up to the church of St. Germain-l'Auxerrois
facing the Louvre.

There they were met by De Souvre, premier

gentilhomme de la chambre, who conducted them into the Louvre, down
Henry IV's Grande galerie, and into the Galerie des Peintures.
Before they saw the King, however, secretaire d'Etat La Ville-auxClercs came forward and asked if the First President had a satisfactory
response to make regarding registration of the March 30 declaration.
Le Jay answered that the court did not, since each magistrate had
voted his convictions and conscience following one side or the other

according to his Majesty's desires, and give him their word on it, I
believe that His Majesty should use his extraordinary bounty, and
dispense them of that which was resolved yesterday, Lit] being much
better that men return to their duty of their own rather than by force,
which is a remedy of which God and men should serve themselves only
on default of the first.'" Louis handed the note to Mole, saying
"You see how If? the Cardinal and I are of the same opinion. I never
give away Mr the Cardinal's notes, but want to make you a copy of it"
and at the same time sent for a secretary. One could not be found,
but Mole understood the point and excused himself, saying he could
well remember what the note had said and would make his report to the
Parlement on it. This was done at 1:30. The procureur general was not
specific about the words of the King but said "only that he was
extremely indignant and absolutely wanted to be obeyed." The Parlement
considered what to do, and it was decided to say nothing to the King
at all, but only to make "grandes reverences." This resolution to
remain silent, D'Andilly adds, was taken in the morning before sending
the procureur general to the Louvre. Journal in£dit, X, 167-70. This
account should be compared with the editorial comments in Richelieu,
Lettres, IV, 149-50, and especially 150, n. 1, where the above note is
published without knowledge of the circumstances of its presentation
at the Louvre. The registers of the Parlement do not mention the
interview.
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of the split decision.

Neither opinion, he said, was given contrary

to the service of the King.

La Ville-aux-Clercs retired, reported to

Louis, and returned to advise Le Jay that the King rejected his
explanation and "prohibited him from speaking in his presence."7^
The court then shuffled up to within twenty feet of the King, seated
on a dias at the end of the hall with the Cardinals Richelieu and La
Valette, the comte de Soissons, Marshals Schomberg and D'Effiat, the
garde des seeaus, the dues de Nemours, de Montmorency, d'Angouleme, de
Chevreuse, de Longueville, and several others.

Louis "said a few

words to them, of which the word rebellion was one," then turned the
proceedings over to Chateauneuf, who spoke forcefully and "extremely
rudely," albeit softly, for about fifteen minutes.^2

The garde des

sceaux's speech showed little originality; rather, it was a canned
reiteration of the ancient royal position that the court was estab
lished to render justice between individuals and not to meddle in
affairs of State.

It was certainly true, Chateauneuf admitted, that

the court had been commissioned to participate in such affairs during
the fifteenth century, but since the present declaration was a recog
nition of lSse-majeste following Article 183 of the Ordinance of
Blois, rather than a commission to try and to judge, the Parlement
7LGriffet, Historie de Louis Kill, II, 148.
72D'Andilly, Journal inSdit, X, 169-70.
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should register it without question.

It had not done so, necessi

tating the arrgt du Conseil of May 12.
La Ville-aux-Clercs then stepped forward and read the text of the
arrgt du Conseil, the accusative portion of which held that the
Parlement
instead of proceding to the pure and simple registration . . .
had put the affair into deliberation and taken various opinions
so that there was no resolution of it, to the great contempt
of the King's authority and of his commandements, £ and toj
the well-being and repose of France, where it is not permitted
to courts of parlement, nor allowable to any other officers,
to take knowledge of affairs of State, administration, and
government of the kingdom.
This being the case,
the King being in his council, wishing to prevent and remedy
improprieties which might in the future come from such abuses and
undertakings against his authority and the public well-being,
has voided and annulled, voids and annuls, the act of the deli
beration made in his said court of the Parlement of Paris on April
26, 1631, upon the said letters of declaration of March 30 last,
as impertinent and made contrary to the laws and usages of the
kingdom, and by private persons without power in this regard.
His Majesty makes very express proscription and prohibition to
the said court of Parlement of in the future putting into deli
beration such and similar declarations concerning the affairs of
his State, administration, and government, at pain of inter
diction from their charges, and greater if need be.
The irresolution of the Parlement thus overridden,
His Majesty orders that the said letters of declaration should be
withdrawn from it [the Parlement] , very expressly forbiding them
from taking any jurisdiction or cognizance of the contents of it,
and that the act of the said deliberation will be withdrawn from
the register of the registry of the said court and t o m up, and
the present arrgt put in its place, of which collated copies will

73B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 96-97, May 14, 1631; Griffet,
Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 150-51. B.N. Ms. fr. 3834, fols. 34-34v°,
"Harangue de mons^ le garde des sceaux a la cour de Parlement,"
contains an incomplete version of the speech lacking the introductory
remarks.
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be sent, together with^the said letters of declaration, into all
the bailliages and slne-chaussees of the ressort of the said
court, to be there read, published, and registered; His Majesty
enjoining the officers of them to keep and exactly observe them;
His Majesty reserving to commission such other of his courts of
Parlement or other officers that it pleases him to procede against
those denominated in the said declaration, to make and pursue
their trials through definitive and sovereign judgment, notwith
standing and without regard to their qualities and privileges
that they might pretend in consequence of it, of which they are
rendered unworthy. Done in the Conseil d'Etat of the King, His
Majesty there sitting, held at Paris the 12th of May 1631.74After reading the arret, Louis told the greffier, Jean du Tillet, to
bring him the register of April 26.
it into pieces.

The King took the page and tore

The council's decision of May 12 was then given to

be put in its place.

These unmistakable gestures of authority com

pleted, the assembly was adjourned and the magistrates retired to
ponder the day's happenings.75
For three magistrates, though, the worse news was yet to come.
Immediately after the meeting, Louis rode out to Versailles where that
evening he ordered the radical ringleaders of the 26th out of Paris
within twenty-four hours. Presidents des Enquetes Barillon and Gayant
were to go to Bourges and Clermont; conseiller Jean Laisne was to take
himself to Limoges.7^

These exiles, the first since 1597, were the

^Mole, Memoires, II, 50-52. A manuscript copy with very slight
variations is found in the registers of the Parlement, B.N. Ms. fr.
nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 90-92, May 13, 1631.
^^The official record of the meeting of May 13 is in the registers,
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 88-98, May 13 and 14, 1631. Other
information may be found in D'Andilly, Journal inldit, X, 169-70; Ifole,
Mlmoires, II, 49-52; Biblio. de l'Inst., Ms. Godefroy 285, fol. 37;
Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 149-51.
76D'Andilly, Journal inldit, X, 170; Moll, Mlmoires, II, 52-53;
Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 152. The billet des opinions for
April 26 confirms that all three exiled magistrates favored the more
radical proposal to offer remonstrances to the King. B.N. Ms. fr.
18413, fol. 127v°.
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first signs that Louis, under Richelieu's guidance, would take the
firmest steps to ensure that the Crown's will was obeyed.

Later,

the manner and timing of the exiles' return would also show the
minister's finesse in managing the Parlement.
News of the exiles pereulated into the Parlement early on the
morning of the 14-th, setting off rumors and murmurs as to what was
afoot and what should be done.

Some of the judges quietly slipped

away until the uproar should die down, while others accepted what
D'Andilly called the Crown's "coup."77 The rest of the 14th was spent
verifying the banishments, and it was not until the 15th that the
gens du roi were ordered to the Louvre to beg for the King's grace.7^
In the meanwhile Louis remained inaccessible at Versailles, hunting
and doubtlessly savoring the hornet's nest stirred up in the Palais.
Out of the buzz of hearsay in Paris, though, came a rumor that some
of the magistrates were considering a judicial strike and closing the
Palais; upon hearing this, Louis rode back into Paris on the evening
of the 15th.

In parting he was overheard to jibe, "I am going to

see if the Parlement will give me battle."7^
Cooler tempers prevailed on both sides, however, when the gens du
roi finally saw Louis on the 16th.

The King received the attorneys

graciously, and sent them off with a promising concession:

the

miscreants would be allowed to return to their country houses near
Paris to await further word.

After receiving the gens du roi's report,

77Journal inedit, X, 172.
78B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 92-99, May 14-15, 1631.
7^D’Andilly, Journal inldit, X, 173.
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Le Jay subtly advised the court to accept this gesture of conciliation:
"The court," he said, "has good reason to be content and satisfied
with the action taken by them [the gens du rox| , which was

full of

courage, virtue, and ability."80 But the court was not satisfied with
half the loaf.

According to the registers the attorneys were sent

back to ask Louis "very humbly to render the grace perfect," but
D’Andilly candidly noted that they were also warned "not to return
until they had obtained the re-establishment of these Messieurs."8-*The gens du roi, however, had to be content with promises from
the garde des sceaux, because Louis had hidden himself away at
Fountainbleau and made himself inaccessible to his attorneys.

Unknown

to the court, though, the royal grace was not long in coming.

On

May 22 conseiller d’Etat de Roissi carried secret permission for the
exiles’ return back to Paris with instructions not to release the
news until one week later.82

In the interim the Enquites continually

pressured the First President to assemble the chambers for debate, but
Le Jay refused, being assured, he said, of theKing’s good intentions.83
Thq King's word was made good by way of de Roissi on Monday, May 30,
and the three absentees re-entered the court on June 2.8^
80B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 101, May 17, 1631.
8lB.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 102, May 17, 1631; Journal
ingdit, X, 173.
82Biblio. de l'Instit., Ms. Godefroy 285, fol. 38; Mole,
Ugmoires, II, 57-60.
8^D'Andilly, Journal ingdit.X, 178; Mole, Mgmoires, II, 57.
^Molg, Memoires, II, 60.
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The warning to Gayant, Barillon, and Laisne did not serve to hush
their outspoken criticisms in the Palais, for no sooner had they
rejoined their colleagues than "the next day, when the occasion
presented itself, president Gayant spoke as freely as ever."®5 On
the whole, though, the Parlement understood the
during the next few months, at least, the
into Louis' very serious family troubles.

lessons

court refused

of May,for
to be drawn

Gaston d’Orleans, for one,

continued to believe that he could charm the Parlement over to his
cause.

On June 6 one of his lackeys attempted to deliver some letters

on his part, whereupon the First President told him to wait until
the next day and went on with the audience.

The messenger stayed

until the hearing was adjourned, tried again, was refused a second
time, and disappeared without coming baek.8^

Three weeks later

Gaston tried again, this time sending a Provencal gentleman named
Sanis into an audience of the Grand*Chambre. When the First President
finished announcing a decision, Sanis stood up and said

85D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 178.
^D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 181.
This incident is notmen
tioned in the memoirs of Talon or Moll. The agent was probably trying
to deliver copies of the so-called "Gaston d'Orllans Manifesto,"
composed at Nancy and dated May 30, along with a recusation of Le Jay
and an appeal to the Parlement. These documents were widely distri
buted throughout Paris at the time and were reprinted in the Mercure
frangois, XVII, 196-260. None of these tracts contained anything new
in regard to the politics of the Parlement. The "Gaston Manifesto"
is put into the context of the pamphlet warfare of the times by W. F.
Church in Richelieu and Reason of State, pp. 207-11.
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Messieurs, this is a packet that Monsieur £Gaston1s usual title],
my master, has commanded me to bring to company and to present
to you, Monsieur [Le Jay], who are its chief. He has sent a
gentleman several times before who could not receive an audience.®*^
Having said this, Sanis threw a packet onto the greffier's desk.
Le Jay ordered the huissiers to take him to the gens du roi, who
recommended that the unopened packet should go with the gentleman to
the King.

After fifteen minutes debate, the court agreed.

Sanis

ended up in the Bastille; his packet proved to be copies of material
already widely circulating in printed form throughout the capital.
Louis was pleased with his judges' action and told them so through
the gens du roi. ^
Marie de Medicis also unsuccessfully attempted to woo the
Parlement during the summer.

During the session of July 21, one

St. Affange, an Angevin page of the Queen Mother, appeared in the
Parlement, announced his mission, and delivered a bundle of letters
very similar to Gaston's earlier appeals.

Marie asked the Parlement

to give her justice against the "pernicious designs and violent
actions of Jean Armand Cardinal de Richelieu," and requested a recusa
tion of Le Jay and president des Enqufetes Lancroc.

After brief

^D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 183^%.H. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 105-06, July 1 and 3, 1631;
D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 183-84; MblS, M&aoires, II, 61.
Imprimes 1* 36.3571, Lettre de la RoyneT sic|mere du Roy
au Parlement (n.p., n.d.), pp. 1-2. Thislittle pamphletof four
urmiimhPT’Bd leaves contains two tracts, "Lettre de la Royne mere du
Roy au Parlement" and "Requeste de la Royne mere du Roy au Parlement
centre le Cardinal de Richelieu."
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debate the judges sent the tracts unopened to the King but set the
messenger at liberty, "which did not please Mr the First President at
90
all."
Undaunted by this rebuff, Marie tried again at the beginning
of August, and again the Parlement refused to become involved. 91
By the time these appeals reached Paris, however, the Queen
Mother had already sought refuge in Flanders.

On July 18 Marie had

slipped secretly away from CompiSgne and fled north into Spanish
territory, eventually settling in Brussels.

Richelieu probably knew

of the escape beforehand but allowed it to continue as the simplest
disposition of a nagging

p r o b l e m . 92

Louis was notified of his

mother's flight during the night of July 19, and rumors of it probably
reached the Parlement soon afterwards.

Nevertheless, Louis was careful

to officially inform his court of what had transpired.

A large

delegation from the Parlement was summoned to the Louvre after dinner
on the evening of July 23, where Chateauneuf recounted what was
known of the escape.

Afterwards the King announced there had been

some gossip about his death, but he was well, and his astrologers had
predicted that he would fare well amidst the cabals of the Queen
Mother and his brother.

In closing Louis took Le Jay aside and told

9°D'Andilly, Journal Inedit, X, 190. This incident is also
briefly recounted in the registers, B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891,
fols. 109-110, July 21, 1631.

91b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 117-118, August 4, 1631;
D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 195; La Gazette de France, August 7, 1631.
9^The opinion of -Burckhardt in Richelieu, His Rise to Power,
pp. 398-99.
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M m that "he would protect him against all and that this was a mark
that he had served him well, seeing that he stood badly with the
Queen Mother and with

M o n s i e u r . "^3

Marie de Medicis' decampment was an embarrassment for the royal
position, but at the same time it also helped clarify and solidify
it.

As July faded into August, both Marie and Gaston had indicated

to one and all that they could not be placated and would not be
reconciled with Richelieu and his policies.

Their demonstrated

hostility and continued attempts to stir up sedition within the
kingdom discouraged hopes for any kind of rapprochement and
encouraged Louis and Richelieu to take up authoritative counter
measures.

One of these, the future Chambre de 1*Arsenal, was in

gestation as an investigation of counterfeiters; September would see
it taking steps against some of the followers of Marie and Gaston.
Another move was made on July 22, when a royal ordinance was issued
giving the followers of Marie and Gaston fifteen days' notice to
adjure their allegiance and return to the kingdom at pain of being
declared spies and disturbers of the public peace.^

As the

prescribed fortnight came and went, it became evident that the line

drawn in the sand would go unheeded, and early in August a declaration
was drafted outlawing those who had left the kingdom and confiscating
their fiefs, properties, and titles.^5 At the same time the Parlement

^^D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 192-93. B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq.
9891, fols. 110-15, July 26, 1631, contains a complete account of
this meeting.
^The text is in Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 372-74.
95ihe -text is in Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 377-89.
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of Paris had, since the end of May, shown itself thoroughly aloof
from any solicitations thrown out by the King's contumacious kin.
Active interest in other grievances of the spring— the paulette,
coamissaires, creations of office, Marillac's trial— had also been
quietly shelved since the arrgt du Conseil of May 13.

From the

Crown's view the time had come to reward this diligence with a
paulette settlement while extracting the last possible bit of
leverage from its concession.
These modified political circumstances of the late simmer
brought Louis into a lit de justice with his Parlement on August 12,
a ceremony which would represent the final act in the spring crisis
and settle several issues pending since early in the year.

Accom

panied by the usual ceremonies and formularies, Louis presented the
declaration outlawing those supporting his mother and brother, along
with a new edict cancelling the December, 1630, creation of offices
and substituting a lesser one of two maitres des requites and four
coaaeeillers.^

The edicts were duly registered, then in exchange

^During the ceremony the King spoke briefly, then Chateauneuf
took the floor for fifteen minutes, but he talked "so low that there
were not six persons who understood him. (It was laughingly said
that he really had not spoken but only propped up Mr de St. Brisson,
provost de Paris, who was beside him.)" D'Andilly, Journal ingdit,
X, 1^9. "The declaration created three conseillers des Bnqugtes and
one conseiller in the Chamhres des Requgtes, a reduction of one in
the Requgtes from the December, 1630, edict. D'Andilly noted that
the two maitres des requgtes were sold for 45,000 ecus each to Mrs
de Thou and Behevre, the last being strongly criticized because he
was but twenty-four. This was the third dispensation he had
received, the first for serving as conseiller with his father and
the second for not having served the necessary time to become a
maftre des requgtes.
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for swallowing this bitter pill, the Parlement was granted the
paulette on the favorable terms of the past.97
For better or for worse the lit de justice of August 12 resolved
several issues that had disturbed the Parlement since the Day of Dupes.
The Crown's employment of commissaires, however, was not affected by
the settlement, and if Louis and Richelieu had any illusions that the
Parlement had permanently abandoned its concern about these agents,
those illusions were rudely dispelled early in September when the
trial of mareschal Marillac was brought to the attention of the court
once again.

After learning of the men who would be his judges, in

July the margschal addressed a third letter of protest to the
Parlement asking nullification of their commissions and that the
court send deputies to investigate "subordinations, violences, and
practices which have been, are done every day, as it is said, by
many false witnesses against the plaintiff." Marillac hoped that
the Parlement would "name an advocat and procurer for him, to furnish
and administer his counsel and to take care of his affairs in the
97r .N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 119-33; D'Andilly,
Journal inedit, X, 190-201; Biblio. de l'lnstit., Collection
Gode^roy 285, fols. 49-50; MolS, Mgmoires, II, 63-65; Gazette de
France, August 14, 1631. The other sovereign courts were granted
the droit annuel on favorable terms over the next few months.
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meanshile."^ As before the court was sympathetic.*^

It received

his appeal on September 4 and issued new injunctions that the
decisions of February 4 and 22 should be obeyed, as well as ordered
that "tres humble remonstrances will be made to the King on the
execution of the said commission of May 13 last, and the prohibitions
contained in the said d e c i s i o n s . T h e Crown's reaction was
predictable and forthcoming.

An arrlt du Conseil of September 12

voided the Parlement's decision, but this time Mathieu Moll was
suspended and summoned to Fountainbleau to account for his acceptance
of the request, "where,” according to Omer Talon, "he was well

9®B.N. Imprimis Lb^.2839> Requestes presentees par de Marillae,
pp. 20-25.
99on this occasion Mole wrote across the bottom of Marillae's
request: "Vu 1'arrSt de la Cour du 22 fevrier dernier, et autres
pieces y attachees, je requiers pour le Roi l'arrlt donnl, les
Chambres assemblies, le 11 flvrier dernier, ensemble eelui du 22
dudit mois, etre executes; et ce faisant, tres-humbles remonstrances
Itre aussi faites sur 1'execution de la commission du 13 mai dernier,
et les defenses y contenues Itre reiterees, et que les deux lettres
missives signles FORTIN seront mises au greffe, paraphees et
reconnues, pour, ce fait, prendre telle conclusion que de raison."
B.N. Imprimis Lb3°.2839, Requestes presenties par de Marillae, p. 25.
See also Moll, Mlmolres, II, 6$, n. 3.
1C5®B.N. Imprimis Lb^.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillae,
p. 27.
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received; and without any further judicial procedure his bearing and
natural gravity, which he bore up in this encounter, obtained for
him an arret of discharge."101
Mole's suspension drove home the fundamental inability of the
judges to influence the outcome of the Marillae Affair, making the
councilliar decision of September 12 the final act in the Parlement's
long involvement with the mareschal's trial.

By this time three arrgts

in Marillae's behalf had satisfied the honor of the court, while
three nullifications made it evident that further efforts would be
futile.

Marillae, too, realized this and sent no more petitions to

the Parlement, preferring instead to address his pleas to the King
and to recuse his judges before the public eye.

These recusations

finally resulted in the resignation of one judge, Paul Hay du
Chastelet, but did not alter the final decision of death which was
handed down on May 8, 1632.

In sum, though defeated in its inter

ventions, the Parlement gone beyond the letter of its legal obligations
by trying to preserve the mar£schal from condemnation at the hands of

1Q1Mgmoires, 6. The text of the arrgt is in Talon's Mgmoires, 5.
There was no formal arret in the form of a judicial document pardoning
Mole. The editors of Mold's Mgmoires were unable to uncover such a
writ among the papers of the procureur general or those pertaining to
the Marillae trial and believed "that there was no other administra
tive act made against Mathieu Mol£, nor likewise an arret of discharge
in his favor, as Omer Talon believed." Mol£, Mgiaoires, II, 68, n. 3.
This opinion is verified by D'Andil y, who observed that Mole was
well treated at Fountainbleau and was even asked to dinner twice by
the garde des seeaux. D'Andilly continued that in a council meeting
held on Sunday, October 12, "where only the ministers met," the King
restored him to his charge without any arret. "The said Sr
Procureur General conducted himself throughout this action with much
prudence and courage." Journal inedit, X, 222-23.
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incompetent judges and unjust process.

The court's motives through

out had been both honorable and self-serving but were overwhelmed
by consideration of the needs of State arising out of the Day of
Dupes, needs which, in the eyes of Louis and his advisers, outweighed
all considerations of private morality and conventional law.
The Day of Dupes not only precipitated the condemnation of
mar^schal Marillae, but it also produced procedings against many
lesser-known figures hovering about Marie and Gaston, individuals who,
in one way or another, contributed to their sedition or carried on
criminal intelligences between them and figures remaining in the
kingdom.

A large proportion of these cases were handed over to an

irregular body of commissaires sitting at the Arsenal, a munitions
factory and storage facility on the edge of Paris built by Henry IV.
The history of this Chambre de 1 'Arsenal and its relationship to
the Parlement is one of the most infamous, yet curious, episodes of .
Richelieu's ministry.

Initially presented to the court as a special

investigation into counterfeiting, the Chambre went into operation as
something much more, a kind of general clearing house for minor
crimes of State which did not warrant the formation of individual
benches.

For a number of reasons the Parlement opposed the estab

lishment of these commissaires even more vigorously than earlier
ones, but the court could not restrain the creation and continuance of
so useful an administrative instrument, and by February, 1632, the
Crown had won a most significant victory over its high judicial
The mastery of this question was most meaningful, for never again
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during Richelieu’s ministry would the Parlement challenge the
Crown's right to the free appointment of cnmmlssaires or the right
to exercise justice retenue.
The Chambre de 1'Arsenal had unique origins that were much
different from its ultimate functions as a court of political justice.
Its formation was ordained in lettres patentes sent to the Parlement
of Paris on June 14, 1631, in which the Crown announced its intentions
of investigating counterfeiters, money clippers, traffickers in
bullion, and "other persons of their cabals who are found to give cause
to false money, of which the substitution surpasses the providence of
lawB and ordinances that the kings or predecessors have made to
remedy such abuses."

To carry out the investigation, the Crown had

of our full power and royal authority made, ordered, and estab
lished, . . . by these patents signed by our hand, a sovereign
chamber which we want to be called a Chambre de justice for the
punishment and correction of abuses and malversations committed
in the making of monies over all our kingdom, pays, lands, and
selgneuries in our obedience.^02
The composition of the Chambre was conventional by past standards:
two presidents and ten conseillers from the Parlement and four
canseillers d'Etat or mafrtres des requites.

The procureur g^n^ral,

his alternate (substitut), the greffier, and the receveur des amendes
et confiscations were to be named by the King.
specified in any of the commission's places.

No individuals were
To a wrTnlimnn of ten of

these as yet unnamed judges was given power and authority "to know
and sovereignly judge in dernier ressort, at the expense of all other
102Le Mercure fransols, XVII, 714-16.
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judges, all crimes concerning our monies, in first instance as byappeal from ordinary judges."

These high powers were accompanied

by the usual injunctions to other officers to obey and co-operate
with the Chambre's jurisdictions.1*^ The Parlement duly registered
the letters according to form and tenor on July 9 but appended two
important limitations: the Parlement's procureur g£n6ral would have
charge of investigations and a commission bearing the names of judges
would be sent to the court for registration.1^
A list of coranissaires1 names was sent to the court on July 30,
but this did not satisfy the court because nothing was said about
nomination of the attorney who would direct the prosecution.

Even

after a lettre de jussion was sent on August 7, the Parlement held
fast to the condition that Mole should be named to the commission.1*^
On September 6 the court agreed to accept a procureur general nominated
outside the Parlement, but it renewed its enjoinders that his substitut
and the greffier of the Ch«nbre should be taken from the Parlement.1^
The Crown found this foot-dragging intolerable, particularly since by
now it had been decided to use the Chambre de l1Arsenal to prosecute
those indicted by the lgse-majestg declaration of August 12.

The

council therefore decided to procede promptly, arbitrarily, and

1Q3lbid., 716-19.
10^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, July 9, 1631.
J-O^Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 720-21.
106D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 220; Griffet, Histoire de Louis
XIII, II, 182-83. There is no register entry for September 6.
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totally without consulting the Parlement by withdrawing the letters
of June 14 already registered and issuing a new general commission
for the Chambre de l1Arsenal on September 23. This asserted that
the Parlement had "greatly erred, from believing that it could
impose a new law on us, to laws that we had to take and chose officers
from it to make up and compose chambers of extraordinary commissions
for the good of our State." Then in a single sentence the Crown
proclaimed simple expeditiousness as the grounds for its action:
We have believed, being founded on the example of our prede
cessors, who for less reason have composed chambers of judges
and officers convoked from various bodies, that we should,
to avoid new contentions, absolutely deny competence of it
[the Chambre 1 to the Parlement in order to give it to other
Judges.107
This commission was not sent to the Parlement but was registered
in the Chambre de 1 'Arsenal by the same judges that would carry it
out.

The issuance of the new commission was not the most arbitrary

aspect of the Chambre, however, because the commissaires simply
went into operation even before it was sent.

On September 11,

nearly two weeks before any general enabling act was dispatched,
the Gazette de France announced the opening and composition of the
Chart)re de 1'Arsenal in this way:
On the 10th the sieurs Favier and Fouquet, cooselllers d'Etat;
De Criqueville. Deschamps, De Nesmond, Bariiion, Be lafFemas,
and Du PrS, martres des requites; De la Bistrate, Charpentier,
Le Tomelier, De Mbntmagny, De Boucqueval, and Lanier, grand
rapporteur, conseillers in the Grand Conseil, held their first
sitting In the Arsenal for several affairs important to the
107Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 721.
of SeptenheF"2j"Is’found on pp. 719-22.

The text of the conmission
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State, and among others for some prisoners of the Bastille.
The sieur d'Argenson, mafrtre des requites, is procureur g 6n6ral,
and the sieur Du Jardin, secretaire du Roi, greffier in this
commission.108
There is other evidence that the comm-?ssaires were named even before
the time, for as early as September 1 the case of Charles Senelle,
a royal doctor accused of various crimes, was committed to the
coaaissaires listed above.10^

On September 7 another commission

sent the trial of the Marquis de la Vieuville "to our respected and
loyal judges by us ordered in the Chambre de justice established at
our chateau the Arsenal of Paris."110 Furthermore, textual discre
pancies in La Vieuville's commission indicate that a general enabling
commission for the whole bench had not yet been sent.111

In all

probability, therefore, the Chambre de 1 'Arsenal was actually founded
during late August, when the council simply selected some maltres des
requites and began sending them cases on individual warrants without
a general enabling commission, which was issued only later for
form's sake.

lo8Gazette de France, September 11, 1631.
10^The commission for Senelle's trial is in B.N. Ms. Dupuy 94,
fols. 319-20; another copy is in B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. 24-25v°.
n 0 The commission for La Vieuville's trial is in B.N. Ms.
Dupuy 94, fol. 323; another copy is in B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols.
16-17.
^ T h e first few lines of this commission read as follows:
"Louis par la grace de Dieu Roy de France et Navarre, a noz aimezet feaux les juges par nous ordonnez en la Chambre de Justice
establie de nostre chasteau de 1'arsenal a Paris, Salut. Depuis
le pouvoir que nous vous avons dcnne par nostre lettres patentes
du
Jour de
de faire le proces blanks in original
manuscript aux nomnez Sennelles, Duval, et Chavny et autre prisonnier d'estat qui sont en nostre chasteau de la Bastille, Nous
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The arbitrary methods of operation and the jurisdiction which
characterized the Chambre de 1*Arsenal during its formative period
persisted through its history.

The Chancre was never organized as a

regular court and kept no regular records, though it heard at
least several dozen cases over the four year

period.1^

Each of

these trials, or at least the most significant ones, was warranted
by an individual commission to the Chambre, which took depositions,
heard evidence, and disposed of the case as it saw fit without
benefit of appeal.

The chamber was-purely an instrument of political

justice, though some of the individuals brought before it were
formally charged with very curious crimes of State, some of which
seem amusing to modem ears but which were taken with great
seriousness at the time.

The case of two royal doctors, Senelle

and Duval, were of this type.

Senelle had been snapped up by royal

agents while coming from Lorraine with letters from Madeleine de
Silly, comtesse du Fargis, a former lady-in-waiting to Anne of
Austria exiled because of her intrigues.

These letters, addressed

to Queen Anne and various persons at court, contained insults
avons eu advis que le Marquis de la Vieuville s'estoit tant oublie
que de sortie de nostre royaume sans nostre conge pour aller trouver
la reyne nostre tres-honnore dame et mere a Bruxelles. . . . " The
blanks in this manuscript show that when it was issued on September 7
a general commission had not yet been sent for the entire bench.
B.N. Ms. Dupuy 94, fol. 323; B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fol. 16.
■*-*^The largest quantity of surviving documentary evidence is
in the form of commissions and arrets in B.N. Ms. Dupuy 94, fols.
319-333, and B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. 15-35v°, 71-73.
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against Richelieu and prognostications on the death of Louis XIII
hased on astrology.

The investigation of Senelle was joined with that

of Duval, another royal doctor arrested for having made a horoscope
ending with the prediction Sol cancrum non peragrabit quin valedicat—
the King would die before the sun left the sign of Cancer.11^ The
two physician-astrologers were arraigned before the Chambre de 1_'
Arsenal which made them its first victims by sentencing them to
the galleys for life on October 17.^

Madame du Fargis was also

tried in absentia for the composition of the seditious correspondence
carried by Senelle.

An arrSt of December 22 declared her guilty

of lbse-majeste and ordered her decapitated in effigy.115

The

same judgment was returned against La Vieuville on January 10, 1632,
for having left the kingdom in spite of prohibitions of the King
and for the murder of the sieur de Poitrincourt.11^>
News of the comnrfssaires1 doings began to filter into the
Parlement during the middle of September.

The Chambre des vacations

under the presidency of Nicolas de BelliSvre began an inquiry into
the rumors. Procureur general Mole was then under suspension in

connection with marAschal Marillae's last petition, but his
substitute, Tranchot, was sent to determine exactly what was going

^^Richou, Histoire des commissions extraordinalres, p. 59;
Griffet, Histoire “de louls XIII, II, 215-17; Marcus fropln, Louis XIII
et Richelieu, 6tude historique accompagnee des lettres inedit du
Rol au cardlnaT"de Richelieu (Paris, 1*75), pp. 152-53iiAGazette de France, October 24-, 1631i^B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. 34-35v°.
i^B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. l8-23v°.
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on.

On September 20 he was able to confirm what most of the judges

already suspected, that a bench of two conseillers d'Etat, six
maitres des requites, and six conseillers from the Grand Conseil
been holding several hearings at the Arsenal during the past fort
night.

On the basis of Tranchot's report, the magistrates decided

to summon some of the commissaires for a personal hearing.117

Two

days later, on September 22, mattres des requ&tes Favier, De
Criqueville, and Laffemas appeared for the interview.

Upon being

questioned, they freely confessed that the King, "having had com
plaints of several individuals who were now prisoners in the
Bastille," had sent them to interrogate them; that they had per
sonally reported the results to the King; and that a few days before,
he had sent them a commission to carry out the trials.

Bellibvre

lectured them on the Parlement's stand towards commissaires, told
than that the King would be informed, and that in the meantime
they should cease their activities.

Favier replied that he would

tell his colleagues and that a decision would have to be reached
among them.118
n 7 B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 148, September 20, 1631;
M d16, Mfinolres, II, 70-71, where the date of September 27 is evi
dently a misprinted error. Though the registers do not mention it,
the court probably decided to present the remonstrances drafted by
Bellievre some time after the 20th. See supra, p.
■^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 148-49, September 22,
1631; Ifclg, MSmoires, II, 71-72.
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After hearing the commissaires, Belli&vre wrote up a rather
aoderate remonstrance on their employment and forwarded this
memoranda, along with a personal plea, to Chateauneuf .H9
Chateauneuf sent back an agreeable note which suggests that the
garde des seeaux had been acting as Richelieu’s agent in the matter
for some time:
[As] for the commission of Messrs. at the Arsenal, I want to
tell you that it could be done by some chosen from the
Parlement. You know how I have worked at the difficulties
and the prohibitions [or, deferences?] which have been
demonstrated at length over four months. There remain to me
no more reasons to suspend the execution, unless some remedies
agreeable to the King should be proposed to us.120
A few days later the president responded in a way showing that he,
too, had worked to resolve the problem from within the Parlement:
I am an irreproachable witness to the great desire and long
patience, as you have heard, for the establishment of the
Chambre de justice in the Parlement. If so little a thing
has deprived us of this honor, why could we not reocver it by
your authority and fine vigilance, since things are not yet
much engaged otherwise? The Chambre des vacations could easily
[be] entreated for all these little formalities to which it
has held. Then I could write with assurance that you had
judged expedient and more, that, for the King's service, that
there should not be any Chambre other than that of the Parle
ment employed in sovereignly judging private parties sent
before these commissions. '

H^The remonstrances are in B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fols. 24-31v°,
and the letter, dated September 23, is at fol. 38. See supra, p.
120b .N. Ms. fr. 18415, fols. 36-36v°, Chateauneuf to Bellifevre,
September 26, 1631.
m B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fol. 34, BelliSvre to Chateauneuf,
October 2, 1631.
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The garde des sceaui, of course, was unable to act without the
authority of the council, and this was lacking.

On October 4 he

sent a final reply to Bellievre, notifying him that the King's mind
was made up and that
it is necessary to consider that the King . . . knows better
than any one that which is good for his State, and that when
he pronounces it thus he deems duty done and that simple
remonstrances founded on the individual opinions of the interests
of the Parlement are not going to change the course of public
affairs, and Lwhich] for the conservation of his authority can
only accept the submission and entreaties of your company.122
Chateauneuf's advice put a temporary quietus on the issue of the
Chambre, which, whether because of BelliSvre's hesitancy or because
of limitations on the Chambre des vacations' staff and authority,
was allowed to go its way undisturbed by further inquiries.
This tranquility evaporated soon after the session of 1632
opened late in N o v e m b e r . T h e new Parlement discovered that in
its absence the Chambre de 1'Arsenal had been busily at work.

On

November 28, the same day that it announced the Parlement's
resumption, the government-sponsored Gazette de France told its
readers that "the Chambre de justice established at the Arsenal is
122B.N. M s . fr. 18415, fol. 32, Chateauneuf to BelliSvre,
October 4, 1631.
-*-2^The court should have opened after the solenm mass cele
brated by the Archbishop of Toulouse in the Grande Salle of the
Palais on the traditional November 12 date. The Gazette de France
reported that the First President, BelliSvre, de Mesmes, Bailleui,
and "a great number of conseillers" had attended, but the number that
returned to plague-infected Paris was actually insufficient to fully
resume the court's calendar. For nearly two weeks this situation
prevailed, and not until November 24 did enough of the staff drift
back for the court to conduct important public business. Gazette
de France, November 14 and 28, 1631.
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is trying more than sixty persons without distinction of quality
accused of the crime of counterfeiting."^^

Indeed, the Ch»Tnhre was

trying counterfeiters, "but it was also reaching into many other

areas as well, as the court heard on November 26. Jlrdme Bignon,
Advocat General, "spoke with great vehemence against the enter
prises of the judges established at the Arsenal," telling the
Grand'Chambre that during its absence the conmrfssaires had carried
out an execution of two counterfeiters in the Place de Gr^ve at
midnight, "violating by this means the royal authority, the order
of justice, and the public security."125
greatest affront to the Parlement.

This, however, was not the

The commissaires had also inter

fered with the jurisdiction of the bailliage du Palais, which was
directly under the Parlement's supervision, by attempting to
imprison its greffier and actually jailing sieur Jean Gillot, its
lieutenant g&agral, "on pretended malversations in his charge.
The lieutenant g&n&ral had appealed to the Parlement for relief on
the grounds that as one of its subalterns it alone should consider
^ ^Qazette de France, November 28, 1631.
^ B . N . Us. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 163, November 26, 1631;
D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 235.
^^B.N. Us. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 163, November 26, 1631.
According to the court's registers, the greffier of the bailliage
had refused to give the commissaires his records on the counter
feiting trial of Henry de Gresse, sieur de Vaugrenier. B.N. Ms. fr.
nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 161, November 18, 1631. D'Andilly noted that
Gillot had been put in the Bastille "because, to the prejudice of
their evocation, he had freed a prisoner accused of counterfeiting
in virtue of a sentence that they pretended was antedated."
Journal inedit, X, 235.
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his conduct. The gens du roi had agreed; Bignon recommended
remonstrances about the Arsenal as well, both in writing and orally,
for
this last action was so prejudicial to the repose of the King's
subjects that it seemed that an action so indecent should
reveal to the said seigneur King the disadvantages of the
said extraordinary commissions and how contrary they were to
his service. ^ 7
The Grand*Chambre thought the matter was of such importance that it
delayed a decision until all the chambers could be assembled the
next day.

This move was the beginning of the greatest crisis in

the Parlement since the spring, a crisis which, before its ultimate
resolution in March, would go through weeks of plenary debate,
repeated royal injunctions of obedience, and culminate in the exile
of several magistrates and the severest royal lecture to the court
in decades.

The Parlement, while certainly self-interested, was

not making a mountain of a mole-hill.

The nuclear issue was of

considerable importance to both Crown and court, for tied to it
were the basic constitutional questions of the delegation of royal
power, the right to create officers, respect for the ordinances, and
127B.N. Mis. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 164, November 26, 1631.
12®Md1£, M&aoires, II, 76-77. Of this decision Mole wrote,
"This shows that it was not the Biquttes who demanded the assembly
of chambers, but the Grand'Chambre which had thus decided itself.
It could have taken care of it by itself, since the complaint had
been made only to the Grand*Chambre and not to the assembled
chambers. This easily demonstrates that the impressions that one is
given are not true, the first decision that of November 26 serving
as the touchstone for all that followed afterwards. These is a
case for blaming the spirit of those who assemble the chambers
within the Parlement, and [then] manifest the contrary to the King,
[then] look in vain for remedies, although it had caused the
problem itself."
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the rights of subjects and officers alike— in brief, royal arbitraire
versus customary law and the respect for rights associated with good
kingship.
The debate on the comnrfssaires began in plenary session on
November 27 and continued through the 29th, becoming more complex
angry as agitation over the Arsenal commission was blended with
excitement about an arbitrary royal increase in the legal fees
associated with sealing decisions from the Parlement.-^9 fa
Thursday, November 27, the Parlement ordered a cease and desist on
all action against Gillot, prohibited his imprisonment, and
decreed that "on the conclusions of the procureur general of the
King, that trls humble remonstrances would be made to the King and in
writing on extraordinary commissions, and particularly on the Chambre
de la Bastille fsicl1,130 In addition the two ranking maftres des
This was the so-called droit de petit sceau, which had to be
paid by litigants for application ot the petit sceau to legal
decisions issued by the Parlement or other courts ^or cases of
private law. The petit sceau was held by the petit chancellerie
of the Palais but was still under the supervision of the chancellor
who controlled the grand sceau appended to public documents. The
petit sceau of the Parlement bore the inscription Sigillum parvum
pro absentia magni. By a declaration of October 16 not registered
In the court the Crown had doubled the fees required for the use
of the seal. The Parlement had decided to make remonstrances on
Novenber 15, and the matter was still under consideration two
weeks later. B.N. Us. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 157-59; Marion,
Dictionaaire des institutions de la France,p. 84; Doueet, Les
InsiiTiuiions de la France, I, 159.
^OD'Andilly, Journal inldit, X, 236.
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requfites would be summoned before the Parlement for personal
Injunctions to their corps.

The court went on to attempt to cripple

the Chambre de 1 'Arsenal by forbidding any "minister of justice" to
obey its instructions, at pain of personal responsibility for all
claims, damages, and interests so inflicted.

The next day

the Parlement accepted a second request for justice from Gillot and
granted him full relief from the prosecution of the commi ssaires.-^2
On Saturday, November 29, the court assembled all chambers and
continued its discussions about rights to the petit sceau in spite
of an arrlt du Conseil forbidding any consideration of matters
relating to the

s e a l . ^33

indeed, the court was now becoming imbued

with a frondeur spirit, as Mathieu Moll observed:
The design (of the court] was nothing other than, by mixing
several affairs together, to resolve none of them, making it
seem that internally the Parlement was jealous of the honor
of the company and, by contrary action underhand, giving the
King notification to oppress it, and crossing the accustomed
order, to do nothing for one or the other. That is very far
from treating affairs in a virtuous spirit and, by the force
of royal authority and by justice, conducting them to the
necessary purpose, to represent the just causes that are there
to be advanced or retarded, and by the credence that one
acquires in a succession of worthy actions, to make the most
of the royal name and oblige the company to follow its will
with worthy intentions.
l^Ibid. There is no register entry for November 27.
132B.N. M s . fr. 9891, fols. 166-67, November 28, 1631; Mole,
MSmoires, II, 78-79.
-'■-^The arrSt du Conseil was issued at Fountainbleau on November
24 and was presented to the Parlement on November 28, though the
registers make no mention of it. The text is in Moll, Mlmoires,
II, 80-82.
MSmoires, II, 82-83.
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The Crown, no less than the Parlement, was willing to press
matters to extremes, but handicapped by Louis' absence from his
capital, it was limited to sending expostulatory letters and arrgts
du Conseil.1^

The first of several of these, a lettre de cachet,

arrived on December 1.

It summarily forbade any assemblies and

ordered the court to send the first and second presidents & mortier
> and six conseillers to the King at Chateau Theirry with any remon
strances.1 ^

The

Parlement never complied with the request to send

deputies, but this royal order, plus Le Jay's maneuverings, managed
to keep the situation under control until December 5, when the
Enquetes demanded an assembly of all chambers to debate the commis
saires 1 continuing prosecution of Gillot.1^

Once again Le Jay

^During the fall Louis was active in northeastern France,
raising troops and securing the countryside against his younger
brother.
^ S h e text is in MolS, Mgmoires, II, 83, n. 1.
1^^Qn December 2, for example, Le Jay sought to frustrate the
extreme anti-royalists by refusing to turn over the minutes for
November 28 and saying that he would not sign them. "This," Mol?

commented, "was a dodge of compliancy [lour de souplessel which was
found out by those who had conducted the affair, for, seeing that the
lettres de cachet could have no effect on that which had been passed
on Friday, the 28th , since the letters being presented on Monday,
the arrSt of Friday preceding would stand, they the Enqugtes
thought that it would be easy to say there had been no decision at all.
He that is obliged to keep order in the company [Le Jsyj, letting
himself be persuaded that he could do this by himself and that it was
a result of his power, took resolution not to turn over the leaf."
Mol?, Mgmoires, II, 90.
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tried to put them off, while secretly writing to the King for
assistance.

New royal prohibitions duly arrived, along with an

arrgt du conseil nullifying the Parlement's decision of November 28
against the Chambre de l 1Arsenal.1^

Under pressure from the

Kaqufrtes, the whole court refused to obey; on December 12 it renewed
its attack on the commissaires by ordering three of them to appear
before the bar along with those responsible for levying the new
rights of the petit sceau. The commissaires were to be apprised
of the seriousness of their pursuits, told that remonstrances were
going to be made, and warned that they were to cease their hearings
at once.

The officers of the Paris watch and the lieutenant

crlminel of the bailliage du Palais were also to be enjoined against
carrying out orders from the Arsenal under pain of suspension.1^
This kind of resistance soon eroded the royal patience, and
on December 16 the council moved definitively to put a stop to it.
A new arr&t du Conseil was issued which left no room to doubt the
King's resolve.

Parlementalre decisions of November 28, December 10,

and December 12 were quashed as "given by incompetent judges and
without power"; the Chambre de 1'Arsenal and lesser regular officers
were enjoined to ignore the Parlement's decisions; levying of the
droit du petit sceau would continue; the officers of the city watch,
^ T h e King sent lettres patentee dated December 7 from
Fountainbleau forbiding any assemblies and asking for remonstrances;
the arret du Conseil was dated December 4 from Chateau Thierry and
was presented in the court on December 10. Mole, Memoires, II,
91-93, 97-98.
139ifol§, Mgmoires, II, 103-04.
in the registers.

This deliberation is not found
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the Chfttelet, and the bailliage were instructed to obey the commissaires at pain of 10,000 livres fine and deprivation of their offices.
Injunctions like these had been made before, but the ones that
followed had not been seen since the spring.

Presidents & mortier

Pierre Seguier and Bellievre, the oldest conseillers of each chamber,
those conseillers who had signed the December 12 decision, and the
ranking presidents from the second, third, fourth, and fifth cbamhres
dee Enqugtes were ordered to appear before the King fifteen days after
the delivery of the arrit with the minutes of the offensive delibera
tions.

Finally, presidents aux Enquetes Gayant and Barillon and

conseillers Tudert, Thelis, and Laisne were ordered to account for
themselves before the King's council.; in the meantime they were
suspended from their charges. A l l

in all, the arrtt was a no-

nonsense warning, and the Crown intended to make it stick.

The

co«te de Soissons, recently made lieutenant ggngral for Paris and the
Ile-de-France during Louis' absence, was ordered to see that the
Parlement obeyed.

On December 24 he acknowledged the charge, saying

"I will not lack if they make a mistake," and then significantly
added, "they have received the arret fdu Conselll and nothing has
surfaced but obedience and submission.”1^1
Soissons was correct in his assessment.

The decision to obey

the King had been taken on December 23, the day after reception of
^°The text is in Molg, Mgmoires. II, 118-21.
to the Parlement on December 22.

It was signified

■^B.N. Ms. fr. 3833, fol. 26, comte de Soissons to Louis,
December 24, 1631. Louis' letter to Soissons is not available.
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the royal order, and on the morning of December 31 the procession of
thirteen magistrates assembled in the Recolets convent in the
faubourg St. Martin.

After hearing mass the group-set out, talcing the

muddy winter road northeast to Metz by way of Rheims and Ste.
Menehould.

The journey took eleven days, the judges arriving on

January 10, but despite entreaties to the garde des seeaux and to the
Cardinal, Louis kept them waiting three weeks for an audience.
Finally, on January 31 the judges were instructed to appear at 3:00
in the afternoon, leaving behind the five suspended representatives
from the Enquetes and the greffier with his records of the delibera
tions . They found Louis assembled with Richelieu, the garde des
seeaux, Schomberg, three secretaires d'Etat, and several others.
Louis told them that they had been summoned to hear his displeasure
and what he wanted done in the future. Chateauneuf then began
speaking without the formal courtesy of an introductory "Messieurs,11
outlining the actions of the fall, emphasizing the King's discontent,
and telling them that Louis would not hear their remonstrances.
In the future, he said, they were not to mix in his affairs, be they
concerned with his mother, brother, or those of foreigners, because
the King was determined to preserve the peace in his kingdom.

They

should therefore, return to the capital and remain within the
limits of their duties.^
•^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 180-84, February 16,
1632; Male, Memo!res, II, 140-42.
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Le Jay then mistakenly tried to defend the Parlement*s actions
with a badly worded and ill-timed speech:
Sire, the speech made to us by Your Majesty's commandment makes
clear to us your wrath for your Parlement. This gives me pause,
because your subjects are not permitted to justify themselves
in the presence of their King irritated against them. We
hope by an obedience to your commandments to life the bad
impressions that we have given you, and that you will grant
this grace, that the interdicted ones in this company should
return to perform their duties, for the public has been
scandalized at the procedure of the Chambre established at the
Arsenal and by a new impost on the seal. The company hopes
that His Majesty will, through his justice, revoke one and the
other, for Louis XI had regrets from having mistreated his
Parlement.1^ '
The First President got no further.

Louis, reddening with anger,

broke in and retorted that
I am not prepared to answer you, but I want to tell you that you
are encroaching on my authority, you are dabbling in the relief
of my people for whom I care more than you. You tell me that
individuals learn in the company to obey me, yet nevertheless
they themselves uphold that very poorly. You were established
only to mete out justice between master Pierre and master Jean,
and if you go.,99 with your enterprises; I will clip your nails
to the quick.
The judges, though accustomed to this kind of outburst, could do
nothing but make a "very humble reverence" and

re tire.

^ B.N. Ms.

fr. nouv.acq. 9891, fol. 184, February 16, 1631.

^ B . N . Ms.

fr. nouv.acq. 9891, fols. 184-85, February 16, 1631.

^B . N . Ms. fr. nouv.acq. 9891, fol. 185, February 16, 1631. A
very similar account was sent to Mathieu Mol£ by an unknown witness
and is presented in his Mgmoires. Even in comparison with other exam
ples of Louis' temper, this was by all accounts an exceptionally
severe display. D'Andilly commented in his journal that "On Friday
the 30th If8 of the Parlement had [their] audience. M** le premier
president delivered a speech which was good neither for the King
nor f*or his own, having said to them nothing other than what has
become known. He put the King in a rage. The King answered with
words like 'Mister to one and the other,' an eloquence and energy
shocking to all attending [eloquence et energie qui tous les
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After the humiliation of Januaiy 31, the magistrates futilely
tried to prevail on Richelieu or Chateauneuf to lift the banishment
of the five EnquStes. At last, being told that their presence and
appeals only worked to their detriment, the judges departed Metz
on February 4-

They arrived in Paris on the 12th and recounted the

dismal chronology of the journey to the Par..ement four days later.
Then unknown, but soon to arrive, was news that the five absent
judges had been sent to Meaux, about a day’s travel from Paris, and
told to await the King's grace.

Richelieu interceded on their

behalf shortly thereafter, probably advising Louis to release them
after allowing a few weeks for the disciplinary lesson to take
effect.1^

Louis willingly agreed, and the exiled judges were given

permission to seek out the King at St. Germain on March 3.

Here

Louis waggled a verbal finger at them, saying "I pardon the mistake
you have made, on the condition that you do not let it happen again.
It is the second time, but if you relapse a third time, there will
be no more pardon for you."

Gayant is supposed to have answered

"in general terms," while "Mr the Cardinal made great civilities
to them.^ 7

as8iatans en furent emerveillls]. M378 of the Parlement recognized
very well that he understood his own affairs better than they had
thought. Following this harangue they were dismissed and the five
interdicted judges commanded to remain." Biblio. de l ’lnstit.,
Ms. Godefroy 285, fols. 65v°-66.
146a s can be judged from the letter Louis wrote to Richelieu on
February 12 acknowledging that he would "willingly accord that which
you have asked of me in regard to the five robes." B.N. Ms. fr.
nouv. acq. 7223, fol. 53. See Supra, Chapter IV, pp. 220-21.
^ D ’Andilly, Journal inedit, X, 253.
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The dramatic interview at Metz was certainly one of the most
famous episodes in the history of the Parlement.

Many contemporaries

marvelled at it, and nearly every later historian of the reign has
found reason to mention what was said.

This attention, while well-

founded, usually leaves the impression that the interview was
nothing more than a remarkable demonstration of royal tactlessness
which had little long term

affect

accurate only as far as itgoes.

on thecourt.

The impression is

Strong Louis' words certainly

had been, but he had spokeout of temper to the Parlement before
and would again; it is to be expected that while this royal temper
tantrum was neither forgiven nor forgotten, its lasting impression
on the court would be slight indeed.

Mich more meaningful than the

royal lecture were the permanent effects of the meeting on the
course of parlementaire politics over the next decade.

While the

interview did not exclude the Parlement from all future affairs of
State, nor render it submissive to Louis' will, the meeting did have
a very real significance in punctuating a royal victory on the issue
of coamissaires. After January, 1632, the Parlement obeyed the
Judicial directives of December, 1631, as they applied to the employ
ment of commissioned agents, and though it was unrealized by either
party, the Crown's ascendancy after this time was going to be
complete:

the Parlement never again raised objections to commis

saires during Richelieu's ministry.
absolutism was substantial.

The resultant thrust towards

The Chambre de 1'Arsenal continued its

operations in Paris without further harassment from the Parlement
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until its dissolution in 1635, passing judgments on the famous
oppositionist pamphleteers Mathieu de Margues and Pfcre Chanteloube
as well as other types of offenders.^

Ultimately, too, the

Crown's successful neutralization of the Paris Parlement furthered
the breakdown of parlementaire resistance to all types of commissaires over all the kingdom.

The provincial parlements continued

to bewail their intrusions, but deprived of the leadership of the
greatest parlement in France, the chances for a united and
co-ordinated resistance extending over the central provinces were
14%ere Jacques d'Apchon, seigneur de Chanteloube, an Oratorian
priest, was one of Gaston's most capable polemicists. Having
followed the prince into exile in 1631, he continued to support his
cause with vitrolic attacks on Richelieu's policies which led to
his condemnation by the Chambre de Arsenal. On May 5, 1632, that
body ordered Chanteloube roulTbroken on the wheel) for having
bribed Francois Alpheston to do away with Richelieu. B.N. Ms. fr.
16537, fols. 78-78v°. A judgment against Mathieu de Morgues was
produced by the commissaires in July, 1635, "for having written
impious letters contrary to the glory of God [and] respect due the
chief of his Church, for cabals against the King, and for fomenting
enterprises on the life of Cardinal Richelieu." This decision is
the last recorded verdict of the Chambre. B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols.
70-73; Gazette de France, no. 105, July 28, 1635, p. 422. The
Chambre de 1'Arsenal also continued to consider crimes other than
those of""5tate. On April 15, 1634, the Gazette de France notified
its readers that on the 11th the Chambre de 1'Arsenal had condemned
"for crime of magic" two men named Bouchar? and Gargan to make an
amende honorable before the Church of St. Pol. They were then
hanged and their bodies burned along with their books and impliments
(charactlres), which consisted of a black stole, two parchment books
of magic, and a small pewter chalice. Gazette de France, no. 35,
April 15, 1634; Richou, Les Commissions extraordlnaires, p. 59.
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considerably reduced.

This situation would prevail until the Fronde

of 1643 when the Parlement once again took the lead in attempting to
restrict the employment of commissaires.
The meeting at Metz also served to mark the end of another
phase of the Parlement's political history.

With the return of the

exiled judges and the continuance of the Chambre de 1 'Arsenal,
the Parlement's involvement with the most direct consequences of
the Day of Dupes largely came to a close.

During the course of

1631 this involvement had drawn the Parlement into the trial of
Louis de Marillae, the flight of Gaston d'Orleans and Marie de
Medicis, and royal prosecution of their followers, but by the first
months of 1632 the court had been excluded from active consideration
of these matters.

This exclusion, however, was not yet complete

because the course of domestic politics continued to be heavily
influenced by the doings of Gaston and Marie, and the Crown's efforts
to deal with their supporters would result in a last disruption of
the relationship between the Crown and its highest court.
During the summer of 1632 Gaston re-entered the kingdom at the
head of an army and made for Langued'oc where he expected assistance
from the due de Montmorency, governor of that province.

Montmorency,

disgruntled with the introduction of the elus into Langued'oc,
was ready to be tempted into rebellion.

The two chiefs met at

Lunel and marched together on Nimes, which refused to open its gates
to them.

While Montmorency tried with indifferent success to rally

the towns of his governorship to Gaston's cause, Louis withdrew frcan
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the area, turned the royal army over to margschal Schomberg,
returned to Paris, and countered the rebels with a new blanket
declaration outlawing all those giving direct or indirect support
to Gaston as guilty of llse-majestg.^49
To publicize the declaration Louis had it registered in a lit
de justice held on August 12.

There was nothing unusual about

either legislation or ceremony, except that the judges were insulted
by several ceremonial usages which the Crown insisted upon.

The

King had notified his Parlement of the lit by lettres de cachet
specially instructing the magistrates to rise upon the entry of the
garde des sceaux, an honor, it was said, that was given all presidents
and conseillers. Past custom, however, had required this courtesy
only for the Chancellor.

Louis took no chances that his instructions

might be misunderstood; when he arrived at the Sainte Chapelle
to hear mass before entering the Palais, all of the presidents
were summoned and sharply warned to be on their best behavior.

They

did as they had been told, but the First President remarked to the
garde des sceaux in passing that "this honor rendered him was not
due to the dignity of garde des sceaux, that this was not the custom
to use it in this way, but that the King having commanded it, they
would obey the King's command, and that they would register
complaint of it."^0

a

Later, Le Jay confessed to Talon that he

Mercure frangois, XVIII, 530-36.
1-^Talon, MSmoires, p. 16.
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had been so surprised when the King had demanded the gesture of M m
at the Sainte Chapelle that he was on the point of asking Louis to
relieve him of his charge and to per-it him to resign.-^1

This

was not the least affront the court had to endure that day.

When

all the speeches were done, contrary to all custom and precedent
the opinions were taken first from the princes of the blood, then
from the cardinals, before consulting the presidents a mortier.
After the ceremony Le Jay protested this order of precedence, but
"M. le garde des sceaux answered that the King could do as he

pleased."1^2
Indeed, by now it must have seemed to the parlementaires that
Louis could do as he pleased, at least in matters of high justice.
Enforcement of the August 12 declaration was almost completely
taken from the Parlement and put into the hands of provincial
sovereign courts or commissaires, even though in the instance of
Henri, due de Montmorency, it was very much a question of trying a
duke and peer of the realm.

Montmorency's efforts in Gaston's

behalf had been brought to a quick and violent end by margschal
Schomberg's forces in a thirty minute battle near Castelnaudary on
September 1.

The comte de Moret, one of Henry IV's bastards, was

killed at the front of Gaston's forces; Montmorency, wounded

151Ibid., pp. 16-17.
^ 2Mol§, Mgmoires, II, 156; D'Andilly, Journal Inedit, X, 280.
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seventeen times, was captured, his forces dispersed, and his royal
patron-ally reduced to negotiations.^3

in these, for once, the

King’s brother made some remonstrances for the salvation of his
ally.

These availed for nothing; Richelieu and the King had deter

mined to make an example of the duke, and Montmorency's trial was
sent to the parlement of Toulouse which had refused to follow him
in aiding Gaston's movement.

The parlement had no trouble

ascertaining the duke's guilt and returning a death sentence which
was carried out at Toulouse on October 30.
The execution of the duke created a sensation throughout France
but produced no noteworthy reaction among the benches of the
Parlement of Paris.

Bearing himself with the hauteur of his class

to the end, the duke proudly accepted his fate, renounced his
privilege, and made no appeals for justice to the Paris court,
which, since the duke had been taken arms in hand, could hardly
have altered his fate.

Several months later, however, the Parlement

did make a modest murmur of protest at the violation of its
jurisdiction.

Upon Montmorency's death the Crown had divided his

lands and property among the prince de conde and the duchesses
d’Angoulfcne and de Ventador; on March 9, 1633. the Parlement of

short-lived settlement was reached with Gaston on the
end of September. The Parlement was duly informed on September 30
in Lettre du Roy envosyge \ nosseigneurs de la cour de la Parlement,
cantenant l'accomnedementTde Monsieur en la bonne grace du Roy;
Le lieu oil s'en va; avec ce que sa MajestF~a accord!? & ceup de
sa maison. “Paris, 1^32. B.N. Imprimes lb^*.2897.
15^Le Mercure francois, XVIII, 530-36; B.N. Imprimes, Actes
royaux FTfo^A, no. ll.
155Ibid., 836-36.
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Paris registered the settlement but "decided that the King will be
humbly petitioned in due

time and place to maintain and preserve

the said court in its privileges in regard to that concerning the
competence over dukes and peers and officers having seats in it."15^
This decision of March 9, however, was aimed at something more
than the Montmorency Affair months before, as the inclusion of
"officers having seats in it" suggests.

This phrase had been written

into the complaint because at the time it was voted the Parlement
had become warmly engaged with the Crown over the final disposition
of offices in the Parlement belonging to two of Gaston's associates.
One of these, president H mortier Jacques le Coigneux, had been
provided with his office by Richelieu at the beginning of 1630 as
part of a package offer to placate Gaston and his followers.

The

bribe had failed and Le Coigneux followed the prince to Lorraine,
for which he was tried and condemned by the parlement of Dijon
during the fall of 1632.

Then in December, 1632, the similar case

of Pierre Payen, sieur des Landes, conseiller in the Parlement, was
given over to his colleagues for judgment.157

"Because of the bad

state of his affairs," as Talon put it, Payen had been obliged to
156B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq: 9891, fol. 230, March 9, 1633157pierre Payen was received as a conseiller clerc in the fifth
lie was at the same time
abboi of 5aint-Martin and prior of Cerqueux and De la Charite-surLoire. In 1645 he entered the Grand1Chambre, where he remained
until he sold this office in 1654! He died in 1669. His father
was Pierre Payen, sieur des Landes and Montereau, secretaire du roi
in 1607. B.N. Ms. fr. 7555^2., fol 100.
Chaabre des enqueues on February 19, 1623"!
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seek refuge in Brussels, where he had sought out the Queen Mother
and become one of her secretaries.^®

Charged with having levied

men-at-arms without permission, taken commissions from the German
Bnperor, founded cannon, and fled the kingdom without royal leave,
Payen was found guilty "through ordinary means of contumace. "1'59
In keeping with customary practice in such instances, he was
banished from the kingdom in perpetuity, his property confiscated
in the name of the King, and his office of conseiller in the Parle
ment suppressed.
It was this last provision, the disposition of Payen's office,
which stirred up a furor in the Parlement.

According to Article 28

of the Ordiname of Moulins (1566), all persons condemned for lgsemajeste by default and contumace were given five years to clear
their names before the sentence could be carried out.1^0 unfor
tunately, Article 183 of the Ordinance of Blois (1579) presented
something of a contradiction, since it maintained that the penalties
for lfese-majestl— confiscation of property and suppression of
office among them— could never be remitted in the future.^

This

implied, ofcourse, that the five year grace period of the Ordinance
of lfoulins had been negated and that the King could immediately
dispose of any offices held by traitors as he saw fit.

But which

158Talon, MSmolres, p. 17.
159Ibid.
^-^Isambert, Anclexmes lols frangaises, XIV, 196-97.
l61Ibld., 424..
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ordinance was to apply in the case of Le Coigneux and Payen?

The

Crown held for immediate disposition, and on January 19, 1633, it
sent a declaration to the Parlement setting out that the Ordinance
of Ifoulins was limited by that of Blois and that the five year
suspension of execution for sentences of lfese-majestg had no
validity.1^2 This should have paved the way for the reversion of
the offices to the Crown and their resale, but the Parlement
refused to verify it, and a lettre de cachet of February 19 failed
to budge the court from its stand.1^3
Further action on the edict was delayed for a few days by the
removal of Chateauneuf as garde des sceaux and the appointment of
Pierre V Seguier in his place.

Seguier, former prgsident 21 mortier,

brought no significant change to the policies of the charge, or to
its function as intermediary between the council and the Parlement.
One of the new garde des sceaux1s first endeavors was to attempt to
persuade the Parlement to approve the suppression of Le Coigneux1s

^ B.N. Ms. fr. 23410, "Licts de justice des Rois au Parlement
de Paris et aultres de ce royaume,” fols. 373-76. Another copy is
in B.N. Ms. fr. 18424, fols. 2-4.
■^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 224-28, January 31,
February 19 and 21, 1633.
-^pierre V Seguier belonged to an ancient and distinguished
robe dynasty which produced a chancellor of France, five presidents
5 mortier, thirteen conseillers, and seven mattres des requites.
The rise of the family had taken place during the sixteenth century,
from the time that Blaise Seguier, an aristocratic merchant of
Paris, made a marriage alliance with the daughter of a maitre de la
Ifarmaie of Paris. Blaise died in 1510, leaving five children to
begin a classic ascent, first through the world of finances, then by
judicial offices. Pierre I Seguier, grandson of Blaise, became
prSsident & mortier in 1555 and considerably enlarged the family’s
status and fortune. The succeeding generations of Seguiers sustained
this elite position at the top of the governmental hierarchy. Pierre
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and Payen1s offices, and -to carry this out two new declarations
containing an elaboration on that of January 19 were sent to the
court.165

The first of these set forth the principle that offices

and charges were different and distinct from other property
belonging to a subject, since charges were only an emanation of the
royal authority which was bestowed on a private individual.

When the

individual lapsed into l&se-majeste or rebellion against the source
of his public power, that power was cancelled and returned to the
Grown.

Thus, the Crown reasoned, offices and charges were immediately

forfeited upon commission of the offense and did not require the
five year waiting period as set out in the Ordinance of Moulins.

Ey

virtue of this interpretation, the offices of Le Coigneux and Payen
V Siguier, son of Jean Siguier d 1Autry, was b o m in Paris in 1588
and became, in succession, conseiller of the Parlement and president
%■mortier by resignation from his uncle Antoine Siguier on April 17,
T6^4. Seguier proved himself in the charge of garde des sceaux
from 1633 and was made chancellor of France upon the death -oI
Etienne d'Aligre in 1636. The Parlement of Paris and the council
addressed him as "Monsieur1' as befitted only the princes of the
blood, but the provincial parlements and all other bodies, corpora
tions, and individuals gave him the title "Ifonseigneur." By the
time of his death in 1672, his titles of nobility included due de
Villemor and comte de Gien. There is no satisfactory biography of
Seguier, that of Rene Kerviler, Le Chancelier Sgguier (Paris, 1874)»
being superficial and hagiograhicaL. A limited amount of information
may be found in Blanchard, Lea presidents a mortier du parlement de
Paris, pp. 397-98, but the most satisfactory source IF presently
Mousaier, Lettres et mSmoires adresses au chancelier Seguier, I,
26-41.
l^Talon, Mfeaoires, p. 18. The text of these declarations has
not come to light, but they were probably very similar to those
registered in the lit de justice of April 12, 1633-
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were suppressed and their disposition returned to the King.

The

second edict followed this up by creating and erecting two identical
offices to be provided to capable and worthy p e r s o n s .1^
The Parlement took the new letters under consideration in
plenary session on March 18, promptly provoking an outburst of
rancor.

Barillon, the radical president des EnquStes, proposed that

the declaration could not and should not be registered, but support
for his opinion dissolved when president a_mortier de Mesmes cleverly
suggested that the court should follow the Ordinance of Moulins and
sidetrack the letters by pigeon-holing them in the registry until
the five year grace period had expired.

This allowed the magistrates

to hide behind a certain legality, and the Parlement adopted it.
Louis, annoyed as usual by this legal dodge, was quick to retaliate.
On Wednesday, March 23, in the middle of Holy Week, president de
Mesmes received royal orders to retire to Blois within twenty-four
hours.

He departed the next day at ten o'clock.1^

Reaction to de Mesmes‘banishment was buffered for a few days
by the Easter recess, but on the last day of March the assembled
chambers ordered a large delegation to complain about his treatment
and ask for his speedy return.

A meeting was arranged for April 9,

and on the appointed day three prlsidents, several conseillers, and
the gens du roi rode out to St. Germain-en-Laye. There they were
1^Talon, Mgmoires, p. 18.
l67Ibid.; MalS, Mgmoires, II, 169-70.
entry for this day.

There is no register
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served dinner before being shown in to the King at two o’clock.
was in a solemn and sober mood.

Louis

Departing from usual practice he

addressed the magistrates himself and, even more extraordinarily,
kept his temper under control while making it plain that he expected
nothing but obedience:
When one judges someone at the Toumelle, this is not only to
make him suffer the penalty of his crime but in order that
others should be kept within their duty by his example. Thus,
when president de Mesmes was commanded to go away, this was
done not only by reason of his error, but also to ensure that
in the future you should be wiser. When pr£sidial judges fall
short in that which they owe you, you declare them criminals
of l&se-majest£ before the Parlement, and you suspend them
from their charges. You have to admit that the power that I
have over you is much greater than that which you have over the.
It is therefore for me to use my authority with respect to you
when you forget what you owe me. If I send some affair to the
Parlement which merits making remonstrances to me, I will
always find them worthy; but likewise, after that, I intend to
be punctually obeyed. As for your saying that this is no lack
of good will if I am not content, I declare to you that I
want effects other than good intentions from my Parlement.
Serve me better in the f u t u r e . ^
Louis then went on to announce a lit de justice to be held the
following Tuesday, April 12, a ceremony in which he expected the most
careful attention to due form as well as the substance of obedience:
Tuesday I am going to my Parlement and I desire that the former
order be re-established: that four of the presidents should
come before me, with a number of conseillers; that the
chambellan at my feet should be reclining and'not seated; that
the garde des sceaux, coming to address me, should be on his
knees as it has customarily b e e n . 9

l68Mol€, M&noires, II, 172-73.
l89lbid.; the same recitation, with some minor variations, is
also given in Talon, MSmoires, p. 19.
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This short admonition delivered, the presidents and conseillers
withdrew, leaving the gens du roi to receive a confidential reminder
that Seguier was rendered all the honors due him.
In the event the lit de justice went smoothly.

The King

arrived at Sainte Chapelle at ten o'clock; Bellievre, Potier, Le
Bailleul, and Tanneguy Seguier conducted him into the Grand 'Chambre
where the magistrates duly stood when garde des sceaux Seguier
entered.

As in the lit de justice of the preceding year, however,

the First President told him that this was an honor rendered at the
express command of the King.

Seguier then went to his knees before

the King, delivered a short, unexceptional address outlining the
reasons for the ceremony and finishing with some words of praise
for his former colleagues in the Parlement.

Le Jay then spoke,

noting that
It was of great consequence to change the laws in a State which
been long approved and observed; and that although there was
some utility evident in new laws, nevertheless it was perilous
to make new introductions in a State which very often ended in
the subversion of monarchies and the ruin of States. But it
was another thing when it was a case of absolutenecessity,
for in these cases only the necessity made law. ^
Le Jay continued by recommending that Louis respect the ancient
integrity and splendor of his Parlement, which even foreigners had
recognized and had had recourse to, as had many kings in serious
affairs of State.

Then he shrewdly added in conclusion, "’We pride

ourselves, Sire, boldly in this honor, for our glory is not ours,

^^Talon, M&noires, p. 21. The registers do not contain even a
synopsis of the First President1s speech in this lit de justice.
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it depends on you.1”171 With the completion of preliminary addresses,
the important business of the day was brought forward in the form
of edicts suppressing the offices held by Le Coigneux and Payen by
virtue of the modification of the articles of Blois and Mbulins.
These were followed by letters substituting two new creations in
lieu of the suppressed offices, the presidency li mortier being
granted to Chretien de Lamoignon and the conseiller-ship to Jean
de la Haye.

The Crown took no chances that the Parlement might find

an excuse to bar the newcomers:

Lamoignon and de la Haye were

sworn in and took their places before the ceremony was adjourned.-^-72
The April 12 lit de justice accomplished its purpose very well:
the last sparks of parlementaire resistance to the Le CoigneuxPayen Affair were effectively snuffed out, and the court raised no
more objections in the case.

Though this issue turned about a legal

interpretation of the ordinances rather than grave issues of State,
the Crown had once again fallen back on the omnipotent mechanism of
the lit de justice to override free discussion in the court.

From

the standpoint of the law, of course, there was little question that
from initial accusation of lfese-majestg through debate over the
ordinances the royalist argument had the greatest validity.
Le Coigneux and Payen had violated long established principles of
lSse-aajestS, they had been duly judged, and the Crown’s legal

171Ibld.
172B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 240-42, April 12, 1633-
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position in regard to their offices was impeccable.

Beyond these

strictly legal considerations, though, were deeper ones of the
violation of the Parlement's historic right to freely weigh the
lives, property, and fortunes of subjects without royal inter
ference; in the Le Coigneux-Payen Affair, as in the most evident
natters of State necessity, the King had been willing to use the
most rigorous means to suspend an element essential to the traditional
monarchy.
In addition to these considerations, the ceremony of April 12
was also a milestone in the history of the Parlement marking the end
of an era of conflict arising out of the Day of Dupes more than two
years before.

These two years had been important, perhaps critical,

in shaping the relationship between the Crown and its high court
for the remainder of Richelieu's ministry, for after November 10,
1630, the Parlement had been conclusively defeated on each of the
several major affairs of State it had heard.

The court had been

unable to prevent the execution of margschal Marillac nor able to
halt the procedings of the Chambre de 1'arsenal; after the interview
at Mstz the question of commissaires, so vital to the establishment
of absolute government, was totally barred from the court.

The

Parlement had been equally frustrated in bringing its interpretation
of justice to Gaston, Marie de Medicis, and their followers.

The

remaining years of Richelieu's ministry would show that this
succession of actions would go far towards restricting the Parlement's
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effectiveness in carrying out its political role:

the free employ

ment of judicial arbitraire had, by 1632, contributed

to a

noticeable shift towards absolutism in the monarchy.
The Parlement had faired somewhat better in protecting its
own privileges of office-holding.

The paulette settlement of 1631,

tardy though it was, upheld a cherished tradition that the sovereign
courts were entitled to special treatment in assessment of officeholding taxes, and while the 1630 creation of offices in the court
was not blocked, it was subjected to a compromise in which the
initial establishment of conseillers was reduced by twenty percent.
On the whole, however, the three years following the Day ofDupes
were hard ones for the Parlement.

Its political role

in thebody

politic had been reduced, its members had been subjected to tough
disciplinary measures and degrading gestures of submission, and
its ressort had been violated.

By way of compensation in this

funereal picture of royal ascendancy, the Parlement could claim
few moments of triumph or glory— a situation that would persist
throughout the remainder of Richelieu's ministry.
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CHAPTER VIII
RESISTANCE AND RESTRAINT, 1635-1642
On May 19, 1635, Louis XIII issued a formal declaration of war
against His Most Catholic Majesty Philip IV of Spain.

In conformity

with custom dating to time immemorial, the declaration was properly
announced to the Cardinal-Infante Don Fernando, Spanish governor of
the Netherlands, following the strict protocol accorded such matters.
A herald in medieval costume, bearing the arms of France and
accompanied by a trumpeter, presented himself in the Grande Place
of Brussels and demanded an interview.

Don Fernando, suspecting

the mission of the French representatives, was reluctant to receive
them.

Learning of their news at the sound of trumpet's blare, his

fears proved well-founded:

a technical pretext for war between the

powers had been raked up in the Spanish seizure and imprisonment on
March 26 of the Archbishop-Elector of Treves, Philip von SStern.
Louis, having undertaken to guarantee the safety and territorial
integrity of the Elector and other ecclesiastical princes along the
Hhine, found the Spanish behavior to be an intolerable act of
belligerency requiring the declaration of hostilities.

French

participation in the great German War was now an accomplished fact.
Actually, however, the archaic ruffles and flourishes displayed
before the Cardinal-Infante were nothing more than a showy formality,
for an under-the-counter kind of cold war between Bourbon and
500
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Hapsburg had been going on for years.

The French had been dabbling

in German politics since 1631, when the Treaty of B&rwalde committed
French monies in exchange for Swedish military activity against the
Emperor.

Richelieu had hestitated to do more until after the

disaster at Nordlingen in 1634, when the Swedish cause virtually
collapsed.

That defeat had been so decisive for the anti-imperials

that the French hand had been called— and Richelieu opted for war.
French troops under French commanders acting in the interests of the
Bourbons were now thrown into the field on a large scale for the
first time in more than two decades.

That commitment, begun in 1635

with high hopes for the greater grandeur of France, would drag on
for nearly twenty-five more years.

In the end there would be no clear-

cut victory, but the Hapsburg ascendancy in Europe would be over and
a century of French predominance begun.
Warfare has always been one of the most costly of humankind’s
endeavors, and the early seventeenth century was no exception.

To

be sure, the spiraling military expenses of the twentieth century
provoked by the technological arms race had little place in the cost
structure of seventeenth century warfare, since the military technology
of the era remained about where it had been for the past fifty years.
At the same time, however, that limited technology, along with the
shortcomings of the mercenary system of recruitment and command, was
incapable of returning any decisive conclusions in the field.

A

peculiarly tragic paradox thus came to characterize the German War:
armies came and went, appeared, occasionally fought, and then
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melted away, seemingly without lasting effects on the course of
political events.

Decision from the battlefield, like the fabled

philosopher's stone of the alchemist, remained an elusive chimera
ever hovering on the verge of realization.

Governments on all -

sides were unable to grasp this basic premise, and princes continued
to pour enormous sums into yearly campaigns in the hope of some
definitive result.

For the great powers, at least, the war came to

be as much a quest for funds as a military effort.
In France the government's search for resources followed the welltrodden paths of the "ordinary" and "extraordinary" revenues.

The

ordinary revenues were a melange of various funds, mostly dating
from the Renaissance or earlier.

The once formidable contribution

taken from the royal domain had shrunk to a pitance by the 1600's,
but the return from impositions like the taille, gabelle, aides,
octrois, and traites amounted to a healthy two-thirds or more of
royal income in peacetime.

The great problem with these revenues

was their restricted capacity for exploitation.

All of them fell on

the unprivileged and the least able to pay, and all were heavily
mortgaged in advance to rapacious financiers.

Even by disregarding

the dictates of humanity and wise economic policy, therefore, Louis
XIII could expect to make only limited expansion of the ordinary
revenues because of the relatively inelastic economic structure of
the kingdom.

After increasing taxes to the point of rebellion, then

pawning them for immediate credit, the Crown had to fall back on the
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greater potential of the extraordinary revenues and other irregular
methods to meet its wartime obligations.
The euphemistic term "extraordinary revenues" covered a variety
of schemes used to paper over the Crown's yawning deficit spending.
Chief among them were the rentes, or State bonds, often issued on
the superior credit of the Hotel de ville of Paris; the sale of
offices; other income, principally loans and the droit annuel, from
the Bureau des parties casuelles; and a "free gift" periodically
given by the clergy.

The last category can be dismissed as insignifi

cant in comparison with the first three, which actually fueled the
French war effort after 1635.

In the typical wartime budget of 1639,

for example, the government spent roughly 173,000,000 livres, of
which 86,000,000 were destined for war.1
also amounted to about 173,000,000.

In the same year receipts

But this was on paper only,

because the costs of tax collection and payment on previous rentes
skimmed off 68,000,000 livres. In the actual fact, in this year
Louis had an income good at the treasury of between 89,000,000
and 105,000,000 livres, according to various ways of accounting.
Of this total, ordinary tax revenues amounted to 31,500,000 livres;
the clergy's free gift came to about 2,000,000 livres; and income
from the domain brought in about 2,000,000 livres. By way of
contrast, no less than 57,000,000 livres, or well over fifty percent,
1From the figures supplied by D'Avenel, Richelieu et la
monarchic absolue, II, Appendix X, "Budget de 1639," 447.
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of revenues in hand at the treasury came from expedients such as the
sale of offices, the droit annuel, and various kinds of loans from
both within and without the bureaucracy.2
These figures of royal income and expense were subject to
some annual variations, but certain general conclusions about them
are inescapable and held true from 1635 until the end of Richelieu's
ministry and beyond.

The most outstanding fact of life that the

monarchy had to face during this period was a gaping deficit due to
the costs of war.

These costs far exceeded receipts from taxation

and drove the King's ministers into a desperate search for any
source of ready money at whatever price.

This insatiable need for

money in turn had its repercussions throughout the body politic.
In the lower levels of society, oppressive taxation evoked a
simmering resentment which sometimes boiled over into open rebellion.
Surintendant des finances Claude Bullion, a councillor in charge of
raising war revenues and thus well aware of the national situation
wrought by the war, wrote to Richelieu in 1639 that
expenditure in cash is up to at least 40 millions, the
traitants are abandoning us, and the masses will not pay
eiiKer the new or the old taxes. We are now scraping the
bottom of the barrel . . . and I am afraid that our foreign
war is degenerating into a civil war.3
2See D'Avenel and the tables prepared by Mallet in Comptes
rendus de 1'artministration du royaume de France, pp. 198-228. There
are some differences in the figures supplied by D'Avenel for the
budget of 1639 and those of Mallet because of their methods of
reckoning. Mallet accepted only sums good at the treasury but did
not include gifts from the clergy in his estimates of royal income.
D'Avenel, on the other hand, did not deduct the expense of collection
from income but carried them as a separate line item of budgetary
expenditure.
^Richelieu, Lettres, VI, 608, Bullion to Richelieu, October 25,
1639.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

505

These problems would have been serious enough in themselves had
not the Crown also found itself at loggerheads with its sovereign
courts when attempting to levy new taxes, seeking approval for
extraordinary funding, or trying to extract monies from the civil
servants themselves.

It is no exageration to say that financial

needs associated with Richelieu's ambitious foreign policy almost
completely absorbed the monarchy's energies after 1635 and provided
the main theme of its domestic politics until the end of the Cardinal's
ministry.
Nowhere was this more true than in the politics of the Parlement,
where the Crown's fiscal policies consistently aroused the opposition
of the court and violated the interests of its members.

This tension

over fiscal matters bore only a superficial resemblance to Charles
I«s troubles with the English Parlement over taxation during the
late 1620's.

Unlike the English houses, the Parlement of Paris could

not claim anything resembling an all-inclusive power of the purse
with the potential to moderate the sovereign power.

Moreover, the

Parlement lacked the broad representative qualities of the Parliament.
Howevermuch it may have wanted to believe otherwise, the court's
breadth of vision was rigid, narrow, selfish, and class-oriented.
It could not escape the mold of its history and function, that of
an elite legal body whose primary function was to judge, not to grant
subsidies to the king.

Moreover in exercising its advisory

capacity, the court was handicapped by the negativity of its modus
operand!. As Glasson has phrased it,
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the means proposed by the Crown in seeking out resources for
itself might be of contestable value, but the Parlement could
not imagine others and forgot to take account of the ends
which it was proposed to attain, the grandeur and success of
France in the memorable wars in which she was engaged.4
The net result of the Parlement's privileged social position and
its manner of working would be a consistent policy of obstructionism,
often assisted by legal technicalities but always without the
staying power to alter the course of Richelieu's foreign policy.
The Parlement's attitude towards the King's fiscal expedients
became evident as the war effort got into full swing.

The buildup

of French forces during 1635 and 1636 was a costly operation, and
the Crown intended to finance a large part of it by the sale
of offices.

The pressure for money was so great and resistance

from the sovereign courts so likely that normal preliminary parleys
with the Parlement were cut short.

On December 20, 1635, Louis

went to the Parlement to hold a lit de justice for the registration
of several financial acts.

The ceremony itself was undistinguished,

save for the absence of almost all the great nobility and the
first public appearance of Pierre Siguier as Chancellor.^
Following custom, Louis opened the session with a few words,
^Glasson, l£ Parlement de Paris, I, 150.
^Former Chancellor Etienne d'Aligre had died on December 11.
SSguier took the oath as Chancellor on the evening of December 19.
His lettres de provision were delivered to the Parlement the next
morning and registered before the lit de justice of the 20th opened.
The new honor changed nothing in Siguier's relations with the court,
since as garde des sceaux he had enjoyed the full confidence of
Louis and Richelieu.
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then the new Chancellor presented the official justification
for the ceremony.

His speech was straightforward and devoid of any

novelties in its defense of royal foreign policy.

Louis had, he

said, sought to bring peace to his people and to Europe, but the
designs of the enemy had led to war.

To wage it, S€guier went on,

70,(XX),000 livres were needed by spring, revenues would be applied
towards the pay of 200,000 infantry and 3-4,000 horse.

The King's

fiscal exigencies had led to the decision to create several new
offices, a decision which the country could easily tolerate because
"there were not enough places in it to give or to occupy the
virtuous and generous [^persons] who sought service in all the noble
exercises of justice and arms, if new ones were not made. "6
At the conclusion of the Chancellor's official remarks, a
huge package of at least sixteen edicts was produced for
verification.7 All but one or two dealt with the creation of
6B.N. M s . fr. 3838, fol. 138-138v°, Philippe de Marescot to
the corate de Bethune, without date. The registers of the Parlement
do not report SSguier's remarks, and Marescot's report was based
on second-hand evidence, since he was not present at the ceremony.
7It is a curious fact that the sources do not agree on the
number of edicts registered in this session. An "AbregS des Edicts
et Ordonnances du Roy, verifiez en Parlement le Roy y seant,
en la Chambre des Comtes et Cour des Aydes, le 20. December 1635"
published in the Gazette de France, No. 35, 1635, 137-42, lists
forty-two titles of edicts and ordinances. Griffet, probably fol
lowing the Gazette, also lists forty-two titles. The Mfimoires of
Mathieu Mol£, on the other hand, insist that there were' only thirteen
acts presented to the Parlement, and Glasson accepted this figure. See
UblM, MSnoires, II, 319, and Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 150.
I have taken the listing of sixteen titles in the registers of the
Parlement as correct. The discrepancies might be explained by assuming
that Molfi's Mgmoires erroneously records "treize" for "seize" and that
twenty-six of the titles listed in the Gazette were registered in the
Chambre des comptes and the Cour des aides only.
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of offices, and some of the individual titles were substantial
creations in their own right.

One edict, for example, confirmed the

establishment of the Parlement of Metz two years before, while
others provided for the resale of some of the rights to the royal
domain, enlarged the bailliage courts, and increased the size of the
Cour des monnaies. Still another act, one shortly to become the
center of a storm within the Parlement, provided for the addition
of a president 3 mortier,twenty conseillers in the Enquetes, four
conseillers in the Requites, eight maitres des requetes, four
huissiers, and two substitutes for the procureur ggngral. Among
these pecuniary measures, an act p u n is h in g military deserters
stood in lone contrast.

The great quantity of legislation precluded

a complete textual reading of each edict, and apparently only the
titles and perhaps a synopsis of each document was read out.®
Jerome Bignon, the finest orator among the gens du roi, delivered
a scathing attack on royal financial procedures and their prejudice
to the Parlement, but he concluded, as duty required, with a formal
request for registration.

SSguier then came forward, collected the

opinions of les grands and the cardinals before those of the
presidents, and delivered these votes to the King.

With formalities

completed, the edicts were considered registered and the session
was adjouxned.9

®Mol€, Mgmoiree, II, 319, notes that the edicts were read, as
do the MSmoires of Talon, 41. Griffet, however, maintains that
only the titles were read because of the lengthy presentation.
^The registers of the Parlement are exceedingly brief in recording
the events of this session. See B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols.
392-403- The Mfiaoires of Qmer Talon, pp. 41-45, and those of MolS
II, 318-20, add very little to the account in the registers.
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Royal procedures in this lit de justice had been excessive in
several ways, and a reaction against them was not long in developing.
By presenting its legislation in the King’s presence, the Crown
had abridged the Parlement’s traditional privilege of freely
examining important enactments.

This offense was deepened by the

quantity of titles presented and by the fact that they had not been
read before the verification had taken place.

Finally, and most

irritatingly, the Parlement was now confronted by a large increase
in its membership.

The judges could expect a reduction in their

Spices commensurate with a reduced case load accruing to each
member of the enlarged body, and correctly or incorrectly, they
also feared that the new creation would deflate the value of their
offices.

Angered by these prospects, ten of the younger and more

radical members of the Enquetes invaded the Grand'Chambre two days
after the lit de justice to demand a general assembly of all
chambers to discuss the edicts registered two days before.

Their

pretext was that the legislation had been registered without a
hearing.

The First President pointed out that this demand was a

ticklish one, sure to offend the King if carried through.

Despite

this warning the Enquetes insisted and asked that the declaration
not be executed until the chambers had been united.

This proposal

had no more success than the first, and no further action was taken
for some days because of the Christmas festivities.10

10M d1§, MSmoires, II, 321; Talon, MSmoires, p. 45.
registers do not contain an entry for December 22.

The
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Though Le Jay had temporarily stalled the Enquites, Louis
had gotten wind of what was afoot and determined to nip any opposition
in the hud.

On the day after Christinas, royal letters, described

by Talon as "full of sharpness and indications of wrath on the part
of the King," were addressed to Mathieu MblS and to the First
President on behalf of the entire court.

Delayed by sickness,

IfolS could not deliver these letters to the Grand'Cbflmhre until
Saturday, December 29.

After receiving the letter addressed to

the Parlement, Le Jay called the Chambre de l1Edit and the Toumelle
together to deliberate.

Some were of the opinion that the Enquetes

should also be called, since the lettre de cachet was addressed to
the entire court and concerned all the chambers, while others
favored sending a deputation to the Chancellor.

When this division

in opinions could not be resolved, the gens du roi were solicited
for their advice.

Knowing the King's interest and instructions,

the attorneys declined to take a stand.
took the more cautious path:

The three chambers finally

a deputation consisting of Henri de

i;LTalon, MSmoires, p. 45. The text of these lettres de cachet
is in MolS, MSmoires, II, 321-24, and B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 4392',
fols. 412-14, December 29, 1635. The letter addressed to MolS was
marked by the peculiarity that the procureur gSnSral was blamed for
having permitted the assembly on December 2?. MolS conmented in
his Mbaolres that he was quite surprised to see that this letter
"imputed something to which it was impossible for me to give order,
since the Saturday following the entry of the King [on December 20],
I had not been able to go to the Parlement because of a passing
sickness from which I had had to excuse myself." Why the Crown
should have made this error is not clear, because there is no
evidence that Mole was at fault.
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Mssines and four conseillers was dispatched to the Chancellor, while
the First President summoned representatives from the Enquetes
to appraise them of what had been done.
While awaiting the outcome of the meeting with the Chancellor,
the Enquites went on badgering for a plenary assembly.

When the

Grand1Chambriers came to take their places on Monday, December 31»
they found all of the Enquetes already on their benches, ready to
deliberate.

Pierre Gayant, a radical Enquete leader, asked the

First President to authorize the joint session, but Le Jay replied
that the records of the lit de justice had already been made official
and that he had amply explained the King's will to them.

De Mesmes,

head of the deputation to the Chancellor, then told the Enquetes
off the record that he had seen the Chancellor, who had promised to
mention their demands to Louis.

This placated the prSsidents, but

the younger and more hot-headed conseillers de Enquetes refused to
leave their seats, forcing the Grand1Chambriers to suspend the
morning's business.
Turmoil within the Parlement in defiance of the King's wishes
continued to deepen as the new year began.

On January 2nd the

Bogustes again entered the Grand'Cbamhre and occupied their places,
and although no propositions were made, neither could normal business
be carried on.

The Touroelle conducted its work as usual, but the

Chambre de 1'Edit had to suspend its sessions for want of solicitors

12B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. <410-14; Talon, MSmoires,
pp. 45-46; MolS, Mtooires, II, 324-27.
13MolS, MSmoires, II, 328-29; Talon, tfemoires, pp. 46-47.
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and barristers, a deficiency which Talon attributed to customary
holiday arrangements rather than to the internecine feud among
the chambers.

These deteriorating circumstances only heightened

royal discontent with the Parlement, and on January 4 a lettre de
cachet was delivered to the court prescribing that it send a
deputation of four presidents and four conseillers to St. Germain
on January 5.

Bignon delivered the letter before the Grand'Chambre,

but immediately after its presentation, the Enqujtes filed in and
took their seats without being summoned.

Le Jay warned them "that

it was extraordinary to assemble themselves without being summoned,"
then read them the King's latest instructions.1^ Reading of the
letter completed, the Enquetes and Requetes were instructed to adjourn
and select their deputies.

This they refused to do, and Jean

LaisnS, one of the more hot-headed Enquetes, stood up, doffed his
bonnet, and told the court that he had a complaint to make about the
First President.

Le Jay ordered him to replace his headgear and

> mind his manners, whereupon Laisne coarsely asserted he would do as
he pleased, since he was speaking to the Parlement and not to the
First President.

The conseiller then recounted a bizarre, but

highly revealing, incident which suggests how important negotiations
concerning parleaantalre politics were carried on behind the scenes
between the First President and the King's ministers.
Laisne related that on December 26 Le Jay and surintendant des
finances Claude Bullion had secretly met in a hermit's cell on

^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fol. 418, January 4, 1636.
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Ifcsrt ValSrien, an isolated peak about halfway between Paris and
St. Germain-en-Laye. There, in presumed security, they had discussed
not only what had transpired in the court on the 22nd, the day the
Enquetes had made their first demonstration, but had also discussed
the means to suppress the dissension.

Bullion and Le Jay had

talked about the consequences of the financial edicts for some time,
and the First President had named several Enquetes who had caused
trouble.

LaisnS's name was prominent among them.

Le Jay then

gave Bullion a memoranda on the subject, which the surintendant read
and then tore up, throwing the pieces into a comer of the room.
LaisnS maintained that he had found out about the rendezvous from
the hermit in whose hut the meeting had taken place.

The recluse

had evesdropped on the conversation, and after the officials
departed, he had collected the pieces of Bullion's memoranda and
brought them to Laisne, along with an account of what had been said.
The rendezvous had been a gross violation of the confidentiality of
the Parlement's business; LaisnS, as well, had been implicated in
politics contrary to the Crown's interest.

Embarrassed and infuriated,

the conseiller thought the matter should be brought to the attention
of the court, since his honor as well as that of the company was at
stake; having finished his tale, he threw a petition outlining his
complaint onto the greffler's desk and withdrew.^

copy of the petition, which does not detail the incident, is
in Hole, MSmoires, II, 328. The best account of the circumstances
surrounding the iiont ValSrien conference is in Talon, MSmoires, p. 45.
Additional information can be gleaned from B.N. Ms. fr. 3839, fols.
4-4v°, a letter of Philippe de Marescot to the comte de Bethune on
January 5 in which Marescot recounted Parisian gossip about the
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Laisng's story immediately provoked a lively buzz within the
court.

Lefevre d'Eaubonne, conseiller in the fourth chamber of

Enquetes, wanted to read Laisne's request, but Le Jay refused
permission.

Upon this denial, confusion reigned in the court.

Some

Enquetes demanded that the petition be sent to the gens du roi,
while others said that because Le Jay had been implicated, he should
step down while the matter was deliberated.

Amid a continuing

clamor from the Enquetes, Le Jay finally abandoned the Grand1Chamhre,
followed in turn by the other Grand *Chambriers. The Enquetes,
however, would not leave and occupied the room until the normal
hour for adjournment, when they sullenly retreated to their chambers.
There they nominated the necessary representatives to meet the
King the next day at St. Germain, as well as a deputation of their
own to see the Chancellor about LaisnS's complaint.
Next day the King and representatives from the Parlement met
at St. Germain at two o'clock.

Siguier elaborated the King's

displeasure, and although himself a former parlementaire, the
Chancellor minced no words in supporting the royal position as mani
fested in the lit de Justice of December 20 and in subsequent
letters.

The creation of offices was, he said, an outgrowth of

incident. The letter reveals that Laisrie had a country residence at
Ruel, near the hermit's cell on Mont Val6rien. During the two
month vacation of the Parlement, LaisnS stayed at his country house
and during past sojourns had befriended the hermit, to whom he had
given handouts of food.
1^The official account in the registers for January 4, B.N. Ms. fr.
nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 417-18, is quite brief. Much more information
can be found in Talon, l/Empires, pp. 45-46, and in B.N. Ms. fr. 3839,
fols. 2v°-3v°, Marescot to the comte de Bethune, January 5, 1636.
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the needs of State, to which the clergy had contr5.buted money and
the nobility had given lives and blood.

The creation of o-fices in

the Parlement had probably resulted in son® small diminuation of
their emoluments, but this was the least sacrifice that one should
expect from men of their standing.

Then Seguier repeated injunctions

regarding the royal authority that all the judges had heard before:
"You have no authority other than that which he has given you,
nor power outside that which he has communicated to you;
nevertheless, you employ it to oppose his will; you would
decry his counsel and his affairs, and likewise you seek to
criticize the government of his State. Do not imagine that
this which he has done bears the mark of his weakness and
poor government, but rather that of his good conduct. For
that reason the King forbides you to assemble, but orders
that you execute his will punctually, to receive the officers
who will be provided, and to demonstrate your obedience to
him by your actions."17
Louis then took the floor.

Having been thoroughly briefed by

Richelieu, he cleverly sought to exploit the schism within the
Parlement by praising the Grand1Chambriers while disclaiming the
actions of the Enquetes. In Talon's words,
Louis said that he had ample grounds to be content with the
messieurs of the Grand'Chambre, who on this occasion and others
had served him well, but that he was not similarly pleased
with the Enquetes, who .seemed to take pleasure in contradicting
and interfering with all his Intentions; that he would make them
obey and turn about, and that he would teach them to do their
duty.18
17Talon, Memoires, p. 49.
18
Ibid. The tactic of praising the Grand'Chambriers was part of
a complete script written out for Louis by Richelieu before the
meeting. This brief is in Richelieu, Lettres, V, 392-93*
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The King then assured Le Jay that he would stand behind him, saying
"'if someone attacks you, I will be your second and will have every
one know that I am pleased with your conduct and your actions.'"19
The First President then mistakenly tried to cover the Pnqufetes'
tracks by saying that they had failed in form rather than in function,
but Louis would not hear him out.

The royal will would be done, and

the Parlement's complaints would be heard only after he had been
obeyed and the new conseillers duly

r e c e i v e d . 20

Louis' determination to have full submission from the Parlement
was underlined the next day when the exile of five Enquetes was ordered.
LaienS and conseiller Foucault were arrested and taken under guard to
Angers; conseillers Sevin and Lefevre d'Eaubonne were sent to
Clermont on their own recognizance, while Jean-Jacques Barillon,
President des Enqufetes, was sent to Saumur.21 Predictably enough,
the disquieting news of the exiles infuriated the Chamibres des
enquetes, and instead of restoring order, the punishment further

•^Ibid. Louis was still following Louis' brief.
20Ibid. The account in B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. <42023, rendered on January 9, 1636, is almost identical to Talon's
version.
21B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 420-26, January 9 and
12, 1636; Talon, Mtooires, p. 50. .The dates given in Talon for the
sessions of January
10, 11, and 12 are incorrect. Glasson,
following Talon, also recorded these dates incorrectly.
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excited the judges.

When all the Parlement’s chambers assembled

on January 9 to hear Le Jay’s report on the visit to St. Germain,
the Eaqt&tes tried to take advantage of the opportunity to bring up
the banishment of their colleagues.

The First President rejected

the demand as patently contrary to royal will, but the Enquetes
would not leave the Grand* Chambre and no judicial business could be
conducted.

During the next two days the Enquetes discussed their

course of action without invading the Grand'Chamhre, but on
Saturday morning, January 12, they quietly entered, seated themselves,
and asked for a united front against the Crown’s arrest of their
associates.

Le Jay attempted to put them off until the following

Tuesday, but the Enquetes insisted on immediate debate.

Once again

the issue became deadlocked, discipline broke down, and the
remainder of the morning ticked away with the Grand *Cbamhriers and
the Enquetes exchanging stares across their respective benches.
The lingering resistance among the Enquetes rapidly used up the
Crown’s remaining disciplinary alternatives, but Louis and his
advisers determined to make another effort at moderate persuasion.
On Tuesday, January 15, secretaire d'Etat La Ville-aux-Clercs, an
honorary conseiller in the Parlement, was sent to the court to read
a royal letter criticizing the Enqufetes * behavior and prohibiting all
assemblies connected with the creation of offices.

The letter was

delivered to the (brand*Chambre alone, which presented something of
a dilemma to the presidents a_mortier: how could the royal
instructions be disseminated among the other rebellious chambers
without stirring up further disorder?

After some discussion, Le Jay
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suggested that a president and a conselller from each chamber be
called to the buvette, the court's refreshment bar, and there be
Informed of La Ville-aux-Clerc1s communication.

But the Enquetes

understandably declined to accept this rather roundabout means on
the grounds that it was neither proper nor customary for them to
receive the King's orders at the same place where they usually drank
their wine.

Next day the Enqugtes spontaneously invaded the

Grand*Chambre to hold a general assembly but were again frustrated
by Le Jay, who in anticipation of their manoeuvre began a closed
door audience at an early hour.22
On the same day, however, unofficial negotiations were started
which would eventually resolve the impasse between the Crown and
the court.

Without the official sanction of the Parlement, though

probably with the First President's knowledge, Bellievre rode out
to Ruel to see Richelieu.

The Cardinal, anxious to settle matters

that were holding up the sale of new offices, agreed to make some
accommodation if a deputation would go to meet the King.
announced this proposition on the 18th.

Le Jay

The Enquetes dragged their

feet on the pretense that the Parlement should not send a deputation
sintply on the advice of the First President, and only the fourth
chamber was immediately willing to rise above this technicality.
Nevertheless, the other chambers finally agreed on condition that
Louis observe all formal proprieties and send them an official summons
22B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 426-28, January 15,
1636; Talon, Mgmoires, p. 50.
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in the form of a lettre de cachet.
on the 21st.

This was brought to the Parlement

The King asked for a delegation of four presidents a

raortier and six other Grand1Chambriers plus two representatives
from each Chambre des enquetes and des requites. These duly presented
themselves at the Louvre on Tuesday, January 22.

Le Jay spoke

first, picking his words carefully in asking the return of the
banished judges without attempting to excuse the behavior of the
court.

To cast his request in the best light, Le Jay noted that

earlier in the day the Parlement had undertaken to execute the
edicts of December 20 by receiving Francois Le Gras into one of the
new offices of maftres des requStes and by the reception of FrancoisJercoe Tambonneau into an old charge of conseiller. The latter
action was an indirect recognition of the Parlement of Metz,
registered on December 20, because Tambonneau had formerly served
in that parlement and had been received at Paris without examination.
Louis expressed satisfaction with the court's obedience and noted
that if the Parlement continued to obey and smoothly received all
the officers of the new creation, the judges might expect his
clemency.

Le Jay, insensitive to Louis1 state of mind, asked for the

iaaediate return of the exiles, whereupon the King snapped back,
"I do not bargain with my subjects and my officers; I am the master
and want to be obeyed."2^

23b .N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 429-34, January 17-23,
1636; Talon, Maaolres, pp. 50-51.
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Full obedience from the Parlement was slow in coming because
of Louis' insistence on compliance as a prior condition for
restoration of the miscreant magistrates.

On January 25 the First

President rendered his official report of the Louvre meeting a few
days before, repeating injunctions that obedience had to be forth
coming before the royal grace could be expected.

Three days later,

on January 28, Chancellor Seguier summoned all the presidents des
Bogufttes and warned them that Louis knew their assemblies were
continuing.

Louis was much angered at this, and to put an end to

it, the presidents would in the future be responsible for maHng
known to the King the names of those conseillers who remained on
their benches after having received an order to adjourn.

The

presidents averred that there was no justice in being required to
denounce their colleagues, since this not only violated their trust
but obliged them to violate rules of the court as well.
lor's dismissal was absolute:

The Chancel

there were no secrets in regard to

the King, who could and should be informed about what went on in
the sovereign companies of the kingdom.

As if any repetition of

these arguments were needed, on January 30 the parquet visited
each of the chambers in turn to underscore the Crown's stand.24
None of these warnings brought the EnquStes into line, and
negotiations dragged on through February, punctuated by attempts to
install conseillers in the new offices.

The Parlement stalled these

*B.H. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 436-45; Talon, Memoires,
pp. 51-52.
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receptions as best it could.

On February 4, for example, the Crown

presented Claude Colombel, a distinguished Parisian professor and
tutor of law, as a candidate for one of the offices.

It took the

best efforts of the prince de Conde to force Colombel's reception,
even though he was obviously and eminently

q u a l i f i e d . 25

During

February the EnquStes also persisted in holding deliberations within
their chambers.

These discussions consumed the judges' time, brought

private judicial hearings to a halt, and negated the Enquetes1 public
service functions.
From the beginning of the dispute, these judges had argued that
they were being discriminated against, since they had to bear the
burden of absorbing the massive expansion within the Parlement.

In

a semi-official conference with Chancellor Seguier on March 10,
this view was clearly enounced by Mac£ Boulanger, president in the
fourth Chambre des enqufetes.

His associates, Boulanger said,

demanded a reduction in the number of conseillers in the creation,
together with a promotion of two Enquetes into the Grand'Chambre.
Boulanger reasoned that
while there had been twenty-six conseillers established in the
Grand* Chambre, there had been only sixteen in each Chambre des
enau&tes. 3ince that time, in various creations the EnqdBtes
tad been enlarged so that at present, there being a number in
each chamber equal to that of the Grand 'Ch«nfr>re, it was just
that this new creation be divided equally, seeing principally
that all affairs were founded in the (brand*Chambre, and that
messieurs of the Grand'Chambre who served in the toumelle and
in the Chambre de l'Edit were charged with the best c a s e s . ^
25ihe details are in Talon, M&aoires, pp. 52-53- The registers
of the Parlement make nothing more than an official acknowledgement
of Colombel*s reception.
26Talon, Memoires, p. 55.
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Claude Mallier, a president des Requites, argued the same way.

The

two Chambre3 des requites, he said, were being asked to accept only
four new conseillers, the same as any one of the Jingulltes.27
Any settlement satisfactory to the Parlement would have to
placate the Eaqu&tes, and the compromise that was reached at the
conclusion of the March 10 meeting did just that.

Originally the

declaration of December 20 had provided for the creation of a
prCsident S mortier, ten conseillers lalques and ten conseiiiers
dercs in the Enquetes, and four conseillers in the Requites.
Now, Seguier told the delegates, the King had agreed to trim off
three conseillers clercs and four conseillers laiques, along with
the president a mortier, for an overall creation of seventeen new
conseillers. Moreover, two of the ranking conseillers in the EnquStes
would be promoted into the Grand'Chambre, bringing the number of
coaaaillers lalques there to eighteen.

To sweeten the deal, the

droit annuel would be guaranteed for the next nine years, even
though it was not yet up for renewal, and the absent judges would be
allowed to return.

A declaration containing these terms was

seat to the Parlement on March 11; it was registered the next day.

At

the same time ranking Enqu&tes eonselllers Jean Le Nain and Michel
Ferrand were installed in the Grand'Chambre. Louis and Richelieu
respected their part of the bargain as well:

a separate declaration

extending the droit annuel was published on March 15.2®

27B.N. Mb. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 460-63, March 12, 1636;
Talon, Mtmoires, p. 55; Moll, Mlmoires, II, 336-37.
28fi.N. Imprimis, Actes Royaux, F.46989, no. 8.
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Cb Monday, March 17, a small delegation from the court officially
requested the restoration of the banished judges.

Louis acknowledged

that the Parlement had given him satisfaction, albeit belatedly,
and after having warned them against such disobedience in the future,
agreed to the recall.^9
Thus was finally concluded what Omer Talon chose to call "this
bickering” (cette brouillerie), the most serious derangement in
parlementaire politics since the affair of the Chambre de ^ Arsenal
in 1631-32.^

For the participants and public the consequences were

veTy diverse, and only the First President of the Parlement emerged
with some unencumbered gain.

For his enduring loyalty under pressure

from the Enqu&tes, Nicolas Le Jay was awarded the cordon bleu and
made garde des seeaux of the Ordre du Saint Esprit on March 22.

The

public fared less well, for the press of public business had squeezed
out most private hearings within the Parlement between January 15 and
March 9, a period of more than six weeks.

Nor was the compromise

settlement an unmitigated success for the King.

The Crown had

succeeded in winning the registration of seventeen new offices within
the court, a substantial boast to its shaky fiscal!ty, but this
victory was more superficial than real.

The Parlement had forced

a compromise and reduced the original creation by one-third.
Furthermore, future events would show that reaping the expected
rewards from the new offices was no sure thing.

As in, the past,

29fi.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 463-71, March 14-18, 1636;
Talon, M&poires, pp. 56-57; Molg, Mgfoolres, II, 338-43. The test of
the modified declaration is in M d16, ifenoTres, II, 338-41.
3°Mgmoires, p. 57.
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after giving their official approval, the judges fell hack on a
second line of defense:

they tenaciously delayed receptions into

the new offices, and after their installation, new men were likely
to find themselves denied a rightful share of cases to he reported.
Protests and recriminations from this harassment were to he sporadically
exchanged throughout the remainder of Richelieu's ministry, as was
resistance to the execution of several other edicts registered in the
lit de justice.
Moreover, neither Crown nor court emerged with any decisive
political advantage, despite the fact that the comportment of hoth
sides had been marked hy excesses.

Throughout the Crown had denied

the Parlenient's right to assemble and thus also denied its right to
present remonstrances.

This was particularly offensive since no

preliminary examination had been allowed before the edicts were
presented in the lit de justice and since a full reading of them had
not been made during that ceremony.

The court had thus been

required to act without prior knowledge and without being officially
appraised of the details of what-it was being asked to approve.

On

the other hand, the disciplinary measures which followed the session
of December 20, however ill-advised, fell well within the recognized
limits of royal authority.

The arrest and exile of judges from

the sovereign courts had not, as Glasson asserts, "born affront to
a fundamental law of the kingdom, to the principle of irremovability
by removing several magistrates."^1

The Parlement, conversely,

^ •Le Parlement de Paris, I, 159.
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showed little sense of sacrifice for the cause of the war, even
though the absorption of seventeen new positions would not have
seriously affected either the long-term value of parlementaire
offices or their emoluments.

The magistrates chose to believe that

the creations were detrimental to their investments, however, and
refused to make concessions to the King’s needs.

As long as the

Crown continued to respect the Parlement's right of veri ication and
registration, this kind of resistance would present a serious obstacle
to the King's extraordinary finances.
Parlementaire interference in State finance took a different
twist as French fortunes of war sank to their nadir during the sumner
of 1636.

During June and July Spanish armies massed in Flanders

launched a major offensive into northern France, a drive which
threatened the fortress of Corbie near Amiens by the first of August.
Corbie guarded the road to Paris, the Spanish onrush seemed irre
sistible, and the kingdom was thrown into near-panic.

During the

crisis of this so-called "Corbie Year," the Parlement showed that
when the King's needs became demonstratably dire, it might make
contributions to ease the national emergency.

Even while doing so,

though, the judges wanted to express their opinion on the defense
of Paris.

Under the circumstances this was an intrusion into the

royal power, as well as a slap in the face to Louis* exertions in
defense of his capital, and it called the King's wrath down on the
Parlement.
On August 4 Louis appraised the court of the military situation
and asked that deputies meet with him at the Louvre to discuss
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remedies.

The court immediately agreed and went further.

In the

same session it voted on emergency arrit ordering any tardy noblemen
to join the army at once.

On the afternoon of the 4-th, Le Jay

and several judges appeared at the Louvre as requested, where Louis
told them that the enemy was on the frontiers and the army was in
grave need of reinforcement.

The city of Paris had already offered

to raise two thousand men, the personnel of the royal council had
agreed to the same number, and the King hoped for the same from
his Parlement.

The levy would only he for two months, he said, and

the contribution should be assessed by the court's chambers without
assembling them in plenary session.

Richelieu added that haste was

essential, that the Parlement should consider the matter on the morrow
rather delay another day.^2
The Parlement, however, showed no great haste to comply with the
Cardinal's admonition to hurry the matter.

On the 5th it was

decided that the levy had to be made with all chambers assembled, in
spite of Louis' wish, and this was done only the next day, when the
judges agreed to contribute two thousand men to the war effort.
The cost of the gesture was about 100,000 livres, and deputies from
the various chambers set to work to divide the assessment.

The

finished apportionment is not completely known, because the figures
for the presidents des chambres and the conseillers are wanting,
but the presidents 4 mortier were asked for 675 livres each, as
were the gens du roi. At the other end of the scale, the huissiers

^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9775, fol. 290, August 5, 1636; IfalS,
II, 351-53.

V&noireB,
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of the Grand1Chambre gave 300 each, while the clerks in the registry
were also asked for 300 livres apiece. 33
While asking for monetary contributions from the city ariH from
the Palais de justice, the government moved in other ways to
strengthen the kingdom's defense.

On August 8 the King published an

ordinance enjoing the inhabitants of bourgs

villages surrounding

Paris to turn out and work on the capital's fortifications.

Several

other measures were promulgated to ensure the city's food supplies,
gentlemen were directed to the front, and the price of arms was
controlled.

At the same time those who owned a carriage were asked to

give one horse for military use. 34 These and similar measures worked
on raw nerves in the city, touching off rumors which inevitably
seeped into the halls and antichambers of the Palais.

On August 9

alarming reports concerning the confiscation of horses were brought
up in the court, it having been rumored all over the city that Louis
intended to requisition a horse from every carriage owner.

Spreading

from this point the session became a forum for a general discussion
of the state of the city's defenses.

Le Jay denied that the King

had demanded a horse from each carriage owner; Louis had, he
maintained, merely hoped that those with three or more animals might
graciously volunteer one for service.

The Parlement gave the city

government permission to float a 100,000 livres loan for the pay and
33ihe complete list of assessments, in which figures for the
presidents and conseillers are lacking, is in Mol£, Mfinoires, II, 355.
The iota! of 100,000 livres for two thousand men is based on the loan
asked by the city of Paris to raise a similar number of men. The Parle
ment approved the loan on August 8. See Mole, MSnoires, II, 352, n. 1.
34ihe government's emergency directives are thoroughly detailed
in Richelieu, Memoires, IX, 221-25.
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equipment of its complement of two thousand, but sane magistrates
wanted to go further and send a committee of twelve to the Hfttel de
ville to oversee the expenditure of emergency sums. Again Le Jay
warned that the King would not approve such a resolution, which could
only be construed as an insult to his authority.

De Mesines then rose

and delivered a wide-ranging criticism of Richelieu and his policies.
It was, he said, up to the Parlement to bring some order into the
affairs of State, since the first minister had directed them so
poorly.

There followed several accusations of mismanagement or

worse, including depletion of the finances, leveling of the city's
ramperts, nepotism, and the removal to Le Harve of a quantity of
munitions and immense sums of money.

De Mesmes then turned his pity

comments on the First President, who was accused of basely cowing
to the Cardinal and of sacrificing the public interest to his own.
Le Jay, sensing that Le Jay was winning the day, got up to leave,
followed by Nicolhs de BelliSvre, the second president & mortier.
After some further recriminations both were persuaded to stay, but
time had run out and the deliberation was scheduled to be continued
an the morrow.^
Before the discussions could be resumed, however, Louis .called
Le Jay and De Mesmes to the Louvre.

The King, indisposed in body

as well as spirit, got out of bed to warn the First President that
^This session is missing from the registers. Ifole gives
only a brief mention of it, and nothing at all is found in Talon's
M&oires. The best description is given by Griffet, Histoire de
IS t tC n g ll, I I , 747-49.
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he would clearly show that he was the master; that he was
satisfied with the company, but that there were two or three
who seemed to be his servants but whose conduct was Spanish.
The deliberation commenced was to be discontinued, and if
it were not, he knew very well how to demonstrate his power;
he wanted to be obeyed and they should not be found wanting
there.36
Da Mesmes spoke out that the reports concerning his position in the
Parlement were malicious and false, and he asked Louis to place no
credence in them.

Louis was apparently convinced, because the

president and others suspected of seditious inclinations escaped
with a reprimand from Richelieu.3*7
The Corbie Year crisis crested in the middle of August.

On the

14th Corbie fell into Spanish hands, but they were unable to hold
it and were soon expelled.

Towards the end of September the enemy

thrust bogged down in irresolution; as winter approached it died
out altogether.

Hostilities went on, however, and as the Corbie

Year ebbed into history, the Parlement began to revive its objections
to the edicts registered in 1635.

Throughout 1637, for example, the

court continually bickered with the Crown over the reception of
conseillers into the newly created positions.38 Though both sides
had submitted to the compromise of March, 1636, the Perlement took
every opportunity to put off receptions into the new positions.
After a conseiller was finally received, it then harassed the
arriviste by refusing to assign him any cases or by denying him a

36jfcl£, Mgmolres, II, 35437Ibid., 354-55.
38There were no new creations of conseillers during 1637, as
one might believe from Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 161.
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fair share of the epices. The Crown could do little about this vinri
of sniping except to renew injunctions against it.

On March 4 Louis

told some deputies from the court that
I want to be obeyed, I have given my Parlement some grace, and
it has not kept its solemnly given word. The conseillers
received are not officers, do not participate in the §plees,
and no one distributes anything to them. That is a bad example
for my subjects and officers of other parlements, which gives
me cause to make a journey to Normandy. 39
After some observations by the First President, Louis told them again,
"I want to be obeyed.

Obedience is worth more than sacrifice."

Richelieu added, "You should await the grace of the King who wants
to be obeyed."^

These admonitions proved futile, however, and the

problem dragged on into 1638, with consequent delays in the dis
position of the offices.

As late as May, 1637, there were still

eight new conseillers who had not been received.41
1637 was also distinguished by a wrangle over two minor edicts
dating to the lit de justice of 1635.

One of these created several

hundred positions for solicitors (procureurs tiers) practicing
before the Parlement, the other established additional assistants to
the greffiers called controlleurs des consignations.

Even though

the solicitors were not properly members of the court, but were
only lawyers entitled to practice before it, and despite the petty
nature of the greffiers1 assistants, the Parlement found reason to

39b .N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fols. 50-51, March 4, 1637.
4°b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 51, March 4, 1637.
41as Louis told deputies from the Parlement at the Louvre on
May 27, 1637. B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 101, May 27, 1637.
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object to both edicts.

This resistance took traditional forms in

which the magistrates obstinately dragged their feet in executing
legislation duly enacted in the King's presence.

On January 2, 1637,

for instance, representatives from the Parlement were called to the
Louvre where Louis told them that he absolutely wished to be obeyed
in regard to all his edicts, because he stood to gain fifteen millions
from them. 42

This lecture did not faze the court, and on May 11 a

letter of warning was sent.

The admonition was followed by a meeting

at Versailles on May 27, at which Louis again demanded compliance:
Messieurs, I find the delays that you bring to the execution
of my edicts very strange. . . . The money that I ask is not
for gambling, nor for foolish expenses. It is not myself
who speaks, it is my State, the need is there. Those who
contradict my will do me more harm than the Spanish.*3
By invoking the needs of State, Louis had presented a persuasive
argument.

Nevertheless, it was not powerful enough to change the

Judges' attitudes towards the edicts.

A permanent resolution of the

problem of the solicitors and greffiers' assistants came only slowly
after July, when the Crown substantially reduced the number of new
offices.
In spite of expedients such as the wholesale traffic in offices,
the royal finances remained chaotic.

In the belief that a livre

saved was a livre earned, the government tried very hard to cut
expenditures.

Frivolities and court pensions suffered under a

regime of utmost economy but so did some disbursements which the
42The figure of fifteen millions undoubtedly referred to the
total expected from all the creations of 1635.
43B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 101, May 28, 1637.
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government felt could be safely postponed.

Among

the government's

principal fiscal obligations were rentes issued on the credit of the
Hfttel de ville of Paris.

These bands required regular quarterly

payments to their holders, but even in times of peace the payments
were always behind.

Now, as expenditures for war rose, the payments

of interest on the rentes lagged several quarters behind.
became unhappy, then truculent, about the situation.

Parisians

As watchdog

over the city's finances, the Parlement lent a ready ear to any
complaints concerning the administration of the rentes. It is not
surprising, therefore, to find that on April 24, 1637, the prlvftt
dee marchands and the £chevins were hailed into court to explain’why
the rentes were not being paid o f f T h e city officials, however,
could do nothing about a shortage of funds which originated with the
royal treasury, and the problem persisted.

By March, 1638, the

government's failure to pay its obligations produced demonstrations
and riots in the capital.

On the 26th the lieutenants civil and

criminal reported that two days before,
a quantity of persons had gathered and committed several
insolences following assemblies made concerning payment of the
rentes of the city. This tended to sedition and riot, for
which they ([the lieutenants 1 had come to render account to
the court, and in order to prevent the course of which they
had jailed three persons whom they said had given consent and
cause to such actions.45
The court decided that the three rioters should be tried, along with
any others found fuilty of the same behavior.

Prohibitions were also

44B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 77, April 24, 1637.
*5B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fols. 340-41, March 26, 1638.
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issued against public gatherings to discuss the payment of rentes
at pain of being declared disturbers of the public peace.
Non-payment of the rentes was a serious problem to the
Parisians who sought to collect their interest, but it was not
really an issue of the most vital concern to the Parlement.

Normally,

a riot provoked by mal-administration of the rentes would have
passed with a cursory examination and reprimand to the city officers.
But in March, 1638, the situation within the Parlement was not quite
normal, because of the war and because just at this time the
Enquetes were again seething over the reception of the new conseillers.
A few days before the rentes riot an arrlt du Conseil had demanded
that the Enquftes stop their harassment of new arrivals, so the
matter of the rentes furnished a ready excuse for them to retaliate
by demanding plenary assemblies embarassing to the Crown.

On

March 27 the third chamber of Enqultes took the rentes under considera
tion, calling for the entire Parlement to launch a full investigation
into the payment of the bonds.

This investigation should, the

Enqultes thought, take place at the Bfttel de ville in conjunction
with officials from the city of other sovereign courts.

In the

meantime the rioters should be transferred from the Bastille to an
ordinary prison and given a hearing by two members from the court.
When deputies from the Enquetes approached the First President with

^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893> fol. 341, March 26, 1638.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53^
their proposition, however, they met a chilly reception.

The King,

Le Jay told them, would take a dim view of any such proceeding.47
The First President was, as usual, correct in predicting the
royal displeasure. On March 29 a lettre de cachet notified the
Parlement that the business of the rentes was "of consequence,"
and that "cognizance is forbidden to our Parlement anc reserved to
our council, and the we alone desire to regulate it."

By virtue

of the council's sole competence, any consideration of the rentes
in the Parlement's assemblies was denied.48 After presentation
in the Grand'Chambre the letter and the earlier arret du conseil
were taken to the five individual Chambres des enqugtes by
conaeiller Samuel La Nauve.

The ~Enqu&tes gave him a rough reception.

In the first chamber, president Barillon asked if the arrSt du Conseil
had been read in the Grand'Chambre, and if so, if it had been recorded
in the registers of the court.
not bound to receive it.

If not, he said, the Enquetes were

La Nauve responded that he was not respon

sible for answering for the Grand1Chambre, whereupon Barillon
answered that he held the arret to be invalid.

The third Chambre

des enqu&tes, led on this particular day by conseillers Charton
and Bitaud, was even more brusque.

It refused to receive the arrSt

or the lettre de cachet and Implied that La Nauve was nothing more
than a huissier acting for the royal council.

No sooner had these

refusals been rendered than the Enquttes filed into the Grand'Chambre
^Talon, Mfeaolres, p. 60; IfolS, M&noires, II, 395-96.
4®The text Is in B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893* fols. 343-345,
March 29, 1638
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to demand a plenary assembly. Spokesmen Gayant and Barillon denounced
the Grand *Chambriers for their lack of interest in public affairs,
for failure to uphold the honor of the Parlement, and for their
miserable example before younger colleagues in the Enquetes. Tfra
First President, however, remained unmoved and the rest of the
morning was wasted when the EnquStes refused to abandon their

p l a c e s . 49

Next day, March 30, the war of nerves was resumed when the
Enqufttes returned to the Grand1Chambre, took their seats, and would
not budge from them.

This behavior was closely observed by the

King's ministers, and on the last day of March a council meeting was
held at Ruel, where it was determined that tougher measures were
called for to break the impediment to royal justice.

Shortly after

the conference, ringleaders Barillon, Charton, Salo, Sc/in, and
Tubeuf were told to leave Paris for Tours, a country house, Loches,
Riom, and Caen respectively.

These suspensions represented a stem

warning, but it was a warning that had been sounded before, and the
Crown undoubtedly realized its shock value had diminished.

Ac

cordingly, the exile of five individuals was underlined by the
stiffest retribution yet meted out:

on April 8, as the Parlement

returned from the Easter recess, word was received that the entire
third Chambre des enqultes had been interdicted from attendance at
the Palais.

All the new conseillers were exempted from the order,

and no indication was given as to the duration of the suspension. $0
49fi.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 345, March 29, 1638; Talon,
‘ M&noires, pp. 60-61; Moll, Mimoires, II, 397-98.
50B.N. M s . fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 348, March 30, 1638; ]fcl£,
Memoires, II, 398-401. The text of the letter of interdiction is in
lioll's Memoires and those of Talon, p. 61, n. 1.
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The effects of the mass ban were catatrophic for the processes
of justice within the Parlement, for no sooner had the order been
announced than the Enqugtes in the other four chambers went out on
a sympathy strike.

They would not attend their own chambers and

absented themselves from the Chamhrp de l 1Edit and the Toumelle
as well.

Such tactics were embarassing to the Crown, but inherent

weaknesses kept them from being sustained for very long.

The

strike was patently illegal, because the officers were not performing
their public duties and it also denied the Enqugtes an important slice
of their income from epices while cases piled up.

Too, the stoppage

of judicial services gradually brought an alienation of public
opinion, which in the beginning had lauded parlementaire investigation
of the rentes. Consequently, on April 24 the Enqugtes sullenly
submitted to the second of two lettres de cachet reminding them of
the duties under the ordinances.51 The suspension on the third
Chambre des enqultes, though, remained in force.

Despite periodic

protests it would not be lifted until April 20, 1640, more than two
years after the rentes affair begun.52
As the war continued through 1638 and 1639, the monarchy's
desperate search for funds went an.

The normal tax base of the

kingdom— the rural peasantry— was squeezed beyond the point of
rebellion during these years, as the Croquant and Va-nu-pied revolts
show.

Increasingly, therefore, the Crown turned to its civil

51M dle, Memoires, II, 401-03; Talon, M&noires, p. 62.
52Mol£, Mgmolres, II, 481.
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servants to make up the difference between conventional tax revenues
and soaring expenditures.

As a privileged group the bureaucracy

was especially vulnerable to extortionate techniques.

Taken as a

whole the officials were fairly well off, their social pretensions
were more recent and less well-founded than either nobility or
clergy, and threats to abrogate the paulette provided a ready means
of extracting money from them.

Late in 1636, therefore, the

Crown nullifed the paulette agreement of 1630-31 and successfully
negotiated a new one for six years in exchange for a large loan.53
The Parlement of Paris escaped this levy because of the special
settlement concession granted on March 15, 1636.54

This was not

to be the case two and a half years later when the Crown again
broke all paulette arrangements and asked for loans from its
officials.

Under the terms of a declaration promulgated on October 6,

1638, the evaluated price of all royal offices was boosted by a
factor of twenty-five percent and the droit annuel increased
proportionately.

Officers of the sovereign courts were additionally

expected to make an immediate loan of twelve and one-half percent;
lesser officials were to contribute correspondingly larger
percentages.55

These conditions represented a serious threat to what

had now become an established privilege for the Parlement; negotiations
53The conditions are given in Mouenier, In Vgnalitg des offices,
pp. 296-97.
54see supra, p.
55b .N. Imprimet, Actes royaux, F.46996, no. 3.
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for their reduction or elimination soon ensued.

On January 4. and

again on April 4. the court decided to send deputies to ask Louis
or Richelieu to grant the droit annuel under former terms and to
plea for the restoration of the third Chambre des enqultes. Even
though the Parlement apparently had little bargaining power in
this round of parleys, the issue was satisfactorily resolved on
May 12, 1639, when the Parlement and the Chambre des comptes were
granted the paulette according to past custom. 56
The relative smoothness with which the paulette was transacted
did not extend to other matters brought before the Parlement in
1639 and 1640.

If the court almost always abstained from great

matters of State, it also remained ready to stand in opposition when
its lective interests were challenged or when the dignity of justice
was in question.

The Crown's irregular financial schemes in

particular continued to annoy the magistrates.

The Parlement per se

escaped any further enlargement, but in December, 1639, it was
asked to approve an edict creating sixteen maftres des requStes,
proceeds from the sale of which were destined for the army.5?
56fi.N. Imprimis, Actes royaux, F.23611, no. 325. The relative
ease with which agreement was reached in 1639 is difficult to
explain. Roland Ifousnier chose to believe that "the necessity to
have creations of office registered rendered the government accom
modating." La Vlhalitg des offices, p. 302. However Ifousnier did
not substantTate thisclaim, and other sources suggest that there
were not substantial creations pending before the Parlement at
the time the droit annuel was negotiated.
57B.N. Imprimis, Actes royaux, F.23611, no. 373.
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These offices were technically parlementaire, many being held by parlemaataire families, and the judges put up a resistance reminiscent
of 1636.

The first jussion arrived on January 30; the next day the

Parlement ignored it and refused to verify.

The Crown promptly

countered by conducting maftre des requites Boivin to the Bastille
and by ordering conseillers Laisne and Scarron out of Paris. A
second lettre de jussion sent on February U failed to produce acquiesence, and on the 13th the four representative mafrtres in the
Parlement tried to have the original edict reread because they had not
attended its first hearing.

Le Jay prevented this, but the mrittreR

stalked out of the assembly, followed by all the EnquStes. No
action could be taken that day.

On the 15th the King interdicted the

maftres from attendance at the Parlement; on the same day the
court registered the creation, but only for eight offices.
lettre de jussion was read to the court on February 29.

A third

This

proved no more effectual than previous ones; rather, it made the
situation worse, because the court found itself deadlocked in a
division of opinions.

The King’s ministers now opted for a

compromise: Mole was called to a conference with Richelieu, Bullion,
and the Chancellor where it was resolved that the creation would be
reduced from sixteen to an even dozen.

Possibly, too, the ministers

held out the promise that the third Chambre des enquStes, suspended
since March, 1638, would be restored if the Parlement capitulated.
In any case Mole appeared on April 20 armed with the modified declara
tion, along with a fourth lettre de jussion enjoining its immediate
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verification.

The declaration was read, Mole concluded that a

division in opinions was no longer possible, and the Parlement
finally registered the modified edict.
since its initial presentation.

Four months had elapsed

On the same day the suspension of

the third Chambre des EnquStes was lifted and restitution of its
wages was made.^
The ma?tre des requfites edict was by no means the only one
delayed during the first months of 1640.

During the spring of the

year, the court rejected diverse minor creations: receveurs and
controlleurs des consignations aux saisies reeles, alternatives and
triannual offices in the greffes of various royal jurisdictions, and
gardes du petit sceau. Enjoinders, letters, deputations, harsh
words, and protests on both sides steadily mounted.

At about this

time, however, the Crown’s hand vis-a-vis its opponent was gradually
growing stronger by virtue of events far removed from parlementaire
politics.

Louis’ position as well as that of the dynasty had been

strengthened by the birth of a dauphin in September, 1638.
cut the last prop from under Gaston's pretensions.

This

By the spring

of 1640, too, the revolt of the Va-nu-pieds in Normandy had been
dealt with, and the monarchy's military situation showed some signs
of progress as well.

Casale fell in May, 1640; on Friday, May 18,

the members of the Parlement attended a solemn Te Deum sung in
celebration of the victory.

French armies sustained the push

^B.N. Ms. fr„ nouv. acq. 9894, fols. 50-73; Moll, Mlmoires,
II, 475-81.
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into northern Italy, and Turin was taken in October.

These positive

considerations were overshadowed by one major negative one:

the

King’s health was visibly deteriorating, and the likelihood of a
regency grew more probable with each passing day.
Under these circumstances Richelieu began to think in terms of
permanently curtaining the Parlement's capacity to obstruct the
exercise of royal authority.

Precisely how these thoughts matured

in the minister's mind during 1639 and 1640 is unknown, but the
general philosophy inspiring his forthcoming actions was clearly
elucidated in the Testament politique.^

Briefly, the Parlement .was

to be excluded from consideration of any matter of State without
the King's solicitation, and its capacity to delay important
legislation was to be restricted.

The Cardinal's ultimate objective

was not to eliminate the court from public affairs but to more
closely delineate its political prerogatives, neutralize its
independence, and render it submissive before royal authority.

The

Parlement's workaday jurisdiction and its role in Parisian adminis
tration would hardly be affected, inasmuch as these seldom clashed
with the principles of centralized absolute government.

With the

Parlement's niche in the body politic defined, a more reasoned
order would prevail, since the King's power would be given a freer
rein.
These objectives were achieved in two steps during 1640 and
1641.

Richelieu's first measure was characteristically pragmatic,

5'See Supra, p.
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probably b o m out of irritation over impediments to the
creation in 164-0. Aware that it was above all the young, irrepressible
radicals in the Enqu&tes, rather than the Grand1nbamhriers, who
usually stirred up tunnoil and footdragging, Richelieu determined to
exclude them from participation in public affairs.

Conveniently

for the minister, there already existed a forgotten edict that
suited his purpose exactly.

In a fit of pique with his Parlement,

Henry IV had issued lettres patentee on May 20, 1597, which shut
the EnauStes and Requites out of deliberations on public business.
These matters were to be taken up by the members of the Grand1Cbamhre
plus the ranking president and the dean of each of the other chambers,
a total of about fifty of the most conservative senior judges in
the Parlement.^

The net effect would have been to severely

reduce debate time and to place public affairs squarely in the
hands of those men most inclined to see the royal side of things.
The letters had been duly verified and registered, but since the
Enqufrtes and Requfites had promised to behave, Henry had allowed the
edict to lapse.

It remained in abeyance until Richelieu resurrected

it in lettres patentee dated April 20, 1640.^

These new letters

reviewed the background of Henry’s act and pointed out that since
1597 the Enqu&tes and Requites "had continued to bring the same
difficulties to public affairs, which have oftentimes halted
60See supra, pp. 93 A copy of the edict is in B.N. Ms. fr. 18413>
fols. 134-35.
63-The date is exactly coincident with the settlement of the
malftres edict, which suggests that this incident convinced the
minister to make some lasting policy changes in regard to the
Parlement.
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the execution of our principal affairs."

For this reason, the

letters went on,
we enjoin and order you that hereafter it £the ParlementJ should
proceed to deliberations on all edicts, declarations, and
lettres patentee that we hereafter will have dispatched and
addressed to our said court the Parlement, on public affairs
important to our service, with the presidents and conseillers
of the said Grand’Chambre, without calling the conseillers in
the Enquetes and Requgtes of our said Parlement, other than
those mentioned in the said letters of our said seigneur and
father of the month of May, 1597.62
The Parlement was informed by means of a lettre de cachet on May 8,
1640; because it was a revival of previously approved legislation
rather than a new act, the letter was not registered.63
The politics of the Parlement remained very quiet for the
remainder of 1640, the only noteworthy event being the death of
Nicolas Le Jay in December.

Despite the relative tranquillity,

Richelieu remained determined to permanently regulate the Parlement.
The second blow fell on February 21, 1641, when Louis went to the
Parlement to hold the last lit de justice of his reign.

The

ceremony was held exclusively to present a strong edict restricting
the Parlement's right to mix in affairs of State and to remonstrate
on legislation.

The Crown shrewdly prepared its coup in secret and

executed it with surprise.

Five days before the lit, on Saturday,

February 15, Oraer Talon and acting First President Bellilvre were
asked to meet with Chancellor Siguier.

Siguier told them that the

King planned to came to the Parlement on Thursday, the 21st,
62The complete text is in Moll, Mlmoires, II, 476, n. 1.
63b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9894, fols. 76-78, May 8, 1640.
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bringing an edict regulating justice and suppressing several offices.
Talon and BelliSvre tried to extract more information, but Siguier
would add little, except to broadly hint that Louis "wanted to
establish the order that he wished [to be] kept in his Parlement for
public affairs, in which he intended that the Parlement should not
mix except when requested."64

The offices to be suppressed, the

Chancellor conceded, were to be those of exiled judges.

The president

and the King's attorney were even denied a copy of the legislation,
which SSguier maintained had not yet been drawn up in writing.

As

events transpired, neither the Parlement nor the gens du roi had
an opportunity to see the text of the act before it was read on
the 21st.65
Louis came to the Palais at seven o'clock on the morning of
the 21st, an hour so early that the Chancellor arrived before some
of the judges had a chance to don their red robes.66 The course of
the lit de justice was unremarkable, save for the untimely arrival of
Gaston d'Orleans and his entourage in the middle of Siguier's
opening words.

The interruption produced such a racket that the

Chancellor, who went on speaking through it all, could not be heard
above the uproar.

Since a successor to First President Le Jay had

not yet been named, Nicolas de BelliSvre welcomed the King in the

^Talon, M&noires, p. 73.65rbis is clear from remarks in Talon's Memoires, p. 73, and
from the short, ad hoc speech that the advocaiTg§n?ral delivered
during the ceremony.
66The official record is in B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9894, fols.
179-85, February 21, 1641.
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name of the Parlement.

Before an audience stunned into silence,

S£guier then read Louis' lettres patentes, letters which prohibited the
Parlement of Paris from mixing in affairs of State, restricted the
court to the rendering of justice, and strictly delineated its
right of remonstrances.
The edict, the single most important piece of royal legislation
affecting the Parlement during the reign of Louis XIII, was a model
legal act of the ancien regime.^

There were two parts: an

extensive preamble, in which the act's legal precedents and raison
d'etre were recited, and a body of ten provisions.

No better

description of the whole can be found than Fayard's, who termed it
"very much a constitution of royal power in its relations with the
P a r l e m e n t ."68

The essential theme throughout was the proper

distribution and exercise of la puissance publique, or the public
power of the sovereign.

The preamble began by enrphazing the nature

and importance of this power to the monarchical principle:
There is nothing which conserves and sustains empires like the
power of the sovereign uniformly recognized by his subjects. It
rallies and unites all parties in the State so happily that there
is born of this union a force which assures its grandeur and
its harmony. It seems that the establishment of monarchies
being founded on the government of one alone, this order is
like the soul which animates them and which inspires force and
vigor as well as perfection; but as this absolute authority
bears States to the highest point of their glory, so too when
it is weakened does one find them very quickly deprived of
the dignity.
6?Texts can be found in Isambert, Anciennes lois franqaises,
XVI, 529-35, and in Mole, Mgmoires, II, 500-10.
^Aperqu historique, II, 126.
^Isambert, Anciennes lois franqaises, XVI, 529.
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The declaration went on to associate the ups and downs that the State
had experienced in its recent history with the integrity of the
royal authority.

The disorders of the League, for example, had

taken their root and growth from contempt for royal authority.
Henry TV had succeeded in restoring grandeur and glory to the
monarchy, making it "the perfect model of the most finished
monarchies," but upon his death a regency had brought "dangerous
shocks."

Among these was the action of the Parlement in 1615, when

"our court of the Parlement of Paris, although inspired by a good
impulse, undertook, by an action which had no precedent and which
injured the fundamental laws of this monarchy, to order the govern
ment of our kingdom and of our person."

At this time

this company, believing that after having disposed of the
government of the State it could censure its administration and
demand an account of the management of public affairs, resolved
by an arr£t that the princes, dukes, peers, and officers of the
Crown who had seats and deliberative voices in our court should
be invited to take themselves there to advise on that which
might be proposed for the good of our service.^
These "factions" were dissolved, the declaration continued, only
after Louis had "restored to the royal authority the force and
majesty that it should have in a monarchical State."

This revitali

zation was insufficient in itself, however; with a regency looming
on the horizon, it had to be preserved for all time:
Because it is not sufficient to have raised this State to so
high a degree of power if we do not affirm it for the person
of our successors, we desire to establish it by such good

70Ibid., 530.
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laws "that the heir with whom it has pleased God to honor our
union should have a reign so happy and a throne so assured
that nothing could "bring any change there.71
The good administration of justice was essential to the security
of the royal power; this in turn necessitated a regulation of the
sovereign courts to prevent their encroachment on the prerogatives
of the sovereign.

Here, concealed in the middle of the preamble, the

essential purpose of the edict was finally revealed:
Now, since the royal authority is never so well affirmed as
when all the orders of a State are regulated in the functions
which are prescribed to them by the prince and when they act
in a perfect dependence on his power, we have resolved to bring
a general resolution there; . . . we have esteemed it necessary
to begin by regulating the functions and by making known to
our parlements the legitimate usages of their authority that
the kings our predecessors and we have disposed to them, in
order that a thing which is established for the good of people
should not produce contrary effects, as might happen if officers,
instead of contenting themselves with the power which makes
them judges of the life, honor, and fortunes of our subjects,
should want to encroach on the government of the State, which
belongs only to the p r i n c e . 72
There had been any number of precedents for such regulation, and the
Crown was careful to cite several of them in justifying the new edict.
As early as the reign of John II (1350-1364), it had been ordered
"that there should not be treated in our court of Parlement any
matter of State, if it is not by special commission."

Francis I had

renewed this injunction, as had Charles IX, who,
after having entertained the remonstrances of the court of
Parlement, nullified and revoked all that had been done by
the said court on the subject, and declared it null as done
by judges to whom knowledge of State affairs never belonged,

71Ibid., 531.
72ibid.
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with prohibitions in the future of putting into dispute or
otherwise deliberating on edicts and ordinances sent to them,
and on things which pertained to the State.73
Louis XIII, too, had had cause to renew the enjoinders of his
forebearers.

In 1615 an arret du Conseil had negated the Parlement1s

efforts to assemble the greats of the land; a similar arr&t had
been issued when the Parlement had sought to prohibit payment of the
droit annuel and order an investigation into the royal finances.
Finally, the edict recalled the circumstances surrounding the arrSt
du Conseil relative to the due d1Orleans in 1631.^
Each of these preceding decisions had had a common denominator
in excluding the Parlement from considerations of matters of State,
and the first three articles of the 1641 edict were concerned with a
very positive reassertion of this principle:
Our said court of the Parlement of Paris and all our other
courts, having been established only to render justice to our
subjects, we make very express proscriptions and prohibitions
to them, not only against talcing competence in the future
of any affairs similar to those which are enounced above, but
generally of all those which concern the State, administration,
and government, which we reserve to our person and succeeding
kings alone, if we do not give them the power and special
commandement by our lettres patentes, reserving [ttie right]
to take the advice of1 our court of Parlement on public affairs
when we judge it appropriate for the good of our service.75
The Parlement had also found ways to defy the King when seated in
his lit de justice. This, too, was strictly forbidden:

"We wish

and intend that the edicts and declaration which will have been
73ibid., 532.
74ibid., 532-33.
75lbld., 533.
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verified in this form should he wholeheartedly executed according to
their form and tenor."

The Parlement or any other sovereign court

was prohibited from "bringing any hindrance to them," except through
"such remonstrances as they will advise . . . for the good of our
service."

After the presentation of such remonstrances, "we wish and

intend that they should obey our will," even if the remonstrances were
rejected.7^
The matter of remonstrances was a complex and sensitive issue
unto itself, and the Crown’s treatment of it correspondingly reflected
sophistication.

Louis and Richelieu realized that the right to

remonstrate was the most cherished of parlementaire prerogatives,
one so deeply ingrained in the traditions of the court that it could
never be wholly eradicated.

Furthermore, the legality of legislation,

and hence its acceptability by the public at large, depended on the
court's right to search out faults in the King's acts.

Sometimes

this scrutiny could result in useful criticism if the legislation
were not sensitive or pressing.

For these reasons the right to

remonstrate was totally abolished only for acts "concerning the
government and administration of the State."

Remonstrances on

financial edicts were specifically permitted, but the judges could
not, "on their own authority, bring any modifications or changes to
them, nor sue the words we should not and cannot {nous ne devons ni
pouvons,- italics Isambert's] which are injurious to the authority of
76Ibid., 533-34.
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the prince."

Second remonstrances might "be permitted under unspecified

conditions, hut after their presentation registration had to take
place "without any delay."77 Two specialized provisions completed the
edict.

Having witnessed the unabated resistance of the Parlement to

the conseillers created in 1635, the Crown had decided to suppress the
offices held by five of the most outspoken opposition figures.

The

charges of president des Enqugtes Barillon and conseillers Scarron,
Bitaut, Sevin, and Salo were abolished, the King reserving the right
to compensate them as he deemed appropriate.7® Finally, because
"discipline had been much slackened in our courts of parlement,"
mercuriales, or sessions devoted to self-examination and criticism,
were to be held every three months until a more general regulation of
justice could be drafted.

The records of these sessions were to be

forwarded to the Chancellor.79
The severity of these provisions rocked the court. Avocat
glnSral Talon, required to give the conclusion on this occasion,
could only make veiled references to the Parlement's dismayed outrage.
The court had, he ventured, been subjected to r,a notable prejudice."
Nevertheless, considering the time, place and the King's temper,
Talon recognized that little more could be said:
We cannot speak to you, Sire, either of innocence or of justi
fication, for on these occasions we omit all sorts of excuses

77Ibid., 554.
7®The offices remained suppressed until after Richelieu's death.
They were uniformly restored by a royal declaration of April 20, 1643,
a few weeks before Louis' death.
79isambert, Anciennes lois franaaises, XVT, 535.
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and ordinary remonstrances.
of an irate prince: we have
the misery of our colleagues
of our sadness gives us hope
that it be longlasting.80

These terms would offend the spirit
no defense other than submission;
confounds us, and the extremity
that Your Majesty will not suffer

The avocat glneral1s conclusions in favor of verification were
followed by the customary taking of opinions, in which the presidents
were once more sollicited last.

Without reporting the votes to the

King, Seguier nervously pronounced the declaration duly registered.
The Parlement once again bowed to the royal will, as it was
compelled to do, and the edict passed into law.

Its provisions went

into effect immediately and had all their desired effect as long as
Richelieu lived.

Indeed, until the end of the reign, the Parlement

was, to use Glasson's expression, "definitively vanquished. "8l
Throughout the next twenty-seven months, until Louis XIII's death
in May, 1643, the court dared not interfere in any matter of State
without the King's invitation.

Nor did it attempt to breach the

conventions fixed for the presentation of remonstrances.
The government of the ancien rlgime was a government of men as
well as of laws, however, and Louis' chief minister was too familiar
with human nature to believe that the obstinate judges could be
restrained by law alone.

Accordingly, the clauses of the 1641 edict

were complemented a few months later when Mathieu Moll was selected

^°Talon, M&noires, pp. 74-75.
81Le Parlement de Paris, I, 171.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

552
to fill the vacant office of First President.82

The choice of Mole

was a prudent one, for in more than Twenty-five years of public
service the procureur ggn&ral had demonstrated dignity, intelligence,
capacity, and moderation in his political inclinations.

Mold's

attitude had also kept him out of the same certain royalism that had
characterized Le Jay, and Richelieu intended to see that royal
interests were well protected.

Before accepting the office, Mole

had to give his solemn promise in writing that he would never allow
the Parlement to assemble in plenary session.8^ This requirement
was not, in fact, as startling as it may appear, for it was in
complete conformity with the parameters laid down in Henry's letters
of 1597 as renewed in May, 1640.
The political history of the Parlement following Richelieu's
restrictive measures was merely a postscript to the tumultuous
years that had gone before.

The Cardinal's ministry closed as it

had opened eighteen years before, with tranquillity reigning over
the Parisian court.

The Cardinal's death on December 4, 1642, made

no impression on this peace, which Louis enjoyed until his own
passing six months later.

To the end of the reign, however, this

Bourbon treated his Parlement as contradietarily as had a dozen
French kings before him.

Having many times humiliated the court's

82Mole was sworn in on November 19, 1641, probably during the
seance de rentree of the Parlement of 1642. The procureur ggnlral's
ftfemolres and theregisters shed little light on installation, and
copies of his lettres de provision are not available. See Mole,
Mgmoires, II, 52^-29, and especially 528, n. 1.
8%lasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 171.
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pretensions, Louis found its prestige and authority indispensable in
grappling with future unknowns.

In April, 164-3, less than a month

before his death, the King asked the Parlement to register a declara
tion leaving Anne of Austria as the head of a regency government
including his brother, the prince de Conde, Cardinal Mazarin, and
Seguier.

At the same time, perhaps in a fit of conscience, Louis

pardoned the five judges punished in 164-1 and restored their offices
to them.
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FINAL JUDGMENT
When Cardinal Richelieu died in December, 1642, an historic era
in the relations between the Crown and the Parlement of Paris came to
an end.

Eighteen years before, when Richelieu secured a permanent

seat in the council, the relationship between the Crown and the
Parlement was generally one of balance, harmony, and cooperation.
Upset by the glorification of royal authority under Richelieu and
Marillac, then under Richelieu alone, this tranquillity slowly
evaporated during the 1620’s and disappeared entirely after 1630.
The twelve years between 1630 and 1642 were marked by wrangling
unprecedented in the history of the court, discord wrought over the
use of onmmlssaires. trials of State, royal finances, familial travail
within the Bourbon household, and several less important projects of
the Cardinal.

All of these contentions stemmed from the growth of

absolutism, centralization, and the emergence of the modem State,
but many of the more fundamental issues underlying the conflict could
be traced to an historic interplay between Crown arbitraire and
limited monarchy.

The Parlement, faithful to its traditions and

concept of customary legality, as well as its own interests, stead
fastly refused to reconcile itself to the limited judicial role
that Cardinal Richelieu wanted it to play.
In the battles of the 1630's, the Crown always emerged
554
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victorious, though occasionally the Parlement was able to "bow out with
a compromise.

This was true, for example, when the court won

reductions in offices created in 1635 and 1639*

Never, though, was

the court able to generate enough sustained resistance to bring sub
stantial changes in royal policies.

The judicial powers of the council

continued to expand after 1630, the use of commissaires and lntendants
went on without effective interference from Paris after 1631, and the
Parlement*s delay of fiscal acts hardly affected French involvement in
the Thirty Years’ War.
In the short view it is the intensity of the conflict of the
1630’s that is most characteristic of the Cardinal’s ministry.

Never

before had the Crown seen fit--or found it necessary--to hold six lits
de justice, to exile multiple judges on six occasions, to interdict an
entire chamber, or to send innumerable lettres de jussion within the
space of a dozen years.

Neither the amplitude of the conflict, the

issues at stake, nor the Crown's repeated reliance on tough disci
plinary measures, however, vindicates the belief Richelieu was
carrying out an administrative revolution in regard to Louis XIII's
Parlement.
The continuum of the Parlement's history, indeed, tends to sub
stantiate the opposite conclusion.

By the 1620*s the Parlement had en

joyed 300 years of independent history, and throughout these three cen
turies it had acted as first guardian of the kingdom's law by offering
judicial services, administrative surveillance, and legal counsel to a
succession of monarchs.

Trained in the law and armed with the right to

remonstrate, the judges were in a unique position to remind kings of
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their obligations to rule justly.

While doing so the political history

of the court had been written around its attempts to define the
rightful exercise of sovereignty.
Throughout the court's history certain issues related to the
expression of royal power had recurred time and time again.

The royal

council's judicial activities, for example, had interferred with those
of the Parlement ever since the inception of the court early in the
fourteenth century.

The nomination of commlssaires extraordinaires.

smother manifestation of judicial arbltralre. had also troubled the
monarchy for centuries.

Lesser judicial problems such as evocations,

committlmus. and the trial of peers before the Parlement had likwise
proved to be insoluable points of contention.

Finally, since the

fifteenth century the Parlement had been interested in the king's
finances, the proliferation of bureaucratic offices, and the adminis
tration of the rentes. During Richelieu's ministry -paulette nego
tiations were a significant issue of comparatively recent origin, but
only once, in 1630-1631* did friction from these negotiations heavily
influence the politics of the Parlement.
Essentially, then, the issues at stake during the l630's were no
different from, and no more reconcilable than those of the past, or
those that would appear in 16^8.

The nexus of the conflict between

the Crown and the court turned about the legitimate usages of sover
eignty and not the nature of sovereignty itself.

The Parlement had

never questioned the principle that all public power was vested in the
king, but the court had always insisted that royalty respect the
customary rights, privileges, and immunities of its subjects; that it
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observe the forms of justice; that it conform to what would today be
called the due process of law.

On the other hand, the crisis con

ditions of Louis’ reign, together with the Cardinal's ambitious
objectives for the kingdom, required sure, swift, and expedient
answers to administrative problems.

Intendants. criminal commissalres,

a specialized and efficient council, extraordinary financing, and other
institutional expressions of absolutism then resulted.

These solutions

were not always comptable with the Parlement's ideas of justice, of
legality, or of prudent kingship, and when they clashed the most
fundamental principle of the monarchy required that the King's
interests, rather than those of the court, should prevail.

The

political acumen and leadership of Richelieu ensured'that in the
long run, the Crown did prevail.

Thus by 1642 the Cardinal's ministry

had produced a distinctly stronger royal power and the exclusion of
the Parlement from affairs of State, both important characteristics
of the age of absolutism.
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APPENDIX I
REVENUES OF THE FRENCH CROWN, 1600-1642*
INDIRECT TAXES
( a l l farms)

TIMBER SALES
(from the
domain)

YEAR

DIRECT TAXES
( t a l l ie s ,
ia ilT a n )

1600
1601
1602
1603
1604

11,433,782
11,769,213
11,140,828
11,433,627
11,569,331

3,097,344
2,554,368
3,297,656
3,940,379
3,446,918

33,651
166,880
241,730
223,285
108,550

1605
1606
1607
1608
1609

11,683,851
11,604,326
11,305,283
10,875,301
10,692,161

4,818,065
6,105,678
5,589,711
6,088,102
6,138,391

160,115
162,600
447,955
278,636
282,271

1610
1611
1612
1613
1614

10,364,489
10,112,643
11,269,129
11,396,888
10,656,733

5,524,198
6,469,741
6,464,492
6,623,975
7,054,379

1615
1616
1617
1618
1619

10,850,718
11,388,551
10,492,527
10,544,545
10,420,201

7,268,213
6,676,535
7,655,110
6,726,948
12,882,468

DENIERS EXTRA"OEDTRaIRSS
(re nte s, sone
sales o f o ffic e )b

PARTIES CASUELLES
(p a u ie tte , sales,
forced loans)
PERCENT

TOTAL

1,644,046
625,006
1,314,312
1,967,530
1,551,674

8.00*
3-7536
7.20*
9.50*
7.20*

20,542,817
16,118,526
19,365,429
21,041,340
21,574,460

7,892,643
8,587,688
10,656,470
12,065,665
13,086,864

2,324,394
1,918,067
1,842,638
3,479,592
2,263,751

8.52*
6.80*
6.33*
10.60*
7.00*

26,879,068
28,378,359
29,842,057
32,787,296
32,463,438

267,533
308,144
402,717
342,414
335,209

15,515,008
8,877,398
7,188,716
6,023,934
7,641,693

1,668,108
1,868,082
2,421,746
4,797,286
3,766,285

5.00*
7.00*
9.25*
17.80*
12.65*

33,339,336
27,636,008
29,746,800
29,184,497
29,454,299

615,963
277,130
403,476
342,064
351,806

3,380,865
4,013,579
9,465,552
7,455,239
11,862,414

2,183,795
10,717,400
6,067,975
2,569,016
3,771,836

9.09*
31.50*
17.66*
9.00*
9.50*

24,299,554
33,073,195
34,084,640
27,637,812
39,288,725

4,333,994d
1,003,059
3,370,903
3,566,519
4,897,987
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Notes, Table 1:
aThe figures for Table 1 are derived from those of J.-R. Mallet, Comptes rendus de l1admin
istration des finances du royautne de France pendant les onze demiSres Annies du Rfegne de Henri
TV, le R§gne de Lo u 1 b~XIII, & soixante-clnq Annies de celui de Louis XIV (fraris, 1789)) pp. 183-228.
TKe accuracy oF llallet's figures have been verified by £)avid“5uisseret In Sully (New York, 1968),
pp. 74-80, and Appendix 1, "Re-establishment of the Budgets," 207-08, and by Mousnier in La V6nalit6
des offices (1st ed.; Rouen, 1945), pp. 391-98.
^Mallet included in the revenues of the deniers extraordinaires some income derived from
the sales of office which should properly be Included in the Parties casuelles, although these
revenues were in no way different from those of the Parties casuelles and were often handled
by the officials of that bureau. See note d.
cThe deniers extraordinaires for the reign of Henry IV and the administration of Sully
included any surplus income as clear revenue for the following year. This accounts for the
steady increase in the deniers extraordinaires after 1602-03• By 1610 Sully had accumulated
a surplus of about 1$,000,000 livres which should be subtracted from the actual totals indicated
in the table. Marie de Medici's expenditure of this surplus is indicated by the abrupt fall in the
deniers extraordinaire after 1610. See Buisseret, Sully, p. 80.
dSee note b. Through information provided in Roland Mousnier, La Vinalite des offices,
1st ed., pp. 392-94) it is possible to correct Mallet's figures for the Parties casuelles for the
years 1630, 1632, 1633, 1636, 1639, and 1642. The table from which the corrective figures have
been drawn is inexplicably missing from the revised edition of Da Venalite des offices which
appeared in 1972.
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APPENDIX II
REVENUES OF THE PARTIES CASUELLES IN LIVRES6
1630
Ordinary revenue*3....... .
droit annuel ........... .
Creations and sales of
office ............... ,
.
Taxes on the officers of
droits and gages0. . . . ,
.
Miscellaneous ......... ,
Total .................. .

1642

1632

1633

1636

1639

. 5,115,469

1,375,835
1,727,642

1,091,723
1,481,234

695,953
2,105,906

451,982
2,975,462

. 9,196,483

12,122,174

16,414,841

21,143,731

12,406,634

5,495,455

. 4,208,066

14,385,960
nothing
28,935,913

17,436,235
570,498
37,293,731

11,178,385
445,841
33,193,556

19,705,058
289,983
33,829,Il9

3,222,257
8,000
8,875,791

. 19,270,542

150,079
nothing

aFrom figures supplied by Mousnier, La y£nalit§ des offices, 1st ed., p. 394. All revenues are those
bon
11epargne, that is to say, accounted for on the books of the central trgsorler de 1 1epargne.
Revenues collected and spent in the provinces are not included. The figures are corrected to include
revenues in the deniers extraordinaires which properly belong with the Parties casuelles.
^Ordinary revenues of the Parties casuelles included the product of resignations and vacances by
death.
cTaxes on the royal officers resulted when the king demanded a forced loan in exchange for increases
in droits (rights of office) and gages (salaries). The officers were not permitted to refuse the
increases. The increases in salary amounted to interest on the forced loans, but very often the salaries
were not paid.
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APPENDIX III
VARIOUS RECEIPTS OF THE PARTIES CASUELLES AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL CROWN INCOME8,
16^0
Ordinary revenue............
droit annuel...............
Creations and sales of office .
Taxes on the officers for
droits and ga ges ..........
Total for Parties casuelles . .

1632

1633

1636

1639

1642

1.8 #
12.0 %
20.0 %

2.35 %
3.33 %
20.00 %

1.5 %
2.2 %
25.0 %

0.6 %
1.8 %
19.0 %

0.4 %
3.0 %
13.0 %

0.17#
0
6.33#

10.0 %
44.0 %

20.00 %
50.00 %

23.0 %
51.0 %

9.0 %
30.0 %

22.0 % 4-0 %
38.0 % 10.5 %

aFrom figures supplied by Mousnier, La Vgnalite des offices, 1st ed., 394. All
percentages based on revenues bon
1 1frpargne and all include corrections for revenues in
deniers extraordinaires.

582

VITA

James Hosea Kitchens, III, was horn in Austin, Texas, on November
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